FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 167892 October 27, 2006
ST. JOHN COLLEGES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
ST. JOHN ACADEMY FACULTY AND EMPLOYEES UNION, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the April 22, 2004 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74519, which affirmed with modifications the June 28, 2002 Resolution2 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC CN RAB IV 5-10035-98-1, and its April 15, 2005 Resolution3 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner St. John Colleges, Inc. (SJCI) is a domestic corporation which owns and operates the St. John’s Academy (later renamed St. John Colleges) in Calamba, Laguna. Prior to 1998, the Academy offered a secondary course only. The high school then employed about 80 teaching and non-teaching personnel who were members of the St. John Academy Faculty & Employees Union (Union).
The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between SJCI and the Union was set to expire on May 31, 1997. During the ensuing collective bargaining negotiations, SJCI rejected all the proposals of the Union for an increase in worker’s benefits. This resulted to a bargaining deadlock which led to the holding of a valid strike by the Union on November 10, 1997. In order to end the strike, on November 27, 1997, SJCI and the Union, through the efforts of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), agreed to refer the labor dispute to the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE) for assumption of jurisdiction:
AGREEMENT AND JOINT PETITION FOR ASSUMPTION OF JURISDICTION
Both parties agree as follows:
1. That the issue raised by the Union shall be referred to the Honorable Secretary of Labor by way of Assumption of Jurisdiction. Note this will serve as a joint petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction.
2. Parties shall submit their respective position paper within 10 days upon the signing of this agreement and to be decided within two months.
3. That management shall grant the employees cash advance of P1,800.00 each to be given on or before December 5, 1997 deductible after two months payable in two installments starting January 31, 1998. The decision re: assumption [of] jurisdiction has not been resolved.
4. Union shall lift the picket immediately and remove all obstruction and return to work on Monday, December 1, 1997.
5. No retaliatory action shall be undertaken by either party against each other in relation to the strike.4
After which, the strike ended and classes resumed. Subsequently, the SOLE issued an Order dated January 19, 1998 assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute pursuant to Article 263 of the Labor Code. The parties were required to submit their respective position papers within ten (10) days from receipt of said Order.
Pending resolution of the labor dispute before the SOLE, the Board of Directors of SJCI approved on February 22, 1998 a resolution recommending the closure of the high school which was approved by the stockholders on even date. The Minutes5 of the stockholders’ meeting stated the reasons therefor, to wit:
98-3 CLOSURE OF THE SCHOOL
The President, Mr. Rivera, informed the stockholders that the Board at its meeting on February 15, 1998 unanimously approved to recommend to the stockholders the closure of the school because of the irreconcilable differences between the school management and the Academy’s Union particularly the safety of our students and the financial aspect of the ongoing CBA negotiations.
After due deliberations, and upon motion of Dr. Jose O. Juliano seconded by Miss Eva Escalano, it was unanimously resolved, as it is hereby resolved, that the Board of St. John Colleges, Inc. be authorized to decide on the terms and conditions of closure, if such decision is made, to the best interest of the stockholders, parents and students.6
Thereafter, SJCI informed the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), parents, students and the Union of the impending closure of the high school which took effect on March 31, 1998.
Subsequently, some teaching and non-teaching personnel of the high school agreed to the closure. On April 2, 1998, SJCI informed the DOLE that as of March 31, 1998, 51 employees had received their separation compensation package while 25 employees refused to accept the same.
On May 4, 1998, the aforementioned 25 employees conducted a protest action within the perimeter of the high school. The Union filed a notice of strike with the NCMB only on May 7, 1998.
On May 19, 1998, SJCI filed a petition to declare the strike illegal before the NLRC which was docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-IV-5-10035-98-L. It claimed that the strike was conducted in violation of the procedural requirements for holding a valid strike under the Labor Code.
On May 21, 1998, the 25 employees filed a complaint for unfair labor practice (ULP), illegal dismissal and non-payment of monetary benefits against SJCI before the NLRC which was docketed as RAB-IV-5-10039-98-L. The Union members alleged that the closure of the high school was done in bad faith in order to get rid of the Union and render useless any decision of the SOLE on the CBA deadlocked issues.
These two cases were then consolidated. On January 8, 1999, Labor Arbiter Antonio R. Macam rendered a Decision7 dismissing the Union’s complaint for ULP and illegal dismissal while granting SJCI’s petition to declare the strike illegal coupled with a declaration of loss of employment status of the 25 Union members involved in the strike.
Meanwhile, in the proceedings before the SOLE, the Union filed a manifestation8 to maintain the status quo on March 30, 1998 praying that SJCI be enjoined from closing the high school. It claimed that the decision of SJCI to close the high school violated the SOLE’s assumption order and the agreement of the parties not to take any retaliatory action against the other. For its part, SJCI filed a motion to dismiss with entry of appearance9 on October 14, 1998 claiming that the closure of the high school rendered the CBA deadlocked issues moot. Upon receipt of the Labor Arbiter’s decision in the aforesaid consolidated cases, SJCI filed a second motion to dismiss10 on February 1, 1999 arguing that the case had already been resolved.
Moreover, after the favorable decision of the Labor Arbiter, SJCI resolved to reopen the high school for school year 1999-2000. However, it did not restore the high school teaching and non-teaching employees it earlier terminated. That same school year SJCI opened an elementary and college department.
On July 23, 1999, the SOLE denied SJCI’s motions to dismiss and certified the CBA deadlock case to the NLRC. It ordered the consolidation of the CBA deadlock case with the ULP, illegal dismissal, and illegal strike cases which were then pending appeal before the NLRC.
On June 28, 2002, the NLRC rendered judgment reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. It found SJCI guilty of ULP and illegal dismissal and ordered it to reinstate the 25 employees to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and other benefits, and with full backwages. It also required SJCI to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and two (2) months summer/vacation pay. Moreover, it ruled that the mass actions conducted by the 25 employees on May 4, 1998 could not be considered as a strike since, by then, the employer-employee relationship had already been terminated due to the closure of the high school. Finally, it dismissed, without prejudice, the certified case on the CBA deadlocked issues for failure of the parties to substantiate their respective positions.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated April 22, 2004, affirmed with modification the decision of the NLRC:
WHEREFORE, in light of the preceding discussions, the decision subject of the instant petition is hereby affirmed with a modification that in the computation of backwages, the two month unworked summer vacation should excluded.
SO ORDERED.11
With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, SJCI interposed the instant petition essentially raising two issues: (1) whether it is liable for ULP and illegal dismissal when it closed down the high school on March 31, 1998 and (2) whether the Union is liable for illegal strike due to the protest actions which its 25 members undertook within the high school’s perimeter on May 4, 1998.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Article 283 of the Labor Code, the following requisites must concur for a valid closure of the business: (1) serving a written notice on the workers at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof; (2) serving a notice with the DOLE one month before the taking effect of the closure; (3) payment of separation pay equivalent to one (1) month or at least one half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher, with a fraction of at least six (6) months to be considered as a whole year; and (4) cessation of the operation must be bona fide.12 It is not disputed that the first two requisites were satisfied. The third requisite would have been satisfied were it not for the refusal of the herein private respondents to accept the separation compensation package. The instant case, thus, revolves around the fourth requisite, i.e., whether SJCI closed the high school in good faith.
Whether or not the closure of the high school was done in good faith is a question of fact and is not reviewable by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari save for exceptional circumstances. In fine, the finding of the NLRC, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that SJCI closed the high school in bad faith is supported by substantial evidence and is, thus, binding on this Court. Consequently, SJCI is liable for ULP and illegal dismissal.
The determination of whether SJCI acted in bad faith depends on the particular facts as established by the evidence on record. Bad faith is, after all, an inference which must be drawn from the peculiar circumstances of a case. The two decisive factors in determining whether SJCI acted in bad faith are (1) the timing of, and reasons for the closure of the high school, and (2) the timing of, and the reasons for the subsequent opening of a college and elementary department, and, ultimately, the reopening of the high school department by SJCI after only one year from its closure.
Prior to the closure of the high school by SJCI, the parties agreed to refer the 1997 CBA deadlock to the SOLE for assumption of jurisdiction under Article 263 of the Labor Code. As a result, the strike ended and classes resumed. After the SOLE assumed jurisdiction, it required the parties to submit their respective position papers. However, instead of filing its position paper, SJCI closed its high school, allegedly because of the "irreconcilable differences between the school management and the Academy’s Union particularly the safety of our students and the financial aspect of the ongoing CBA negotiations." Thereafter, SJCI moved to dismiss the pending labor dispute with the SOLE contending that it had become moot because of the closure. Nevertheless, a year after said closure, SJCI reopened its high school and did not rehire the previously terminated employees.
Under these circumstances, it is not difficult to discern that the closure was done to defeat the parties’ agreement to refer the labor dispute to the SOLE; to unilaterally end the bargaining deadlock; to render nugatory any decision of the SOLE; and to circumvent the Union’s right to collective bargaining and its members’ right to security of tenure. By admitting that the closure was due to irreconcilable differences between the Union and school management, specifically, the financial aspect of the ongoing CBA negotiations, SJCI in effect admitted that it wanted to end the bargaining deadlock and eliminate the problem of dealing with the demands of the Union. This is precisely what the Labor Code abhors and punishes as unfair labor practice since the net effect is to defeat the Union’s right to collective bargaining.
However, SJCI contends that these circumstances do not establish its bad faith in closing down the high school. Rather, it claims that it was forced to close down the high school due to alleged difficult labor problems that it encountered while dealing with the Union since 1995, specifically, the Union’s illegal demands in violation of R.A. 6728 or the "Government Assistance to Students and Teachers in Private Education Act." Under R.A. 6728, the income from tuition fee increase is to be used as follows: (a) 70% of the tuition fee shall go to the payment of salaries, wages, allowances, and other benefits of teaching and non-teaching personnel, and (b) 20% of the tuition fee increase shall go to the improvement or modernization of the buildings, equipment, and other facilities as well as payment of the cost of operations. However, sometime in 1995, SJCI claims that it was forced to give-in to the demands of the Union by allocating 100% of the tuition fee increase for teachers’ benefits even though the same was in violation of R.A. 6728 in order to end the on-going strike of the Union and avoid prolonged disturbances of classes. Subsequently or during the school year 1996-1997, SJCI claims that it obtained an approval from the DECS for a 30% tuition fee increase, however, only 10% was implemented. Despite this, the Union persisted in making illegal demands by filing a complaint before the DOLE claiming that they were entitled to the unimplemented 20% tuition fee increase. Finally, during the collective bargaining negotiations in 1997, the Union again made economic demands in excess of the 70% of the tuition fee increase under R.A. 6728. As a result, SJCI claims it had no choice but to refuse the Union’s demands which thereafter led to the holding of a strike on November 10, 1998. It argues that the Union’s alleged illegal demands was a valid justification for the closure of the high school considering that it was financially incapable of meeting said demands and that it would violate R.A. 6728 if it gave in to said demands which carried corresponding penalties to be imposed by the DECS.
We are not persuaded.
These alleged difficult labor problems merely show that SJCI and the Union had disagreements regarding workers’ benefits which is normal in any business establishment. That SJCI agreed to appropriate 100% of the tuition fee increase to the workers’ benefits sometime in 1995 does not mean that it was helpless in the face of the Union’s demands because neither party is obligated to precipitately give in to the proposal of the other party during collective bargaining.13 If SJCI found the Union’s demands excessive, its remedy under the law is to refer the matter for voluntary or compulsory dispute resolution. Besides, this incident which occurred in 1995, could hardly establish the good faith of SJCI or justify the high school’s closure in 1998.
Anent the Union’s claim for the unimplemented 20% tuition fee increase in 1996, suffice it to say that it is erroneous to rule on said issue since the same was submitted before the Voluntary Arbitrator14 and is not on appeal before this Court.15 Besides, by referring the labor dispute to the Voluntary Arbitrator, the parties themselves acknowledged that there is a sufficient mechanism to resolve the said dispute. Again, we fail to see how this alleged labor problem in 1996 shows the good faith of SJCI in closing the high school in 1998.
With respect to SJCI’s claim that during the 1997 CBA negotiations the Union made illegal demands because they exceeded the 70% limitation set by R.A. No. 6728, it is important to note that the alleged illegality or excessiveness of the Union’s demands were the issues to be resolved by the SOLE after the parties agreed to refer the said labor dispute to the latter for assumption of jurisdiction. As previously mentioned, the SOLE certified the case to the NLRC, which on June 28, 2002, rendered a decision finding that there was insufficient evidence to determine the reasonableness of the Union’s proposals. The NLRC found that SJCI failed to establish that the Union’s demands were illegal or excessive. A review of the records clearly shows that the Union submitted a position paper detailing its demands in actual monetary terms. However, SJCI failed to establish how and why these demands were in excess of the limitation set by R.A. 6728. Up to this point in the proceedings, it has merely relied on its self-serving statements that the Union’s demands were illegal and excessive. There is no basis, therefore, to hold that the Union ever made illegal or excessive demands.
At any rate, even assuming that the Union’s demands were illegal or excessive, the important and crucial point is that these alleged illegal or excessive demands did not justify the closure of the high school and do not, in any way, establish SJCI’s good faith. The employer cannot unilaterally close its establishment on the pretext that the demands of its employees are excessive. As already discussed, neither party is obliged to give-in to the other’s excessive or unreasonable demands during collective bargaining, and the remedy in such case is to refer the dispute to the proper tribunal for resolution. This was what SJCI and the Union did when they referred the 1997 CBA bargaining deadlock to the SOLE; however, SJCI pre-empted the resolution of the dispute by closing the high school. SJCI disregarded the whole dispute resolution mechanism and undermined the Union’s right to collective bargaining when it closed down the high school while the dispute was still pending with the SOLE.
The Labor Code does not authorize the employer to close down the establishment on the ground of illegal or excessive demands of the Union. Instead, aside from the remedy of submitting the dispute for voluntary or compulsory arbitration, the employer may file a complaint for ULP against the Union for bargaining in bad faith. If found guilty, this gives rise to civil and criminal liabilities and allows the employer to implement a lock out, but not the closure of the establishment resulting to the permanent loss of employment of the whole workforce.
In fine, SJCI undermined the Labor Code’s system of dispute resolution by closing down the high school while the 1997 CBA negotiations deadlock issues were pending resolution before the SOLE. The closure was done in bad faith for the purpose of defeating the Union’s right to collective bargaining. Besides, as found by the NLRC, the alleged illegality and excessiveness of the Union’s demands were not sufficiently proved by SJCI. Even on the assumption that the Union’s demands were illegal or excessive, SJCI’s remedy was to await the resolution by the SOLE and to file a ULP case against the Union. However, SJCI did not have the power to take matters into its own hands by closing down the school in order to get rid of the Union.
SJCI next argues that the Union unduly endangered the safety and well-being of the students who joined the valid strike held on November 10, 1997, thus it closed down the high school on March 31, 1998. It claims that the Union coerced the students to join the protest actions to pressure SJCI to give-in to the demands of the Union.
However, SJCI provided no evidence to substantiate these claims except for its self-serving statements in its position paper before the Labor Arbiter and pictures belatedly attached to the instant petition before this Court. However, the pictures were never authenticated and, on its face, only show that some students watched the Union members while they conducted their protest actions. More importantly, it is not true, as SJCI claims, that the Union admitted that it coerced the students to join the protest actions and recklessly placed the students in harm’s way. In its Reply16 to SJCI’s position paper before the Labor Arbiter, the Union categorically denied that it put the students in harm’s way or pressured them to join the protest actions. Given this denial by the Union, it was incumbent upon SJCI to prove that the students were actually harmed or put in harm’s way and that the Union coerced them to join the protest actions. The reason for this is that the employer carries the burden of proof to establish that the closure of the business was done in good faith. In the instant case, SJCI had the burden of proving that, indeed, the closure of the school was necessary to uphold the safety and well-being of the students.
SJCI presented no evidence to show that the protest actions turned violent; that the parents did not give their consent to their children who allegedly joined the protest actions; that the Union did not take the necessary steps to protect some of the students who allegedly joined the same; or that the Union forced or pressured the said students to join the protest actions. Moreover, if the problem was the endangerment of the students’ well-being due to the protest actions by the Union, then the natural response would have been to immediately go after the Union members who allegedly coerced the students to join the protest actions and thereby endangered the students’ safety. But no such action appears to have been undertaken by SJCI. There is even no showing that it prohibited its students from joining the protest actions or informed the parents of the activities of the students who allegedly joined the protest actions. This raises serious doubts as to whether SJCI was really looking after the welfare of its students or merely using them as a scapegoat to justify the closure of the school and thereby get rid of the Union.
Even assuming arguendo that the safety and well-being of some of the students who allegedly joined the protest actions were compromised, still, the closure was done in bad faith because it was done long after the strike had ended. Thus, there is no more danger to the students’ well-being posed by the strike to speak of. It bears stressing that the closure was implemented on March 31, 1998 but the risk to the safety of the students had long ceased to exist as early as November 28, 1997 when the parties agreed to refer the labor dispute to the SOLE, thus, betraying SJCI’s claim that it wanted to safeguard the interest of the students.
Furthermore, if SJCI was after the interests of the students, then it should not have closed the school because the parents and the students were vehemently opposed to the same, as shown by the letter dated March 9, 1998 written by Mr. Teofilo G. Mamplata, President of the Parents’ Association, and addressed to the Secretary of DECS, to wit:
As per letters sent recently by the school Management to the teachers and parents, notifying of its closure on March 31, 1998, as decided upon by its Board of Trustees and Stockholders on February 22, 1998 no reasons were stated to justify said decision and action which will definitely affect adversely and to the detriment of the plight of parents, teachers, students and other personnel of the school.
In this connection and due to the urgency of the matter, we hereby reiterate our appeal with our prayer that the management and Board of Trustees of St. John Academy of Calamba, Laguna, be stopped from pursuing their most sudden, unfair, unfavorable and detrimental decision and action, and if warranted, sanctions be imposed against the erring party.17 (Italics supplied)
Along the same vein, the parents voiced out their strong objections to the proposed closure of the school, to wit:
PAHAYAG NG PAGTUTOL
Kami, mga magulang, mag-aaral, guro, propesyonal, manggagawa at iba pang sector ng pamayanan sa bayan ng Calamba, Laguna ay nagpapahayag ng pagtutol sa hindi makatarungang pagsasara ng paaralang SAINT JOHN ACADEMY. Ang kagyat na pagsasara nito ay nagdulot ng malaking suliranin sa 2,300 estudyante (incoming 2nd year – 4th year), kagaya ng mga sumusunod:
1. Kakaunti ang bilang ng paaralan sa Calamba;
2. Walang paaralan na basta tatanggap sa 700 incoming third year at 800 incoming fourth year;
3. Ang lahat ng "HONOR STUDENTS" ay mababaliwala ang kanilang pinagsikapan;
4. Negatibo ang epekto sa moral ng mga batang estudyante ang pagkakaroon ng physical and moral displacement dahil sa biglaang pagsasara nito;
5. Hindi lahat ng magulang ay kakayaning bumayad ng mataas na tuition fee sa ibang paaralan;
6. Ang mataas na kalidad ng turo ng mga guro sa paaralang ito ay mahirap pantayan; at
7. HIGIT NA LIGTAS SA SAKUNA ANG AMING MGA ANAK sa nasabing paaralan.
Bilang pagtutol sa pagsasara ng SAINT JOHN ACADEMY ay inilalagda namin ang aming pangalan sa libis nito. (56 signatures follow)18 [Italics supplied]
Worth noting is the belief of the parents that the safety of their children was properly secured in said high school. This was obviously in response to the claim of SJCI that the school was being closed, inter alia, for the safety and well-being of the students. As correctly observed by the CA:
The petitioner urges this Court to believe that they closed down the school out of their sheer concern for the students, some of whom have started to sympathize and participate in the union’s cause.
As intimated by the private respondent, however, the petitioner itself said that the closing down of the school was, inter alia, "because of irreconcilable differences between the school management and the Academy’s Union." Indeed, this translates into an admission that the cessation of business was neither due to any patrician nor noble objective of protecting the studentry but because the administration no longer wished to deal with respondent Union.
We are further tempted to doubt the verity of the petitioner’s claim that in deciding to shut down the school, it only had the welfare of its students in mind. There is evidence on record which hints otherwise. Apparently, the parents of the students were vehemently against the idea of closing down the academy as this would be, as it later did prove, more detrimental to the studentry. No less than Mr. Teofilo Mamplata, President of St. John Academy Parents Association of Calamba expressed the groups’ aversion against such move and even wrote a letter to the then Secretary of the Department of Education seeking immediate intervention to enjoin the school from closing. This is an indication that the parents were unanimous in their sentiment that the shutdown would result in inconvenience and displacement of the students who had already been halfway through elementary school and high school. It turned out some were even forced to pay higher tuition fees just so they would be admitted in other academies.19 (Italics supplied)
To recapitulate, there is insufficient evidence to hold that the safety and well-being of the students were endangered and/or compromised, and that the Union was responsible therefor. Even assuming arguendo that the students’ safety and well-being were jeopardized by the said protest actions, the alleged threat to the students’ safety and well-being had long ceased by the time the high school was closed. Moreover, the parents were vehemently opposed to the closure of the school because there was no basis to claim that the students’ safety was at risk. Taken together, these circumstances lead to the inescapable conclusion that SJCI merely used the alleged safety and well-being of the students as a subterfuge to justify its actions.
SJCI next contends that the subsequent reopening of the high school after only one year from its closure did not show that the previous decision to close the high school was tainted with bad faith because the reopening was done due to the clamor of the high school’s former students and their parents. It claims that its former students complained about the cramped classrooms in the schools where they transferred.
The contention is untenable.
First, the fact that after one year from the time it closed its high school, SJCI opened a college and elementary department, and reopened its high school department showed that it never intended to cease operating as an educational institution. Second, there is evidence on record contesting the alleged reason of SJCI for reopening the high school, i.e., that its former students and their parents allegedly clamored for the reopening of the high school. In a letter20 dated December 15, 2000 addressed to the NLRC, which has never been rebutted by SJCI, Mr. Mamplata, stated that –
Para po sa inyong kabatiran xxx isinara nila ang paaralang ito dahil sa mga nag-alsang guro.
Sa ganitong kalagayan kaming pamunuan at kasapi ng PTA ay nakipag-usap sa pamunuan ng paaralang ito na huwag naming isara dahil malaking epekto ito sa aming mga anak dahil noon ay kalagitnaan pa lamang ng pasukan. Sa kabila ng pakiusap naming ito ay hindi kami pinakinggan at sa halip ay tuluyang isinara. Sa kanilang ginawang ito marami sa mga bata ang hindi nakapasok sa ibang paaralan at ang iba naman ay nadoble ang pinagbayaran sa matrikula. Sa kabuuan nito ay malaking paghirap ang ginawa nila sa aming mga magulang at anak na nag-aaral sa paaralang ito dahil lamang sa panggigipit sa mga gurong walang tanging hangarin kundi bayaran sila ng naaayon sa itinakda ng batas.
Sa taong 1999-2000 ay muling binuksan ang paaralang ito na sabi nila ay sa kahilingan ng PTA. Alin kayang PTA ang tinutukoy nila. Paanong magkakaroon ng PTA samantalang ito ay nakasara at kami ang PTA bago ito isinara.
Kaya po pinaabot naming sa inyong kaalaman na kaming PTA ng paaralang (St. John Academy) ito ay hindi kailanman humiling sa kanila na pamuling buksan ito.21 (Italics supplied)
Finally, when SJCI reopened its high school, it did not rehire the Union members. Evidently, the closure had achieved its purpose, that is, to get rid of the Union members.
Clearly, these pieces of evidence regarding the subsequent reopening of the high school after only one year from its closure further show that the high school’s closure was done in bad faith.
Lastly, SJCI asserts that the strike conducted by the 25 employees on May 4, 1998 was illegal for failure to take the necessary strike vote and give a notice of strike. However, we agree with the findings of the NLRC and CA that the protest actions of the Union cannot be considered a strike because, by then, the employer-employee relationship has long ceased to exist because of the previous closure of the high school on March 31, 1998.
In sum, the timing of, and the reasons for the closure of the high school and its reopening after only one year from the time it was closed down, show that the closure was done in bad faith for the purpose of circumventing the Union’s right to collective bargaining and its members’ right to security of tenure. Consequently, SJCI is liable for ULP and illegal dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The April 22, 2004 Decision and April 15, 2005 Resolution of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74519 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Callej, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 56-66. Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes and concurred in by Associate Justices Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. and Arsenio J. Magpale.
2 Id. at 114-129. Penned by Commissioner Ireneo B. Bernardo and concurred in by Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier.
3 Id. at 68-71. Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes and concurred in by Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Regalado E. Maambong.
4 CA rollo, p. 224.
5 Id. at 222-223.
6 Id. at 223.
7 Rollo, pp. 99-107.
8 NLRC Record of Certified Case, pp. 130.
9 Id. at 174.
10 Id. at 233.
11 Rollo, p. 65.
12 Mobil Employees Association v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 79329, March 28, 1990, 183 SCRA 737, 745.
13 General Milling Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146728, February 11, 2004, 422 SCRA 514, 525.
14 The records show that this case was filed with the NCMB, Voluntary Arbitration, Regional Office No. IV, Quezon City and before VA Reynaldo Garcia but the records do not reveal the docket number of said case.
15 Parenthetically, the contention of the Union in the voluntary arbitrator case is, on its face, not totally devoid of merit. Basically, the Union argued that the 20% refund to the parents/students is contrary to SJCI’s past practice of giving the full value of the tuition fee increase to its workers. The Union has made a case for diminution of workers benefits based on an alleged past practice of the company. Also, if the law unequivocally allocates the tuition fee increase for the benefit of the workers, then the Union might have reason to complain that the 20% refund of the tuition fee increase to the parents/students was illegal. In fine, it is difficult to resolve the merits of the voluntary arbitrator case on the basis of the position papers only since neither party was able to rebut the allegations of the other party. No replies appear to have been filed or the replies of both parties were not attached by SJCI to its petition before the CA. This is the problem of delving into the merits of this voluntary arbitrator case which is a non-issue in the instant case.
16 Records of NLRC NCR CA No. 018460-99 (R2), Union’s reply to SJCI’s position paper, pp. 1-2.
17 Rollo, p. 281.
18 Id. at 282-283.
19 Id. at 62-63.
20 Id. at 284.
21 Id.
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