FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 171144 November 24, 2006
SANTOS L. NACAYTUNA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the October 4, 2005 Decision2 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 27759 finding petitioner Santos L. Nacaytuna guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; and its January 4, 2006 Resolution3 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
On November 17, 1999, petitioner Santos L. Nacaytuna, who was then Municipal Mayor of San Miguel, Surigao del Sur appointed his wife, herein private complainant Marydole V. Nacaytuna as Municipal Health Officer.4 In the course of her employment, Marydole drafted a letter of resignation dated April 7, 2000 which petitioner purportedly received on even date. In May 2001, Marydole left the conjugal home and lived separately from petitioner.5 Sometime in April 2002, a certain Marly Prieto informed Marydole that petitioner has accepted her resignation effective at the end of April 2002.6
Marydole questioned the acceptance of her resignation before the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and the Office of the Ombudsman claiming that she never tendered the resignation letter.
The CSC declared the acceptance of Marydole’s resignation illegal and ordered her reinstatement with full backwages. Meanwhile, upon recommendation by the Ombudsman, an information was filed against petitioner for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, which reads:
That sometime during the period of April 2002 or shortly prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of San Miguel, Surigao del Sur and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Santos L. Nacaytuna, a high ranking public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of San Miguel, Surigao del Sur, committing the offense while in the performance of his official functions, did there and then, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and thru evident bad faith, cause upon Dr. Marydole L. Nacaytuna undue injury by removing here from office as the Rural Health Officer of San Miguel, Surigao del Sur using the latter’s supposed resignation letter dated 07 April 2000 and approving the same on 23 April 2002 despite the fact that said resignation letter has not been officially tendered to the accused thereby depriving her not only of her office but also the salaries and other monetary benefits attached to it to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Marydole testified that she drafted the resignation letter sometime in April 2000 but she never tendered the same to petitioner; that she continued working even after drafting the letter and after the same has been approved because she had no intention of resigning; that petitioner probably got the letter from among her belongings which she left behind in their conjugal abode.
Petitioner testified that the April 7, 2000 resignation letter was received by his private secretary on said date; that he kept the letter in his office until he accepted the resignation on April 23, 2002; that he did not immediately approve the letter because he was still assessing Marydole’s performance; and that he consulted the CSC prior to approving the resignation.
On October 4, 2005, the Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Santos L. Nacaytuna guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 as charged, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, sentencing him to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) month as minimum to ten (10) years as maximum, and perpetual disqualification to hold public office.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied hence the instant petition raising the following errors:9
I
THAT THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT DR. MARYDOLE L. NACAYTUNA DID NOT TENDER HER RESIGNATION
II
THAT THE GUILT OF THE PETITIONER WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
III
THAT THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Petitioner contends that Marydole tendered her resignation on April 7, 2000, which he validly accepted in April 2002. He claims he is presumed to have regularly performed his official duties as Municipal Mayor; that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt; and that no undue injury was caused to Marydole because she was reinstated and given her backwages.
The sole issue for resolution is whether the prosecution sufficiently proved petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find that the Sandiganbayan correctly found petitioner guilty as charged. Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 states:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices by public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x x
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 requires proof of the following facts:
1.) The accused is a public officer discharging administrative or official functions or private persons charged in conspiracy with them;
2.) The public officer committed the prohibited act during the performance of his official duty or in relation to his public position;
3.) The public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross, inexcusable negligence; and
4.) His action caused undue injury to the Government or any private party, or gave any party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to such parties. 10
All the foregoing facts were established beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner, as Municipal Mayor, was a public officer. His acceptance of Marydole’s resignation was done in the performance of his official duty. It was also proved that Marydole never tendered the resignation letter hence petitioner was evidently acting in bad faith when he made it appear that it was submitted. Worse, he accepted the same knowing that it was never tendered in the first place. Petitioner’s actuations caused undue injury to Marydole because it resulted to her removal from office and the withholding of her salaries.
Resignation is the "act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his office and renounces the further right to use it. It implies an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce, and relinquish the office and its acceptance by competent and lawful authority."11 To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office, there must be: (a) an intention to relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper authority.12
In the instant case, the intention to relinquish and the act of relinquishment are clearly absent. While Marydole admits having written and prepared the resignation letter dated April 7, 2000, the evidence shows that she did not actually tender the same and refrained from pursuing her intention to resign.
As observed by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner’s account of how he received the resignation letter is rife with inconsistencies.1âwphi1 Before the CSC, he claimed that Marydole’s resignation letter "reached him not through the normal course of transmitting written communications"13 because protocol is not strictly observed between them as husband and wife. However, when he testified before the Sandiganbayan, he claimed that the letter was received by his private secretary. The Sandiganbayan thus correctly disregarded petitioner’s testimony.
On the other hand, Marydole consistently maintained that she never resigned from her position as Municipal Health Officer. She continued working after the letter was drafted and allegedly tendered on April 7, 2000 until its supposed acceptance on April 23, 2002, and even thereafter, despite the fact that her salaries were withheld. Upon being informed of the acceptance of her resignation, she protested by writing petitioner a letter on April 24, 2002.
The length of time between the alleged resignation and its acceptance likewise negates petitioner’s claim of good faith. The letter was allegedly drafted and tendered on April 7, 2000 but was accepted only two years hence or on April 23, 2002. Petitioner’s allegation that he first observed and assessed Marydole’s performance before accepting her resignation deserves no credence at all. His contention that he consulted the CSC before taking any action on Marydole’s resignation was correctly disregarded by the Sandiganbayan, thus:
Accused’s allegation that he consulted the Civil Service Commission before he accepted the resignation of the complainant and he was advised that the acceptance is at his discretion does not lend strength to his cause for, not only is it self-serving and unsupported by any other evidence, it betrays his desire to remove the accused from her office and cause injury to her. Otherwise he could have just asked the complainant if she was resigning or not, but he failed to do so. Such failure and his belated acceptance of the complainant’s untendered resignation, which may have been motivated by their apparent marital problems, are clear indications of evident bad faith.14
The penalty for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 is "imprisonment for not less than six years and one month nor more than fifteen years, perpetual disqualification from public office."15 Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is punished by special law, the Court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum term shall not be less than the minimum prescribed by the same.16 Hence, the Sandiganbayan correctly imposed the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from public office.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 4, 2005 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 27759 finding petitioner Santos L. Nacaytuna guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, with perpetual disqualification to hold public office, and its Resolution dated January 4, 2006 denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice |
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 8-30.
2 Id. at 31-47. Penned by Associate Justice Rodolfo A. Ponferrada and concurred in by Associate Justices Gregory S. Ong and Jose R. Hernandez.
3 Id. at 75-81.
4 Id. at 12.
5 Id. at 33.
6 Id. at 33.
7 Records, Volume I, p. 1.
8 Rollo, p. 46.
9 Id. at 14.
10 Escara v. People, G.R. No. 164921, July 8, 2005, 463 SCRA 239, 252.
11 Ortiz v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-78957, June 28, 1988, 162 SCRA 812, 819.
12 Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres v. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 303, 314 (1998).
13 Records, Volume I, p. 262.
14 Rollo, pp. 42-43.
15 See Section 8, Republic Act No. 3019.
16 Escara v. People, supra note 10 at 253.
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