THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 159224 January 20, 2006
JOSE D. ONTIMARE, JR., and RENE D. ONTIMARE, as sons/heirs, substituted for their deceased father and the original party JOSE M. ONTIMARE, SR., Petitioners,
vs.
SPS. RENATO and ROSARIO ELEP, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the Decision,1 dated July 18, 2003, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69138, affirming with modifications the Summary Judgment2 dated July 11, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, in Civil Case No. Q-96-28991. The RTC ordered Jose M. Ontimare, Sr. to pay respondents actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P75,000 per month from July 1996 to September 1998, exemplary damages amounting to P50,000, attorney’s fees in the amount of P30,000, and the sum of P150,000 as reimbursement for the damage on respondents’ wood parquet floors, wall paintings and ceiling.
The facts, as borne by the records, are as follows:
Ontimare Sr. and respondents are neighbors in Hyacinth Street, Roxas District, Quezon City. Respondents wanted to build a four-door, two-storey apartment on their lot at No. 74 Hyacinth Street and applied for a building permit with the Building Official of Quezon City sometime in December 1995.
Ontimare Sr. owned the adjoining house and adjacent lot on No. 72 Hyacinth Street. His terrace extends to the boundary between his property and respondents’. On December 3, 1995, respondents wrote Ontimare Sr. a letter seeking his written consent to the construction of a firewall adjacent to his existing firewall.
Instead of consenting, on December 20, 1995, Ontimare Sr. filed a Complaint with the Building Official asking that the request for a building permit be withheld since a firewall would adversely affect the ventilation and market value of his property.
Despite a building permit issued to respondents on January 8, 1996,3 a Cease and Desist Order4 to stop the construction of the four-door apartment was issued on January 12, 1996, as a result of the Complaint of Ontimare Sr.
However, when respondents wrote the City Engineer and explained they were constructing a one-sided firewall within their property, the Cease and Desist Order was forthwith lifted on January 16, 1996.
On January 26, 1996, the complaint of Ontimare Sr. was dismissed. He appealed to the City Mayor, who ordered an investigation on the matter.
On February 2, 1996, Ontimare Sr. filed a Notarial Prohibition.
After hearings conducted on June 18 and 25, 1996, the Building Official dismissed the complaint on July 11, 1996 and ordered Ontimare Sr. to make the adjustments in the construction of his house.5 Respondents were issued a new building permit on July 16, 1996.6
Meanwhile, the day before, on July 15, 1996, while respondents’ workers were plastering and water-proofing the firewall, Ontimare Sr. fired his shotgun, threatening to kill anyone who would enter his property and work on respondents’ construction.7 As a result, a portion of the firewall remained unfinished. According to respondents, water seeped in the building and damaged the sanding, the wood parquet floors and the ceiling. Respondents filed an action for damages with application for preliminary injunction and restraining order against Ontimare Sr. before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77.
After trial, Ontimare Sr. moved for a summary judgment while the respondents moved for the resolution of the case on the merits. The RTC issued the summary judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, and the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiffs:
1. Actual and compensatory damages in the form of unrealized income and bank amortization interest in the amount of P75,000.00 per month from July, 1996 to September, 1998;
2. The amount of P150,000.00 as reimbursement for the damage on the wood parquet floors, wall paintings and ceiling;
3. P50,000.00 as and by way of exemplary damages; and
4. P30,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.8
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed summary judgment with modification,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, and the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiffs:
1. Compensatory damages in the form of unrealized income in the total amount of Two Hundred Eighty-eight Thousand Pesos (P288,000.00) for Apartments A, B and C, and bank amortization interest from July 1996 to July 1997 in the total amount of Three Hundred Forty-four Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy-five Pesos and 74/100 centavos (P344,875.74);
2. The amount of P150,000.00 as reimbursement for the damage on the wood parquet floors, wall paintings and ceiling;
3. P50,000.00 as and by way of exemplary damages; and
4. P30,000 as and by way of attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.9
Meanwhile, while the case was on appeal, Ontimare Sr. died. He was survived by his two sons, petitioners herein, who now come to us on a petition for review on certiorari on the ground that:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN MAINTAINING THE TRIAL COURT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST MOVANT DEFENDANT
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN OVERLOOKING MATERIAL FACTS TO FIND DEFENDANT SOLELY LIABLE FOR THE DELAY IN THE PLASTERING OF THE FIREWALL
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AS A MERE SCRAP OF PAPER WHICH COULD NOT BE ACTED UPON BY THE COURT
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AWARDING UNEARNED RENT AND REIMBURSEMENT OF BANK INTEREST AMORTIZATION FOR ANY PERIOD AFTER THE REWORK ON THE FIREWALL HAD BEEN COMPLETED IN SEPTEMBER 1996
5. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A PATENT ERROR IN GRANTING DAMAGES EQUIVALENT TO ELEVEN MONTHS WHEN THE LIABILITY PERIOD IT COMPUTED ONLY ADDED UP TO TEN MONTHS
6. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AWARDING EXEMPLARY DAMAGES WITHOUT ANY BAD FAITH ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT10
Simply put, there are two issues for resolution, namely (1) Is the summary judgment rendered by the trial court proper? (2) Are petitioners liable for the damages awarded?
Anent the first issue, petitioners argue that summary judgment may issue only in favor of a moving party and only when there is no genuine issue on any material fact, except for the amount of damages. Petitioners insist that the summary judgment in this case was rendered against the movant and despite the existence of disputed facts.
On the other hand, respondents counter that Ontimare Sr., in moving for summary judgment indicated that he did not want a de riguer trial. Further, respondents argue that he waived his right to question the said summary judgment when he did not object to respondents’ motion that the case be resolved on its merits.
On this issue, Rule 34, Section 3 of the Rules of Court is pertinent. It provides:
SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. - … After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleading, depositions, and admissions on file together with the affidavits, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Hence, for summary judgment to be proper, two (2) requisites must concur, to wit: (1) there must be no genuine issue on any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (2) the moving party must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
When, on their face, the pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment is not proper. An issue is genuine if it requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.11
In the instant case, the summary judgment was rendered after the presentation of evidence by both parties in a full blown trial. Records show that during the two-year trial of the case, Ontimare Sr. had presented his own witnesses, all four of them, and had cross-examined the witnesses of the opposing party.
The trial court’s decision was merely denominated as summary judgment. But in essence, it is actually equivalent to a judgment on the merits, making the rule on summary judgment inapplicable in this case.
Anent the second issue, petitioners contend that respondents were issued locational clearance only on July 16, 1996 and hence, the start of the construction work should be reckoned not earlier than the said date. When the shotgun incident happened on July 15, 1996, respondents had no locational clearance.
Petitioners also argue that the unearned rent and reimbursement of bank interest amortization should be counted up to and not from the completion of the rework because the apartments could have been rented out and could have started to earn once the rework was completed. Petitioners insist the period for the computation of unrealized income should have been ten months.
Lastly, petitioners maintain that Ontimare Sr. did not act in bad faith nor abusively in the protection of his rights, thus no exemplary damages should be granted.
For their part, respondents counter that petitioners raise pure questions of fact already ruled upon by the Court of Appeals, hence, the instant petition should be denied outright. Granting arguendo that the petition should be given due course, respondents aver that Ontimare Sr., despite knowledge that respondents had already acquired a building permit, nevertheless, threatened bodily harm on workers of respondents to prevent the construction. He should thus be held liable for damages for abuse of his rights to the prejudice of respondents.
Respondents alleged that rework on the firewall started from September 1996, as evidenced by the receipts issued by the contractor. The compensatory damages in the form of unearned rent started to accrue on October 1, 1996 until the completion of the rework on August 1, 1997 for Apartment A (a total of eleven months) and until July 15, 1997 for Apartments B and C (a total of ten months and fifteen days).
Lastly, respondents posit that Ontimare Sr.’s threats with use of a firearm constitute bad faith.
At the outset, it bears stressing that, except for the issue on exemplary damages, petitioners raise pure questions of fact, which may not be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari.12 Well-settled is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any of the following recognized exceptions:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.13
Petitioners failed to show that their case falls under any of the above-quoted exceptions. Hence, we see no reason to disturb the findings of the Court of Appeals, which we find supported by evidence on record.
We are likewise constrained from reversing the award of exemplary damages. Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good.14 Ontimare Sr.’s firing his shotgun at respondents’ workers cannot be countenanced by this Court. Exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000 is proper.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision, of the Court of Appeals dated July 18, 2003, in CA-G.R. CV No. 69138 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA
Asscociate Justice |
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman, Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 34-44. Penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner, with Associate Justices Eliezer R. De los Santos, and Jose C. Mendoza concurring.
2 CA Rollo, pp. 17-21.
3 Records, p. 17.
4 Id. at 19.
5 Id. at 30-31.
6 Id. at 18.
7 TSN, 25 September 1998, pp. 28-29.
8 CA Rollo, p. 21.
9 Rollo, p. 43.
10 Id. at 16.
11 Evadel Realty and Development Corporation v. Soriano, G.R. No. 144291, 20 April 2001, 357 SCRA 395, 401.
12 De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120004, 27 December 2002, 394 SCRA 302, 310.
13 Id. at 310-311.
14 Article 2229 of the Civil Code.
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