SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 145938 February 10, 2006
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE AUGUSTO V. BREVA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 10, ERNESTO SALVADOR and GUILLERMO SALDAÑA, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Office of the Ombudsman seeks the annulment and setting aside of the Orders dated September 8 and 29, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City in Criminal Case No. 45, 505-2000 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Ernesto Salvador and Guillermo Saldaña, Accused, a prosecution for violation of the Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The facts:
At times material hereto, the above-named accused, Ernesto Salvador and Guillermo Saldaña, now private respondents, were both employees of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Davao City. Private respondent Salvador held the position of Legislative Officer II, while private respondent Saldaña was the Sanggunian's Secretary.
Investigating news reports regarding the allegations of Davao City Councilor Diosdado Mahipus concerning anomalous disbursements of the city’s PhP1M legislative research fund, the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, in a proceeding thereat docketed as OMB-MIN-98-0200, thru its Graft Investigation Officer Rachelle M. Ladrera-Tagud, issued a resolution (hereinafter referred to as the Ladrera resolution) finding the existence of sufficient evidence to warrant the criminal prosecution of both private respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Accompanying the Ladrera resolution is a draft Information1 bearing date March 22, 2000, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That sometime in or about 1997, or shortly prior or subsequent thereto, in Davao City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, ERNESTO SALVADOR and GUILLERMO SALDAÑA, both low-ranking public employees, committing the offense while in performance of their official duties and taking advantage of their public position, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, did there and then, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, cause undue injury to the City Government of Davao thru evident bad faith in the performance of their official duties when accused Salvador made a cash advance in the amount of P1 million under the Legislative Research Program of the Sangguniang Panglungsod and in the liquidation of the same, they made it appear that they have paid said amount to the caterers who provided food and snacks during the seminars and trainings they have allegedly conducted for the youth in the different barangays in Davao City when in truth and in fact, no seminars and trainings of said nature were conducted, thereby causing damage and injury to the government in the said amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On May 2, 2000, the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao endorsed the records of OMB-MIN-98-0200, including the Ladrera resolution and the draft Information, to the City Prosecutor of Davao.
On May 29, 2000, the City Prosecutor of Davao filed with the RTC of Davao City the aforementioned Information, thereat docketed as Criminal Case No. 45, 505-2000 which was raffled to Branch 5 of the court.
Meanwhile, in OMB-MIN-98-0200, private respondent Ernesto Salvador filed a motion for reconsideration of the Ladrera resolution, followed a few days later by a similar motion of private respondent Guillermo Saldaña.
To complement their motions for reconsideration, both private respondents jointly filed in Criminal Case No. 45, 505-2000 an Omnibus Manifestations and Motions, praying thereunder as follows:
a. For reconsideration and/or completion of Preliminary Investigation by the Ombudsman;
b. Holding in abeyance the implementation of and/or recall the warrant of arrest; and
c. To defer further proceedings.
In its Order2 of July 20, 2000, however, the trial court denied the omnibus motion.
Subsequently, private respondent Salvador filed with the same court a Motion to Quash Criminal Case No. 45, 505-2000, invoking the pronouncement of this Court in George Uy vs. Sandiganbayan3 bearing on the authority of the Ombudsman to file information with regular courts.
On September 8, 2000, the trial court issued an Order4 considering as submitted "without any opposition" respondent Salvador's Motion to Quash.
On the same date - September 8, 2000 - the trial court issued the herein assailed Order5 dismissing Criminal Case No. 45, 505-2000, rationalizing as follows:
Submitted for resolution without opposition is the MOTION TO QUASH filed by accused Ernesto Salvador, dated August 31, 2000,…. The motion is based on the ground that the Officer who filed the Information in this case had no authority to do so in light of the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of George Uy v. Sandiganbayan, et al. (G.R. Nos. 105965-70) where it is held that –
"In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the corresponding information/s against petitioner in the regional trial court. The Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan."
xxx xxx xxx
"The clear import of such pronouncement is to recognize the authority of the State and regular provincial and city prosecutors under the Department of Justice to have control over prosecution of cases falling within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The investigation and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman relate to cases rightfully falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770 ("An Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman, and for other purposes") which vests upon the Ombudsman "primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan …" And this is further buttressed by Section 11(4a) of R.A. 6770 which emphasizes that the Office of the Special Prosecutor shall have the power "to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan." Thus, repeated references to the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction clearly serve to limit the Ombudman's and Special Prosecutor's authority to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan."
Apparently not yet aware of the trial court's aforementioned order of dismissal, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao filed an Opposition 6 dated September 8, 2000, therein opposing and basically praying for the denial of Salvador’s Motion to Quash on the argument that –
1. While it is true that the Supreme Court has ruled in the case of George Uy vs. Sandiganbayan, et. al., G.R. Nos. 105965-70, that "it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has authority to file the corresponding information/s against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court" and "the Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan", it is equally true that said decision rendered on 09 August 1999 and followed by a Resolution dated 22 February 2000 has never been final and, therefore, premature as of this moment to consider the same as judicial precedent;
Also, seemingly unaware, too, of the dismissal of the case, private respondent Saldaña filed his own Motion to Quash,7 dated September 11, 2000, therein likewise citing George Uy.
Apprised later of the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 45, 505-2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration8 which the trial court denied via its other assailed Order 9 dated September 29, 2000.
On November 29, 2000, petitioner filed the present recourse on the submission that respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion when:
I. HE TOOK COGNIZANCE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT SALVADOR'S FATALLY DEFECTIVE MOTION TO QUASH AND CONSIDERED IT "SUBMITTED FOR RESOLUTION WITHOUT OPPOSITION";
II. HE ADOPTED THE GEORGE UY RULING AND DISMISSED CRIMINAL CASE NO. 45, 505-2000 ON THE GROUND THAT THE OFFICER WHO FILED THE INFORMATION HAD NO AUTHORITY TO DO SO, THEREBY DISREGARDING THE FOLLOWING VITAL CONSIDERATIONS:
A. THE JURISDICTION OF THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN IS NOT PARALLEL TO, OR TO BE EQUATED WITH, THE BROADER JURISDICTION OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN;
B. THE PHRASE "PRIMARY JURISDICTION OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN OVER CASES COGNIZABLE BY THE SANDIGANBAYAN" IS NOT A DELIMITATION OF ITS JURISDICTION SOLELY TO SANDIGANBAYAN CASES; AND
C. THE AUTHORITY OF THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR TO PROSECUTE CASES BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN CANNOT BE CONFUSED WITH THE BROADER INVESTIGATORY AND PROSECUTORIAL POWERS OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN; AND
III. HE DISREGARDED THE PENDENCY OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATION IN THE GEORGE UY CASE BEFORE THIS HONORABLE COURT.
We find merit in the petition.
At the core of the controversy is the perceived overlapping of jurisdiction between the Office of the Ombudsman and the Department of Justice in the investigation and prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and employees. The confusion came about as an aftermath of a series of enactments restructuring the offices of the Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan, specifically, the following: Rep. Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, reorganizing the Office of the Ombudsman; Rep. Act No. 7975, reorganizing the Sandiganbayan; and Rep. Act No. 8249, defining the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction.
As may be recalled, it was amidst the foregoing backdrop of legislative enactments when this Court promulgated on August 9, 1999 its Decision10 in the George Uy case. In the penultimate paragraph of that Decision, the Court stated "… it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the corresponding information/s against petitioner in the regional trial court. The Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan." 11 Thereafter, the Court, in the same case of George Uy, promulgated a Resolution12 on February 22, 2000, therein stressing, as follows:
(T)he clear import of such pronouncement is to recognize the authority of the State and regular provincial and city prosecutors under the [DOJ] to have control over prosecution of cases falling within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The investigation and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman relate to cases rightfully falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770 … which vests upon the Ombudsman "primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan …" And this is further buttressed by Section 11 (4a) of R.A. 6770 which emphasizes that the Office of the Special Prosecutor shall have the power to "conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan." Thus, repeated references to the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction clearly serve to limit the Ombudman's and Special Prosecutor's authority to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan" (Word in bracket added; italization in the original).
Subsequently, the Ombudsman interposed in George Uy a motion for further clarification.13 Resolving the motion, the Court, this time speaking thru Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, in a Resolution dated March 20, 2001,14 nullified and set aside its pronouncement in its decision of August 9, 1999 and its resolution of February 20, 2000 in George Uy that the Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, thus:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court’s ruling in its decision dated August 9, 1999 and its resolution dated February 20, 2000 that the Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
This time, the Court categorically stated that: "the Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute all criminal cases involving public officers and employees, not only those within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but those within the jurisdiction of the regular courts as well." Elaborating on its nullificatory ruling, the Court, in its aforementioned Resolution of March 20, 2001, writes:
The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees is founded in Section 15 and Section 11 of RA 6770. Section 15 vests the Ombudsman with the power to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient, thus:
"Sec 15. Powers, Functions and Duties.–The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;
xxx xxx xxx"
Section 11 grants the Office of the Special Prosecutor, an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman . . ., the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It states:
"Sec 11. Structural Organization. – xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(4) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall, under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman, have the following powers:
(a) To conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan;1avvphil.net
xxx xxx xxx
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee.
The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15 (1) giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and Section 11 (4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.
Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman "to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases." The grant of this authority does not necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and employees cognizable by other courts. xxx.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770 [whose] power to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers and employees of the government ….
Given the Court’s George Uy ruling under its March 20, 2001 Resolution, the trial court’s assailed Orders of September 8 and 29, 2000, are, in hindsight, without legal support and must, therefore, be set aside. This is not necessarily to say, however, that grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as petitioner presently argues, attended the issuance of both orders. As it were, the orders were issued under the aegis of the then prevailing August 9, 1999 George Uy decision, as reiterated in the Court’s February 22, 2000 Resolution. Until they were contextually superseded and set aside by the March 20, 2001 George Uy Resolution, the August 9, 1999 decision and February 22, 2000 resolution in question veritably formed part of the legal system of the land. And a judicial action taken conformably with what may be considered as the law of the land cannot, without more, be plausibly challenged on ground of lack or in excess of jurisdiction. If respondent judge is to be called to task, it is perhaps for not heeding petitioner’s plea to defer action on private respondents’ separate unsworn motions to quash in Criminal Case No. 45, 505-2000 on the ground stated therein pending resolution of petitioner’s Motion for Further Clarification in George Uy then pending with this Court.
At any rate, the determinative issue in this case pivots on the question of whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman was possessed of the authority to file with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City the information for violation of the Anti-Graft Law against herein private Respondents. This issue and practically all arguments and counter-arguments on collateral matters raised in the pleadings have been adequately addressed, if not rendered functus oficio, by the clarificatory resolution in the George Uy case. They need not detain us any longer.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed orders of the respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 45, 505-2000 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA
Asscociate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 47-48.
2 Ibid., pp. 67-68.
3 312 SCRA 77 (1999).
4 Rollo, p. 72.
5 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
6 Rollo, pp. 73-74.
7 Ibid., pp. 95-96.
8 Ibid., pp. 97-98.
9 Ibid., pp. 35-38.
10 See Note # 3, supra.
11 At page 90.
12 See 354 SCRA 651, 656 (2001).
13 Rollo, pp. 75-94.
14 See Note #12, supra.
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