G.R. No. 151342




SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 151342 June 23, 2005 CELSO VERDE, petitioner, vs. VICTOR E. MACAPAGAL, AIDA MACAPAGAL, RECTOR E. MACAPAGAL, HECTOR MACAPAGAL, FLORIDA M. GUIRIBA, REDENTOR E. MACAPAGAL, NESTOR E. MACAPAGAL and ZENAIDA E. MACAPAGAL, respondents. D E C I S I O N CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Vicente F. Macapagal and Irenea R. Estrella were the owners of 2.5 hectares of agricultural land, subject of this dispute, denominated as Lot No. 4714, Cad-320-D, Case 1, situated in Palapala, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. After their demise, said piece of land passed on to their children (respondents herein) who are now the pro-indiviso owners of the same. On the other hand, petitioner is the leasehold tenant of the subject land having succeeded his father, Francisco Verde, in the tenancy thereof. On 14 July 1995, respondents initiated an action for ejectment against petitioner before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board in Malolos, Bulacan.¹ Respondents alleged in their complaint² that sometime in 1993, without their knowledge and consent, petitioner mortgaged the subject land to Aurelio dela Cruz upon the condition that the latter would be the one to work on one-half of said property. When confronted regarding this matter, petitioner not only admitted that he had, indeed, mortgaged the subject land to dela Cruz but also asked for forgiveness from respondents and assured the latter that he would pay them the agreed amount of rental. In addition, petitioner purportedly guaranteed that he would redeem the mortgage immediately after the 1993 planting season and would never mortgage the property again. Apparently, petitioner failed to fulfill his promise to respondents as dela Cruz still farmed the subject land in 1994. Respondents went on to argue that petitioner’s mortgaging the property to dela Cruz constituted abandonment which is a ground for termination of agricultural leasehold relation under Section 8, Republic Act No. 3844,³ as amended. Respondents then brought the matter before the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council (BARC) of Palapala, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, for conciliation. However, proceedings before the BARC were ineffective as the parties herein failed to reach an amicable settlement as evidenced by the Certification issued by the BARC Chairman.⁴ Attached to the complaint, as Annex "C" thereof, was the joint sworn statement executed by Albino Sanciangco and Monico Cruz who declared that in 1993, dela Cruz was the one who attended to one-half of the subject land by virtue of a contract of mortgage between him and petitioner; that Sanciangco was present when respondents Victor and Rector confronted petitioner about the mortgage; and that dela Cruz was still the one who cultivated the subject land in 1994.⁵ On 09 August 1995, petitioner filed his answer denying the material allegations of the complaint and by way of special and affirmative defenses, claimed that he only hired the services of dela Cruz and the latter’s carabao because from 1993 to 1994, he (petitioner) did not have the means to own a beast of burden. He also stated that from 1975 up to the filing of this action, he continued to occupy, possess, and cultivate the subject land as a bona fide tenant. In support of his contentions, petitioner appended to his answer the sworn statement of dela Cruz⁶ and the joint sworn statement of Petronilo Sayco and Oscar Cruz.⁷ Dela Cruz maintained that in 1993 and 1994, he was hired to work on the land tenanted by petitioner because during those years, the latter did not have a carabao. For their part, Sayco and Cruz alleged that ever since the tenancy over the subject land was transferred to petitioner by the death of his father Francisco, he had continuously farmed and possessed said property. The case was set for hearing on 10 and 22 August 1995, 05 September 1995, and 03 October 1995. During the last hearing, the parties were required to submit, within twenty days therefrom, their respective position papers after which the case would be deemed submitted for resolution. In a decision⁸ dated 07 February 1996, Provincial Adjudicator Erasmo SP. Cruz dismissed the case for lack of merit. The provincial adjudicator ruled that petitioner did not give up "actually and absolutely" his tenancy right over the subject land as the complaint itself stated that petitioner was supposed to cultivate the other half of the property during the 1993 and 1994 agricultural seasons, thus: In the case at bar, there was no showing that defendant [petitioner herein] intentionally abandoned the landholding. The alleged mortgaged (sic) must not be mistaken from personal loan, the latter referring to borrowed money where defendant then was in dire need of financial help. Such personal loan for all intent and purposes, cannot be treated as an overt act because defendant had the intention to continue cultivating the other ½ of the property. The "Magkasanib na Sinumpaang Salaysay" in favor of the plaintiffs were patently self-serving on the ground that their counsel never attempted to have his affiants/witnesses took (sic) the witness stand to clarify the truthfulness and veracity of the contents of their Magkasanib na Sinumpaang Salaysay. "Generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself. x x x. For this reason, the infirmities of affidavits as species of evidence is much a matter of judicial experience." (People vs. Bulawin, 29 SCRA 710, 718) "Generally, an affidavit is not prepared by affiant himself but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statements" (People vs. Mariquina, et al., 46 O.G. 6053). To prove their case, plaintiffs [respondents herein] could have filed clear, sufficient and convincing evidence to substantiate their claim. Thus, they failed to do so."⁹ Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the provincial adjudicator. Respondents then filed an appeal before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which, however, affirmed the earlier ruling of the provincial adjudicator.¹⁰ Undaunted by these setbacks, respondents filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In the decision now assailed before us, the appellate court reversed and set aside the decision of the DARAB. According to the Court of Appeals, Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 1199¹¹ prohibits a share-tenant from employing a subtenant to work or furnish labor on the land subject of a tenancy agreement. Moreover, jurisprudence dictates "that there should be personal cultivation by the tenant or by his immediate farm household or members of the family of the lessee or other persons who are dependent upon him for support or who usually help him in his activities."¹² In the present case, as dela Cruz is clearly not a member of petitioner’s immediate farm household nor did he depend upon petitioner for support or helps the latter in operating the farm enterprise, the requirement of personal cultivation is obviously lacking. Hence, the present recourse where petitioner raises, in the main, the issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that he did not personally cultivate the subject land thereby justifying his ejectment therefrom. Preliminarily, we note that petitioner brought this case before us via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure whereas the proper remedy for him was to file an appeal from the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals under Rule 45 since the issue raised deals purely with a question of law. Nevertheless, as the subject petition was filed within the prescribed fifteen-day period, and in view of the substantial issue raised therein, we gave due course to the same and treated it as a petition for review on certiorari in our resolution dated 05 April 2004.¹³ Petitioner argues that being a bona fide tenant of the subject land, he is entitled to security of tenure such that he cannot be dispossessed of the land he had been tilling for around twenty years on the basis of mere conjecture and hypothesis. Likewise, petitioner assails the Court of Appeals’ reliance on the joint sworn statement of Sayco¹⁴ and Cruz and contends that dela Cruz’s own affidavit sufficiently refuted the allegations of the said joint sworn statement. As dela Cruz was supposedly a party to the alleged contract of mortgage, the appellate court should have given credit to his affidavit instead of depending on the statements of Sanciangco and Cruz. In addition, petitioner insists that an agreement involving mortgage of real rights of a leasehold tenant must be reduced into writing pursuant to the statute of frauds, otherwise, said agreement cannot bind third parties. Finally, petitioner avers that respondents were not able to substantiate their claim that he had abandoned the subject land more so since he continues to till the same and that under Rep. Act No. 3844, the agricultural lessee is required to notify the agricultural lessor of his intention to abandon the leaseholding. In this case, petitioner claims that said notification is lacking. In their comment, respondents contend that petitioner’s intent to abandon the subject property was manifested when he mortgaged the landholding to dela Cruz and allowed the latter to till said property from 1993 up to 1994 in contravention of Rep. Act No. 1199 which limits personal cultivation of a tenanted land to the tenant himself and to his immediate household. Also, respondents argue that Rep. Act No. 3844, as amended, requires the agricultural lessee to provide the agricultural lessor with a notice only in case of voluntary abandonment. However, as this case involves involuntary abandonment, the prescribed notice under the law does not apply. Under Section 5(a) of Rep. Act No. 1199, a "share tenant" is defined as a person who himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter’s consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price-certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system. On 08 August 1963, Rep. Act No. 3844, the law abolishing share tenancy and establishing agricultural leasehold relation, was approved. Section 166(2) of Rep. Act No. 3844, as amended, defines "agricultural lessee" as follows: Sec. 166. Definition of Terms.- … (2) "Agricultural lessee" means a person who, by himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another with the latter’s consent for purposes of production, for a price certain in money or in produce or both. It is distinguished from civil law lessee as understood in the Civil Code of the Philippines. As we discussed in the case of Cuaño v. Court of Appeals,¹⁵ despite the passage of Rep. Act No. 3844, "share tenancy" and "agricultural lease relationship" share the same common requisite elements, to wit: (1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) The subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land; (3) There is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) The purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.¹⁶ As can be gleaned from the foregoing, personal cultivation is an important factor in determining the existence of agricultural lease relationship such that in its absence, an occupant of a tract of land, or a cultivator thereof, or planter thereon, cannot qualify as a de jure lessee.¹⁷ The law defines "personal cultivation" as cultivation by the lessee or lessor in person and/or with the aid of labor from within his immediate household,¹⁸ i.e., members of the family of the lessee or lessor and other persons who are dependent upon him for support and who usually help him in his activities.¹⁹ In the present case, it is not disputed that dela Cruz is not a member of petitioner’s immediate household. The question thus posed is whether by petitioner’s hiring his services and that of his carabao, the agricultural lease relationship between the parties in this case ceased to exist. We rule that it did not. Under Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 1199, a tenant is required to perform the following tasks: 1. The preparation of the seedbed which shall include plowing, harrowing, and watering of the seedbed, the scattering of seeds, and the care of the seedlings. 2. The plowing, harrowing, and watering of the area he is cultivating, except final harrowing of the field as an item of contribution specified in Section thirty-two of this Act. 1. The maintenance, repair and weeding of dikes, paddies, and irrigation canals in his holdings. 2. The pulling and bundling of the seedlings preparatory to their transplanting. 3. Care of the growing plants. 4. Gathering and bundling of the reaped harvest. 5. The piling of the bundles into small stacks. 6. The preparation of the place where the harvest is to be stacked. 7. Gathering of the small stacks and their transportation to the place where they are to be stacked. 8. Piling into a big stack preparatory to threshing. As can be gleaned from the foregoing, the use of a carabao, for which petitioner hired the services of dela Cruz, is only one phase of farm labor which is supposed to be rendered by a tenant. Cultivation does not refer solely to the plowing and harrowing of the land.²⁰ The fact that a tenant or an agricultural lessee for that matter employs farm laborers to perform some aspects of farm work does not preclude the existence of an agricultural leasehold relationship provided an agricultural lessee does not leave the entire process of cultivation in the hands of hired helpers. Indeed, while the law explicitly requires the agricultural lessee and his immediate family to work on the land, we nevertheless had declared that a tenant or an agricultural lessee’s hiring of farm laborers on a temporary or occasional basis does not negate the existence of the element of "personal cultivation" essential in a tenancy or agricultural leasehold relationship, thus: . . . [T]he mere fact that the tenant did not do all the farm work himself but temporarily or on an emergency basis utilized the services of others to assist him, was not taken to mean that the tenant had thereby breached the requirement imposed by the statute. We do not consider that the statute prohibits the tenant or agricultural lessee who generally works the land himself or with the aid of members of his immediate household, from availing occasionally or temporarily of the help of others in specific jobs.²¹ To be sure, Section 27(2) of Rep. Act No. 3844 permits the agricultural lessee, in case of illness or temporary incapacity, to avail himself of the services of laborers, "incapacity" being any cause or circumstance which prevents the lessee from fulfilling his contractual and other obligations under the Code.²² To our mind, petitioner’s lack of means to own a carabao during the agricultural years in question constitutes incapacity requiring him to employ dela Cruz.1avvphi1.zw+ The cases cited by the Court of Appeals in concluding that there was an absence of personal cultivation in this case do not apply. First, in the case of De Jesus v. Intermediate Appellate Court,²³ it was proven during trial that petitioner therein hired the services of many persons to help him cultivate the fishpond involved in that case and that he was, in fact, cultivating another fishpond. Consequently, we concluded that petitioner was not a small farmer but a businessman. Likewise, in Evangelista v. Court of Appeals,²⁴ we held that petitioner in said case was not a bona fide tenant-farmer of the land in question upon the finding that he employed many plowers, harrowers and planters as well as farm laborers. In this case, it is not shown that except for dela Cruz, who admitted being hired by petitioner because of his carabao, petitioner made use of the services of other farm laborers. In fact, even the affidavits executed by respondents’ witnesses referred solely to dela Cruz and to no other person as having worked on the land in dispute thus bolstering petitioner’s stance that dela Cruz’s service was engaged only for the use of his carabao which petitioner could not afford to have at that time. We cannot, however, sustain petitioner’s stance that the appellate court erred in giving credence to the joint sworn statement of Sanciangco and Cruz in contravention of the pertinent provision²⁵ of the Rules of Court. The DARAB New Rules of Procedures²⁶ explicitly ordains that technical rules of procedure which bind the regular courts find no application in proceedings before said board and its Regional and Provincial Adjudicators. To give effect to this rule, the DARAB New Rules of Procedure commands that all agrarian cases, disputes or controversies should be resolved "in a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity."²⁷ But what makes petitioner’s stance on this matter even more unavailing is the fact that the provincial adjudicator, acceding to petitioner’s prayer in his motion for reconsideration that a hearing be conducted for the purpose of asking clarificatory questions, set the date for the parties’ oral argument on 10 July 1996.²⁸ Despite notice, however, petitioner failed to show up during said date prompting provincial adjudicator to submit for resolution petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In an order dated 06 December 1996, the provincial adjudicator recalled his 10 July 1996 order and instead scheduled another hearing on 14 January 1997 for the purpose of asking clarificatory questions.²⁹ Yet again, petitioner failed to attend this hearing, thus, respondents moved that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration be resolved.³⁰ Given this series of events, petitioner cannot now be heard to complain that the Court of Appeals erred in putting premium on the joint sworn statement of Sanciangco and Cruz as he was given ample opportunity to challenge its contents. Notwithstanding this finding, we still find merit in the instant petition and resolve to grant the same. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18 December 2001 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the DARAB dated 30 October 2000 is REINSTATED. No costs. SO ORDERED. Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur. Footnotes ¹ The case was docketed therein as DARAB Case No. 1031-Bul. ’95. ² Records, pp. 21-17. ³ The Agricultural Reform Code. ⁴ Records, p. 11; Annex "D" of the Complaint. ⁵ Records, pp. 13-14. ⁶ Records, p. 36; Annex "1" of the Answer. ⁷ Records, p. 35; Annex "2" of the Answer. ⁸ Rollo, pp. 41-44. ⁹ Id., pp. 43-44. ¹⁰ Rollo, pp. 52-55. ¹¹ The Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines, Section 24(2) of which reads: "It shall be unlawful for a share-tenant to employ a sub-tenant to furnish labor on any phase of the work required of him under this Act, except in cases of illness or any temporary incapacity on his part, in which eventuality the tenant or any member of his immediate farm household is under obligation to report such illness or incapacity to the landholder. Payment to the sub-tenant, in whatever form, for services rendered on the land under this circumstance, shall be for the account of the tenant." ¹² Rollo, p. 61; CA Decision, p. 5; citing Evangelista v. Court of Appeals, No. L-37736, 23 February 1988, 138 SCRA 41. ¹³ Rollo, pp. 94-95. ¹⁴ This should be Sanciangco. ¹⁵ G.R. No. 107159, 26 September 1994, 237 SCRA 122. ¹⁶ Id., pp. 132-133. ¹⁷ See Gelos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 86186, 8 May 1992, 208 SCRA 608. ¹⁸ Section 166(13), Republic Act No. 3844. ¹⁹ Section 166(8), Republic Act. No. 3844. ²⁰ De Guzman v. Santos, No. L-16568, 30 November 1962, 6 SCRA 795. ²¹ Supra, note 15, pp. 135-136. ²² Section 166(9), Republic Act No. 3844; emphasis supplied. ²³ G.R. No. 72282, 24 July 1989, 175 SCRA 559. ²⁴ G.R. No. L-37736, 23 February 1988, 158 SCRA 41. ²⁵ Rule 130, Section 36 of the Revised Rules of Court states: "A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules." ²⁶ Done and adopted on 30 May 1994. ²⁷ Section 3 of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedures. ²⁸ Records, p. 144. ²⁹ Records, p. 170. ³⁰ Records, p. 176. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation