A.M. No. RTJ-03-1750




SECOND DIVISION A.M. No. RTJ-03-1750 January 14, 2005 MAMERTO MANIQUIZ FOUNDATION, INC., as represented by its President NORBERTO C. MANIQUIZ, petitioner, vs. HON. ROGELIO M. PIZARRO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 222, respondent. D E C I S I O N CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: A Complaint for violation of Rule 140, Revised Rules of Court and the Code of Judicial Conduct was filed by the Mamerto Maniquiz Foundation, Inc., represented by its President, Norberto C. Maniquiz (complainant) against Judge Rogelio M. Pizarro, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 222. The factual antecedents that gave rise to the Complaint are: On 15 December 1997, complainant obtained a loan in the amount of one million pesos from Don C. Mejia (Mejia) secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land and its improvements covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-116481 (316248) of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. When complainant defaulted in the payment of its obligation, Mejia caused the foreclosure of the property thru the Office of the Sheriff of Quezon City by filing an extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage under Act No. 3135 as amended by Act No. 4118. After the necessary posting was made, the property was thereafter sold at public auction to Mejia who submitted the highest bid and a Certificate of Sale was issued in his favor. The complainant did not exercise its right to redeem the property, consequently Mejia consolidated his ownership over the land, caused the cancellation of the previous title and the issuance of a new title, TCT No. N- 211795, in his name. On 24 May 2000, Mejia filed a verified petition for the issuance of a writ of possession docketed as LRC Case No. Q-12842 (00) before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 222, where respondent judge presides.¹ Mejia subsequently amended his Petition to allege further that demand was made on the complainant and those claiming rights under it to vacate the land in question and to surrender possession thereof but the same was not heeded.² In its opposition to the Petition,³ the complainant moved that LRC Case No. Q-12842 (00) be dismissed or, in the alternative, that the proceedings be suspended on the ground that it had filed on 10 August 2000 Civil Case No. Q-00-41555 for declaration of nullity of real estate mortgage, sheriff’s sale, TCT No. N-211795, and damages, entitled "Mamerto Maniquiz Foundation, Inc. represented by Norberto C. Maniquiz v. Don C. Mejia, Office of the Ex-oficio Sheriff and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City," before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 105.⁴ Denying complainant’s opposition, the petition was granted and a writ of possession was issued in favor of Mejia in a Decision rendered by the trial court dated 15 January 2001.⁵ On 02 February 2001, complainant thru counsel submitted a notice of appeal.⁶ On 14 February 2001, complainant submitted a manifestation of its proposal in an effort to settle the case out of court.⁷ On 19 February 2001, Emma M. Vila, upon prior motion,⁸ filed a third-party complaint to intervene⁹ in LRC Case No. Q-12842 (00). On 06 March 2001, the trial court in LRC Case No. Q-12842 (00) issued an Order¹⁰ denying complainant’s Notice of Appeal dated 02 February 2001, and held: It appearing from the Record of this case that oppositor Norberto Maniquiz, through counsel, already withdrew in open court his opposition to the instant petition on December 1, 2000 and that the same had already become final and executory, the "Notice of Appeal" filed by said oppositor Maniquiz, through counsel, on February 2, 2001, considering that he had already lost his standing in court, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. On 12 March 2001, complainant thru counsel filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction likewise before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 222, seeking to set aside the Decision of the trial court dated 15 January 2001 and the Order dated 06 March 2001 denying its notice of appeal.¹¹ On 27 March 2001, the trial court issued an Order denying the Manifestation (proposed settlement), including the motion for leave to file third-party complaint and third-party complaint, but giving due course to the petition for relief from judgment finding the same to be sufficient in form and substance.¹² On 30 April 2001, the trial court, for lack of merit, denied complainant’s prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction including the petition for relief from judgment.¹³ The trial court said: Considering that nowhere in the prayer for a restraining order did oppositor Norberto C. Maniqu[i]z state the acts(s) or person(s) which [sic] he seeks to prevent or enjoin and/or which matter, he wants maintained in status quo: that neither did oppositor Maniquiz, through his counsel, make any such manifestation on his application for the issuance of the said order in the hearing conducted for that purpose; that even if he did, it is still ministerial upon the court to issue a writ of possession in favor of the petitioner even upon an ex-parte petition therefor (Barican v. IAC, 162 SCRA 358; GSIS v. CA, 169 SCRA 244), the prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction contained in the oppositor’s "Petition For Relief From Judgment" filed, through counsel, on March 13, 2001 and the Petition for Relief are hereby DENIED for lack of merit. From this latest Order of the trial court, complainant filed a notice of appeal which was given due course by the trial court in its order dated 17 May 2001 finding the notice of appeal to have been filed within the reglementary period. The trial court in the same Order directed the elevation of the records of the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition.¹⁴ For his part, Mejia filed a motion to dismiss complainant’s appeal. Aside from the remedy of appeal to assail the 30 April 2001 order of the trial court, complainant filed a petition for Certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 64974 on 01 June 2001 before the Court of Appeals. Resolving the motion to dismiss the complainant’s appeal, and finding the motion to be well-taken on the ground that complainant had already filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, the trial court granted Mejia’s motion to dismiss appeal and at the same time ordered the execution of the Writ of Possession in the Order dated 16 July 2001.¹⁵ The Order reads: Acting on "Motion To Dismiss Appeal" and the "Supplemental Motion To Dismiss Appeal" filed by petitioner, through counsel, on May 29, 2001 and July 5, 2001, respectively, and finding the reason given therein to be well-taken, and it appearing from the Record of this case that oppositor Mamerto Maniquiz Foundation, Inc. has already filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Hon. Court of Appeals, the said motions are hereby GRANTED pursuant to Section 1 Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Meantime, therefore, let the execution of the Writ of Possession take place until so restrained by a higher judicial authority. Complainant filed a Motion to set aside and/or defer implementation of the trial court’s order dated 16 July 2001 citing the filing of the petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. On 22 August 2001, Mejia filed a Motion to Break-Open. In an Order dated 17 September 2001, the trial court granted the Motion to Break-Open, and held: Considering that the oppositor-movant has already clearly abandoned his appeal by the filing of a petition for certiorari with the Honorable Court of Appeals only thirteen (13) days after this Court gave due course to his notice of appeal, and considering further that a trial court may still retain jurisdiction over the case and subject matter involved in the appeal under its residual and corrective powers (Section 5[g] Rule 135, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), the "Motion To Set Aside and/or Defer Implementation of Order (dated July 16, 2001)" filed by said oppositor on July 31, 2001 is hereby DENIED. Meantime, the "Motion to Break Open" filed by petitioner, through counsel, on August 22, 2001 is hereby GRANTED, it appearing from the "Sheriff’s Report" dated July 27, 2001 (p. 246, Records) that respondent Norberto Maniquiz did not want to yield possession of the subject property to the petitioner and instead prevented the latter from entering the premises despite the Order of this Court dated July 16, 2001, the said motion is hereby GRANTED, there being no restraining order yet from any higher judicial authority, and considering further that, the Court hereby reiterates, that the issuance of a writ of possession is ministerial upon a court.¹⁶ This was restrained by the Court of Appeals in an Order dated 04 October 2001.¹⁷ Complainant’s petition for Certiorari was ultimately dismissed by the Court of Appeals in a Decision dated 12 December 2001 finding that there exists no extrinsic fraud to justify complainant’s petition for relief.¹⁸ Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration. On 05 February 2002, complainant, thru counsel, filed a motion to inhibit respondent judge. In the meantime, Mejia filed a motion for the execution of a writ of possession which the trial court denied in an order dated 20 February 2002 "it appearing that there is still a pending motion for reconsideration before the appellate court" at the same time denying the motion for the inhibition of respondent judge.¹⁹ On 05 March 2002, complainant filed the administrative complaint against respondent judge before this Court docketed as OCA-IPI-02-1431-RTJ for bias, partiality and gross ignorance of the law in connection with respondent judge’s disposition of LRC Case No. Q-12842 (00).²⁰ Meanwhile, complainant’s motion for reconsideration of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 04 October 2001 dismissing complainant’s petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 64974 was dismissed in the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 15 March 2002. Per first indorsement dated 18 April 2002 by the Court Administrator, respondent judge was required to file his Comment on the Complaint.²¹ Respondent judge filed his Compliance on 20 May 2002.²² According to the respondent judge, after Mejia had presented his evidence in LRC Case No. Q-12842 (00), complainant, thru its President Norberto C. Maniquiz, assisted by counsel, withdrew its opposition to the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession on 01 December 2000, the date set for the presentation of complainant’s evidence after Mejia agreed to give complainant forty-five (45) days to negotiate with him (Mejia) for the repurchase of the property. Since the negotiations did not prosper, the trial court rendered its decision granting the writ of possession as prayed for. The denial of complainant’s notice of appeal in the trial court’s Order of 06 March 2001 is justified because it has lost its standing in court by the withdrawal of its opposition as stated earlier. The subsequent issuance of the writ of possession to Mejia is, according to respondent judge, a ministerial duty of the court. The order dated 16 July 2001 granting the motion of Mejia to dismiss complainant’s notice of appeal was issued on account of the certiorari petition filed by the complainant which the respondent viewed as inconsistent with the remedy of appeal. On 20 September 2002, complainant tendered its Comments thereon.²³ It denies respondent judge’s claim that it withdrew its opposition to the petition at the hearing on 01 December 2000. On the contrary, the hearing was deferred in the hope that the parties would arrive at a compromise and ultimately agree to settle the case. In a Resolution of this Court dated 13 January 2003, the Court noted the administrative complaint filed by the complainant, respondent’s Comment and complainant’s reply.²⁴ In a subsequent resolution dated 13 January 2003, the Court resolved that this case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and the issue of whether or not there was withdrawal of complainant’s opposition to the grant of writ of possession amounting to its loss of standing in court be referred to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals for raffle among the members and to submit his investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the record.²⁵ The case was raffled to Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero. On 12 March 2003, after having been duly notified, the parties appeared at the hearing conducted at the chambers of Justice Guerrero. In the Order of Justice Guerrero dated 13 March 2003, the parties, by agreement, were given fifteen (15) days to file simultaneous memoranda, after which the case was considered submitted for report and recommendation.²⁶ Justice Guerrero, henceforth, submitted his REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION dated 11 April 2003 stating that "there was indeed a withdrawal of complainant’s opposition," as supported by evidence. To be addressed in the instant case are the following: (1) the correctness of the Decision dated 15 January 2001, granting the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of Mejia; (2) the break-open Order dated 17 September 2001; (3) the order dated 06 March 2001 denying notice of appeal of the Decision rendered by Judge Pizarro which granted the petition for a writ of possession; and (4) the order dated 16 July 2001 granting Mejia’s motion to dismiss complainant’s notice of appeal denying complainant’s petition from relief of judgment, among other things, after the trial court through the respondent judge initially gave due course to it. Complainant claims that the decision²⁷ and the Orders in question were all issued at a time when its complaint for annulment of mortgage and sheriff’s sale (Civil Case No. Q-00-41555) was still pending before another branch of the trial court (Branch 105), thus, respondent judge allegedly failed to observe peer courtesy when he issued said break-open Order despite knowledge that the result of Civil Case No. Q-00-41555 would affect the issuance of the writ of possession. Complainant further impugns respondent judge’s Order for the execution of the writ of possession and break-open Order despite the pendency of the petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals and the fact that the records of the case were already ordered elevated to the Court of Appeals. The Complaint is not meritorious. On the issuance of the writ of possession and as a necessary consequence, the break-open order – we affirm the correctness of respondent’s order. A writ of possession is generally understood to be an order whereby the sheriff is commanded to place a person in possession of a real and personal property, such as when a property is extrajudicially foreclosed.²⁸ The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure such as in the case at bar is merely a ministerial function.²⁹ It is a settled rule that after the consolidation of title in the buyer’s name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem, the writ of possession³⁰ becomes a matter of right. In the case of Vaca v. Court of Appeals,³¹ this Court held: . . . The question raised in this case has already been settled in Vda. De Jacob v. Court of Appeals [184 SCRA 199], in which it was held that the pendency of a separate civil suit questioning the validity of the mortgage cannot bar the issuance of the writ of possession, because the same is a ministerial act of the trial court after title on the property has been consolidated in the mortgagee. The ruling was reiterated in Navarra v. Court of Appeals [204 SCRA 850], in which we held that as a rule any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of possession. Indeed, the pendency of an action questioning the validity of a mortgage cannot bar the issuance of the writ of possession after title to the property has been consolidated in the mortgagee. Thus, it follows that at the expiration of the period of redemption, the mortgagee who acquires the property at the foreclosure sale can proceed to have the title consolidated in his name and a writ of possession issued in his favor.³² More to the point is the case of Ong v. Court of Appeals ,³³ where this Court held: In several cases, the Court has ruled that the issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial function. "The order for a writ of possession issues as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper motion and the approval of the corresponding bond. The judge issuing the order following these express provisions of law cannot be charged with having acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion." Therefore, the issuance of the writ of possession being ministerial in character, the implementation of such writ by the sheriff is likewise ministerial. Contrary to petitioners’ protestations that Veloso v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 205 SCRA 227 (1992) should only apply to cases wherein the one-year period for redemption has already lapsed, Veloso makes no such distinction. In said case, the Court merely observed that – "Worthy of note is that petitioners do not impugn the validity of the mortgage at its inception. Their assault is on it is founded on events allegedly transpiring after its execution. The tenability of their challenge to the mortgage may well be determined in the civil action (No. 136559) instituted by them in the Manila Regional Trial Court. But clearly, the pendency of that action does not and cannot bar the issuance of a writ of possession to the mortgagee who has, in the meantime, extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged property and acquired it as highest bidder in the subsequent public auction sale. The law is quite explicit on this point, and the right of the mortgagee thereunder unquestionable. And decisions abound applying the law and declaring it to be the court’s ministerial duty to uphold the mortgagee’s right to possession even during the redemption period." As a rule, any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of possession. Regardless of whether or not there is a pending suit for annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure itself, the purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice of course to the eventual outcome of said case. Hence, an injunction to prohibit the issuance of writ of possession is entirely out of place.1awphi1.nét Equally instructive is the recent case of Rempson Samson, et al. v. Judge Rivera, et al .³⁴ Under the provision cited above, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale may apply for a writ of possession during the redemption period by filing for that purpose an ex parte motion under oath, in the corresponding registration or cadastral proceeding in the case of a property with torrens title. Upon the filing of such motion and the approval of the corresponding bond, the court is expressly directed to issue the writ. This Court has consistently held that the duty of the trial court to grant a writ of possession is ministerial. Such writ issues as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper motion and the approval of the corresponding bond. No discretion is left to the trial court. Any question regarding regularity and validity of the sale, as well as the consequent cancellation of the writ, is to be determined in a subsequent proceeding as outlined in Section 8 of Act 3135. Such question cannot be raised to oppose the issuance of the writ, since the proceeding is ex parte. The recourse is available even before the expiration of the redemption period provided by law and the Rules of Court.1a\^/phi1.net The purchaser, who has a right to possession that extends after the expiration of the redemption period, becomes the absolute owner of the property when no redemption is made. Hence, at any time following the consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new transfer certificate of title in the name of the purchaser, he or she is even more entitled to possession of the property. In such a case, the bond required under Section 7 of Act 3135 is no longer necessary, since possession becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as the confirmed owner. . . . This Court has long settled that a pending action for annulment of mortgage or foreclosure does not stay the issuance of a writ of possession. On the 06 March 2001 order of respondent judge, it must be noted that the dismissal of the complainant’s appeal was premised on its withdrawal of its opposition to the petition which withdrawal was confirmed by the result of the investigation and report submitted by Justice Guerrero. Per report³⁵ of Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero, the investigation before the Court of Appeals yielded the information that there was in fact withdrawal by the complainant of its opposition to the petition. The report reads: On the sole issue to be resolved, the findings is that there was in fact a withdrawal by Norberto C. Maniquiz of his opposition in the "Ex-Parte Petition For Issuance of Writ of Possession" filed by Don C. Mejia in LRC No. Q-12842 (00). The reasons: (1) The transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing on 01 December 2000 reflects this fact. It says: "Atty. Mendoza: Your Honor, same appearance as counsel for oppositor. After conferring with my client, we will now withdraw our opposition. We would like to submit this case for decision." (2) As a consequence of the above-quoted manifestation, respondent Judge on the same day dictated in open court the following order: "In view of the withdrawal of the opposition and it appearing from the record that the petitioner has already completed the evidence presentation, this case is now deemed submitted for decision." (3) Even after the Maniquiz’s side received the decision on 18 January 2001, they did not file a motion for reconsideration thereof nor appealed therefrom within the reglementary period. Instead, per Norberto’s own admission in the investigation, they requested for another conference of the parties for possible settlement. Respondent Judge obliged but nothing happened during the parties’ discussion. It was then that the Maniquiz’s side filed a petition for relief from judgment. These sequence[s] of events only confirm as gospel truth respondent Judge’s factual finding that there was a withdrawal of complainant’s opposition. On the assailed order dated 16 July 2001, respondent judge justified the dismissal of the notice of appeal due to two apparent conflicting remedies adopted by the complainant. The Court Administrator found that there appears to be some justification for respondent’s judgment and we agree. Per the report submitted by the Office of the Court Administrator - . . . The Petition for Certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals precisely questioned the correctness of respondent’s order denying the complainant’s Petition for Relief From Judgment. The same question would also be presented to the appellate court in the appeal if the same had been allowed due course. Respondent must have considered the appeal and the petition for certiorari seeking, as they did, the same remedy, that is, the reversal of respondent’s Order of April 30, 2000 to be some form of forum shopping. We are not ready to pronounce his action as in error. However, assuming that the same was in error, it was a judgment error for which the respondent cannot be sanctioned in the absence of proof that the same was rendered due corrupt and improper motives.³⁶ The above disposes of attacks in the Decision dated 15 January 2001, the Order of 06 March 2001 and the break-open order of 17 September 2001 of the respondent Judge. Necessarily, the importation of gross ignorance of the law must also fail. We now come to the issue of bias and partiality. In administrative proceedings, the complainant bears the onus of establishing, by substantial evidence, the averments of his complaint.³⁷ Notatu dignum is the presumption of regularity in the performance of a judge’s functions, hence bias, prejudice and even undue interest cannot be presumed, specially weighed against a judge’s sacred allegation under oath of office to administer justice without respect to any person and do equal right to the poor and to the rich.³⁸ In a long line of cases decided by this Court,³⁹ it was held that bare allegations of bias are not enough in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor. In Sinnott v. Barte ,⁴⁰ it was further held, mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality. Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable error that may be inferred from the decision or order itself. Although the decision may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts concerning a judge’s integrity, absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself would be insufficient to establish a case against the judge. It is an opportune time to reiterate what this Court has said in the case of Araos v. Luna-Pison :⁴¹ Assuming for the nonce that respondent judge may have erred at all, the lapse would be a mere error of judgment. A judge may not be administratively charged for mere errors of judgment, in the absence of showing of any bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose. Indeed, it is settled that judges cannot be held to account criminally, civilly or administratively for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith.1a\^/phi1.net As held in Dionisio v. Escano [302 SCRA 411], if a party is prejudiced by the orders of a judge, his remedy lies with the proper court for the proper judicial action and not with the Office of the Court Administrator by means of an administrative complaint. Divergence of opinion between a trial judge and a party’s counsel is not proof of bias and partiality. All told, the absence of any evidence showing that respondent Judge acted in bad faith, ill-will or malice reduces the charges against her into a mere indictment. We cannot, however, give credence to charges based on mere suspicion and speculation. Complainant miserably failed to support its allegation of bias and partiality of the respondent Judge. Beyond its bare assertions, the Court cannot find any substantiated proof of this misdemeanor to warrant administrative sanction against the respondent. WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the complaint against respondent Judge Rogelio M. Pizarro, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 222, is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur. Footnotes ¹ Annex A, Rollo, pp. 12-15. ² Annex B, Rollo, pp. 16-19. ³ Annex C, Rollo, pp. 20-22. ⁴ Annex D, Rollo, pp. 23-27. ⁵ Annex E, Rollo, pp. 28-29. ⁶ Annex F, Rollo, p. 30. ⁷ Annex I, Rollo, pp. 39-40. ⁸ Annex G, Rollo, p. 31. ⁹ Rollo, pp. 33-36. ¹⁰ Annex J, Rollo, p. 42. ¹¹ Annex K, Rollo, pp. 43-46. ¹² Annex L, Rollo, pp. 47-48. ¹³ Annex M, Rollo, p. 49. ¹⁴ Annex N, Rollo, p. 50. ¹⁵ Annex O, Rollo, p. 51. ¹⁶ Rollo, p. 54. ¹⁷ Annex R, Rollo, p. 55. ¹⁸ Rollo, pp. 69-75. ¹⁹ Annex S, Rollo, p. 57. ²⁰ Rollo, pp. 1-10. ²¹ Rollo, p. 57-A. ²² Rollo, pp. 58-61. ²³ Rollo, pp. 63-68. ²⁴ Rollo, p. 104. ²⁵ Rollo, p. 105. ²⁶ Rollo, p. 113. ²⁷ It is nevertheless admitted that the decision in LRC Case No. Q-12842 (00) dated 15 January 2001, rendered by the respondent judge granting Mejia’s petition directing the issuance of a writ of possession in his favor had already become final and executory. ²⁸ A. G. Development Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 111662 , 23 October 1997, 281 SCRA 155, cited in Chailease Finance Corporation v. Ma, G.R. No. 151941 , 15 August 2003, 409 SCRA 250. ²⁹ F. David Enterprises v. Insular Bank of Asia and America, G.R. No. 78714, 21 November 1990, 191 SCRA 516. ³⁰ Manalo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141297 , 08 October 2001, 366 SCRA 752. ³¹ G.R. No. 109672, 14 July 1994, 234 SCRA 146, 148. ³² Union Bank of the Philippines v. CA, G.R. No. 134068 , 25 June 2001, 359 SCRA 480, citing Vaca v. CA, ibid. ³³ G.R. No. 121494, 08 June 2000, 333 SCRA 189, 197-198. ³⁴ G.R. No. 154355, 20 May 2004. ³⁵ Dated 11 April 2003. ³⁶ Rollo, p. 102. ³⁷ Cortes v. Agcaoili, A.M. No. RTJ-98-1414 , 20 August 1998, 294 SCRA 423, cited in Barbers v. Laguio, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-00-1568 , 15 February 2001, 351 SCRA 606. ³⁸ People v. Belaro, G.R. No. 99869 , 26 May 1999, 307 SCRA 591, 600, cited in Datuin, Jr. v. Soriano, A.M. No. RTJ-01- 1640 , 15 October 2002, 391 SCRA 1. ³⁹ People v. Kho, G.R. No. 139381 , 20 April 2001, 357 SCRA 290, citing Go v. CA, G.R. No. 106087, 07 April 1993, 221 SCRA 397; Abad v. Belen, A.M. No. RTJ-92-813, 20 January 1995, 240 SCRA 733; People v. Tabarno, G.R. No. 101338, 20 March 1995, 242 SCRA 456; Webb v. People, G.R. No. 127262 , 24 July 1997, 276 SCRA 243; People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129120 , 02 July 1999, 309 SCRA 705. ⁴⁰ A.M. No. RTJ-99-1453, 14 December 2001, 372 SCRA 282. ⁴¹ A.M. No. RTJ-02-1677, 28 February 2002, 378 SCRA 246, 252-253. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation