Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 155555. August 16, 2005
ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR., Petitioners,
vs.
LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners Isabel P. Portugal and her son, Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., assail the September 24, 20021 Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 1242 which dismissed, after trial, their complaint for annulment of title for failure to state a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.
From the records of the case are gathered the following material allegations claims of the parties which they sought to prove by testimonial and documentary evidence during the trial of the case:
On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz Lazo.3
On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta.4
On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to a boy whom she named Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her herein co-petitioner.5
On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli,6 later baptized as Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal, herein respondent.7
On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of Rights8 over the estate of their father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate on November 2, 1964.9 In the deed, Portugal’s siblings waived their rights, interests, and participation over a 155 sq. m. parcel of land located in Caloocan in his favor.10
On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34292 covering the Caloocan parcel of land in the name of "Jose Q. Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo."11
On February 18, 1984, Paz died.
On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate.
On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an "Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person"12 adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of land. TCT No. 34292/T-17213 in Portugal’s name was subsequently cancelled and in its stead TCT No. 15981314 was issued by the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City on March 9, 1988 in the name of respondent, "Leonila Portugal-Beltran, married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr."
Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and still later of the 1988 transfer by respondent of the title to the Caloocan property in her name, petitioners filed before the RTC of Caloocan City on July 23, 1996 a complaint15 against respondent for annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication executed by her and the transfer certificate of title issued in her name.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is not related whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the Caloocan parcel of land and that she perjured herself when she made false representations in her Affidavit of Adjudication.
Petitioners accordingly prayed that respondent’s Affidavit of Adjudication and the TCT in her name be declared void and that the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan be ordered to cancel the TCT in respondent’s name and to issue in its stead a new one in their (petitioners’) name, and that actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and litigation expenses be awarded to them.
Following respondent’s filing of her answer, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order chronicling, among other things, the issues as follows:
a. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr., is valid?
b. Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr.?
c. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested by plaintiffs.
d. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims under the complaint.16 (Underscoring supplied)
After trial, the trial court, by Decision of January 18, 2001,17 after giving an account of the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses and of their documentary evidence, without resolving the issues defined during pre-trial, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action on the ground that petitioners’ status and right as putative heirs had not been established before a probate (sic) court, and lack of jurisdiction over the case, citing Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario.18
In relying on Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the trial court held:
The Heirs of Yaptinchay case arose from facts not dissimilar to the case at bar.
x x x
In the instant case, plaintiffs presented a Marriage Contract, a Certificate of Live Birth, pictures (sic) and testimonial evidence to establish their right as heirs of the decedent. Thus, the preliminary act of having a status and right to the estate of the decedent, was sought to be determined herein. However, the establishment of a status, a right, or a particular fact is remedied through a special proceeding (Sec. 3(c), Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Court), not an ordinary civil action whereby a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong (ibid, a). The operative term in the former is "to establish", while in the latter, it is "to enforce", a right. Their status and right as putative heirs of the decedent not having been established, as yet, the Complaint failed to state a cause of action.
The court, not being a probate (sic) court, is without jurisdiction to rule on plaintiffs’ cause to establish their status and right herein. Plaintiffs do not have the personality to sue (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 3, in relation to Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 2, supra).19 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial court’s ratio decedendi in dismissing the case as diametrically opposed to this Court’s following ruling in Cariño v. Cariño,20 viz:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993]) However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. (Niñal, et al. v. Bayadog, GR No. 13378, March 14, 2000). In such cases, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Conceding that the ruling in Cariño was promulgated (in 2001) subsequent to that of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay (in 1999), the appellate court found Cariño to be inapplicable, however, to the case in this wise:
To be borne in mind is the fact that the main issue in the Cariño case was the validity of the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago Cariño, whose death benefits was the bone of contention between the two women both named Susan (viz., Susan Nicdao Cariño and Susan Yee Cariño) both of whom he married. It is not disputed in said case that SPO4 S. Cariño contracted two marriages with said two women during his lifetime, and the only question was: which of these two marriages was validly celebrated? The award of the death benefits of the deceased Cariño was thus, merely an incident to the question of which of the two marriages was valid. Upon the other hand, the case at bench is of a different milieu. The main issue here is the annulment of title to property. The only undisputed fact in this case is that the deceased Jose Portugal, during his lifetime, owned a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-34292. However, here come two contending parties, — herein plaintiffs-appellants and defendant-appellee, — both now insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent. x x x. The status and rights of the parties herein have not, therefore, been definitively established, as yet. x x x. Necessarily and naturally, such questions as to such status or right must be properly ventilated in an appropriate special proceeding, not in an ordinary civil action, whereunder a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong. The institution of an ordinary civil suit for that purpose in the present case is thus impermissible. For it is axiomatic that what the law prohibits or forbids directly, it cannot permit or allow indirectly. To permit, or allow, a declaration of heirship, or the establishment of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child to be determined in an ordinary civil action, not in an appropriate special proceeding brought for that purpose, is thus to impinge upon this axiom. x x x21 (Emphasis in the original, underscoring supplied).
The appellate court, by Decision of September 24, 2002,22 thus affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the case.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,23 faulting the appellate court to have erred when
I.
. . . it affirmed the RTC decision dismissing the initiatory complaint as it failed to state a cause of action.
II.
. . . (i) it applied the ruling in Heirs of Guido [and Isabel] Yaptingchay despite the existence of a later and contrary ruling in Cariño, and (ii) when the Honorable CA and the lower court failed to render judgment based on the evidence presented relative to the issues raised during pre-trial, . . .24 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thus prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Supreme Court that the questioned CA decision be reversed, and a new one entered in accordance with the prayers set forth in the instant complaint based on the above disquisition and evidence adduced by petitioners in the court a quo.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, should the Honorable Supreme Court find that the pronouncements in Cariño apply, a decision be entered remanding to the court a quo the determination of the issues of which of the two marriages is valid, and the determination of "heirship" and legitimacy of Jose Jr. and Leonila preparatory to the determination of the annulment of title issued in the name of Leonila.
Other relief and remedy just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.25 (Underscoring supplied).
Petitioners, in the main, argue that the appellate court misapplied Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay and in effect encouraged multiplicity of suits which is discouraged by this Court as a reading of Cariño shows; that Cariño allows courts to pass on the determination of heirship and the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child so long as it is necessary to the determination of the case; and that contrary to the appellate court’s ruling, they had established their status as compulsory heirs.
In the main, the issue in the present petition is whether petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of respondent’s Affidavit of Adjudication and of the TCT issued in her name.
In the above-cited case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay,26 the therein petitioners executed on March 17, 1994 an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, "owners-claimants" of the two lots mentioned therein. They later discovered on August 26, 1994 that a portion, if not all, of the two lots had been titled in the name of the therein respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation which in turn sold portions thereof to the therein individual respondents. The therein petitioners Heirs thus filed a complaint for annulment of titles. The therein respondents moved to dismiss the case for failure of the therein petitioners to, inter alia, state a cause of action and prove their status as heirs. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss in this wise:
But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a semblance of it—except the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned Yaptinchays—that they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must take precedence over the action for reconveyance . . .27 (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied).
On petition for certiorari by the Heirs, this Court, albeit holding that the petition was an improper recourse, found that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case. Citing Litam et al. v. Rivera28 and Solivio v. Court of Appeals,29 this Court held that "the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right."
In the above-cited case of Litam,30 Gregorio Dy Tam instituted a special proceeding for issuance of letters of administration before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, alleging in his petition that he is the son of Rafael Litam who died in Manila on January 10, 1951 and is survived by him and his therein named seven (7) siblings who are children of the decedent by his marriage to Sia Khin celebrated in China in 1911; that the decedent contracted in 1922 in the Philippines another marriage with Marcosa Rivera; and that the decedent left neither a will nor debt. Dy Tam thus prayed for the issuance of letters of administration to Marcosa Rivera, "the surviving spouse of the decedent." The CFI granted the petition and issued letters of administration to, on Marcosa’s request, her nephew Arminio Rivera.
While the special proceeding was pending, Dy Tam and his purported siblings filed a civil case before the same court, against the estate of Rafael Litam administrator Arminio Rivera and Remedios R. Espiritu, duly appointed guardian of Marcosa. In their complaint, Dy Tam and his purported siblings substantially reproduced the allegations made in his petition in the special proceeding, with the addition of a list of properties allegedly acquired during the marriage of the decedent and Marcosa.
Finding the issue raised in the civil case to be identical to some unresolved incidents in the special proceeding, both were jointly heard by the trial court, following which it rendered a decision in the civil case dismissing it, declaring, inter alia, that the plaintiffs Dy Tam et al. are not the children of the decedent whose only surviving heir is Marcosa.
On appeal to this Court by Dy Tam et al., one of the two issues raised for determination was whether they are the legitimate children of Rafael Litam.
This Court, holding that the issue hinged on whether Rafael Litam and Sia Khin were married in 1911, and whether Rafael Litam is the father of appellants Dy Tam et al., found "substantially correct" the trial court’s findings of fact and its conclusion that, among other things, the birth certificates of Dy Tam et al. "do not establish the identity of the deceased Rafael Litam and the persons named therein as father [and] it does not appear in the said certificates of birth that Rafael Litam had in any manner intervened in the preparation and filing thereof"; and that "[t]he other documentary evidence presented by [them] [is] entirely immaterial and highly insufficient to prove the alleged marriage between the deceased Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and [their] alleged status . . . as children of said decedent."
This Court went on to opine in Litam, however, that "the lower court should not have declared, in the decision appealed from, that Marcosa is the only heir of the decedent, for such declaration is improper in the [civil case], it being within the exclusive competence of the court in [the] [s]pecial [p]roceeding."
In Solivio,31 also cited in Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, there was a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased, who was a soltero, filed before the RTC of Iloilo. In the special proceeding, Branch 23 of said court declared as sole heir Celedonia Solivio, the decedent’s maternal aunt-half sister of his mother. Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, the decedent‘s paternal aunt-sister of his father, moved to reconsider the court’s order declaring Celedonia Solivio as sole heir of the decedent, she claiming that she too was an heir. The court denied the motion on the ground of tardiness. Instead of appealing the denial of her motion, Concordia filed a civil case against Celedonia before the same RTC, for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages. The civil case was raffled to Branch 26 of the RTC, which rendered judgment in favor of Concordia. On appeal by Celedonia, the appellate court affirmed the said judgment.
On petition for review filed before this Court by Celedonia who posed, among other issues, "whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain [the civil action] for partition and recovery of Concordia Villanueva’s share of the estate of [the deceased] while the [estate] proceedings . . . were still pending . . . in Branch 23 of the same court," this Court held that "[i]n the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedent’s estate, a court should not interfere with [estate] proceedings pending in a co-equal court," citing Guilas v. CFI Judge of Pampanga.32
This Court, however, in Solivio, upon "[c]onsidering that the estate proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless [therein private respondent-Concordia Villanueva] had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings, opted to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the interest of justice," and declared her an heir of the decedent.
In Guilas33 cited in Solivio, a project of partition between an adopted daughter, the therein petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas (Juanita), and her adoptive father was approved in the proceedings for the settlement of the testate estate of the decedent-adoptive mother, following which the probate court directed that the records of the case be archived.
Juanita subsequently filed a civil action against her adoptive father to annul the project of partition on the ground of lesion, preterition and fraud, and prayed that her adoptive father immediately deliver to her the two lots allocated to her in the project of partition. She subsequently filed a motion in the testate estate proceedings for her adoptive father to deliver to her, among other things, the same two lots allotted to her.
After conducting pre-trial in the civil case, the trial court, noting the parties’ agreement to suspend action or resolution on Juanita’s motion in the testate estate proceedings for the delivery to her of the two lots alloted to her until after her complaint in the civil case had been decided, set said case for trial.
Juanita later filed in the civil case a motion to set aside the order setting it for trial on the ground that in the amended complaint she, in the meantime, filed, she acknowledged the partial legality and validity of the project of partition insofar as she was allotted the two lots, the delivery of which she was seeking. She thus posited in her motion to set aside the April 27, 1966 order setting the civil case for hearing that there was no longer a prejudicial question to her motion in the testate estate proceedings for the delivery to her of the actual possession of the two lots. The trial court, by order of April 27, 1966, denied the motion.
Juanita thereupon assailed the April 27, 1966 order before this Court.
The probate court’s approval of the project of partition and directive that the records of the case be sent to the archives notwithstanding, this Court held that the testate estate proceedings had not been "legally terminated" as Juanita’s share under the project of partition had not been delivered to her. Explained this Court:
As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated (Siguiong vs. Tecson, supra.); because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefor has not elapse (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137). The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate o[r] intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol vs. Cano, supra,; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic vs. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil., 455, 460-461).34 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
This Court thus set aside the assailed April 27, 1966 order of the trial court setting the civil case for hearing, but allowed the civil case to continue because it "involves no longer" the two lots adjudicated to Juanita.
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugal’s estate, executed on February 15, 198835 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court.36 Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.37
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land,38 to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case – subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugal’s estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners’ status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners,39 the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, which bear repeating, to wit:
1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal, is valid;
2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal (Sr.);
3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested by plaintiffs;
4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under the complaint.40
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed September 24, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the trial court, Branch 124 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, for it to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties and render a decision on the above-enumerated issues defined during the pre-trial.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Rollo at 49-56.
2 Records at 212-230.
3 Exh. "3," Folder of Exhibits.
4 Exh. "A," Folder of Exhibits.
5 Exh. "B," Folder of Exhibits.
6 Exh. "4," Folder of Exhibits.
7 Exh. "5," Folder of Exhibits.
8 Exh. "G," Folder of Exhibits.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Exh. "C," Folder of Exhibits.
12 Exh. "E," Folder of Exhibits.
13 Exh. "C," Folder of Exhibits
14 Exh. "D," Folder of Exhibits.
15 Records at 1-5.
16 Id. at 78-80.
17 Id. at 212-230.
18 304 SCRA 18 (1999).
19 Records at 228-230.
20 351 SCRA 127 (2001).
21 CA Decision, Rollo at 49, 52-54.
22 Id. at 49-56.
23 Id. at 3-46.
24 Id. at 14.
25 Id. at 43-44.
26 Supra, note 18.
27 Id. at 22.
28 100 Phil. 364 (1956).
29 182 SCRA 119 (1990).
30 Supra, note 28.
31 Supra, note 29.
32 43 SCRA 111 (1972).
33 Ibid.
34 Guilas v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, supra at 117 (1972).
35 Exh. "E," Folder of Exhibits.
36 SEC. 1 Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. — If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. The parties to an extrajudicial settlement, whether by public instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the filing of the public instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a bond with the said register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property involved as certified to under oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that may be filed under section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two (2) years after the death of the decedent.
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. (Underscoring supplied).
37 Herrera, Remedial Law III-A, p. 31 (2005), citing Utulo v. Leona Pasion Vda. de Garcia, 66 Phil. 302 (1938).
38 Vide Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of [Portugal], supra, note 12.
39 Vide Pereira v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 154 (1989); Intestate Estate of Mercado v. Magtibay, 96 Phil. 383 (1955).
40 Supra, note 16.
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