EN BANC
Adm. Case No. 6490 September 29, 2004
(CBD 03-1054)
LILIA TABANG and CONCEPCION TABANG, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
On February 3, 2003, complainants Lilia Tabang and her mother, Concepcion Tabang, filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a verified complaint for disbarment or suspension against respondent Atty. Glenn C. Gacott for gross misconduct, deceit and gross dishonesty.
Complainants allege as follows:
Sometime between the years 1984 and 1985, Lilia sought the legal advice of then incumbent Judge Eustaquio Gacott, father of herein respondent, regarding her desire to buy a 30-hectare agricultural land in Barangay Bacungan, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, which consists of several parcels of land belonging to different owners. Judge Gacott informed Lilia that under the agrarian reform program of the government, she is prohibited from acquiring vast tracks of agricultural land, as she already owns other parcels of land. Judge Gacott then advised her to put the title of the lands in the names of fictitious persons and to keep the titles with her for easy disposition. Following the advice of Judge Gacott, Lilia bought the parcels of land using fictitious names. Eventually, Lilia was able to secure individual titles over these parcels of land in the names of 7 fictitious persons to wit:
TCT No. 12790 – Agnes Camilla
TCT No. 12794 – Andes Estoy
TCT No. 12791 – Leonor Petronio
TCT No. 12792 – Wilfredo Gomez
TCT No. 12793 – Elizabeth Dungan
TCT No. 12476 – Wilfredo Ondoy
TCT No. 12475 – Amelia Andes
Respondent knows this fact. Later on, Lilia and Concepcion decided to sell the subject parcels of land because they needed money for their medication and other necessary expenses. On the pretext that he is going to help them sell the subject property to prospective buyers, respondent borrowed the seven land titles from complainants. However, despite the lapse of one year from the time he borrowed the titles, respondent still failed to negotiate the sale of the property. He informed herein complainants that he lost all the seven land titles. Respondent then advised complainants to file a petition in court for re-issuance of title. Following respondent’s advice, Lilia Tabang, in the guise of acting as the "authorized agent-representative" of the fictitious owners, filed a case for the re-issuance of title to the seven parcels of land. However, in the course of the proceedings, the public prosecutor noticed that the signatures of the alleged owners in the seven individual Special Power of Attorney executed in favor of Lilia Tabang appear to have been signed by the same person because of the similarities in their strokes. The public prosecutor informed the trial court of this fact prompting the latter to summon the alleged principals. To avoid embarrassment and possible sanctions from the court because the alleged principals are in fact fictitious, Lilia withdrew the case without prejudice to the re-filing of the same. Subsequently, Lilia filed a new set of cases for re-issuance of title, changing the signatures of the fictitious owners. Upon knowledge that a new set of cases was filed, respondent executed or caused to be executed several documents, among which were Revocation of Special Power of Attorney and Affidavits of Recovery purportedly signed by the principals of Lilia Tabang. Respondent caused the annotation of these documents in the land titles covering the subject properties. Thereafter, respondent caused the publication of a notice representing himself as the owner of the subject parcels of land and indicating therein his desire to sell the said properties. Eventually, respondent was able to sell the seven parcels of land to seven individuals. However, only three of these buyers were legitimate, while the remaining four are dummies of respondent. As a result of selling the three parcels of land, respondent was able to receive ₱3,773,675.00. None of the proceeds of the sale was remitted to complainants.
Complainants contend that in executing the various Revocation of Special Power of Attorney and Affidavit of Recovery, affixing thereon the signatures of the fictitious registered owners of the disputed parcels of land, and in arrogating the ownership over the said lands upon himself, respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty and deceit. Complainants likewise allege that this is not the only case wherein respondent sold properties of his clients to third persons without his clients’ knowledge and consent.1
Respondent filed his Answer to the Complaint denying the material allegations of the complainants. He claims that the seven land titles covering the subject properties are valid and duly executed; and denies complainants’ allegations that the alleged owners are fictitious. Respondent further claims that the registered owners voluntarily sold the seven parcels of land to different individuals and his only participation in the said sale is that he was authorized by the registered owners to collect from the buyers the full payment of the lands sold. He further denies that complainant Lilia Tabang is the real owner and that she merely acted as a broker who was trying to promote the sale of the properties; that when she came to know that the properties were sold by their registered owners, she called up the law office of respondent and demanded that she be given her share or "balato" in the sale of the properties equivalent to 20% of the gross sales because of her alleged efforts exerted in promoting the sale of the subject parcels of land; that when respondent turned her down, Lilia threatened to put him in bad light and seek his disbarment. Respondent further denies complainants’ allegation that he sold real properties of some of his clients to third persons claiming that in all these cases his role was merely to notarize the documents of sale executed voluntarily by his clients and the buyers of their properties.2
The case, docketed as CBD Case No. 03-1054, was assigned by the IBP to Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro for report and recommendation. Commissioner Navarro conducted a mandatory conference on November 25, 2003 after which she required the parties to submit their respective position papers, together with all the necessary documents and duly verified affidavits of their witnesses, if any. In a report dated March 4, 2004, Commissioner Navarro found respondent guilty of gross misconduct for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.3 Accordingly she recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months.4
On April 16, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution adopting the report of Commissioner Navarro. However, the Board modified the recommended penalty and imposed the supreme punishment of disbarment.5
We do not agree with the IBP Resolution. The case should be remanded for further proceedings.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. Among the grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to the practice of law, willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, corrupt or willful appearance as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The grounds are not preclusive in nature even as they are broad enough as to cover practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in his professional career or in his private life. A lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his entrance to the Bar but are likewise essential demands for his continued membership therein.6
Nonetheless, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution.
For the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Indeed, considering the serious consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, the Supreme Court has consistently held that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.7
Moreover, in complaints for disbarment, a formal investigation is a mandatory requirement which may not be dispensed with except for valid and compelling reasons.8 Rule 139-B provides for the procedure of investigation in disbarment and disciplinary proceedings against attorneys before the IBP, thus:
Sec. 8. Investigation. – Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to answer, the Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of the case. He shall have the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on his behalf, and be heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte.
The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3) months from the date of its commencement, unless extended for good cause by the Board of Governors upon prior application.
Willful failure or refusal to obey a subpoena or any other lawful order issued by the Investigator shall be dealt with as for indirect contempt of court. The corresponding charge shall be filed by the Investigator before the IBP Board of Governors which shall require the alleged contemnor to show cause within ten (10) days from notice. The IBP Board of Governors may thereafter conduct hearings, if necessary, in accordance with the procedure set forth in this Rule for hearings before the Investigator. Such hearing shall as far as practicable be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its commencement. Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors shall within a like period of fifteen (15) days issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations, which shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action and if warranted, the imposition of penalty. (Emphasis ours)
In the present case, the Investigating Commissioner initiated the formal investigation by conducting a mandatory conference between the complainants and the respondent after both parties have filed their complaint and answer, respectively. The mandatory conference was supposedly held for the purpose of defining the issues and enabling the parties to stipulate facts. However, no definitive result was reached during the conference as respondent continued to deny all the allegations of the complainants. After the mandatory conference was held, no further hearings were conducted. Instead, the Investigating Commissioner merely required the parties to submit their respective position papers, including all the necessary documents and duly verified affidavits of witnesses, if any. On the sole basis of the pleadings filed by both parties and of the documents attached thereto, the Investigating Commissioner submitted her Report and Recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors.
Considering the gravity of the charges imputed against the respondent and the imposition of the penalty of disbarment being prayed for by complainants, the Investigating Commissioner should not have simply relied on the parties’ position papers and the pieces of documentary evidence submitted by them. She should have proceeded with the investigation by conducting formal hearings and calling upon the parties to present additional evidence to support their respective contentions. In the case of the complainants, the Investigating Commissioner should have required the presentation of the persons who allegedly executed the affidavits presented in evidence to prove the veracity of the allegations contained in said affidavits, at the same time affording respondent the opportunity to cross- examine the supposed affiants. The failure of the complainants to move for the presentation of the persons alleged to have executed the subject affidavits does not render the IBP powerless to conduct further investigation, considering its power to issue subpoena under the Rule.
In the same manner, the Investigating Commissioner should have compelled the persons named by the respondent as the original owners as well as the buyers of the subject properties to appear before her. The appearance of these witnesses could have easily been facilitated considering that the residence and office addresses of the three of the supposed buyers are all located in Makati while the residence of three of the original owners are located within Manila and the remaining four are residing in the province of Cavite which is very near Metro Manila. To repeat, under the above-quoted Rule, the Investigating Commissioner is authorized to issue subpoena to compel the appearance of persons and witnesses before it.
It bears to point out that majority of the pieces of evidence presented by complainants and respondent consists of affidavits and photocopies of documents. Not one of the persons who executed these affidavits and instruments was presented or subpoenaed by the Commissioner to identify their affidavits and give the adverse party opportunity to confront the witnesses in a formal hearing.
Consequently, no judgment could be rendered fairly and squarely on the issues raised in the subject administrative matter.
WHEREFORE, the instant administrative case is hereby REMANDED to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna*, Tinga**, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
* On leave.
** On leave.
1 Rollo, pp. 1-12.
2 Id., pp. 56-60.
3 Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
4 Rollo, pp. 198-211.
5 Id., p. 197.
6 Gonzaga vs. Villanueva, A.C. No. 1854, July 23, 2004 .
7 Gaviola vs. Salcedo, A.C. No. 3037, May 20, 2004, citing Santos vs. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622 and Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293.
8 Arandia vs. Magalong, 386 SCRA 187, 191 (2002).
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