SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-03-1489 March 31, 2004
DR. FRANCISCA T. YOINGCO and ATTY. NESCITO C. HILARIO, complainants,
vs.
HON. CONCEPCION V. GONZAGA, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In a verified complaint received by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on June 20, 2002, Dr. Francisca T. Yoingco and Atty. Nescito C. Hilario charged respondent Judge Concepcion V. Gonzaga of the Municipal Trial Court of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, with "Grave Abuse of Authority and/or Oppression and Gross Ignorance of the Law, Jurisprudence and Rules" relative to Criminal Cases Nos. 2000-185 to 2000-188, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Dr. Francisca T. Yoingco" for Violation of BP 22.
Complainant Dr. Yoingco is the accused while Atty. Hilario is her counsel in the said criminal cases. Before arraignment could be set, Dr. Yoingco filed a Motion to Quash on the ground that the MTC of Batangas has no jurisdiction because the subject checks were made, drawn and issued at the office of complainant in Makati, Metro Manila.
After hearing, respondent Judge Gonzaga issued an Order dated February 19, 2002 denying the Motion to Quash, ratiocinating, thus:
The ground of the Motion to Quash is improper venue. Considering that it is basic in law, as held in the case of Dacoycoy vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 195 SCRA 641 (1991) that trial court may not motu propio dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper venue, the court deemed it wise and prudent, to schedule the Motion for hearing, in order that it may be said that all efforts were exerted, to insure compliance with due process, to which every party is entitled, towards an ideal and impartial administration of justice.
. . .
Unlike jurisdiction over the subject matter, in these particular cases, the four checks issued by accused Dra. Yoingco to private complainant Norberto Carandang, which is conferred only by law, within the exclusive jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Courts, and may not be conferred by consent or waiver upon a court, which otherwise would have no jurisdiction, the venue of an action as fixed by statute, may be changed by consent of the parties and an objection on improper venue may be waived by the failure of the accused to raise it at the proper time. This was what actually happened in the instant cases for Violation of BP 22, when accused failed to raise the question of improper venue at the first instance that the cases were filed in court, more than a year ago.
Rules as to jurisdiction can never be left to the consent or agreement of the parties. Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional and hence may be waived. It is meant to provide convenience to the parties rather than restrict their access to the court, as it relates to the place of trial. In such an event, the court may still render a valid judgment.1
In the same Order, respondent set the arraignment of Dr. Yoingco on April 2, 2002. The arraignment was reset to June 10, 2002 but no arraignment was held on the said date up to the filing of the present administrative case.
Complainants charge respondent with:
I. Grave Abuse of Authority and/or Oppression:
a. that Judge Gonzaga violated the Constitutional right of Dr. Yoingco to speedy trial as provided for under the enabling law, R.A. 8493, and as implemented by Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98 dated August 11, 1998 which provides:
"The arraignment, and the pre-trial if the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. . . . "
II. Gross Ignorance of the Law, Jurisprudence, and Rules:
a. The ground raised in the Motion to Quash was that the MTC of Sto. Tomas, Batangas has no territorial jurisdiction over the case and the person of Dr. Yoingco because the alleged transaction took place in Makati City, including the issuance of the checks, the presentment to the bank of the said checks, and dishonor of the same and this was duly proven thru testimonial and documentary evidence during the hearing of her Motion to Quash; however, such findings were not included in the subject Order of February 19, 2002 in utter violation of Section 1 of Rule 36 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure;
b. Judge Gonzaga declared that the ground of the said Motion to Quash is VENUE, and NOT territorial jurisdiction over the case and person of the accused which clearly shows her incompetence and gross ignorance of the law and rules;
c. It is gross ignorance of jurisprudence for the respondent Judge to equate the issue of territorial jurisdiction with venue, as she cited the case of Dacoycoy vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (195 SCRA 641); and
d. It is falsification of judicial records or sheer gross ignorance on the part of Judge Gonzaga when she ruled that Dr. Yoingco "failed to raise the question of improper venue at the first instance that the cases were filed in court, more than a year ago" because Dr. Yoingco is NOT questioning ‘IMPROPER VENUE’ as claimed by the respondent Judge, but the territorial jurisdiction of the MTC of Sto. Tomas, Batangas to try and decide the subject criminal cases since the transaction involving the issuance, presentment, and dishonor of the subject checks were all done and had transpired in Makati City.2
On July 4, 2002, complainants filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Complaints with the OCA stating that respondent had explained to them the reasons for her action/inaction that justify the delay of the disposition of the criminal cases and that it would take time for them to verify the reasons given by Judge Gonzaga; and praying that their complaints be considered withdrawn without prejudice.3
On July 25, 2002, the OCA referred the complaint to respondent for her Comment.
In her Comment, respondent alleges, as follows:
1. Four (4) criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22 were filed against complainant Dr. Francisca T. Yoingco who never appeared in court and that it was her daughter-in-law who negotiated an amicable settlement in her behalf but which ended in futility. Hence, proceedings as mandated began on June 13, 2001 when the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
2. When the accused appeared for the first time, the court, seeing her advanced age, was moved to renew the efforts for settlement which her daughter-in-law had initiated. This was the reason the Court cited the Dacoycoy case even if it was civil in nature to support the stand that the court could motu propio dismiss the case and resolve the motion; and
3. It is not true that the delay in the arraignment of the accused was attributable to her. She points out that criminal cases were scheduled for trial once a week due to the unavailability of the public prosecutor. The trial of the case had been set but was deferred and postponed due to litigated motions filed and intervening incidents caused by the accused and counsel.4
In a Memorandum dated March 13, 2003,5 the OCA recommends that the complaints be re-docketed as a regular administrative case and that respondent be held administratively liable for acting on the criminal cases over which her court has no jurisdiction and fined in the amount of ₱10,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.
In a Resolution dated April 21, 2003,6 the Court noted the report of the OCA and directed that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter. In another Resolution7 of even date, the Court required the parties to manifest whether or not they were submitting the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed. Complainants responded in the affirmative.8 In her letter dated May 29, 2003, respondent likewise manifested her willingness to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed but points out that despite the pleadings filed and the notice of withdrawal of complaints, she cannot understand why this became an administrative matter.
In compliance with the Court’s Resolution dated March 8, 2004, the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, furnished us with certified true copies of the four criminal complaints adverted to in the present administrative case.
After going over the records of the case, the Court agrees with the findings of the OCA, except for the recommended penalty.
First, as stated by the OCA, the withdrawal of a complaint by the complainant does not necessarily ensure the dismissal of the administrative case. As a general rule, the Court does not dismiss administrative cases against members of the bench merely on the basis of withdrawal of charges9 even as the notice of withdrawal of the complaints filed by herein complainants is only a provisional withdrawal due to their assertion that they need time to verify the reasons given by Judge Gonzaga for the delay in the disposition of the criminal cases.
Secondly, the Court agrees with the finding of the OCA that the charge of delay in the arraignment of Dr. Yoingco cannot be considered against Judge Gonzaga in view of the lack of public prosecutor assigned to her court and the postponements at the instance of Dr. Yoingco. Thus, respondent should be exonerated from the charge of grave abuse of authority and oppression.
Thirdly, the Court agrees with the recommendation of the OCA that respondent be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law, jurisprudence and the rules.
The Motion to Quash is primarily anchored on lack of jurisdiction considering that the subject checks were not made, drawn and issued at Sto. Tomas, Batangas but in Makati City; that the MTC of Sto. Tomas, Batangas has no jurisdiction over the criminal complaints as the elements of the offense of violation of Bouncing Checks Law occurred in Makati City which is outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the MTC of Sto. Tomas, Batangas.
However, a close scrutiny of the allegations in the four criminal complaints show that all the subject checks were made, drawn and issued at Barangay San Vicente, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, all within the territorial jurisdiction of the court presided over by respondent.
Unfortunately, respondent denied complainants’ Motion to Quash for the wrong reasons: that the ground relied upon by Dr. Yoingco is improper venue which is only procedural, not jurisdictional and can be waived by failure to raise it at the proper time; that Dr. Yoingco failed to raise the ground of improper venue at the first instance that the cases were filed in court more than a year ago; and that by virtue of the ruling of the Court in a civil case, entitled, Dacoycoy vs. IAC,10 that when the ground is improper venue, the court cannot motu propio dismiss it but has to conduct hearing to ensure compliance with due process.
Respondent’s denial of the motion to quash is patently erroneous. It is an exception to the hornbook doctrine that when the subject of the complaint may be subject to judicial review, the administrative complaint shall be dismissed.11 In criminal proceedings, improper venue is lack of jurisdiction.12 Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction.13 Unlike in a civil case where venue may be waived, this could not be done in a criminal case because it is an element of jurisdiction. It is basic that one can not be held to answer for any crime committed by him except in the jurisdiction where it was committed.14
Respondent’s irresponsible convolution of the concept of venue in a civil case and in a criminal case exhibits ignorance of the law that caused undue confusion to the herein complainants. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the Rules of Criminal Procedure, he erodes the public confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is ignorance of the law.15
Considering that this is her first offense and considering further that there is no allegation or proof that the same was committed with malice or with bad faith or for monetary consideration,16 and the same did not cause undue damage or injury to complainants as the motion to quash was denied, although for the wrong reason, the Court deems it just to reprimand respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Concepcion V. Gonzaga is hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, (Acting Chairman), Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Puno, (Chairman), J., on official leave.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 17-19.
2 Rollo, pp. 3-5.
3 Rollo, p. 24.
4 Rollo, pp. 26-28.
5 Rollo, pp. 34-36.
6 Rollo, p. 37.
7 Rollo, p. 38.
8 Rollo, p. 40.
9 Enojas, Jr. vs. Gacott, Jr., 322 SCRA 272, 278-279 (2000).
10 195 SCRA 641.
11 Calleja vs. Santelices, 328 SCRA 61, 67 (2000); Vda. De Danao vs. Ginete 395 SCRA 542, 547 (2003).
12 Ganchero vs. Bellosillo, 28 SCRA 673, 676 (1969).
13 Lopez vs. City Judge, 18 SCRA 616, 619 (1966).
14 Hernandez vs. Albano, 19 SCRA 95, 100 (1967).
15 Oporto, Jr. vs. Judge Monserate, 356 SCRA 443, 450 (2001).
16 Lu vs. Siapno, 335 SCRA 181, 187 (2000).
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