SECOND DIVISION
A.M. MTJ-02-1448 March 25, 2004
ATTYS. JOSE B. JOSON and ANTHONY L. PO, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE BELEN B. ORTIZ, MeTC-Br. 49, Caloocan City, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J.:
Attys. Jose B. Sison and Anthony L. Po, counsel for the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 00-25537, "Perlinda Lim Yeung and Yeung Yan Seu v. Salvador Brecilla," for ejectment and damages before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 53, Caloocan City (MeTC-Br. 53), in their verified Complaint dated 15 March 2001 charged respondent Judge Belen B. Ortiz, Presiding Judge, MeTC-Br. 49, Caloocan City, and Pairing Judge of MeTC-Br. 53 of the same court, with Gross Inefficiency and Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, particularly Rules 3.08 and 3.09 thereof.
Specifically, complainants alleged that —
(a) Respondent Judge cancelled the preliminary conference scheduled on 27 September 2000 on the bare manifestation of defendant’s counsel that his brother "had already died," and reset the conference to 15 November 2000 "for the last time" despite the objection of plaintiff’s counsel;
(b) The preliminary conference as reset was again cancelled without any notice whatsoever in view of the alleged attendance of respondent Judge in a seminar;
(c) Respondent Judge never bothered to send an order in reference to the ten (10)-day period she gave during the preliminary conference on 6 December 2000 to submit position papers;
(d) Respondent Judge, despite the expiration on 16 December 2000 of the 10-day period to submit position papers with only plaintiff submitting one, failed to decide the case for more than three (3) months after it was submitted for decision;
(e) The inaction of respondent Judge prompted them to file on 6 March 2001 a Manifestation and Motion to Resolve and Render Decision in Civil Case No. 00-25537 and it was only then that respondent Judge acted by issuing an Order to the effect that the case could not be considered as submitted for decision yet on 164 December 2000 since there was no proof that the defendant had already received copy of her Order dated 6 December 2000; and
(f) The complainants received a copy of the Order dated 6 December 2000 on 14 March 2001 which was only mailed on 8 March 2001, which made them conclude that the order must have been either antedated or respondent Judge was grossly inefficient in failing to supervise her court staff that failed to send out her order promptly, if that be the case.
In her Comment dated 6 June 2001, respondent Judge claimed that as to the cancellation of the preliminary conference on 27 September 2000,1 Atty. Ariel de Guzman, who appeared in place of Atty. Po, did not object to a resetting when defendant’s counsel manifested that he was not mentally prepared to proceed with the conference as he had just received a long distance call informing him of the death of his brother. Hence, she contended that complainants could not claim that she cancelled the preliminary conference over the objection of plaintiff’s counsel.
As to the 15 November 2000 setting of the preliminary conference, respondent Judge averred that the cancellation was due to an unexpected call to an emergency meeting of the Board of Directors of the Metropolitan and City Judges Association of the Philippines, of which she is a member. According to her, there was no time to inform complainants about the cancellation since Atty. Po did not leave any telephone number through which he could be reached.
Respondent Judge also denied that her subject Order was antedated considering that it was given in open court during the preliminary conference on 6 December 2000. She maintained that it was mere oversight on the part of the staff of MeTC-Br. 53, Caloocan, in failing to send out copies of her order immediately after it was issued, and that such oversight was neither intentional nor attended with malice. She contended that she cannot be faulted for relying on the court employees to prepare her order, present it to her for her signature, and thereafter send it out to the parties considering her numerous tasks as Executive Judge, Presiding Judge of Branch 43, and Pairing Judge of both Branches 50 and 53.
With respect to her alleged failure to decide the case for more than three (3) months after it was allegedly submitted for decision, respondent Judge alleged that the case had not yet even been submitted for decision at the time complainants filed on 6 March 2001 their Manifestation and Motion to Resolve and Render Decision in Civil Case No. 00-25537 since copies of her Order dated 6 December 2000 anent the preliminary conference had not yet even been sent out and received by the parties.
On 26 March 2001, respondent Judge voluntarily inhibited herself from hearing and deciding the case and it was eventually re-raffled to Branch 51.
In its Report2 dated 15 May 2002, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that this case be dismissed for lack of merit but that respondent Judge be advised to be more careful in the performance of her duties.
The Court, in its Resolution of 13 January 2003 directed the OCA to conduct a complete investigation of the complaint and submit its report and recommendation within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt of notice thereof. This was done after due consideration of the seriousness of the allegations of inefficiency, antedating of a court order and violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Also, dismissing the complaint is too lenient considering that there are factual issues that are as yet to be determined, such as the following:
(1) Proof of the emergency meeting of the Board of Directors of the Metropolitan and City Judges Association of the Philippines which respondent Judge allegedly attended;
(2) The nature of the "emergency," which necessitated the cancellation of the scheduled preliminary conference which was supposedly "for the last time;"
(3) The measures taken by respondent Judge in determining who was or were responsible for the belated release of subject Order dated 6 December 2000; and,
(4) The administrative sanction taken against the erring employee or employees, if any.
The Court, in its 26 March 2003 Resolution, upon recommendation of the OCA in its 24 February 2003 Memorandum, referred the instant administrative case to Honorable Silvestre H. Bello, Jr., Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of records.
On 9 September 2003 Deputy Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock indorsed to Atty. Tomasita M. Dris, Clerk of Court of this Court’s Second Division, the sealed Report submitted by Executive Judge Silvestre H. Bello, Jr., together with the complete records of subject case. The recommendation of Executive Judge Bello, Jr. recommended thus:
We submit that the benefits of a mitigated liability be afforded the respondent Judge Belen B. Ortiz. That the case against her be DISMISSED but she would be WARNED to be more judicious in the supervision of her court personnel.
The Court deems it necessary to rule on the allegations set forth in the complaint notwithstanding complainants’ manifestation during the investigation conducted by Executive Judge Bello, Jr. that they were no longer interested in pursuing their complaint.
It was no less than the Executive Judge herself who cited Judge Cabatingan v. Judge Arcueno3 where this Court ruled that "[a] simple expediency such as a complainant’s change of mind followed by a withdrawal of the complaint would not result in the automatic dismissal of the case."4 Moreover, the following exposition strongly militate against the exoneration of the respondent Judge.
First. To the cancellation of the preliminary conference set on 15 November 2000, respondent Judge offered as an explanation the emergency meeting of the Board of Directors of the Metropolitan and City Judges Association of the Philippines (MCJAP), of which she is a member. In her position paper, she maintained that the purpose of the emergency meeting was "to conduct a final check and verification on the logistical/manpower arrangements, program, speakers, etc. for the three-day convention and seminar of the MCJAP which was due to start the following day, 16 November 2000 at the Century Park Sheraton Hotel."5 The Court, however, finds that the proffered purpose or nature of the "emergency" does not justify the cancellation of a scheduled hearing in the respondent Judge’s sala. She must be reminded that her duty to the court and the public is more important than attending to her duties to any private organization. The scheduled hearings of cases must be given priority as they have been priorly set with notice to all parties.
Moreover, the setting of the preliminary conference for 15 November 2000 was "for the last time" according to respondent’s own Order. She should have given meaning and due importance to her own warning.
Second. The denial of respondent Judge that her 6 December 2000 Order was antedated, since it was given in open court during the preliminary conference may be acceptable because of the fact that it was done in open court. However, it does not mean that the transcription and finalization of said Order could not have been antedated, considering that it was much belatedly released to the parties. The records show that the subject Order of 6 December 2000 was only mailed on 8 March 2001, two (2) days after petitioners filed with the MeTC-Br. 53 their Manifestation and Motion to Resolve and Render Decision in Civil Case No. 00-25537. Clearly, the act of finally sending out the Order is by itself evidence of the blatant inefficiency, if not, worse still, a desperate measure aimed at covering-up the patent neglect.
Definitely, respondent judge cannot seek refuge in the alleged failure of her staff to send out her order immediately after it was issued nor in the incompetence of his subordinates to excuse her own inefficiency since proper and efficient court management is her own responsibility.6 She is the master of her own domain and should take responsibility for the mistakes of those under her.7
Thus, in failing to ensure that her Order dated 6 December 2000 was properly sent out to the parties, respondent was definitely remiss in her duties under Rules 3.08 and 3.09 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, thus:
Rule 3.08. — A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence in court management, and facilitate the performance of the administrative functions of other judges and court personnel.
Rule 3.09. — A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity.
But more than that, she failed to give due importance to the very purpose for the adoption of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, i.e., to provide an expeditious settlement of the cases covered by it, and to avoid unnecessary delays in their disposition. It is disappointing at the very least to know that it was the court, nay the judge herself, that occasioned the delay sought to be prevented by the Rule.
Moreover, respondent Judge cannot be excused by reason of her being Executive Judge, Presiding Judge of Branch 43 and Pairing Judge of Branches 50 and 53. We have already ruled that the designation of a judge as an Executive Judge or as Acting Presiding Judge of two (2) other salas does not excuse the judge from complying with the duty to decide cases within the prescribed period.8 The other branches temporarily assigned to her have their own Branch Clerks of Court to handle the affairs of their respective branches, so that respondent Judge cannot claim that her Branch Clerk of Court and the staff under her were overburdened because of the other branches assigned to her. Each branch has its own responsibilities even if assigned temporarily under the judge of another branch.
Third. The fact that Civil Case No. 00-25537 was not yet submitted for decision at the time complainants filed their Manifestation and Motion to Resolve and Render Decision in Civil Case No. 00-25537 on 6 March 2001 is of no moment and cannot absolve respondent Judge from administrative liability. Precisely the reason why the subject case was decided only on 30 March 2001,9 or more than ten (10) months after it was filed on 26 May 2000, and more than three (3) months after the preliminary conference held on 6 December 2000 was because it took so long before the parties received respondent Judge’s written Order. The date of receipt by the parties of the said Order is crucial since it is from there that the 10-day period for submission of position papers is to be reckoned.10 The date of filing of position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing them, is in turn crucial in determining the 30-day period11 within which the court ought to render judgment.12
Besides, it was respondent Judge cannot be heard to claim that the parties were given ten (10) days to file their position papers. She was well aware that upon the expiration of the period for submission by the parties of their position papers, or on 16 December 2000, the case would be submitted for decision. Why was there delay on her part to decide the case for more than thirty (30) days after the case was deemed submitted for decision? The reglementary period for deciding cases covered by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is only thirty (30) days and not three (3) months as respondent Judge Comment seems to impliedly in his Comment.
Fourth. Also, respondent Judge cannot be heard to claim that delay could have been avoided had complainants themselves been more vigilant in inquiring from the Clerk of Court whether her Order of 6 December 2000 had been sent out and when; that instead of calling the attention of the Clerk of Court to the oversight immediately and simply without much "brouhaha," complainants allegedly allowed months to pass by knowing fully well that the case would be submitted for decision only after the parties shall have filed their respective position papers within ten (10) days from receipt of the order.
In Requierme, Jr. v. Yuipco,13 we ruled that it was unthinkable for a judge to contend that complainants failed to remind her to issue the order, for it is not their duty but hers to issue a pre-trial order. In the instant case, it was herein respondent’s responsibility, not complainants, to ensure that her Order of 6 December 2000 was accordingly released.
In fine, the explanations of respondent Judge to the allegations of complainants failed to absolve her from administrative liability. Her collective acts of inefficiency are clearly known in her inability to carry out her duties with efficacy and alacrity. Verily, the Court cannot brush aside and label her acts as mere oversights and dismiss the charges. Instead, respondent Judge must be imposed a proportionate penalty for conduct violative of the Code of Judicial Conduct to which she is bound as Judge.
In Belen v. Soriano,14 the Court admonished the respondent Judge therein and imposed upon him a fine of Two Thousand Pesos (₱2,000.00) for failure to file his Order dismissing two criminal cases for grave threats for lack of jurisdiction, and for his delay of more than one year in furnishing the prosecution a copy of said Order.
In Heirs of the Late Nasser D. Yasin v. Felix,15 the respondent Judge was ordered to pay a fine of Two Thousand Pesos (₱2,000.00) for failing to ensure that a written Notice of Hearing on a petition for habeas corpus was sent by his staff to the Provincial Prosecutor prior to the hearing.
Considering that in the present case, the respondent Judge incurred a delay of three (3) months before she issued the 6 December 2000 Order, this Court deems the imposition upon respondent Judge of a fine of Two Thousand Pesos (₱2,000.00) warranted under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, for violation of Canons 3.08 and 3.09 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, respondent Judge Belen B. Ortiz, MeTC-Br. 49, Caloocan City, is FINED TWO THOUSAND PESOS (₱2,000.00), with warning that a repetition of the same will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Respondent Judge mistakenly referred to the cancelled conference on 27 September 2000 as 25 September 2000 in her Comment.
2 Penned by Deputy Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock, approved by Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
3 A.M. No. MTJ-00-1323, 22 August 2002, 387 SCRA 532.
4 Id. at 540.
5 Rollo, p. 74.
6 Ong v. Rosales, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1459, February 2000, 325 SCRA 689.
7 Pantaleon v. Guadiz, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-00-1525, 25 January 2000, 323 SCRA 147.
8 Cases submitted for decision before retired Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., RTC-Br. 53, Manila, A.M. No. 99-7-250-RTC, 5 April 2000, 329 SCRA 637.
9 Decision penned by Judge Eleanor R. Kwong, MeTC-Br. 51, Caloocan City, after respondent Judge Ortiz inhibited from the case on 26 March 2001 in view of this administrative complaint.
10 Sec. 9, The 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
11 The period of deciding cases under Summary Procedure is only thirty (30) days and not three (3) months or ninety (90) days as alleged by complainants.
12 See note 8, sec. 10.
13 A.M. No. RTJ-98-1427, 27 November 2000, 346 SCRA 25.
14 A.M. No. MTJ-94-920, January 20, 1995, 240 SCRA 298.
15 A.M. No. RTJ-94-1167, December 4, 1995, 250 SCRA 545.
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