SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 147789 January 14, 2004
ALEXANDER P. RUGAS, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as amended, of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 23419 (CR) affirming with modification the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Branch 81, in Criminal Case No. 2095.
The Antecedents
On December 11, 1997, the petitioner Alexander P. Rugas was charged with Frustrated Homicide in an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 16th day of September 1997, at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, in barangay Taclobo, municipality of San Fernando, province of Romblon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with a deadly weapon one GERBERTO RAFOL, inflicting upon the latter critical injuries in different parts of his body, which ordinarily would cause the death of said Gerberto D. Rafol, thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the felony of homicide, as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused and that is by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to the victim which prevented his death.
Contrary to law.3
The petitioner was duly arraigned, assisted by counsel and entered a plea of not guilty.
The Case for the Prosecution
As synthesized by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals, the prosecution was able to establish the following:
At around 9:00 o’clock in the evening of September 16, 1997, Herberto (or Gerberto) Rafol was conversing with Perla Perez in the street fronting the house of Anda Romano in barangay Taclobo, San Fernando, Romblon, when the accused Alexander P. Rugas, suddenly stabbed him at his left thigh. He faced him to know who stabbed him but the accused stabbed him on his stomach. He ran and shouted for help. Somebody helped him in boarding him to a tricycle and he was brought to the hospital at Cajidiocan where Dr. Fermin M. Fatalla operated on him and issued the medico-legal certificate, dated September 25, 1977 (Exh. F) and he drew a sketch (Exh. G). Dr. Fatalla found a stab wound on the right upper quadrant of the abdomen, 3 cms. in length and about 4 to 5 cms. in depth penetrating the abdominal cavity as well as the right lobe of the liver. This was a fatal wound, involving as it did the liver, one of the vital organs of the body. The patient could die of severe hemorrhage if no surgical operation was done. And he immediately operated the patient upon arrival at the hospital. The second stab wound was 7.5 cms. in length located at the lower left quadrant or at the uppermost part of the left lateral thigh. This was not a fatal wound. Both could have been caused by any sharp pointed or bladed instrument like a knife. The first stab wound could have been inflicted with the assailant in front of the victim or at the right side of the victim or somewhere obliquely to the right of the patient, using his right or left hand. The second stab wound could have been inflicted with the assailant in front or could be on the left side of the victim, obliquely to the side of the victim, which he could inflict if he comes from the rear or from the back of the victim using his right hand.
According to private complainant, he first saw the accused coming about twenty-five (25) meters from him. He directly came to him and he did not know that he was holding a knife. He just came all of a sudden and he did not know he would stab him. Before this incident, they did not quarrel and had no misunderstanding.
He spent a total of P25,390.00 as a result of these injuries he sustained. (Exhs. B, B-1 and B-2; Exhs. C, C-1 to C-41; and Exhs. E-1 to E-10).4
The petitioner invoked self-defense. He testified that at about 9:00 a.m. on September 16, 1997, he was in the house of his aunt at Barangay Taclobo, San Fernando, Romblon. His aunt had asked him to take care of her children. While he was in the kitchen slicing lemon, he heard someone shouting outside the house: "Get out those who are brave!" He then pocketed the knife he was using and went out of the house to find out what the commotion was all about.
Outside, the petitioner saw Crispulo Romano, Joval Rones and Herberto Rafol. Rafol was armed with a bolo. He went out of the gate and asked Rafol, "Why are you like that?" Peeved, Rafol handed his bolo over to Rones and approached the petitioner, kicking him on the left arm. The two then had a fistfight. When the petitioner saw Rones raise his bolo, he pulled out the knife from his pocket to defend himself. Rafol also pulled out a knife of his own. The petitioner then stabbed Rafol on the front portion of his body, and the latter’s knife fell to the ground.
The petitioner picked up his knife and stabbed Rafol anew. He then faced Rones, who ran away. The petitioner did not notice where Romano had gone. He then fled from the scene of the crime and proceeded to the house of his aunt.
The petitioner’s testimony was corroborated in part by Jovy Vicente. He testified that at about 9:00 p.m. on September 16, 1997, he was wheeling his bicycle on his way home. He passed by Rafol who was then conversing with Perla Perez. He saw Rafol holding an empty bottle of gin and Romano holding a bolo. The two were already inebriated. He saw the petitioner emerge from the gate of his aunt’s house and walk past him on his right side.
The petitioner’s aunt, Perla Perez, testified that she saw Rafol holding a bolo. When she saw the petitioner and Rafol throwing stones at each other, she was so petrified that she frantically fled from the scene, her legs trembling. However, she contradicted herself when she also testified that she saw Rafol hand over his bolo to Rones, and Rafol and the petitioner boxing each other. Afraid, she fled from the scene. She did not witness the stabbing of Rafol by the petitioner.
The trial court, thereafter, rendered judgment convicting the petitioner of the crime charged and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty, appreciating against him the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused ALEXANDER P. RUGAS, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Homicide under the Information, dated December 11, 1997, and hereby sentences him to a prison term of not less than 6 years and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessories of the law, to pay Herberto Rafol the sum of P25,390.00 as and for actual expenses, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The period of preventive imprisonment the accused had undergone shall be credited in his favor to its full extent in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.5
The trial court declared that the petitioner failed to prove that he acted in self-defense when he stabbed the victim twice on the left side of the body and on the uppermost portion of the left thigh. The petitioner likewise failed to surrender to the police authorities and give a statement stating that he stabbed the victim in self-defense, and account for the knife he used in stabbing the victim. The court also declared that the petitioner’s testimony and those of his witnesses contradicted each other.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with modifications, with the following ratiocinations:
The defense proved that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when he allegedly kicked the accused. This is just the mere claim of the accused which is not corroborated by Mrs. Perez who testified that there was a fistfight between the two. Perla Perez declared that the two had a fistfight because of the shout, the brave come out (tsn, Dec. 2, 1998, p. 7). Aside from this, when asked by the court if the accused was injured when he was kicked at the eyebrow, the accused said no. Simply, this Court does not believe that the victim kicked the accused at the eyebrow. The accused was apparently inconsistent, as the trial court observed in its ratiocination, is exemplified to wit: "True, he claimed that Rafol kicked him in his left arm before the alleged fistfight between him and Rafol (Alexander P. Rugas, Jr., on direct examination, tsn, May 14, 1999, p. 6), yet he would point later to his eyebrow as sustaining no injury as a result of the kick by Rafol (supra, on cross-examination, p. 10) likewise, when asked in what part of the body he stabbed Herberto Rafol of the first time, he answered in front, with the accused waving his hand up and down (supra, p. 13), when actually it was almost directly on the left side of the body of Rafol at the uppermost part of the left lateral thigh and certainly not in front as demonstrated by the accused (please refer also to sketch G).
As questions were profounded (sic) on both the prosecution’s and defense’s witnesses, it can be traced that they knew each other. If this is the case, it can be said therefore, that complainant knew that the one whom he claimed to be he was talking with at the time was the aunt of the accused. Yet, the victim has no apprehension in his claim that he was called by Mrs. Perla Perez. As this court went over the testimony of the prosecution’s witnesses, it finds their testimony to be more consistent and credible. Capole, another prosecution’s witness, testified that he saw the accused with a knife running towards the victim. The defense obviously tried to destroy the testimony of the said witness but this Court believes that it failed.
While on the other hand, the defense witness Perla Perez’ answers were evasive and not responsive to the questions profounded (sic) when cross-examination was undertaken on her. In her direct examination, she testified that she had a companion Violeta Eling (tsn, Dec. 2, 1998, p. 3), they were near the street where the store was also near (supra, p. 4). But when Alex went out to ask "Why are you like that?" allegedly to the victim, Perez declared that she was then alone. And Yolanda was far (tsn, Dec. 2, 1998, p. 29). This court also notes Perez’ testimony at first that the victim broke a bottle of gin but who later admitted that she did not see it but only overheard it from a certain Yolanda. But according to her, Yolanda was far from her. This court doubts the credibility of this witness. Besides, she admitted she had not witnessed anything except that she heard the shouting and thereafter left then.
Certainly, this court is not impressed with the theory of the accused that the victim, Rafol, was holding a bolo at the time but handed it later allegedly to one Joval Rones. That at the course of the fistfight, complainant drew a knife while Joval Rones was raising his hand holding the bolo. These two aggressors were armed if we are to believe the defense but despite of that, accused with a mere knife and who was not ready for a fight if he is to be believed because he was slicing a lemon at the kitchen then faced his aggressors without fear. Again, if we would take hook line and sinker the defense’s theory, there are three companions of the victim so that, there were four in all. Yet, it is surprising and contrary to human nature and experience that accused never suffered even a slight injury. The physical facts in the instant case reveals that accused did not act in self-defense.
In the present case, the defense claimed that the victim shouted while in the street "Get out those who are brave." So that accused got out and asked "why are you like that?" Then a fistfight ensued. We opine that accused herein voluntarily and practically face a fight. The rule is when one agrees to engage in a fight, he cannot plead self-defense because there is no unlawful aggression to speak of.
Also, we find application by analogy of an old ruling of the Supreme Court, which held as follows:
"The court a quo rejected the claim of self-defense interposed by the appellant. We find that such plea cannot be availed of because no unlawful aggression, so to speak, was committed by the deceased, Rodolfo Saldo, and Hernando Caunte against the appellant. Appellant’s version of the incident was to the effect that he had come to the aid of Villafria at the latter’s call when Villafria boxed Mariano Dioso and engaged the group of Dioso, Saldo and Caunte in a fight. In other words, he voluntarily joined the fight, when he did not have to. He voluntarily exposed himself to the consequences of a fight with his opponents. Granting arguendo that the first attack came from Dioso or Saldo or Caunte, yet same cannot be considered an unlawful or unexpected aggression. The first attack which came from either is but an incident of the fight. (People vs. Kruse, C.A., 64 O.G. 12632): (Reyes, Revised Penal Code on Crim. Law, 12th Ed., 1981, p. 168) (underscoring supplied)
Granting arguendo that the victim and his companion have had shouted, "get out those who are brave," the accused’s name was never mentioned or called out. The victim was then in the street but the accused went out from the house and asked the victim why they were like that which only shows that he exposed himself to the consequences of a fight as explained by the Supreme Court in the aforequoted ruling.6
In this case, the petitioner asserts that contrary to the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, he proved that he acted in complete self-defense when he stabbed Rafol. Rones raised a hand that held a bolo and Rafol was armed with a knife. They had a confederate in the person of Romano. He was alone against three adversaries, two of whom were armed with lethal weapons, so he stabbed Rafol to defend himself. Rafol kicked him on the eyebrow and as a consequence, he suffered disgrace and humiliation. The petitioner contends that Rafol’s act of kicking him without justifiable cause can be considered as an unlawful aggression, citing the ruling of this Court in People v. Sabio.7
The petition has no merit.
First. The determination of the unlawful aggressor’s identity, as between the appellant or the victim, is a factual issue.8 In this case, the trial court ruled that the appellant, not the victim, was the unlawful aggressor, and that the appellant’s evidence to prove his defense was incredible, thus:
The accused interposed, in effect, self-defense. There is no showing, however, that he voluntarily surrendered to the authorities even on the barangay level. Neither did he inform any such authorities that he acted in self-defense. No police statements whatever were executed by him or by any witness in his behalf. The knife he used was unaccounted for. While the victim, Herberto Rafol, almost died due to one of his stab wounds the accused admittedly inflicted upon him, assailant Alexander P. Rugas, Jr. was unable to exhibit even the slightest scratch on himself. True, he claimed that Rafol kicked him on his left arm before the alleged fistfight between him and Rafol (Alexander P. Rugas, Jr., on direct examination, tsn, May 14, 1999, p. 6), yet he would point later to his eyebrow as sustaining no injury as a result of the kick by Rafol (supra on cross examination, p. 10); likewise, when asked in what part of the body he stabbed Herberto Rafol for the first time, he answered in front, with the accused waving his hand up and down (supra, p. 13), when actually it was almost directly on the left side of the body of Rafol at the uppermost part of the left lateral thigh and certainly not in front as demonstrated by the accused (please refer also to the sketch, Exh. G).
These badges of guilt or circumstances coupled with the failure of the accused to prove self-defense which he invoked, in effect, by clear and convincing evidenced are fatal to his defense. As the burden of proof is shifted on him, he must consequently rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution. (People vs. Edgar Umadhay Travasas, et al., G.R. No. 119544, August 3, 1998, Kapunan, J.; Case Digests of Supreme Court Decisions, August 3, 1998, Vol. 40, No. 2, p. 275). His version failed to convince as against that of the prosecution. His conviction must follow.9
Case law has it that the findings of the trial court and its assessment and probative weight of the testimonies of witnesses are accorded by the Court high respect, if not conclusive effect, especially when affirmed by the CA, and in the absence of any justifiable reason to deviate from the said findings. This is in view of the trial court’s unique advantage of being able to monitor and observe at close range the deportment and conduct of witnesses as they testify. We have reviewed the records and found no such justification to modify the trial court’s findings.
Second. Like alibi, self-defense is inherently a weak defense which can be easily fabricated.10 When the accused interposes self-defense, he hereby admits having caused the injuries of the victim. The burden of proof then shifts on him to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, the confluence of the essential requisites for such a defense, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed and to prevent or repel it; (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the prosecution’s, for even if the latter is weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing.11 In People v. Alfaro,12 and People v. Camacho,13 we held that the failure of the accused to account for the presentation of the bladed weapon allegedly used by the victim is fatal to his plea of self-defense. In this case, the appellant failed to account for the knife supposedly held by the victim and the bolo which the victim allegedly handed over to Rones. He also failed to account for the knife he used in stabbing the victim and to surrender himself and the said knife to the police authorities and to admit having stabbed the victim in self-defense.14 Such failure rejects appellant’s claim of self-defense.15
Third. The petitioner’s reliance on our ruling in People v. Sabio,16 citing the ruling of the Supreme Court of Spain on January 20, 1904, is misplaced. In that case, the Court ruled that a slap on the face is an unlawful aggression since the face represents a person and his dignity. Slapping the face of a person is a serious personal attack; it is a physical assault, coupled with a willful disgrace, nay, a defiance, of an individual’s personality; and it may, therefore, be frequently regarded as placing in real danger a person’s dignity, rights and safety. In this case, there is no evidence that the victim slapped the petitioner. The petitioner merely claimed that he was hit on his eyebrow which the trial court and the Court of Appeals found to be baseless. This reliance on People v. Sabio to sustain the claim that the petitioner intended to defend his honor, is inconsistent with his testimony that he stabbed the victim to defend himself from an imminent physical assault when the latter pulled out a knife. This is also inconsistent with the fact that the victim was stabbed three times.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that treachery attended the commission of the crime and that it was merely a generic aggravating and not a qualifying circumstance. As found by the trial court, the attack on the victim was so sudden and unexpected that the victim had no time to prepare and defend himself.17 However, such modifying circumstance was not alleged in the Information as mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.18 Thus, treachery cannot be considered by the Court even as a generic aggravating circumstance. Although the crime took place before the said Rule took effect, it should nevertheless be applied retroactively as it is favorable to the appellant.19
Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal in its full range. The penalty for frustrated homicide is one degree lower than reclusion temporal, or prision mayor, which has a range of from 6 years and one day to 12 years. From the penalty of prision mayor shall be taken the maximum of the indeterminate penalty, taking into account the modifying circumstances attendant in the commission of the crime, if any. There being no modifying circumstances in the instant case, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the medium period of prision mayor, which has a range of from eight years and one day to ten years. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full range of the penalty not lower than prision mayor, which is prision correccional, with a range of from six months and one day to six years.
The trial court failed to award moral and exemplary damages to the victim. The decision of the trial court shall, thus, be modified. The appellant is ordered to pay P25,000.00 as moral damages20 to the victim Herberto D. Rafol, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages,21 conformably to current jurisprudence.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Branch 81, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Petitioner Alexander P. Rugas is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide defined and penalized under Article 247 in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstance in the commission of the crime, is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum. The petitioner is hereby directed to pay to the victim Herberto D. Rafol P25,000.00, as moral damages, and P25,000.00, as exemplary damages. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Penned by Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr., with Associate Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Perlita J. Tria Tirona concurring.
2 Penned by Judge Placido C. Marquez.
3 Rollo, p. 36.
4 Rollo, p. 37.
5 Rollo, p. 32.
6 Rollo, pp. 38-41.
7 G.R. No. 23734, April 27, 1967.
8 People v. Genebazzo, 361 SCRA 572 (2001).
9 Rollo, p. 31
10 People v. Moay, 296 SCRA 292 (1998).
11 People v. Camacho, 359 SCRA 200 (2002).
12 119 SCRA 204 (1982).
13 Supra.
14 Rollo, p. 129.
15 People v. Piamonte, 303 SCRA 577 (1999).
16 19 SCRA 901 (1967).
17 People v. Perez, 351 SCRA 549 (2001).
18 SEC. 8. Designation of the offense.—The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
19 People v. Iluis, G.R. No. 135844-45, November 24, 2003.
20 Article 2219, paragraph 1, New Civil Code.
21 People v. Catubig, 363 SCRA 621 (2001).
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
