FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 146020 May 29, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NORMAN PALARCA y MERCADO alias "Bong", accused-appellant.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 12, in Criminal Case No. 605-M-99, convicting accused-appellant of the crime of rape; sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; and ordering him to pay the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, plus the costs of suit.
The facts of the case as alleged by the prosecution are as follows: At the time of the incident, private complainant Concepcion C. Javier, was a 70 year old widow who personally tended her 24-hour sari-sari store located at 101 Rosal Street, Alido Heights Subdivision, Bulacan. She was suffering from recurrent insomnia, thus, she regularly took sleeping pills to ward off her sleeping problem.2
Twenty-eight year old accused-appellant, single, was then working as a keyboardist and sequencer of an establishment that produces "minus one" music. He was a resident of the same subdivision and a frequent buyer at private complainant’s store during the wee hours of the morning.3
On May 19, 1998, at 5:00 in the early morning, private complainant was tending her sari-sari store and waiting for her two children to leave the house for Manila. At that time, accused-appellant was still in front of the store finishing the two bottles of beer he bought from private complainant. After her children left, private complainant went to the kitchen and took her regular dose of sleeping pill.4
Suddenly, accused-appellant entered through the kitchen door. He swiftly darted towards private complainant; shoved her on the forehead and pushed her against the kitchen counter. When she attempted to run, he grabbed her arm and punched her twice on the abdomen, causing her to fall to the ground. Though private complainant was reeling from the physical assault as well as from the effects of the sleeping pill, she felt accused-appellant raise her duster and remove her underwear. She saw him unzip his pants and pull down his briefs. Then, accused-appellant forced her legs open and raped her. She felt pain and bled, but she could do nothing as she was feeling very weak. Moments later, accused-appellant put on his pants and pointed the blood on the floor to private complainant.5
After accused-appellant left, private complainant struggled to get up and wiped the blood on the floor. Then, she proceeded to the bedroom where one of her daughters, Teresa, was sleeping. Teresa woke up and saw the bloodied underwear of her mother. Private complainant told her that she was raped by accused-appellant but failed to give the details as she dozed off to sleep.6
The following day, May 20, 1998, private complainant submitted herself for physical examination at the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory in Malolos, Bulacan. Said examination yielded the following results:
x x x x x x x x x
PHYSICAL INJURIES: With contusion at the right upper arm. Contusion at the abdomen.
GENITAL:
PUBIC HAIR: moderate; white
LABIA MAJORA: gaping
LABIA MINORA: light brown
HYMEN: Transformed to caruncular.
EXTERNAL VAGINAL ORIFICE:
VAGINAL CANAL: With abrasions, multiple of the vaginal wall.
CERVIX: none
PERI-URETHRAL AND VAGINAL SMEARS:
REMARKS: With abrasions, multiple of vaginal wall.7
Accused-appellant, on the other hand, denied the accusation against him. He maintained that on the night of May 18, 1998, he and several others attended a "despedida" party in the house of his friend, Jonjon. At 2:00 in the early morning of May 19, 1998, they decided to go home on board a tricycle. Accused-appellant dropped by the sari-sari store of private complainant and bought two bottles of beer. As he was finishing his drink at 3:00 a.m., two daughters of private complainant left for Manila. Not long after that, he went home.8
Defense witness Paul Danlin Conejero testified that he was one of the companions of accused-appellant in the house of a certain Jonjon on the night of May 18, 1998. At 2:00 in the early morning of May 19, 1998, they boarded a tricycle and went home. Accused-appellant, who was first to get off the tricycle, alighted near the sari-sari store of private complainant. Conejero admitted that he was no longer aware of the whereabouts of accused-appellant after they parted.9
On November 10, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding herein accused Norman Palarca y Mercado @ "Bong" guilty as principal beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as charged in the information, without any circumstance, aggravating or mitigating, found attendant to its commission, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua as imposed by law, to indemnify private offended party Concepcion C. Javier in the amount of P50,000.00 for moral damages subject to the corresponding filing fee as a first lien, and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
SO ORDERED.10
Hence, the instant appeal, on the following assignment of errors:
I.
IT IS ERROR ON THE PART OF THE LOWER COURT TO HAVE CONVICTED ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON A MERE POSSIBILITY OR SUSPICION OF GUILT. MORAL CERTAINTY IS GLARINGLY AND CLEARLY ABSENT IN ESTABLISHING BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE GUILT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
II.
IT IS ERROR FOR THE LOWER COURT TO HAVE GIVEN CREDENCE AND VALUE TO THE SWORN STATEMENT OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE (EXHIBIT "A"), DESPITE ITS INHERENT IMPROBABILITY AND HER CREDIBILITY, IMPAIRED.
III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED TO HAVE ACCORDED WEIGHT AND VALUE TO BIOLOGY REPORTS B-98-658 AND B-98-736 (EXHIBIT "B" AND "C") RESPECTIVELY, FINDING THE PRESENCE OF HUMAN BLOOD AND SEMINAL STAINS ON THE DUSTER AND UNDERWEAR DESPITE THE INHERENT IMPROBABILITY OF THEIR FINDINGS AND FAILURE OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE TO IDENTIFY THE OWNERSHIP OF SAID BLOOD AND SEMINAL STAINS. THE INTEGRITY OF THESE PIECES OF EVIDENCE HAVE BEEN SERIOUSLY IMPAIRED.
IV.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED TO HAVE GIVEN WEIGHT AND VALUE TO EXHIBIT "D", THE MEDICO LEGAL REPORT, FINDING INJURIES ON THE PERSON OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLE DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THIS MEDICAL REPORT TO REFLECT COMPLETE MEDICAL FINDINGS OF THE ALLEGED INJURIES.11
The present review hinges on the following issues: (1) whether or not accused-appellant may be validly convicted under the information charging him with rape; and (2) if so, whether the evidence for the prosecution established the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
The information charging accused-appellant with rape, recites:
The undersigned Asst. Provincial Prosecutor, on complaint of Concepcion C. Javier, accuses Norman Palarca y Mercado alias "Bong" of the crime of rape, penalized under the provisions of Article 266-B in relation to Art. 266-A, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed as follows:
That on or about the 19th of May, 1998, in the municipality of Malolos, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge with said Concepcion C. Javier, 70 years of age, against her will and consent.
Contrary to Law.
While the accusatory portion of the information failed to specifically allege that the rape was committed through force or intimidation, the prosecution was able to establish by evidence that accused-appellant was guilty of rape as defined under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The statement in the preamble of the information that accused-appellant was being charged with rape "penalized under the provisions of Article 266-B in relation to Art. 266-A, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code" made no difference. It is not the preamble or caption of the information, but the actual recital of the facts alleged in the body of the information, that determines the validity and real nature of the criminal charge.12
In any event, accused-appellant failed to interpose any objection to the presentation by the prosecution of evidence which tended to prove that he committed the rape by force and intimidation. While generally an accused cannot be convicted of an offense that is not clearly charged in the complaint or information, this rule is not without exception. The right to assail the sufficiency of the information or the admission of evidence may be waived by the accused-appellant. In People v. Lopez,13 we held that an information which lacks certain essential allegations may still sustain a conviction when the accused fails to object to its sufficiency during the trial, and the deficiency was cured by competent evidence presented therein. Thus -
[F]ailure to object was thus a waiver of the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. It is competent for a person to waive a right guaranteed by the Constitution, and to consent to action which would be invalid if taken against his will. (1 ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES 31-32 [1983 ed.]). This Court has, on more than one occasion, recognized waivers of constitutional rights, e.g., the right against unreasonable searches and seizures (People v. Malasugui, 63 Phil. 221 [1936]; Viuda de Gracia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689 [1938]); the right to counsel and to remain silent (People v. Royo, 114 SCRA 304 [1982]); the right to be heard (Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525 [1949]; People v. Dichoso, 96 SCRA 957 [1980]); and the right to bail (People v. Donato, 198 SCRA 130 [1991]).
On the second issue, accused-appellant questions the trial court’s assessment of private complainant’s testimony. Accused-appellant makes much of the finding of the investigating judge during the bail hearing that the evidence against accused-appellant was not strong. It must be stressed, however, that the assessment of the evidence presented during a bail hearing is intended only for the purpose of granting or denying an application for the provisional release of the accused. Not being a final assessment, and merely for the purpose of determining the necessity of confinement to avoid escape, courts tend to be fair and liberal in their appreciation of evidence. Thus in People v. Baldoz, et al.,14 the Court made the following pronouncements:
"…The assessment of the evidence presented during a bail hearing is intended only for the purpose of granting or denying an application for the provisional release of the accused. It is not a final assessment. Before conviction, every one accused is entitled to bail, except when the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death; and the evidence of guilt is strong. Needless to say, everyone enjoys the presumption of innocence.
The denial of this fundamental right is justified only if there is a great probability of escape. Confinement prior to conviction is warranted, in order to assure the presence of the accused at the trial. Thus, the natural tendency of the courts has always been towards a fair and liberal appreciation of the evidence in the determination of the degree of proof and in the presumption of guilt necessary to warrant a deprivation of that right. Such appreciation is at best preliminary and should not prevent the trial judge from making a final assessment of the evidence before him after full trial. It is not an uncommon occurrence that an accused person granted bail is convicted in due course."
Accused-appellant next points out the alleged inconsistency in the narrations of private complainant. In her May 22, 1998 sworn statement before the investigating police, she stated that:
x x x x x x x x x
Q: Ano pa po ang sumunod na nangyari ng daganan kayo ni BONG PALARCA?
A: Ng patungan na nga niya ako ay mabilis po niyang ibinaba and zipper ng kaniyang pantalon at ipinasok niya ang kanyang tit[i] sa ari ko.15
On the other hand, she testified before the investigating judge on the same day to the following effect:
Q. Ano pa ang ginawa niya ng itinulak kayo at dinaganan at ibinukas yong kanyang zipper?
A. Iyon na nga po passed out na ako hazy na yong tingin ko, lupaypay na ako bale.
Q. Paano nyo nalaman na narape kayo nitong si Bong?
A. Nakaramdam po ako ng sakit saka yong mahapdi.
Q Saan?
A Sa puert[a] ko.16
Contrary to the claim of accused-appellant, we find no inconsistency in the aforecited declarations. As correctly argued by the Solicitor General, both statements actually confirmed that a sexual act was forced upon the victim, represented by one, "ipinasok niya ang kanyang tit[i] sa ari ko" and the other, "Nakaramdam po ako ng sakit saka yong mahapdi, x x x sa puert[a] ko." The first statement clearly pictured the sexual act itself, while the other referred to the physical pain felt by private complainant. Both declarations corroborate and confirm the cause and effect of forced sexual congress.
The only added disclosure depicted in the latter statement was the fact that when the sexual act was being made, private complainant was reeling from mental inertia, ready to succumb to physical pain and to the effects of the sleeping pill. Despite such condition, however, she was conscious and aware of the atrocity being committed against her.
At any rate, private complainant’s thorough narration of the rape incident on the witness stand, which remained firm and consistent under exhaustive cross-examination by the defense, convinces us that she was indeed raped. It is settled jurisprudence that when a woman says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed.17 It is hard to believe that a 70-year old woman who was not shown to have any grudge against accused-appellant would concoct a humiliating rape story and spend the remaining days of her life in sending a man to prison if her motive was not to avenge her honor and have her ravisher punished. Bolstered by the medical findings showing that private complainant sustained multiple abrasions on the vaginal wall, as well as bruises on the abdomen and right arm which confirmed that she was indeed boxed and grabbed by accused-appellant, we see no reason to doubt her testimony.
Likewise, we find no merit in accused-appellant’s attempt to discredit private complainant on account of ailing memory triggered by an alleged terminal cancer disease and dose of sleeping pills which supposedly impaired her mental faculties. The said physical ailment of private complainant was not shown to have affected her mind.
We find nothing contrary to human experience in the behavior of private complainant during the rape incident as well as during the preliminary investigation. The lack of resistance by the victim during the rape can be explained by the physical assault employed by accused-appellant, not to mention the effects of the sleeping pill. So also, the absence of raging anger on the part of private complainant when she saw accused-appellant at the preliminary investigation does not make her behavior unnatural. As a mature widow, her wisdom must have dictated her to remain composed rather than be hysterical and expose herself to further ridicule. Furthermore, different people react differently to the same or similar stimuli. There is no standard behavior for rape victims with which we can compare herein private complainant’s comportment, as there is no model form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.18
The delay of two days before private complainant and her family decided to report the rape incident to the authorities does not diminish her credibility. As sufficiently explained by private complainant, she and her daughters had to discuss what to do about her misfortune. It is indeed not easy for a rape victim, especially for one who is in her twilight years, to decide whether to conceal her humiliation in secrecy or to bravely have the rapist punished, at the same time bearing the inevitable and consequent public ridicule and embarrassment.
Then, too, the contention of accused-appellant that the duster and underwear of private complainant which were found to be stained with human blood and semen were tampered deserves scant consideration. Suffice it to state that even in the absence of said pieces of evidence, the lone testimony of private complainant is enough to produce conviction of accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
All told, the defenses of denial and alibi interposed by accused-appellant cannot prevail over the positive, direct and categorical assertion of private complainant.19 Subjected to the severest scrutiny, we are convinced that the trial court which had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified, did not err in giving full faith and credence to private complainant’s testimony.
Under Article 266-B in relation to Art. 266-A, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, rape committed through the use of force, threat or intimidation is punishable by reclusion perpetua.
The Court sustains the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages which need no proof since it is presumed that the rape victim suffered moral injuries.20 In addition, accused-appellant must also be ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the offense. The payment of civil indemnity is mandatory upon a finding of rape; it is distinct from any award for moral damages as the latter is based on a different jural foundation and is assessed at the trial court’s sound discretion.21
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 12, in Criminal Case No. 605-M-99, finding accused-appellant Norman Palarca y Mercado alias "Bong" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in addition to the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, plus costs, accused-appellant is further ordered to pay private complainant the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Penned by Judge Crisanto C. Concepcion.
2 TSN, June 15, 1999, pp. 8-12.
3 TSN, June 23, 1998, pp. 26, 34-35.
4 TSN, June 17, 1998, pp. 3-6.
5 Ibid., pp. 6-15.
6 Id., pp. 16-17.
7 Exhibit "D", Records, p. 5.
8 TSN, June 23, 1998, pp. 26-30; July 13, 2000, pp. 6-10.
9 TSN, July 2, 1998, pp. 31-36.
10 Rollo, p. 22.
11 Rollo, p. 44.
12 People v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 138987, February 6, 2002, citing People v. Bali-Balita, 340 SCRA 450 [2000].
13 346 SCRA 469, 475 [2000], citing the separate opinion of then Justice, now Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., in People v. Moreno, 294 SCRA 728 [1998].
14 G.R. No. 140032, November 20, 2001.
15 Records, p. 4
16 TSN, May 22, 1998, p. 5.
17 People v. Santos, G.R. Nos. 135454-56, November 13, 2001, citing People v. Bolatete, 303 SCRA 709 [1999].
18 People v. Baldoz, supra, citing People v. Luzorata, 286 SCRA 487 [1998]; People v. Ranido, 288 SCRA 369 [1998]; People v. Deleverio, 289 SCRA 547 [1998]; People v. Cabebe, 290 SCRA 543 [1998].
19 People v. Mercado, G.R. No. 139904, October 12, 2001; citing People v. Bawang, 342 SCRA 147 [2000]; People v. Watimar, 388 SCRA 173 [2000].
20 People v. Colisao, G.R. No. 134526, December 11, 2001, citing People v. Banela, 301 SCRA 84 [1999]; People v. Alba, 305 SCRA 811 [1999].
21 People v. Colisao, supra, citing People v. Marabillas, 303 SCRA 352 [1999].
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