THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 140894 November 27, 2000
ROSARIO YAMBAO and REBECCA YAMBAO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GUILLERMO LIGON, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the 18 May 1999 and 17 November 1999 Resolutions issued by the Court of Appeals1 in CA - G.R. CV No. 61761.
On 26 August 1994, private respondent Guillermo Ligon filed a petition for the cancellation of the name of his alleged spouse, petitioner Rebecca Yambao, in Transfer Certificate of Title V-10458. The petition was docketed as LR Case No. 5941 (AD) 1075-V-94 and assigned to Branch 75 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela. Since petitioner Rebecca Yambao failed to file her answer and to appear on the scheduled date of hearing, the trial court permitted private respondent to present his evidence ex-parte. On 29 September 1994, the trial court granted the petition for cancellation. Petitioner Rebecca Yambao then filed a motion for new trial and/or petition for relief from judgment, which was granted by the trial court on 4 October 1995.
During the pendency of LR Case No. 5941 (AD) Case No. 1075-V-94, petitioner Rosario Yambao, the sister of petitioner Rebecca Yambao, filed an action for specific performance against private respondent and her sister, praying for the execution of a deed of sale in her favor over 149 square meters of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-10458. This action was docketed as Civil Case No. 4558-V-95 and assigned to Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela. On 23 November 1995, Judge Floro P. Alejo of Branch 172 ordered the consolidation of Civil Case No. 4558-V-95 with LR Case No. 5941 (AD) 1075-V-94 for joint trial in Branch 75.
Judge Jaime F. Bautista of Branch 75 rendered a decision on 15 April 1998, dismissing petitioner Rosario Yambao’s complaint in Civil Case No. 4558-V-95 and granting private respondent’s petition in LR Case No. 5941 (AD) 1075-V-94. On 27 April 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal with the trial court, paying P820.00 in docket fees. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners’ appeal in its 18 May 1999 resolution which stated that -
Considering the report, dated May 3, 1999, of the Judicial Records Division (page 1 of the Rollo) to the effect that the appellant failed to pay the full amount of the required docket fee within the period set, let the appeal be DISMISSED, pursuant to Section 1 (c), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.2
Petitioners received a copy of the abovequoted resolution on 9 June 1999. Two days later, on 11 June 1999, petitioners’ counsel, Ricardo M. Perez, learned from the Judicial Records Division of the Court of Appeals that P20.00 for the legal research fund fee was still lacking.3 On 17 June 1999, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration with the appellate court. Pending resolution of their motion, petitioners paid the P20.00 deficiency on 26 October 1999, as evidenced by Official Receipt Nos. 11456105 and 11456106. Yet, despite the payment, their motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its assailed resolution4 issued on 17 November 1999.5
Thus, the instant petition.
Petitioners explained that they had initially paid P820.00 as docket fees because this was the amount assessed by the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Valenzuela. However, as it turned out, the docket fees paid by petitioners were insufficient by P20.00 because the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Valenzuela had erroneously fixed the legal research fund fee for each of the cases at P10.00, instead of P20.00. The Office of the Clerk of Court made an admission to this effect in a certification dated 10 December 1999.6 Therefore, petitioners assert that they should not be faulted for the incomplete payment of docket fees as the same was attributable, not to them, but to the erroneous assessment of the Clerk of Court.7
The right to appeal is not a natural right. It is a statutory privilege, and must be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.8 Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an appeal to the Court of Appeals from cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered such judgment or final order and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. Furthermore, within this same period, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees.9 The Court has consistently held that the payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory.10
However, considering the importance and purpose of the remedy of appeal, an essential part of our judicial system, courts are well-advised to proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has "the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities."11 In line with this policy, we have held that, in appealed cases, the failure to pay the appellate court docket fee does not automatically result in the dismissal of the appeal or affect the court’s jurisdiction, the dismissal being discretionary on the part of the appellate court. This was our ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals,12 wherein the Court held that –
Case after case, this Court stressed the rule that failure to pay the appellate court docket fee within the reglementary period confers a discretionary, and not mandatory, power to dismiss the proposed appeal, and that such power should be used in the exercise of the court’s sound judgment in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play and with a great deal of circumspection considering all attendant circumstances. Said "discretion must be exercised wisely and prudently, never capriciously, with a view to substantial justice."
Furthermore, Section 5 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court on payment of appellate docket fees in appeals from the regional trial court to the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, provides in pertinent part that –
x x x If the fees are not paid, the court may refuse to proceed with the action until they are paid and may dismiss the appeal or the action or proceeding.1âwphi1
Thus, the appellate court may extend the time for the payment of the docket fees if appellant is able to show that there is a justifiable reason for his failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees within the prescribed period, like fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence, or a similar supervening casualty, without fault on the part of the appellant.13 In the recent case of Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals,14 the Court held that the failure of the Solicitor General to pay the docket fees with the reglementary period was excusable since the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure - requiring the payment of the docket fees to the court which rendered the judgment within the period for taking an appeal – took effect only fourteen days prior to the filing of the notice of appeal.
In the case at bar, the failure of petitioners to pay the correct amount of docket fees was due to the erroneous assessment by the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Valenzuela, as evidenced by the 10 December 1999 Certification issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court.15 Petitioners first learned of the deficiency in the docket fees on 9 June 1999, when they received a copy of the 18 May 1999 Resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing their appeal.16 Soon after, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration with the Court of Appeals on 17 June 1999 and, even before the resolution of their motion, completed the payment of the docket fees on 26 October 1999.
Petitioners cannot be faulted for their failure to pay the required docket fees for, given the prevailing circumstances, such failure was clearly not a dilatory tactic nor intended to circumvent the Rules of Court. On the contrary, the subsequent payment by petitioners of the P20.00 deficiency even before the appellate court had passed upon their motion for reconsideration was indicative of their good faith and willingness to comply with the Rules.
WHERFORE, the petition is granted. The 18 May 1999 and 17 November 1999 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are set aside. The appellate court is hereby ordered to give due course to petitioners’ appeal.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Promulgated by the Twelfth Division, composed of Justices Ramon Mabutas, Jr., ponente and Chairman; Hilarion L. Aquino; and Teodoro P. Regino.
2 Rollo, 19.
3 Ibid., 10.
4 Ibid., 21.
5 Ibid., 6-11.
6 Ibid., 72.
7 Ibid., 3-15.
8 Ortiz v. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 708 (1998); Mabuhay Development Industries v. National Labor Relations Commission, 288 SCRA 1 (1998).
9 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 41 –
SEC. 2. Modes of Appeal. –
(a) Ordinary appeal. – The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
(b) Petition for review. – The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42.
(c) Appeal by certiorari. – In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. – The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. - Within the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or the record on appeal.
10 Uy v. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 343 (1998); Suson v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 284 (1997), citing Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, 170 SCRA 274 (1989).
11 Moslares v. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 440 (1998).
12 253 SCRA 632 (1996), citing Fontanar v. Bonsubre, 145 SCRA 663 (1986), NAWASA v. Secretary of Public Works and Communications, 16 SCRA 536 (1966), Favis v. Municipality of Sabangan, 27 SCRA 92 (1969), Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 75 SCRA 401 (1977), Panes v. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 509 (1983), Del Rosario & Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., 136 SCRA 669 (1985).
13 Guevarra v. CA, 157 SCRA 33 (1988).
14 312 SCRA 463 (1999).
15 Rollo, 72.
16 Ibid., 10.
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