FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 133547 February 10, 2000
HEIRS OF ANTONIO PAEL and ANDREA ALCANTARA and CRISANTO PAEL, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JORGE H. CHIN and RENATO B. MALLARI, respondents.
x-----------------------------x
G.R. No. 133483 February 10, 2000
MARIA DESTURA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JORGE H. CHIN and RENATO B. MALLARI, respondents.
LUIS M. MENOR, intervenor
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
These are separate petitions for review assailing the Decision dated April 29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 45425.1 The two petitions were ordered consolidated by this Court on August 16, 1999.2
This case has its beginnings in a complaint filed by Maria Destura on December 9, 1993 against herein private respondents Jorge H. Chin, Renato B. Mallari and plaintiff's own husband, Pedro Destura. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-93-18569 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96.3
About year earlier, on January 20, 1993, the husband, Pedro Destura, had filed a substantially similar complaint against the same defendants, respondents Chin and Mallari. The complaint against Jorge H. Chin and Renato B. Mallari, for annulment of title, reconveyance and specific performance, damages and nullification of the Memorandum of Agreement, was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-93-14522 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99.
The above-stated Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated March 26, 1992 was among Chin and Mallari, as first parties; Pedro Destura, as second party; and a certain Jaime B. Lumasag, Jr., as third party, whereby the parties agreed to sell the property subject of this petition to an interested buyer and to share in the proceeds, with Lumasag acting as broker of the sale. However, the prospective buyer of Lumasag backed out and the sale did not materialize.
Upon defendants Chin and Mallari's motion, on November 5, 1993, the trial court issued an Order dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action.
Pedro Destura then appealed to the Court of Appeals. On December 10, 1996, the Court of Appeals' Twelfth Division affirmed the order of dismissal.4 The Court of Appeals not only declared the MOA as valid, it also upheld the titles of Chin and Mallari by expressly declaring that they have a better title to the property. This decision has long been final and executory per entry of judgment.
Inspite of the decision against her husband, Maria Destura filed a similar action one month after the decision, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-93-18569 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96.5 As stated, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal by the Regional Trial Court of Pedro Destura's complaint for lack of cause of action. In an obvious attempt to avoid application of res judicata or litis pendentia doctrine, Maria impleaded her own husband as a defendant. Significantly, after the complaint was filed, Maria dropped Pedro Destura as a party-defendant, alleging that the two had amicably settled their differences.
In her complaint, Maria Destura averred that on May 22, 1979, she and Pedro purchased from Crisanto Pael, through attorney-in-fact Lutgarda Marilao, a tract of land consisting of 77.9477 hectares, situated in Barrio Culiat, Quezon City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 36048 in the name of "Antonio Pael y Andria Alcantara, conyuges, y Crisanto Pael, hijo." The owner's duplicate of title and approved survey plan were allegedly delivered to Pedro but he misplaced them, and he suspected that they were taken from his office by a certain Luis Menor. Inasmuch as title to the land was still in the name of the Paels, Pedro caused the execution of an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses Antonio Pael and Andria Alcantara with sale of real property, as well as an affidavit of self-adjudication.1âwphi1.nęt
Thereafter, with the intention of disposing of the property, Pedro allegedly executed a special power of attorney to sell in favor of Renato Mallari and Jorge Chin. The latter failed to sell the property, whereupon Pedro executed a deed of conditional sale in favor of Chin, but the sale was allegedly not consummated due to Chin's non-compliance with certain conditions. Pedro thereafter went to Canada and, when he returned, he allegedly discovered that the title to the property had been transferred in the names of Chin and Mallari, as TCT Nos. 529286 and 529297.
When Pedro was about to prosecute Chin and Mallari, the latter allegedly offered to settle their dispute. This resulted in the execution of the MOA sought to be nullified in both the complaints of Pedro and Maria.
On January 24, 1995, the trial court in the Maria Destura case, presided by Judge Lucas Bersamin, rendered a decision based on default, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Nullifying the memorandum of agreement dated March 26, 1992;
2. Ordering the defendant Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 52928 and 52929 in the names of Jorge Chin and Renato Mallari and the transfer certificates of title from which said certificates were derived until but not including Transfer Certificate of Title No. 36048 and thereafter to reinstate Transfer Certificate of Title No. 36048 in the names of Spouses Antonio Pael and Andrea Alcantara and Crisanto Pael; and
3. Sentencing the defendants to pay costs of suit.
The cause of action for damages is hereby dismissed for lack of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
The above-quoted decision of Civil Case No. Q-93-18569 was rendered after Chin and Mallari were declared in default for failure to answer the complaint. Thus, judgment by default was issued nullifying of the MOA and ordering the cancellation of Chin's and Mallari's TCT Nos. 52928 and 52929. Surprisingly, the trial court did not award any affirmative relief of the plaintiff therein, Maria Destura. Instead, the trial court ordered the reinstatement of TCT No. 36048 in the names of the Paels, who were non-parties in the case. In fact, petitioners, heirs of the Paels, were not impleaded in the case below, did not intervene, and were non-parties in every sense of the word. These notwithstanding, valuable property was awarded to them.
Maria Destura did not appeal the trial court's decision. It, therefore, became final insofar as it awarded titles to non-parties and declined to grant any of the prayers of the plaintiff therein. Inspite of the finality of the decision as against her, Maria Destura surprisingly came in as intervenor on the later stage of this petition before this Court.
Maria raised matters that are more proper for her lost appeal and not in a last minute intervention in the Supreme Court.
On February 13, 1995, Atty. Oliver O. Lozano, counsel for respondents Chin and Mallari, filed a notice of appeal,8 which was approved by the trial court and given due course.9 Later, on February 21, 1995, Atty. Lozano filed a Motion for New Trial,10 alleging that his clients' failure to answer was due to honest mistake and that they have a good and valid defense. Atty. Lozano's notice of appeal did not state when the notice of the decision was received by the appellants.
On February 14, 1995, the trial court approved the notice of appeal and directed the forwarding of the records to the Court of Appeals.
On March 3, 1995, Atty. Lozano filed a supplemental motion.11
On March 7, 1995, Maria Destura filed a motion to dismiss the motion and supplemental motion for new trial.12
On April 11, 1995, respondents Chin and Mallari, through new counsel Atty. Ponciano H. Gupit, filed an Omnibus Motion13 alleging that their sad plight to present on time their side of the controversy was due to the censurable negligence of their counsel, Atty. Lozano, whose services they had engaged to file their answer.
On August 28, 1995, the trial court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing:
1. The motion for new trial, supplemental motion, and omnibus motion, all filed by the defendants, are hereby denied for lack of merit;
2. The appeal allowed in the Order of February 14, 1995 is hereby considered abandoned and is accordingly dismissed; and
3. The decision dated January 24, 1995 is hereby declared to be final and executory.
SO ORDERED.14
From the adverse decision and order of the trial court, private respondents filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals, which required the respondents named therein to comment on the petition.
In the meantime, one Letty Sy, claiming to have legal, direct and material interest in the matter in litigation and having learned that Maria Destura will not file her comment on the petition, filed on October 22, 1997 a "Motion for Leave to Substitute Party Respondent With Prayer that She be Allowed to File Comment on the Petition for Annulment of Judgment Within a Reasonable Period of Time".15 Private respondents opposed this motion on November 26, 1997. The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution dated January 8, 1998, denied Letty Sy's motion.16
Previously, on November 17, 1997, Maria Destura decided to file her comment and opposition to the petition,17 to which respondents Chin and Mallari filed a vigorous reply dated December 1, 1997.18
On the other hand, the heirs of Antonio Pael filed a motion for extension to file comment on the petition. On October 29, 1997, Roberto Pael, as administrator of the estate of the Paels, filed a short comment. Because the titles of private respondents Chin and Mallari were cancelled by the trial court not on substantial grounds but on their alleged default and abandonment of their case compounded by various unusual procedural errors, the Court of Appeals passed upon the issue of the intrinsic validity of the disputed land titles.
On April 29, 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated January 24, 1995 and the Order dated August 28, 1995, both issued in Civil Case No. Q-93-18569, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and accordingly, judgment is issued:
a) DECLARING as valid the memorandum of agreement dated March 26, 1992;
b) DECLARING as null and void both the calcellation of the titles, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 52928 and 52929 of petitioners Jorge H. Chin and Renato B. Mallari over the subject property and reinstatement of the title Transfer Certificate No. 36048, in the names of Antonio Pael, Andrea Alcantara and Crisanto Pael;
c) DECLARING the petitioners as the true and absolute owners of the subject property and ORDERING the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to REINSTATE the aforementioned titles, TCT Nos. 52928 and 52929 in favor of petitioners Jorge H. Chin and Renato B. Mallari;
d) DIRECTING Sheriff Mr. Jose G. Martinez of the trial court, or whoever has taken his place, to surrender forthwith the owner's duplicate copy (original) of TCT No. 36048 to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City within ten (10) days from finality of` this decision.
In the event that Sheriff Martinez or his replacement fails to surrender the said original owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 36048 within the said ten (10) day period, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to CANCEL the said title, TCT No. 36048, and to EFFECT forthwith the reinstatement of the titles, TCT Nos. 52928 and 52929 in the names of Chin and Mallari.
e) DENYING the petitions-in-intervention of Letty Sy and PFINA Properties, Inc. Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit; and
f) DENYING the prayer for damages sought for by petitioners, not having been proven by a preponderance of evidence.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.19
While the petition for annulment was pending before the Court of Appeals, or on January 28, 1998, a certain corporation called PFINA Properties, Inc. (PFINA, for brevity) filed a motion for leave of court to intervene and to admit petition-in-intervention. It alleged that PFINA acquired the property subject of the litigation for substantial and valuable consideration from Roberto A. Pael and the Heirs of Antonio Pael, Andrea Alcantara and Crisanto Pael, by virtue of a deed of assignment dated January 25, 1983, and that the title was issued in its name by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. This motion was opposed by private respondents. They cite the fact that the alleged acquisition of the property by PFINA supposedly occurred as early as January 25, 1983, and for fifteen (15) years, inspite of numerous proceedings before different courts and agencies involving the disputed property, both the Paels and PFINA were silent about the alleged change of ownership. No steps to register the sale or secure transfer titles were undertaken during this period.
Private respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for the cancellation and declaration as null and void of the title illegally obtained by PFINA in its name and to hold the officials of PFINA, their counsel, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City in contempt of court. The grounds for the Omnibus Motion are as follows:
Private respondents caused on October 8, 1997 the annotation of the Petition for Annulment of Judgment with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City which was granted.
The manner and the haste and the speed by which the new title, TCT No. 186662, was issued in the name of PFINA Properties, Inc. was surreptitious and condemnable.
The new title was obtained by PFINA despite its knowledge that there was a pending case for annulment before the appellate court.
Atty. Samuel C. Cleofe, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City who cancelled the title, TCT No. 36048 in the names of Antonio Pael and Andrea Alcantara and Crisanto Pael, and issued the new title in the name of PFINA acted in gross and evident bad faith. Not only was the Register a party respondent fully knowledgeable and served with all processes in the annulment case, but the petition before the appellate court was also annotated at the back of the title of the Paels, TCT No. 36048 and Entry No. PE-5702-06-T-(36048) the Court of Appeals' decision dated December 10, 1996 allowing them to conduct a verification and relocation survey and the Entry of Judgment issued by the Court of Appeals dated March 4, 1997. The date of the inscription is May 7, 1997.
The Register of Deeds also knew that the instant case was pending before the appellate court. In cancelling the title of the Paels, TCT No. 36048, and issuing a new title, TCT No. 186662 in favor of PFINA, Cleofe disturbed the proceedings in the appellate court, degraded the administration of justice and should be held in contempt. Register of Deeds Cleofe was not merely discharging a ministerial duty because he was a party to the case before the appellate court and was aware and familiar with the proceedings and developments in this case.
Only after a period of fifteen (15) years did PFINA come forward to present the deed and claim the subject properties. The said deed and the circumstances surrounding its issuance are suspect. The deed may be fabricated and the signatures of the parties and witnesses forged.
The issuance of the new title was attended with irregularities. Before a new title is issued in favor of a party, all the required taxes should have been paid. In the instant case, there is no valid proof that the capital gains tax, the real estate taxes and the transfer taxes have been fully paid. Documents alleging payment of taxes were introduced but verification and certification from the Assessor's Office, the Treasurer's Office and the Bureau of Internal Revenue of Quezon City show that these offices have not actually received the amounts indicated.
The Court of Appeals gave credence to the objections interposed by private respondents. In its Resolution dated February 25, 1998, it cited badges or indicia of fraud in the alleged acquisition of the property by PFINA as well as the cancellation of the title of the Paels and issuance of a new title in favor of PFINA.
On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, as well as the records elevated, the appellate court rendered judgment in favor of private respondents.
Dissatisfied, petitioners in both cases filed separate petitions before this Court. As earlier stated, upon motion of petitioners in G.R. No. 133547, said case was consolidated with G.R. No. 133843.
On July 31, 1998, during the pendency of the petition in G.R. No. 133547, Roberto Pael, being the administrator of the estate of Antonio Pael, Andrea Alcantara and Crisanto Pael, filed a "Manipestasyon"20 dated July 21, 1998 worded in the Pilipino dialect, withdrawing the petition for review in G.R. No. 133547 and stating among others:
1. That he confirms the decision of the Court of Appeals in favor of Jorge Chin and Renato Mallari;
2. That he recognizes the ownership of Jorge Chin and Renato Mallari over the subject properties covered by TCT Nos. 52928 and 52929 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City.
This "Manipestasyon" was subscribed under oath by Administrator Roberto Pael before Atty. Josefina Ma. S. Castro, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 99, Quezon City.21
Surprisingly, on July 30, 1998, or a day before he filed his aforementioned "Manipestasyon", Mr. Roberto Pael also filed a "Manifestation",22 couched in English, in effect retracting his statements in his "Manipestasyon", and stating that he has not withdrawn the petition he filed before this Court.
On September 3, 1998, private respondents filed the required comment on the petition.23
On September 23, 1998, Mr. Roberto Pael, again in his capacity as Administrator of the Pael Estate and as representative of the heirs of Antonio Pael and Andrea Alcantara and Crisanto Pael, withdrew the petition and filed a "Motion at Manipestasyon"24 dated September 22, 1998, praying that his withdrawal of the "Motion to Withdraw Appeal" dated July 30, 1998 be deleted from the records of this case and that his "Manipestasyon" dated July 31, 1998 be recognized and respected. This "Motion at Manipestasyon" was this time subscribed under oath by Mr. Pael before Atty. Enriqueta Esguerra-Vidal, the Assistant Division Clerk of the First Division of the Supreme Court.25
In his "Motion at Manipestasyon", Mr. Pael reiterated his previous statements in his earlier "Manipestasyon", to wit:
1. That he is really and actually withdrawing the petition filed in behalf of the Heirs of Antonio Pael and Andrea Alcantara and Crisanto Pael;
2. That he really and actually confirms the decision of the Court of Appeals in favor of private respondents;
3. That he really and actually recognizes the ownership of private respondents over the subject property covered by TCT Nos. 52928 and 52929 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City.
On October 5, 1998, this Court issued a Resolution granting the manifestation and motion dated September 22, 1998 of Mr. Pael, and considered this case "CLOSED and TERMINATED".26 The full text of this Resolution reads as follows:
G.R. No. 133547 (Heirs of Antonio Pael, et al., vs. Hon. Lucas P. Bersamin, etc., et al.). — The Court resolved to:
(a) GRANT the motion of petitioners for an extension of ten (10) days or until September 28, 1998 within which to file a comment on the opposition of private respondents to petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a petition for review on certiorari;
(b) NOTE the said comment thereafter filed; and
(c) NOTE and GRANT the manifestation and motion dated September 22, 1998 of Roberto Pael, petitioner/administrator of the estate of Antonio Pael, Andrea Alcantara and Crisanto Pael, praying that the withdrawal of the motion to withdraw appeal be deleted from the records of the case and the manifestation filed on July 31, 1998 be recognized and respected.
This case is considered CLOSED and TERMINATED.
On October 30, 1998, Mr. Pael executed another flip-flopping "Sinumpaang Salaysay"27 again retracting his earlier "Motion at Manipestasyon".
Likewise, on November 5, 1998, the Heirs of Antonio Pael and Andrea Alcantara and Crisanto Pael, namely Zosima, Jose, Cresencia, Gloria, Segundo and Cristanto, Jr., all surnamed Pael, submitted to this Court a "Sinumpaang Salaysay"28 wherein they disowned the previous manifestation of Mr. Roberto Pael withdrawing their appeal and recognizing the rights of private respondents.
On November 6, 1998, private respondents filed a "Motion for Issuance of Entry of Judgment",29 in accordance with Rule 36 of the Rules of Court.
On May 24, 1999; after a series of pleadings and counter-pleadings from the parties, all noted by this Court, private respondents filed an "Urgent Motion for Issuance or Entry of Judgment"30 considering that the case had earlier been closed and terminated. They alleged that the issuance of the entry of judgment will be consistent with the doctrinal rulings of this Court that in case of closure and termination of cases, entry of judgment is ordered in due course, the parties are notified accordingly, and the case is recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment. This Court noted the motion on June 24, 1999.
On July 28, 1999, this Court issued a Resolution granting petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the October 5, 1998 Resolution, which considered this case closed and terminated, and reinstating the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 133547.31
Subsequently, on July 9, 1999, Luis M. Menor filed an "Urgent Motion for Intervention" in both petition,32 together with an attached "Complaint-in-Intervention Against Both Original parties"33.
On August 6, 1999, intervenor filed a Motion to Admit Supplemental pleading.34
On August 10, 1999, private respondents opposed Menor's motion for intervention.35 They cited the fatal procedural defects of the motion for intervention and why there should be non-admission of the intervention at this late stage of the proceedings.
After considering the numerous and voluminous pleadings filed in these two cases, the intervention of Luis Menor, the alleged sale to PFINA Properties, Inc. and the alleged interests of Letty Sy, the comments on the petitions are treated as answer to the petitions. We find the pleadings to be sufficient in form and substance and the issues sufficiently joined. We resolve to give due course to the petitions and accordingly decide them.
Prefatorily, we first pass upon the issue of the withdrawals by Roberto Pael of the petition for review filed in G.R. No. 133547.
Private respondents contend that the withdrawals made by Roberto Pael of the petition filed by him in his capacity as Administrator of the Pael Estate and in his capacity as representative of the Heir or Antonio Pael, Andrea Alcantara and Crisanto Pael, were freely and voluntarily executed by Mr. Pael. They likewise contend that when asked by either of the two solemnizing officers, RTC Branch Clerk of Court of Quezon City, Branch 99, Josefina Castro, and Supreme Court Assistant Division Clerk of Court Enriqueta Esguerra-Vidal, if Mr. Pael understood the contents of the motions or papers he was signing, Mr. Pael readily answered that he fully understood the contents and statements he made therein and that he freely and voluntarily executed the same. They further argue that the aforesaid withdrawals were couched in the Pilipino or Tagalog dialect, which Mr. Pael very well understands. Atty. Castro of the Regional Trial Court, and Atty. Vidal of the Supreme Court, are two respected and responsible officers of the Judiciary. There is no reason to doubt that they competently performed their duties as solemnizing officers of the motions-withdrawals.
Private respondent also contend that this Court acted correctly and to the best interest of the parties when it issued the Resolution dated October 5, 1998 declaring this case closed and terminated. This Court need not proceeded with the case if petitioners, through their duly authorized representative, no longer desire to prosecute their case.
We fully agree with private respondents. Entry of judgment could have been ordered in this case. In a Resolution issued by this Court En Banc on September 14, 1999, we ordered that entry of judgment shall be made in cases where resolutions have been issued denying extensions of time to file petitions or declaring cases closed and terminated for failure to file petition. With more reason should entry of judgment be ordered where petitioners freely and voluntarily withdraw their petition. The en banc resolution reads in full.
Re: Request for Uniform Guidelines in Entries of Judgment Involving Denial Extension of Time to File Petition or Cases Declared Closed and Terminated for Failure to File a Petition — The Court Resolved that from hereon ENTRY OF JUDGMENT shall be made in cases where resolutions have been issued denying extensions of time to file petition or declaring cases closed and terminated for failure to file a petition.
The claims of private respondents are meritorious. We find that Mr. Roberto Pael voluntarily and freely withdrew the petition. He is the known and authorized representative of petitioners Pael and the Administrator of the Pael Estate who has always acted for petitioners at all stages of the proceedings. We have no doubt that the solemnizing court officials conducted the necessary steps to ensure that the motions or papers being solemnized by them were freely and voluntarily executed by the affiants.
At any rate, even if we disregard the said withdrawals and give recognition to the vacillating attitude displayed by Mr. Pael, we find from the records that there is substantial merit to the position of private respondents in these cases. Decided on the merits, the outcome will be the same.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 133547, the heirs of Antonio Pael, Andrea Alcantara and Crisanto Pael, anchored their petition for review on the following assignment of errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY MISAPPRECIATED, IGNORED, MISAPPLIED AND/OR OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT UNDER THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, THE ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT IS IMPROPER AS THERE WAS NO EXTRINSIC FRAUD OR RECKLESS AND GROSS NEGLIGENCE COMMITTED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' FORMER COUNSEL, ATTY. OLIVER LOZANO, HENCE, THE ASSAILED DECISION OF THE APPELLATE COURT SHOULD BE STRICKEN DOWN FOR BEING WITHOUT ANY CREDIBLE BASIS.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT EXTRINSIC FRAUD AND GROSS AND RECKLESS NEGLIGENCE WERE COMMITTED BY ATTY. LOZANO, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE BOUND BY SAID EXTRINSIC FRAUD AND GROSS AND RECKLESS NEGLIGENCE AS THEY THEMSELVES CONTRIBUTED TO THE COMMISSION OF SUCH FRAUD AND NEGLIGENCE OF THEIR COUNSEL.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE REVIVAL OF THE TITLE IN FAVOR OF ANTONIO PAEL AND ANDREA ALCANTARA AND CRISANTO PAEL, EVEN IF THEY ARE NOT PARTIES TO THE CASE BELOW, WAS A LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE OF THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT SINCE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT HAD ALREADY LONG BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY, CONSEQUENTLY THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE TITLES OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND THE DECLARATION AS NULL AND VOID OF THE TITLE IN THE NAMES OF ANTONIO PAEL AND ANDREA ALCANTARA AND CRISANTO PAEL WERE ERRONEOUS AND IMPROPER.
V
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IN ITS DECISION IT ADJUDICATED THE CASE ON THE MERITS, WHICH IS PROCEDURALLY FLAWED.36
Maria Destura, on the other hand, petitioner in G.R. No. 133843, raised the following grounds:
1. The ruling of the respondent Court of Appeals that private respondents are not bound by the negligence and incompetence of their counsel is erroneous and contrary to law and jurisprudence.
2. The ruling of the respondent Court of Appeals that the gross negligence of counsel for private respondents constitutes is "extrinsic fraud" is likewise erroneous and contrary to law and jurisprudence.
3. Granting for the sake of argument, that there is basis to annul the questioned decision, the action of respondent Court of Appeals in adjudicating the merits of the case is contrary to Section 7, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
4. The findings of the respondent Court of Appeals that the interest of the private respondent in the subject property over that of petitioner is borne out by any evidence in the records of the case in the trial court.37
The petition being one for annulment of judgment, the principal issue to be resolved is whatever there was extrinsic fraud, want of jurisdiction, or lack of due process that attended the rendition of the Decision dated January 24, 1995 and the issuance of the Order dated August 28, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-93-18569.
In Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals,38 this Court had occasion to state that fraud may assume different shapes and be committed in as many different ways, and here lies the danger of attempting to define fraud. For man in his ingenuity and fertile imagination will always contrive new schemes to fool the unwary.
There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Sec. 9 par. (2), of B.P. 819. Blg, where it is one the effect of which prevents a party from hearing a trial, or real contest, or from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters, not pertaining to the judgment itself, but to the manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy. In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. Fraud is extrinsic where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had any knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing.39
In granting the petition for annulment of judgment, the Court of Appeals found the following instances as indicative of the attendance of extrinsic fraud:
(a) The enigmatic failure of petitioners' (i.e., respondents Chin and Mallari) former counsel to file an answer to the complaint within the period prescribed by the Rules of Court which resulted in a decision by default. The property is extremely valuable and strongly coveted by scheming persons whose false claims have been rejected in the past. The petitioners were absolutely denied the opportunity to be heard and to present their side in the proceedings below;
(b) The immediate filing by their former counsel of their notice of appeal from the default judgment, and the filing a few days later of a motion for new trial despite the perfection of their appeal, knowing fully well that both remedies (appeal and new trial) are utterly inconsistent with and contradictory to each other;
(c) Petitioners were deprived of their right to have the appellate court pass upon, consider and resolve the merits of their appeal and to have their side of the case ventilated, as well as the suspicious actuations on the part of petitioners' former counsel resulting in the denial of petitioners of their day in court, amounting to gross and reckless negligence of their counsel, which constituted a gross violation of petitioners' right to due process;
(d) The flip-flopping committed by the respondent trial court in its order when it ruled on petitioners' motion and supplemental motion for new trial and at the same time declared that it had no jurisdiction over the case as the appealing parties therein (petitioners) had expressly abandoned their appeal;
(e) The utter lack of merit of the Destura complaint shown by the fact that the respondent Judge had to search for a non-party, who might have a shadow of a claim to the disputed titles, instead of merely dismissing the complaint;
(f) The refusal of the appellate court to clarify its judgment and to and to amend the dispositive portion of the said judgment; and
(g) The manifest bias, partiality and collusion by the respondent Judge with the sheriff and the private respondent Maria Destura and her spouse Pedro Destura, and with the Paels, as shown among others, by the fact that the title of the petitioners over the subject property was delivered by the sheriff personally to Maria Destura, which is clearly highly irregular and anomalous. Especially, when the Court ruled that Destura had no right to any title and instead awarded title to the Paels.40
Citing the case of Laxamana v. Court of Appeals41, the Court of Appeals held that there is extrinsic fraud justifying annulment of judgment in instances wherein a party was prevented from defending the action brought against him on account of the delinquent acts and omissions of his attorney. Thus:
Lack of due process of law and extrinsic or collateral fraud vitiate a final and executory judgment and are valid grounds for setting it aside. In an adversary litigation, fundamental fairness requires that as much as possible both parties should be heard so that a just and impartial verdict may be promulgated.
The extrinsic or collateral fraud which invalidates a final judgment, "must be such as prevented the unsuccessful party from fully and fairly presenting his case or defense; it must be such as prevented the losing party from having an adversary trial of the issue". Thus, the act of the successful party in inducing the lawyer of the losing party to commit professional delinquency or infidelity constitutes extrinsic or collateral fraud.
In other words, there is extrinsic fraud when a party was prevented from having presented all of his case to the court as when the lawyer connives at his defeat or corruptly sells out his client's interest.42
Since the badges of fraud as found by the Court of Appeals have their origin in the acts of respondents' counsel, it becomes necessary to pass upon the effects of those acts on respondents' defense. Petitioners in both cases maintain that respondents should be bound by the mistakes of their counsel and, thus, must suffer the consequence of the dismissal of their appeal due to the mistake of Atty. Oliver Lozano in resorting to two clearly inconsistent remedies, namely, appeal and motion for new trial. However, the rule, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, is not hard and fast one and admits of exceptions, such as where the mistake of counsel is so gross, palpable and inexcusable as to result in the violation of his client's substantive rights. For while it is true that the acts of a lawyer in the defense of a case, including his mistakes and negligence, are the acts of his client, this rule does not extend where such mistakes or negligence would result in serious injustice to the client.43 In cases of gross and palpable negligence of counsel, the courts must step in and accord relief to a client who suffered thereby.44
Such is the situation in the case at bar. When Atty. Lozano filed a motion for new trial days after filing a notice of appeal, he should have known that his appeal had already been perfected. Consequently, the trial court lost its jurisdiction over the case, save for acts for the protection or preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve matters litigated in the appeal.
Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. — A party's appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.
A party's appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time.
In appeals by notice of appeal the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the records on appeal filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection or preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal.45
Having first opted for the remedy of appeal and having filed the requisite notice thereof, Atty. Lozano should have been fully aware that the trial court had already lost jurisdiction over the case. Thus, the court could not have validly entertained the motion for new trial that Atty. Lozano subsequently filed. This palpable error was compounded by the act of the trial court in denying the motion for new trial and at the same time dismissing respondents' appeal. Necessarily, respondents, through no fault or negligence of their own, were left with no remedy to obtain substantive relief from the judgment rendered against them, thereby resulting in a flagrant denial of their right to due process. In cases such as the one at bar, the courts have the legal and moral duty to provide judicial aid to parties who are deprived of their rights. Indeed, respondents were then in no position to analyze the legal niceties of the remedies resorted to by their counsel and to realize the deleterious effects of the latter's tactical errors and the invalid acts of the trial judge on their cause. As succinctly stated by the Court of Appeals:
Petitioners' (respondents herein) hands were thus tied in view of the gross negligence of their former counsel, the Flip-flopping committed by Judge Bersamin and the refusal of the appellate court to clarify its judgment and amend the dispositive portion of the said judgment. They were unjustifiably and unceremoniously stripped of their titles over their property by Judge Bersamin, and instead the title of the Paels — who were never parties to the case and are complete strangers thereto — was reinstated. The actuations of Judge Bersamin are clearly prejudicial to the superior interests of the petitioners (i.e., respondents herein) over the subject property which compelled them to institute the instant Petition for Annulment of Judgment.46
More importantly, the Court of Appeals took note of the contradictory decisions of Judge Lucas Bersamin in Civil Case No. Q-93-18569, on the one hand, and Civil Case No. Q-89-4275, on the other hand, which prejudiced respondents herein. In the latter case, Judge Bersamin reversed the appealed judgment which dismissed the ejectment suit filed by Luis and Leony Menor against Roberto and Juanita Pael, and upheld the sale of 70% portion of the subject land by the Paels to the Menors. In the case below, however, the same Judge Bersamin ordered the reinstatement of TCT No. 36048 in the name of the Paels.
Not only are the Decision and Order tainted with irregularities constituting extrinsic fraud. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that they are null and void. Maria Destura's complaint should have been dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia and res judicata, considering that her husband Pedro Destura had earlier filed a complaint, Civil Case No. Q-93-14522, principally against the same defendants, namely respondents Chin and Mallari, for, among others, annulment of their titles and annulment of the Memorandum of Agreement. These are the same causes of action pleaded by Maria in Civil Case No. Q-93-18569. As held by the Court of Appeals:
The filing of the complaint by Maria Destura with respondent Court (i.e., RTC Quezon City, Branch 96) also violated the rule on litis pendencia under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. The pendency of another action or litis pendencia to be invoked, it is required that the parties to the action are the same, that there is substantial identity of the cause of action and the relief sought, and that the result of the first action is determinative of the second in any event (Anorthcolt & Co. vs. Villa Abrile, 41 Phil. 462).
Here, while the appeal by Pedro Destura from the order of dismissal by Judge de Guzman of his complaint for annulment of titles, reconveyance and/or specific performance and damages on November 5, 1993, as well as the validity of the memorandum of agreement, was pending before the appellate court, Maria Destura commenced on December 9, 1993 a similar action for annulment of memorandum of agreement and titles with damages before the same Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. A shown above, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision only on December 10, 1996 affirming the order of Judge de Guzman. That judgment is final and has been executed a long time ago.
Maria Destura's complaint should be stricken down on ground of res judicata. Pedro Destura previously filed before Judge De Guzman an action impugning the validity of the memorandum of agreement and the titles of (respondents) Chin and Mallari. The trial court thru Judge de Guzman dismissed the complaint in effect upholding the validity of the memorandum of agreement and the titles of the (respondents). This dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which categorically stated that the titles of Chin and Mallari are better than those of the Desturas. Clearly, res judicata lies. All the essential elements of res judicata are present in the instant case, namely: (a) that the previous judgment must be final; (b) that the prior judgment was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) that there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action. (Mangoma vs. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 21, Guevara vs. Benito, 247 SCRA 570). Even if the plaintiff in the first action was Pedro Destura, while in the second action, the plaintiff was Maria Destura, wife of Pedro Destura, still there is identity of parties because Maria Destura is a successor-in-interest of Pedro Destura. A decision is conclusive upon the parties therein as well as their successors-in-interest under the doctrine of res judicata. (Suobiron vs. Court of appeals, 250 SCRA 184). Moreover for res judicata to apply, what is required is not absolute but only substantial identity of parties. (Javier v. Veridiano II, 237 SCRA 565).47
The Court of Appeals also found that petitioner Maria Destura did not come to court with clean hands when she instituted Civil Case No. Q-93-18569. She should have known then that her husband's complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-93-14522, had already been dismissed for lack of cause of action. She also knew that the said decision, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, became final and executory.
On the whole, annulment of judgment was the proper remedy for respondents, notwithstanding that the judgment by default against them had already become final. They were left with no other remedy under the circumstances. Moreover, a petition for annulment of judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud may be filed within four years from the discovery of the same.48 Hence, petitioners' contention that respondents could no longer avail of the remedy of annulment of judgment because the judgment by default against them had already become final holds no water.
Moreover, the trial-court's decision is not only erroneous but is void from the beginning as the title was given to the Paels despite the fact that they were not parties and have been total strangers to the said case. They were never impleaded nor did they intervene in the case wherein the disputed property was awarded to them.
Petitioners argue that the reinstatement of the title in favor of Antonio Pael and Andrea Alcantara and Crisanto Pael is not unprecedented, dubious or unthinkable even if the Paels were not parties to the case below.
The claim that the judgment did not favor a non-party or a stranger to the case, like the Paels, is contrary to the trial court's decision itself which in no uncertain terms specifically ordered the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel TCT Nos. 52928 and 52929 in the names of private respondents and thereafter to reinstate TCT No. 360478, which was in the names of the spouses Antonio Pael and Andrea Alcantara and Crisanto Pael, before they sold the land to private respondents.
The trial court's decision, insofar as it reinstated the title of the Paels, cannot be enforced, consistent with the rule enunciated by the Supreme Court in the following cases:
A person not included as a party to a case cannot be bound by the decision made by a court.49
A person who was not impleaded in the complaint could not be bound by the decision rendered thereon for no man shall be effected by a proceeding to which he is a stranger.50
Generally accepted is the principle that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court.51
On the issue of ownership of the land in dispute, the records sustain the claim of private respondents as against those of petitioners.
As earlier stated with respect to petitioner Maria Destura, she has no valid claim of ownership. The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals ruled against the claim of her husband in Civil Case No. Q-93-14522. The decisions, long final and executory per entry of judgment, upheld the titles of Chin and Mallari and declared that they have a better title to the property. Maria Destura tried to revive the case lost by her husband by also impleading him together with Chin and Mallari. Later, however, she withdrew her complaint against her husband.
Equally important, Destura did not appeal from the court's decision. The said decision has already become final and executory as to Destura. She is thus bound by the decision of the trial court and has no right to file a petition directly with the Supreme Court.
That Destura has no right whatsoever over the subject property was expressly declared by the appellate court in its Resolution dated January 8, 1998, to wit:
We cannot resolve the merits of movant Letty Sy's plea that she is a real party in interest in the instant case without going over the records of this case so far submitted to the Court, including the decisions of the trial and appellate courts. For, Letty Sy's motion would rise or fall depending on whether or not Maria Destura has any interest in the subject properties. Let it be emphasized, however, that We are not, at this time, deciding the petition for annulment of judgment on the merits or resolving whether the petitioner's petition for annulment of judgment has any merit, or that private respondents' opposition thereto should be given credence. What we are concerned only now is the motion of Letty Sy to substitute Maria Destura on the ground that she is the absolute owner of the property having bought the property from Maria Destura, and that the latter is no longer filing her comment on the petition.
We find established to Our satisfaction that Letty Sy's motion is not impressed with merit.
x x x x x x x x x
. . . It thus appearing that spouses Maria Destura and Pedro Destura do not have any evidence to prove that they own the subject properties which they sold to Letty Sy, consequently, Letty Sy's motion to substitute Maria Destura based on her having bought the subject properties from Maria Destura by virtue of an alleged Deed of Absolute Sale cannot be given judicial imprimatur.52
Letty Sy's claim that Destura is no longer interested and that Sy is the interested party is negated by Destura's filing of a 44-page pleading actively pursuing her case before the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court ruled "that the spouses Maria Destura and Pedro Destura do not have any evidence to prove that they own the subject properties which they sold to Letty Sy." Destura did not refute this finding that she sold property she did not own in her petition. She was silent, even if the appellate court's finding was damaging to her stand.
Maria Destura's complaint should also be stricken down on the ground of res judicata. The Quezon City Regional Trial Court had earlier dismissed her husband's 1993 complaint. The Court of Appeals, in affirming the Regional Trial Court's decision on December 10, 1996, categorically ruled that the titles of private respondents are superior to that of the Desturas.
As to the Paels, they likewise have no right over the subject properties. The Court of Appeals found sufficient evidence to establish that they had already sold 70% of the land, comprising an area of 543,633.90 square meters, to Luis and Leonor Menor. This 70% portion was, in turn, sold by Menor to private respondents Chin and Mallari on December 10, 1978. Insofar as the remaining 30% of the land is concerned, there is likewise evidence to show that the same was sold by the Pael heirs directly to Chin and Mallari also on December 10, 1978. Eventually, titles were issued in private respondents' names.
As earlier stated, it was error for respondent trial court to cancel the titles of private respondents and order the reinstatement of title in the name of Antonio Pael, Andrea Alcantara and Crisanto Pael, because the Paels were not parties to the case below. The party plaintiff in that complaint for annulment of title, Civil Case No. Q-93-18569, was Maria Destura alone. The defendants therein were private respondents herein, Jorge H. Chin and Renato B. Mallari, as well as the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.
The highly anomalous and deplorable conduct of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City in registering the reinstated title in favor of the Paels who were non-parties to the case, inspite of his being a defendant in the case, resulted in the sale of this vast tract of land by the Paels to anybody right and left, including Letty Sy, PFINA, and presumably others who have not come forward to intervene in this case.
The Paels, having no longer any right over the subject property, had nothing to sell to PFINA. Therefore, the title obtained by PFINA allegedly by virtue of the deed of assignment executed by the Paels in its favor is a nullity. Worse, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City connived and conspired with PFINA when the former registered the deed of assignment on the basis of fake and spurious documents.
The Court of Appeals also found it unbelievable for PFINA to acquire extremely valuable real estate in Quezon City for only P30.00 per square meter. In 1983, PFINA Mining and Exploration, Inc. was a mining company. It changed its corporate name to PFINA Properties, Inc., only on January 22, 1998, six (6) days before filing its petition-in-intervention with the Court of Appeals. In its petition, PFINA claimed to have bought urban real estate in 1983, notwithstanding that at the time it was still a mining company which had no business dabbling in the highly speculative urban real estate trade.
The Court of Appeals further ruled:
The arguments regarding payment of taxes by the Paels are absurd, to say the least, and they tend to make the Paels appear as blockheads. The P20,000,000.00 allegedly paid to the Paels would be a paltry fraction of the amount of taxes which would be involved in a genuine sale of this magnitude. The Office of the Treasurer of Quezon City has certified that the certificate of real estate tax payment dated January 21, 1998 was not issued by their Office, that the receipts of tax payments are fabricated and that the signature in the certification is not the signature of the issuing officer.53
On the other hand, the records show that private respondents are the owners of the subject property by virtue of the sale to them by the Menors and the Paels as early as December 10, 1978. As above stated, the Paels sold 70% of the total land area of the property to the spouses Luis and Leony Menor. The Menors, in turn, sold to private respondents the same 70%, while the remaining 30% was old by the surviving heirs of the Paels to private respondents. In a separate Decision dated December 10, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 44324, the Court of Appeals ruled that private respondents have a better right over the subject property because of these transactions.
The Court of Appeals also held:
Glaringly inexplicable is the fact that Maria Destura claims ownership of the subject property over the Paels when Pedro Destura caused the execution of a document entitled "Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Spouses Antonio Pael and Andrea Alcantara with Sale Adjudication" and the execution of a deed of sale of the property between Pedro Destura and Lutgarda which was by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney allegedly executed in favor of Marilao. Pedro Destura did not mention any transfer of the property between him and Maria Destura and the spouses Luis and Leony Menor who later on canceled and registered in their favor TCT No. 36048 which constitutes 70% of the property of the Paels sold to them in 1978, very much earlier than the alleged sale in 1979.
On the other hand, the records show that the ownership by petitioners Jorge H. Chin and Renato B. Mallari of the subject property is by virtue of the sale of 70% of the total land area of 543,633.90 square meters made by the Paels in favor of the spouses Luis and Leony Menor. Menor in turn sold to Chin and Mallari the aforesaid 70% of the land area, while the remaining 30% of the land area was sold by the surviving heirs of the Paels to Chin and Mallari in 1978, respectively.54
We have carefully read and scrutinized the Court of Appeals' findings and find no error in them. The facts, the law and the jurisprudence clearly support the holding that private respondents are the true and absolute owners of the disputed property since 1978.
Petitioners argue that the adjudication of the case on the merits by the Court of Appeals was procedurally flawed as it violated Rule 47, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, and that the case should have been remanded to the trial court.
This argument deserves scant consideration. There is no point in remanding the case to the court below because the property was awarded to a non-party — the Paels — despite the fact that private respondents are the registered owners thereof. The Court of Appeals did not annul a valid registration but merely declared a questionable registration, which was void because there was an existing registration and there was a notice of lis pendens annotated on the titles of private respondents. The Register of Deeds flagrantly ignored and violated these when he allowed the registration and issuance of the title first in favor of the non-parties Paels and then, in favor of PFINA, the dubious corporation.
Private respondents are the real victims in this case. When they bought the property from the Menors and the Paels, they registered the sale and, consequently, titles were issued in their names. There is nothing in the records that could affect the validity of their earlier ownership over the disputed property and, their titles having been illegally and unlawfully canceled, it is only right that the same be restored.
The filing by private respondents of the petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals did not presuppose the validity, finality and executory nature of the judgment sought to be annulled. Nowhere in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court does it imply such validity of the judgment of the trial court. It would be procedurally improper for the Court of Appeals to remand the proceedings below and order the trial court to conduct a new trial of the case under Rule 47, Section 7 because respondent trial court did not just dismiss the complaint of plaintiff Destura, but also canceled the titles of defendants, now private respondents, and reinstated the titles of the Paels who were total strangers to the action. Moreover, with manifest bias, partiality and collusion among the trial judge, the sheriff, Maria Destura and her husband Pedro, and the Paels, which the Court of Appeals took cognizance of, remanding the case to the court below for new trial would be an exercise in futility and an unnecessary prolongation of a case commenced six (6) years ago.
Furthermore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is justified by the fact that during the proceedings before the appellate court, the Register of Deeds irregularly issued a new title, TCT No. 186662, in favor of PFINA. The function and importance of a notice of lis pendens were lost on respondent trial judge and the Register of Deeds. As held in Seveses v. Court of Appeals, et al.:55
We once more emphasize that a notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular property is in litigation, and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.56
Coming now to the issue of intervention, it would appear that intervenor Menor's Motion for Intervention is not only without merit but was also filed late. Rule 19, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a motion to intervene should be filed "before rendition of judgment by the trial court". To be sure, intervention can no longer be allowed in this case. Menor's intervention was filed with the Supreme Court only in 1999, during the latter stage of the proceedings herein.
At any rate, even if the Motion for Intervention was seasonably filed, it should still be denied. As we held in Seveses v. Court of Appeals, et al.:57
In the case of Santiago Land Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 106194, 276 SCRA 674 [1997]), petitioner maintained that as a purchaser pendente lite of the land in litigation, it had a right to intervene under Rule 12, Section 2. We rejected this position and said that "since petitioner is not a stranger to the action between Quisumbing and the PNB, petitioner in fact having stepped into the shoes of PNB in a manner of speaking, it follows that it cannot claim any further right to intervene in the action." As in the instant Petition, it was argued that the denial of the Motion to Intervene would be a denial likewise of due process. But this, too, was struck down in Santiago Land where we held that "petitioner is not really denied protection. It is represented in the action by its predecessor in interest." Indeed, since petitioner is a transferee pendente lite with notice of the pending litigation between Reyes and private respondent Carreon, petitioner stands exactly in the shoes of Reyes and is bound by any judgment or decree which may be rendered for or against the latter.
Indeed, the records show that intervenor Menor had already sold the properties purchased from the Paels. And if intervenor has any cause of action against private respondents, he should seek his remedies elsewhere and not before this Court.1âwphi1.nęt
WHEREFORE, the petitions for review in G.R. No. 133547 and G.R. No. 133843 are DENIED. The appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 29, 1998 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is ordered, within ten (10) days from finality of this Decision, to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 186662 in the name of PFINA Properties, Inc., and RESTORE to private respondents within the same period Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 52928 and 52929 registered in their names.
The Motion to Intervene filed by Luis M. Menor is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Santiago, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, G.R. No. 133843, pp. 44-102.
2 Rollo, G.R. No. 133843, p. 534.
3 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, Annex "B", pp. 198-203.
4 CA-G.R. CV No. 44324; Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, pp. 255-263.
5 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, pp. 198-203.
6 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, p. 501.
7 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, p. 503.
8 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, p. 212.
9 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, p. 213.
10 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, pp. 215-219.
11 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, p. 220.
12 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, pp. 221-225.
13 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, pp. 231-237.
14 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, pp. 247-248.
15 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, pp. 336-342.
16 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, pp. 356-368.
17 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, pp. 371-413.
18 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, pp. 414-434.
19 Op. cit., note 1, at pp. 100-102.
20 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, pp. 497-500.
21 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, p. 500.
22 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, pp. 516-519.
23 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, pp. 523-556.
24 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, pp. 575-577.
25 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, p. 577.
26 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, p. 565.
27 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, pp. 601-602.
28 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, pp. 603-604.
29 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, pp. 567-570.
30 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, pp. 661-664.
31 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, p. 739.
32 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, pp. 682-688; Rollo, G.R. No. 133843, pp. 327-333.
33 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, pp. 689-714; Rollo, G.R. No. 133843, pp. 334-452.
34 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, pp. 790-840: Rollo, G.R. No. 133843, pp. 475-521.
35 Rollo, G.R. No. 1333547, pp. 740-748.
36 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, pp. 113-114.
37 Rollo, G.R. No. 133843, pp. 18-19.
38 265 SCRA 168, 179 (1996).
39 Supra., at 179-180; citations omitted.
40 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, pp. 149-152.
41 87 SCRA 48, 56 (1978).
42 Citations omitted.
43 People v. Hernandez, 260 SCRA 25, 38 (1996), citing Villa Rhecar Bus v. De La Cruz, 157 SCRA 13 (1988); De La Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 370, June 29, 1989.
44 Kalubiran v. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 320, 334 (1998).
45 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 41, Section 9.
46 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, pp. 173-174.
47 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, pp. 166-169.
48 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 47, Section 3.
49 Buazon v. Court of Appeals, 220 SCRA 182, 190 (1993).
50 Filamer Christian Institute v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 485, 492 (1990).
51 Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 490 (1996).
52 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, pp. 359-360, 366; emphasis provided.
53 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, p. 191.
54 Rollo, G.R. No. 133547, pp. 179-180.
54 G.R. No. 102675, October 13, 1999.
55 Citing Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117108, 281 SCRA 298, 306-307 (1997).
57 Supra.
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