Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 133047 August 17, 1999
HEIRS OF LORENZO YAP, namely SALLY SUN YAP, MARGARET YAP-UY and MANUEL YAP, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON YAP and BENJAMIN YAP, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
What in essence petitioners seek is the enforcement of an alleged trust agreement between Lorenzo Yap, now deceased, and his brothers Ramon and Benjamin, herein co-respondents, covering a piece of land and its improvement. The case and factual settings found by the Court of Appeals do not appear to deviate significantly from that priority made by the trial court.1âwphi1.nęt
Sometime in February 1966, Ramon Yap purchased a parcel of land situated at 123 (formerly 75) Batanes Street, Galas, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 82001/T-414, from the spouses Carlos and Josefina Nery. The lot was thereupon registered in the name of Ramon Yap under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 102132; forthwith, he also declared the property in his name for tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon from 1966 to 1992. In 1967, Ramon Yap constructed a two-storey 3-door apartment building for the use of the Yap family. One-fifth (1/5) of the cost of the construction was defrayed by Ramon Yap while the rest was shouldered by Chua Mia, the mother of Lorenzo, Benjamin and Ramon. Upon its completion, the improvement was declared for real estate tax purposes in the name of Lorenzo Yap in deference to the wishes of the old woman.
Lorenzo Yap died on 11 July 1970. A few months later, his heirs (herein petitioners) left their family dwelling in Lucena City to reside permanently in Manila. Ramon Yap allowed petitioners to use one unit of the apartment building.
On 18 March 1992, Ramon Yap sold the land and his share of the 3-door apartment to his brother, his herein co-respondent Benjamin Yap, for the sum of P337,500.00 pursuant to a Deed of Sale, recorded on even date in the Memorandum of Encumbrances of the title to said property. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 73002 was in due time issued in the name of Benjamin Yap.
The controversy started when herein petitioners, by a letter of 08 June 1992, advised respondents of the former's claim of ownership over the property and demanded that respondents execute the proper deed necessary to transfer the title to them. At about the same time, petitioners filed a case for ejectment against one of the bonafide tenants of the property.
On 29 July 1992, respondents filed an action with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Quezon City, docketed Civil Case No. Q-92-12899, for quieting of title against petitioners. In their answer, petitioners averred that sometime in 1966 the spouses Carlos and Josefina Nery offered to sell the disputed parcel of land to their predecessor-in-interest, Lorenzo Yap, for the sum of P15,000.00. Since Lorenzo and his wife Sally Yap were at that time Chinese citizens, Lorenzo requested his brother Ramon to allow the use of the latter's name in the purchase, registration, and declaration for tax purposes of the subject lot to which Ramon Yap consented. It was agreed that the property would remain registered in the name of Ramon Yap until such time as Lorenzo would have acquired Philippine citizenship but that, should Lorenzo predecease, the lot would then be transferred to Lorenzo's heirs upon the latter's naturalization. Petitioners contended that it was Lorenzo who had caused the construction of the 3-door apartment on the property, merely entrusting the money therefor to Ramon Yap. The death of Lorenzo in 1970 prompted petitioners to move in and occupy the apartment and the lot, without any objection from Ramon and Benjamin, although the latter were allowed to stay in the premises since they had no other place to live in. In 1991, petitioners acquired Philippine citizenship and, forthwith, they requested Ramon Yap to have the title to the lot transferred to their names but to their chagrin they discovered that Ramon had sold the lot to his co-respondent Benjamin.
Assessing the evidence before it, the trial court found for the respondents and adjudged Benjamin Yap to be the true and lawful owner of the disputed property.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and debunked the claim of petitioners that Ramon Yap was merely so used as a dummy by Lorenzo Yap. Giving full weight and credit to the Deed of Sale executed by the Nery spouses in favor of Ramon Yap, the appellate court stressed that to overcome the presumption of regularity in the execution of a public document, the evidence to the contrary should be clear and convincing even as it was equally incumbent upon petitioners to show that the subsequent sale of the property to Benjamin had only been simulated and fictitious. The appellate court, however, deleted the award of attorney's fees in favor of respondents for, in its view, it was not adequately shown that petitioners had acted in bad faith in pursuing their case.
Petitioners are now before this Court seeking a reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals and contending that —
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT HOLDS THAT DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS FATHER, LORENZO YAP, BEING CHINESE CAN NOT ENTER INTO A TRUST AGREEMENT AND THE EXISTENCE OF A TRUST AGREEMENT CAN NOT BE PROVEN BEING CHINESE.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT HOLDS THAT THE FAILURE TO SHOW WRITTEN TRUST AGREEMENT RENDERS THE ALLEGED AGREEMENT UNENFORCEABLE BY NOT CONSIDERING THE SAME AS ONE UNDER IMPLIED TRUST.
III
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT HOLDS THAT PAROL EVIDENCE AND/OR STATUTE OF FRAUDS APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BAR.
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT HOLDS THAT APPELLANTS HAVE TO REFUTE THE DEED OF SALE EXECUTED BY THE NERY SPOUSES IN FAVOR OF RAMON YAP BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE NOTWITHSTANDING ADMISSION OF THE SAID DEED OF SALE.
V
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER THAT IN TRUST THE TITLE IS IN THE NAME OF THE TRUSTEE AND NOT IN THE NAME OF THE NAKED OWNER.
VI
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HOLDS THAT RAMON YAP CAN NOT BE A DUMMY OF LORENZO YAP BEING ALIEN AND DISQUALIFIED TO OWN REAL PROPERTY.
VII
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE TITLE IN THE NAME OF RAMON YAP VOID BEING ACQUIRED AS DUMMY.
VIII
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT BENJAMIN YAP HAS POSSESSION OF APARTMENT UNIT 123 LIKEWISE OWNERSHIP PERSONAL PROPERTIES THEREIN ON THE BASIS OF THE INVENTORY OF THE SHERIFF OF THE COURT A QUO BY WAY OF A SUBSEQUENT MANDATORY INJUNCTION WHICH WAS DENIED.1
The Court finds no merit in the appeal.
To begin with, a brief discussion on the trust relation between two parties could be helpful. A trust may either be express or implied.2 Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words evincing an intention to create a trust.3 Implied trusts are those which, without being express, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent or, independently of the particular intention of the parties, as being superinduced on the transaction by operation of law basically by reason of equity.4 These species of implied trust are ordinarily subdivided into resulting and constructive trusts.5 A resulting trust is one that arises by implication of law and presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties, the intention as to which can be found in the nature of their transaction although not expressed in a deed or instrument of conveyance.6 Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that it is the more valuable consideration that the legal title that determines the equitable interest in property.7 Upon the other hand, a constructive trust is a trust not created by any word or phrase, either expressly or impliedly, evincing a direct intention to create a trust, but one that arises in order to satisfy the demands of justice. It does not come about by agreement or intention but in main by operation of law8 construed against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold.9
One basic distinction between an implied trust and an express trust is that while the former may be established by parol evidence, the latter cannot. Even then, in order to establish an implied trust in real property by parol evidence, the proof should be as fully convincing as if the acts giving rise to the trust obligation are proven by an authentic document.10 An implied trust, in fine, cannot be established upon vague and inconclusive proof.11
Unfortunately for petitioners, the issues they submit in the case at bar boil down to the appreciation of the evidence presented. The Court of Appeals, sustaining the court a quo, has found the evidence submitted by petitioners to be utterly wanting,12 consisting mainly of the self-serving testimony of Sally Yap. She herself admitted that the business establishment of her husband Lorenzo was razed by fire in 1964 that would somehow place to doubt the claim that he indeed had the means to purchase the subject land about two years later from the Nery spouses. Upon the other hand, Ramon Yap was by then an accountant with apparent means to buy the property himself. At all events, findings of fact by the Court of Appeals, particularly when consistent with those made by the trial court, should deserve utmost regard when not devoid of evidentiary support. No cogent reason had been shown by petitioners for the Court to now hold otherwise.
Not to be dismissed, furthermore, is the long standing and broad doctrine of clean hands that will not allow the creation or the use of a juridical relation, a trust whether express or implied included, to perpetrate fraud or tolerate bad faith nor to subvert, directly or indirectly, the law. The trust agreement between Ramon and Lorenzo, if indeed extant, would have been in contravention of, in fact the fundamental law. Then Section 5, Article XIII, of the 1935 Constitution has provided that —
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations, qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
The mandate has also been adopted in Section 14, Article XIV, of the 1973 Constitution and now reiterated under Section 7, Article XII, of the 1987 Constitution. A trust or a provision in the terms of a trust would be invalid if the enforcement of the trust or provision is against the law even though its performance does not involve the commission of a criminal or tortuous act. It likewise must follow that what the parties are not allowed to do expressly is one that they also may not do impliedly as, for instance, in the guise of a resulting trust.13
The foregoing disquisition renders unnecessary the resolution of the incidental issues raised in the petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals of 08 January 1998 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 46838 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., concur.1âwphi1.nęt
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., no part. Member of the Court of Appeals Division that rendered the decision.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 25-27.
2 See Article 1441, New Civil Code.
3 Rizal Surety and Insurance Company vs. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 69; O'Laco vs. Co Cho Chit, 220 SCRA 656; citing Ramos vs. Ramos, 61 SCRA 284.
4 Salao vs. Salao, 70 SCRA 65; 89 C.J.S. 724.
5 89 C.J.S. 722.
6 Ramos vs. Ramos, supra, citing 89 C.J.S. 725.
7 O'Laco vs. Co Cho Chit, supra.
8 89 C.J.S. 726-727.
9 O'Laco vs. Co Cho Chit, supra, citing 76 Am. Jur. 2d 446.
10 Santa Juana vs. Del Rosario, 50 Phil. 110; O'Laco vs. Co Cho Chit, supra.
11 Suarez vs. Tirambulo, 59 Phil. 303.
12 Calculated to render applicable Article 1448 of the Civil Code to the effect that there "is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property. The former is the trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary."
13 Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 348.
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