Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 118599 June 26, 1998
ANICETO
1 M. QUINO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PURIFICACION L. CANSON, EDITHA G. LEONARDO, CARMELITA L. MORI, JOSEFINA L. BAIS, AIDA L. COLLYER, ANTONIO G. LEONARDO, RUDOLFO G. LEONARDO, ROBERTO G. LEONARDO and TERESA L. REGNER, in substitution for ANTONIO LEONARDO SR., JOSEFA GALAN and JOSE BITOON, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 29 October 1974 Bernarda and Rosario Galan sold their agricultural land with an area of 2.3926 hectares situated in Basak, Compostela, Cebu, to spouses Antonio Leonardo Sr. and Josefa Galan for P2,000.00. More than a decade later, or on 30 October 1986, petitioner Aniceto Quiño filed a complaint for redemption of the property against the vendees claiming that he had been instituted as tenant thereon by the Galans since 1951; consequently, he had the right to be notified in writing of the owners' intention to sell the property to enable him to exercise his right of preemption under Sec. 11 of RA No. 3844 2 but that notwithstanding the Galans had not informed him of the sale. He claimed that he learned of the transaction only on 1 September 1986 when he found out that the Leornardos were already the new owners. He therefore prayed that he be allowed to redeem the property and consigned the purchase price with the trial court on the same day he filed his complaint.
Meanwhile, on 4 November 1986 the Leonardos sold the property to private respondent Jose Bitoon for P30,000.00.
On 12 November 1986 petitioner filed another complaint against the same spouses for injunction with a prayer for a restraining order to enjoin his ejectment from the property.
During the pendency of the case, Antonio Leonardo Sr. died. His childred, private respondents Purificacion L. Canson, Editha G. Leonardo, Carmelita, L. Mori, Josefina L. Bais, Aida L. Collyer, Antonio G. Leonardo, Rudolfo G. Leonardo, Roberto G. Leonardo and Teresa L. Ragner, were substituted in his stead as co-defendants.
Something thereafter, petitioner received a letter from the counsel of respondent Bitoon dated 24 November 1986 notifying him of the transfer of ownership of the land to his client. As no supporting document was attached to the letter to bolster counsel's claim, petitioner went to the Notarial Division of the Capitol Building and obtained on 2 March 1987 a copy of the pertinent deed of sale between spouses Leonardo and respondent Bitoon.
On 27 July 1987 petitioner filed an amended complaint impleading Jose Bitoon as additional defendant. However, on 8 October 1990 the trial court dismissed the original as well as the amended complaint after finding that majority of the esential requisites of tenancy relationship between the parties did not exist. 3
The Court of Appeals however arrived at an entirely different evaluation of the evidence. 4 On 5 August 1994 it held that all the essential requisites for tenancy relationship were present, and being a tenant petitioner was entitled to the rights of preemption and redemption under Secs. 11 and 12, respectively, of RA No. 3844. Nevertheless it noted a stumbling block to petitioner's complete victory thus —
Be that as it may, since the land in question had already pass(ed) on to defendant-appellee Jose Bitoon, and plaintiff-appellant's quest against defendant-appellees spouses Antonio Leonardo and Josefa Galan may be considered moot and academic under RA 3844, Section 10, defendant-appelle Jose Bitoon having been subrogated to the rights and obligations of his predecessors-in-interest, his obligation under the law to the tenant-plaintiff continues and subsists, that if he decides to sell the land, then plaintiff-appellant can still exercise his rights under the law (Velasquez v. Nery, 211 SCRA 28, emphasis supplied). 5
The appellate court decreed thus —
1. declaring petitioner as tenant of Bernarda and Rosario Galan and thereafter of their successor-in-interest, Antonio Leonardo Sr. substituted by his (nine) children and in turn of the present owner, respondent Bitoon.;
2. ordering respondent Bitoon to reinstate petitioner as agricultural tenant and to maintain him in the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the land tenanted by him;
3. ordering the Clerk of Court of the trial court to return to petitioner the amount of two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) which he consigned with the trial court as redemption price for the land in question, covered by O.R. No. 9802404 J dated 30 October 1986; and,
4. no pronouncement as to costs. 6
On 23 November 1994 respondent Court of Appeals denied reconsideration. 7
The issue then is whether respondent Court of Appeals was correct in holding that petitioner could not redeem the property from respondent Bitoon unless the latter decided to sell it on the strength of the ruling in Velasquez v. Nery. 8
Petitioner asserts that Velasquez is inapplicable because of the difference in factual circumstances. In that case, the sale made by the landowners to a third party was by virtue of a court order and not as envisioned under Sec. 11 of RA No. 3844. In other words, the right of the tenants therein to preemptively purchase wa not violated. Hence the right of redemption was unavailing to them.
For a better understanding of the controversy, it is essential to discuss first the statutory right of redemption and pertinent jurisprudence on the matter.
Sec. 12 of RA No. 3844 as amended by RA No. 6389 provides —
Sec. 12. Lessee's right Redemption. — In case the landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price consideration . . . . The right of redemption under this Section may be exercised within one hundred eighty days from notice in writing which shall be served by the vendee on all lessees affected and the Deaprtment of Agrarian Reform upon the registration of the sale . . . . The redemption price shall be the reasonable price of the land at the time of the sale . . . .
Simply stated, in the event that the landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter is granted by law the right to redeem it within one hundred eighty (180) days from notice in writing and at a reasonable price and consideration. Petitioner was not notified of the first and second instances of sale of the property apparently because all the respondents disputed petitioner's assertion that he has been a tenant thereon since 1951. These instances of sale without notification gave rise to his right to redeem the property as lessee although no longer from the Leonardos but from its present owner, respondent Bitoon.
A letter dated 24 November 1986 from the counsel of respondent Bitoon was received by petitioner informing him that the ownership of subject property has been transferred to respondent Bitoon. However the counsel did not bother to furnish petitioner with the supporting documents which is why petitioner did not readily believe what was written in the letter. Petitioner had to proceed to the Notarial Division of the Capitol Building on 2 March 1987 to secure a copy of the deed of sale between spouses Leonardo and respondent Bitoon.
The purpose of the written notice required by law its to remove all uncertainties as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to quiet any doubts that the alienation is not definitive. The law does not prescribe any particular form of notice, nor any distinctive method for notifying the redemptioner. So long as the redemptioner is informed in writing of the sale and the particulars thereof, the period for redemption will start running. 9 The letter received by petitioner, being bare, was not such written notice. It failed to make certain the terms, particulars and validity of the sale. Rather, only a copy of the deed of sale, in an authentic form, will satisfy the requirement of the law and serve the purpose thereof. Thus, it is proper to reckon the period of redemption from receipt of the authentic document on 2 March 1987. The amended complaint filed on 27 July 1987 is well within the redemption period of one hundred eighty (180) days.
The preceding discussion leads us to the requirement concerning reasonable price and consideration. An offer to redeem to be properly effected can either be through a formal tender with consignation or by filing a complaint in court coupled with consignation of the redemption price within the prescribed period. 10 It must be stressed however that in making a repurchase it is not sufficient that a person offering to redeem merely manifest his desire to purchase; this statement of intention must be accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of payment which constitutes the legal use or exercise of the right to repurchase. And the tender of payment must be for the full amount of the repurchase price, otherwise the offer to redeem will be held ineffectual. 11 As to what constitutes reasonable price and consideration, the valuation placed by the Leonardo spouses and respondent Bitoon themselves as price of the land must be taken to be such reasonable price and consideration. 12
Petitioner consigned the amount of P2,000.00 paid by the Leonardos to the Galans. However when he amended his complaint by impleading respondent Bitoon, he did not increase the amount consigned as would have made it equivalent to P30,000.00, representing payment by the second vendee. In this regard, petitioner submits that he is not required to consign the latter amount since that would put an additional burden on a tenant seeking redemption. After all, he would be paying whatever amount be finally determined by the trial court as reasonable price and consideration.
It is not difficult to discern why the full amount of the redemption price should be consigned in court. Only by such means can the buyer become certain that the offer to redeem is one made seriously and in good faith. A buyer cannot be expected to entertain an offer of redemption without the attendant evidence that the redemptioner can, and is willing to accomplish the repurchase immediately. A different rule would leave the buyer open to harassment by speculators or crackpots, as well as to unnecessary prolongation of the redemption period, contrary to the policy of the law in fixing a definite term to avoid prolonged and anti-economic uncertainty as to ownership of the thing sold. Consignation of the entire price would remove all controversies as to the redemptioner's ability to pay at the proper time. 13 Against such rationale, petitioner's submission is rendered insignificant. The amount so consigned by him falls short short of the requirement of the law and leaves the Court with no choice but to rule against him.
With the foregoing ratiocination, it becomes unnecessary to dwell on the issue of whether petitioner may redeem the property from respondent Bitoon. Nevertheless, we shall pursue the discussion thereon if only to rectify some points. In Velasquez, the Velasquez spouses, in a nutshell, were agricultural lessees of the property owned by the Nery spouses and the Lorenzos. Later, the owners filed an action for partition before the trial court. In a compromise agreement, they agreed to sell the property to Delta Motor Corporation. Having received information about the impending sale, the Velasquez spouses filed an action for redemption before the then Court of Agrarian Relations. Subsequently, the sale materialized. Unfortunately, the redemption case was dismissed due to lack of interest to redeem the property at its acquisition price. The appeal before respondent court and the petition before this Court met the same fate. However, we also noted that the Philippine National Bank (PNB), which was not a party to the case had in the meantime extrajudicially foreclosed the property. By way of obiter dictum we stated —
Because of the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage over the subject by the Philippine National Bank, the present case has become moot and academic with regard to petitioners claim against Delta Motor Corporation. It is now the PNB or its subsequent transferees from whom the petitioners must redeem, if and when PNB decides to sell or alienate the subject property in the future . . . .
Respondent appellate court must have taken out of context our statement therein when the former ruled that "if respondent Bitoon decides to sell the land then petitioner can still exercise his rights under the law." The phrase in the Velasquez case that "if and when PNB decides to sell or alienate the subject property in the future" logically refers to "its subsequent transferees" only, and not as a condition precedent to the exercise of the right of redemption as what respondent court perceived it to be. To further stress the matter, the ruling of respondent court overlooks the essence of redemption provided in the amended Sec. 12 of RA No. 3844 which, as previously mentioned, grants to the lessee such right in case the property is sold to a third person without his knowledge. Since that situation obtained in Velasquez, the Velasquez spouses had the right to redeem the property from the PNB as new owner. The circumstances that the property was sold to a third person without the knowledge of the lessee provides the source from which the right of redemption springs. Analyzing this right, it may be stated that such right works only one way — in favor of the redemptioner. For he can compel the purchase to sell but he cannot be compelled to buy. Supposing the lessee failed to redeem the property and the purchaser decided to sell or alienate it without notifying the former, the property may be redeemed from the subsequent transferee because another essence of the right of redemption is that it attaches to a particular landholding by operation of law. 14 The plain import of the obiter dictum in the Velasquez case is that the Velasquez spouses may redeem the property from the PNB as new owner, or should PNB decide to sell the property they may redeem the same from its transferee. Thus, contrary to the assertion of petitioner, Velasquez is applicable but not as so applied by respondent court; instead, it should have based its main ruling lack of interest to redeem the property at the acquisition price paid by respondent Bitoon.
Hence we reiterate that, for of petitioner to consign the entire redemption price, there was no valid exercise by him of his legal right to redeem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals (1) declaring petitioner as tenant of Bernarda and Rosario Galan and thereafter of their successor-in-interest, Antonio Leonardo Sr. and Josefa Galan, and in turn, of the present owner respondent Bitoon; (2) ordering respondent Jose Bitoon to reinstate petitioner as agricultural tenant and to maintain him in the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the land tenanted by him; (3) ordering the Clerk of Court of the trial court to return to petitioner the amount of of P2,000.00 which he consigned as redemption price for the land in question covered by O.R. No. 9802404 J dated 30 October 1986, with no pronouncement as to costs, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Vitug, Panganiban and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Appears as "Aniceto" in the complaint filed with the trial court.
2 The Agriculture Land Reform Code, approved 8 August 1963.
3 Decision penned by Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, RTC-Br. 28, Cebu City, Records, p. 85.
4 Decision penned by Justice Artemon D. Luna with the concurrence of Justices Asaali S. Isnani and Ramon A. Barcelona; Rollo, pp. 17-45.
5 G.R. No. 64284, 3 July 1992; Rollo, p. 44.
6 Id., pp. 44-45.
7 Id., p. 51.
8 Respondents allegedly resorted to this Court but their petition was dismissed on a technicality.
9 Conejero v. Court of Appeals, No. L-21812, 29 April 1966, 16 SCRA 775.
10 Lee Chuy Realty Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104114, 4 December 1995, 250 SCRA 596.
11 Belisario v. IAC, G.R. No. 73503, 30 August 1988, 165 SCRA, citing Angao v. Clavano, 17 Phil. 152, and Rumbaoa v. Arzaga, 84 Phil. 812.
12 Cuano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107159, 26 September 1994, 237 SCRA 122.
13 See Note 10.
14 See Not 13.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
