G.R. No. 109148




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 109148 December 4, 1998 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ERNESTO BELO, accused-appellant. QUISUMBING, J.: On appeal is the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 26, in Criminal Case No. 92-3892, convicting accused-appellant Ernesto Belo of the crime of Robbery with Rape and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering him to return the amount of P5,060.00 taken from the victim and to pay her the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity. On October 11, 1991, at around 1:00 o'clock in the morning, Leonila Pellosis was tending to her sick infant in their house in Dike, Del Carmen, Minalabac, Camarines Sur, when she heard footsteps near their kitchen. 2 Suspecting a possible intruder, she became nervous and attempted to scare him away by shouting at her 14-year-old daughter, Miriam, to fetch the local faith-healer to treat her infant. 3 Miriam was about to leave the house when suddenly, appellant Ernesto Belo forced open the door and announced "Mayo nang magkorahaw ta hold-up ini!" (Don't shout; this is a hold-up!) 4 Appellant poked a foot-long double bladed knife at the neck of Leonila and demanded money from her. Leonila begged him not to kill her and fearfully opened the cabinet ("aparador") where she kept the family's money from the recent rice harvest and handed over cash amounting to P5,060.00. 5 Suddenly, the "gasera" placed near the window was furtively struck with a piece of wood from the outside. 6 Appellant demanded more money and threatened to rape and kill her and her daughter unless he was given more money. Leonila pleaded that she had already given him all the money she had. 7 Heedless of her pleas, appellant, with the knife still pointed at Leonila's neck, dragged her towards the kitchen and forced her to lie on top of the sacks of rice. Appellant loosened his short pants and brought it down to his knees. He removed the victim's short pants and undergarments and forcibly had sexual intercourse with her. 8 When Miriam saw her mother being dragged to the kitchen, she had the presence of mind to grab her youngest brother, and with another brother (Joel), jumped out of the window to seek help from Elmer Taguilid whose house was some 500 meters away. She instructed her younger sisters (Melanie and Mirlan) to hide inside a cabinet. Miriam frantically tried to awaken Elmer from his drunken stupor. Thereafter, Elmer and six other men armed themselves and rushed to the house of the victim only to find Leonila in a distraught state and the appellant gone.9 William Pellosis, the husband of the victim, spent the night guarding their palay harvest at the San Juan-San Lorenzo Cooperative Bodega. When he arrived in the early morning of October 11, 1991, his wife tearfully related to him her tragic ordeal. 10 Enraged, he immediately hurried to the Minalabac Police Station to report the incident. PO3 Antonio Algora and other police officers sprung into action and scoured the vicinity to locate appellant, to no avail. William Pellosis and the police officers then went to the house of appellant where they found his common-law wife, Leonida Belo, who didn't know the whereabouts of her husband. Eventually, however, the police officers tracked down appellant and took him into custody. 11 On October 14, 1991, the Chief of Police of Minalabac, Camarines Sur, Gil V. De la Cruz, filed a Complaint 12 with the Municipal Trial Court of Minalabac, Camarines Sur, accusing appellant of the crime of Robbery with Rape. On January 9, 1992, the Municipal Trial Court of Minalabac, Camarines Sur, 13 issued a Resolution 14 finding that the case did not fall under its jurisdiction, and hence, ordered the Clerk of Court to forward the original records to the Provincial Prosecutor's Office in Naga City. On January 21, 1992, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Romeo S. Dañas filed an Information 15 accusing appellant of Robbery with Rape, committed as follows: That on or about the 11th day of October 1991, at Barangay San Felipe-Santiago, Municipality of Minalabac, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aid accused, with intent of (sic) gain, and by means of violence and intimidation of person, while armed with a knife and after an unlawful entry in the middle of the night, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and rob from one LEONILA NUÑEZ-PELLOSIS the sum of FIVE THOUSAND AND SIXTY (P5,060.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency; that the aforesaid robbery is (sic) accompanied by rape when said accused then and there had sexual intercourse with said Leonila Nuñez-Pellosis by means of force and intimidation and against her will. On March 17, 1998, upon arraignment, the accused, duly assisted by Atty. Hector A. Tayer from the Public Attorney's Office, entered a plea of "not guilty." At the trial, the prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely, (1) Miriam Pellosis, the victim's daughter; (2) Leonila Pellosis, the victim herself; (3) Dra. Josephine De La Torre, a resident physician on Obstetrics and Gynecology at the Bicol Regional Hospital; and (4) SPO3 Antonio Algura of the Minalabac Police Station, who received the complaint of the victim's husband at around 1.30 A.M. on the same day, and together with the victim's husband and other police officers, proceeded to the house of the victim to investigate the crime. He also advised the victim to undergo a physical examination, and they even accompanied her to the Bicol Regional Hospital. The defense, on the other hand, presented appellant and his common-law wife, Leonida Belo, as witnesses. Appellant had a pat alibi. He claimed that he was employed in Sta. Maria, Bulacan, from June to December 1991, 16 and that he only learned of his pending case when he came back from Bulacan in December 1991. 17 His wife's meandering testimony corroborated his story.18 On November 26, 1992, after requiring the parties to submit their respective memoranda, 19 the trial court rendered a decision 20 finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape. In its decision, the trial court painstakingly traced the events leading to the commission of the crime and accordingly gave credence to the positive identification of the accused by the victim and her daughter vis a vis appellant's tainted alibi. In the present appeal, 21 appellant now assigns the sole error that: 22 THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT ERNESTO BELO GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR [sic] THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH RAPE DESPITE THE EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to prove the identity of the perpetrator beyond reasonable doubt, and for the failure of the trial court to appreciate his defense of alibi. Robbery with rape is a special complex crime, or more properly, a composite crime, 23 punishable under the second paragraph of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code 24 which provides: Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. — Penalties. — Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer: x x x x x x x x x 1. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua, when the robbery shall have been accompanied by the crime of rape or intentional mutilation, or if by reason or on occasion of such robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 1 of Article 263 shall have been inflicted; Provided, however, that when the robbery accompanied with rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death (As amended by PD No. 767). (underlining added) In Robbery with Rape, "[i]t is enough that robbery shall have been accompanied by rape to be punishable under the Revised Penal Code which does not differentiate whether the rape was committed before, during or after the robbery." 25 After a thorough scrutiny of the records of the case, we find the present appeal utterly without merit. All the elements of the crime of Robbery with Rape are here present and proved. First, appellant employed violence against and intimidation on the person of Leonila Pellosis by poking a double bladed knife on her neck to compel her to give him money. Second, after getting the money of the hapless victim, he dragged her to the kitchen where he mercilessly raped her. Contrary to appellant's contentions, his identity as the perpetrator of the crime was sufficiently established by the testimonies of the victim and her daughter who readily recognized appellant since he was their former farmhand. 26 Identification is facilitated by the fact that the person has gained familiarity with another. 27 While the crime was committed in the middle of the night, there was sufficient illumination inside the house coming from a "gasera" near the window sill which was later struck down by an unidentified person. Numerous cases have held that illumination coming from a "gasera" is sufficient for purposes of identification of an assailant. 28 The trial court's reliance on the victim's testimony is apt, considering that it was credible in itself and buttressed by the testimony of her daughter, the medico-legal officer, and the police investigator. 29 Moreover the aforesaid witnesses saw the distraught state of the victim on the very day of the commission of the crime. We have repeatedly held that assessment of the credibility of the witnesses is a function that is best discharged by trial courts. 30 This is in line with the doctrine that factual findings of trial courts are accorded the highest respect unless certain facts of value have been plainly overlooked which, if considered, could affect the result of the case. 31 The credibility of a rape victim is enhanced when, as in the instant case, she has no motive to testify against the accused or where there is absolutely no evidence which even remotely suggests that she could have been actuated by such motive. 32 Appellant himself admitted that he could not discern any motive in the accusation of the crime except that he owed the family P50.00, 33 which is too preposterous a claim to even deserve consideration by this Court. No married woman would subject herself to public scrutiny and humiliation to foist a false charge of rape. Neither would she take the risk of being alienated from her husband and her family. The fact that the victim resolved to face the ordeal and relate in public what she suffered evinces that she did so to obtain justice. 34 Her willingness and courage to face the authorities as well as to submit to medical examination are mute but eloquent confirmation of her sincere resolve. 35 We are thus convincingly assured that the lower court prudently fulfilled its obligation as a factual assessor and legal adjudicator. 36 Further, Dra. Josephine de la Torre, the medico-legal officer, testified that she examined the victim at around 12:05 noon on the same day of the incident and found sperm cells in the genitals of the victim resulting from sexual intercourse within the past 12 hours, and that the victim suffered abrasion and contusions on the neck area, which were probably sustained when the victim tried to defend herself. 37 The finding of seminal constituents in a rape victim is important evidence for substantiating the fact that sexual intercourse has taken place, but their absence does not necessarily mean that a rape did not occur. Physical injuries such as bruises or bleeding tend to confirm the fact that a violent assault did take place." 38 The presence of sperm cells in her violated organ affirmed her charge more than words or anger could prove. 39 In a prosecution for rape, the complainant's physical condition as shown by a medical examination is given considerable weight in proving that a crime has been committed by testimony of the physician as to evidence of recent sexual intercourse 40 and marks of violence and bruises on her person. 41 Appellant's invocation of alibi to exculpate himself is insufficient to overcome the positive identification made by the victim and her daughter. In comparison with the clear and straightforward testimony of the complainant and her witnesses, the defenses of denial and alibi, which appellant relies upon, are discredited and shopworn. 42 His alibi is self-serving and his bare denial is a negative declaration which deserves no consideration and cannot prevail over the affirmative testimony of complainant which was corroborated by further evidence. 43 More importantly, "[i]n the case of alibi, it is elementary case law that the requirements of time and place be strictly complied with by the defense, meaning that the accused must not only show that he was somewhere else but that it was also physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed." 44 While appellant could have been in Sta. Maria, Bulacan, from October to December 1991, it was not physically impossible for him to have been in Manibalac on the day of the commission of the crime. Coming now to the particular circumstances of the offense, while the information alleged nocturnity (nocturnidad) or nighttime, the trial court did not consider it an aggravating circumstance. "There are two tests for nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance: the objective test, under which nocturnity is aggravating because it facilitates the commission of the offense; and the subjective test, under which nocturnity is aggravating because it was purposely sought by the offender. These two tests should be applied in the alternative." 45 By and of itself, nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance. 46 The fact that the offense was committed at night will not suffice to sustain nocturnidad. 47 Other than the time of the commission of the crime, there is paucity in the evidence on record to show that nighttime darkness was purposely sought by the offender, or that it facilitated the commission of the crime. Hence, nighttime could not be considered an aggravating circumstance. Considering that the crime was committed in the domicile of the victim without provocation on her part, the aggravating circumstance of dwelling is present. Dwelling is considered an aggravating circumstance because primarily of the sanctity of privacy the law accords to human abode. According to one commentator, one's dwelling place is a "sanctuary worthy of respect" and that one who slanders another in the latter's house is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere. 48 He who goes to another's house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere. 49 Considering, however, that appellant stands accused of the crime of Robbery with Rape with the use of a deadly weapon, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, the appreciation of the dwelling as an aggravating circumstance is no longer necessary. Since the crime was committed prior to the effectivity of the death penalty law, the penalty of reclusion perpetua, an indivisible penalty, 50 imposed by the trial court is fit and proper. Under the circumstances in this case, we deem it proper to award the complainant an indemnity of P50,000.00 51 and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 under Article 2219 of the Civil Code, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence. WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 91-3892 is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that in addition to ordering the appellant to return to the victim the amount of P5,060.00, and to pay her P50,000.00 as indemnity, appellant is also hereby ordered to pay the victim P50,000.00 as moral damages. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., concur. Footnotes 1 Penned by Judge Edgar S. Surtida. 2 TSN, May 14, 1992, p. 3. 3 TSN, May 7, 1992, p. 4. 4 Id., 5 TSN, May 14, 1992, p. 4. 6 Id., p. 16. 7 Id., p. 5. 8 Id., pp. 5-8. 9 TSN, May 7, 1992, pp. 6-9; 23-25. 10 Id., pp. 11-13. 11 TSN, May 18, 1992, pp. 14-17. 12 Records, p. 2. 13 Presided by Judge Beatriz Contreras-Arroyo 14 Records, p. 18. 15 Records, p. 1. 16 May 28, 1992, pp. 2-3. 17 Id., p. 4-5. 18 TSN, August 13, l992, pp. 20-21. 19 Only accused complied and duly filed a Memorandum dated September 18, 1992. 20 Original Records, pp. 197-202. 21 Notice of Appeal, Records, p. 207. 22 Appellant's Brief, Rollo, p. 44. 23 In People v. Barros, 245 SCRA 312, 329 (1995), Justice Regalado, in his Separate Opinion, explained that composite crimes are "neither of the same legal basis as nor subject to the rules on complex crimes in Article 48 (of the Revised Penal Code), since they do not consist of a single act giving rise to two or more grave or less grave felonies (compound crimes) nor do they involve an offense being a necessary means to commit another (complex crime proper). However, just like the regular complex crimes and the present case of aggravated illegal possession of firearms, only a single penalty is imposed for each of such composite crimes although composed of two or more offenses." 24 Cf. Article 294, as amended by Section 9 of R.A. No. 7659, (which took effect on December 31, 1993), now provides: "Art. 294. — Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. — Penalties. — Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation on any person shall suffer: 1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when for any reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson. . . ." 25. People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 123186, July 9, 1998, p. 14, citing People v. Caisip, et. al., 105 Phil. 1180, 1186-1187 [1959]. 26 TSN, May 7, 1992, p. 9; TSN, May 14, 1992, p. 23; TSN, May 28, 1992, p. 5. 27 People v. Gaorana, G.R. No. 109138-39, April 27, 1998, pp. 15-16, citing People v. Castillo, 261 SCRA 493, 501 [1996]; See also People v. Prades, G.R. No. 127569, July 30, 1998, p. 7. 28 People v. Ching, 240 SCRA 267, 276 [1995] ("There can likewise be no doubt as to the identity of the malefactor since at the time of the incident, there was a kerosene lamp which brightly illuminated the locus delicti. It has been held that a kerosene lamp gives off sufficient illumination like a "gasera" or "lampara" and, in previous cases, this Court has held that the illumination thus produced is sufficient for the identification of persons."); People v. Sarino, 221 SCRA 234, 242 [1993], ("A kerosene lamp gives off sufficient illumination like a "gasera" or "lamparahan," and the illumination produced by these gadgets is sufficient for the identification of persons."); People v. Cabactulan, 216 SCRA 178, 183-184 [1992]; People v. Penillos, 205 SCRA 546, 556 [1992]; People v. Almenario, et. al., 172 SCRA 268, 276 [1989]; People v. Reana, 120 SCRA 583, 588 [1983]; People v. Arias, 102 SCRA 303, 320 [1981]. 29 See People v. Auxtero, G.R. No. 118314, April 15, 1998, pp. 10-11. 30 People v. De Los Santos, G.R. No. 121906, September 17, 1998, p. 23, citing People v. Cabaluna, 264 SCRA 596 [1996]. 31 Id., citing People v. Villanueva, 254 SCRA 202 [1996]. 32 People v. Prades, G.R. No. 127569, July 30, 1998, p. 9, citing People v. Leoterio, 264 SCRA 608 [1996]; People v. Echegaray, 257 SCRA 561 [1996]; People v. Matamorosa, et. al., 231 SCRA 509 [1994]. 33 TSN, May 28, 1992, p. 8. 34 People v. Mostrales, G.R. No. 125937, August 28, 1998, p. 10; citing People v. Cristobal, 252 SCRA 507, 516 [1996]. 35 People v. Mostrales, G.R. No. 125937, August 28, 1998, p. 10, citing People v. Cabaluna, 264 SCRA 596 [1996]. 36 People v. Prades, G.R. No. 127569, July 30, 1998, p. 9. 37 TSN, May 18, 1992, pp. 3-12. 38 Saferstein, R., Criminalistics, An Introduction to Forensic Science, 5th ed., 376. 39 People v. Gomez, 279 SCRA 688, 695 [1997]. 40 65 Am Jur 2d § 90, citing State v. Fox, 131 NW 2d 684; State v. Evans, 39 SW 462; State v. Sanchez, 361 P2d 174. 41 Id., citing State v. Fox, supra., Holland v. Commonwealth, 272 SW 2d 458; Maxwell v. State, 362 SW 326. 42 People v. Pili, G.R. No. 124739, April 15, 1998, p. 23. 43 People v. Ranido, G.R. No. 116450-51, March 31, 1998, p. 9, citing People v. Ramirez, 266 SCRA 335 [1997]; People v. Francisco, 258 SCRA 558 [1996]; People v. Melivo, 253 SCRA 347 [1996]. 44 People v. Pili, G.R. No. 124739, April 15, 1998, p. 23-24, citing People v. Amania, 248 SCRA 486 [1995]; People v. Flores, 217 SCRA 613 [1993]; People v. Magana, G.R. No. 105673, July 26, 1996; People v. Marquez, 153 SCRA 700 [1997]. 45 People v. Parazo, 272 SCRA 512, 525 [1997]; People v. Palon, 127 SCRA 529, 540 [1984]; People v. Garcia, 94 SCRA 14 [1979]. 46 People v. Cayabyab, 274 SCRA 387, 403 [1997]. 47 People v. Fortich, G.R. No. 80399-404, November 13, 1997; People v. Boyles, 11 SCRA 88 [1964]. 48 People v. Parazo, 272 SCRA 512, 524 [1997]; People v. Balansi, 187 SCRA 566, 575 [1990]; Reyes, L., Revised Penal Code Annotated, Vol. I., 1993 ed. 49 People v. Quinao, 269 SCRA 495, 512 [1997]; People v. Amania, 248 SCRA 486 [1995]. 50 People v. Lucas, 240 SCRA 66 [1995]. 51 In the later case of People v. Victor, G.R. No. 127903, July 9, 1998, we held that "[i]f the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by the present amended law, the indemnity for the victim shall be not less than P75,000.00. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation