G.R. No. 119771




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Baguio City SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 119771 April 24, 1998 SAN ILDEFONSO LINES, INC., and EDUARDO JAVIER, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Thirteenth Division) and PIONEER INSURANCE and SURETY CORPORATION, respondents. MARTINEZ, J.: At around 3:30 in the afternoon of June 24, 1991, a Toyota Lite Ace Van being driven by its owner Annie U. Jao and a passenger bus of herein petitioner San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. (hereafter, SILI) figured in a vehicular mishap at the intersection of Julia Vargas Avenue and Rodriguez Lanuza Avenue in Pasig, Metro Manila, totally wrecking the Toyota van and injuring Ms. Jao and her two (2) passengers in the process. A criminal case was thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig on September 18, 1991 charging the driver of the bus, herein petitioner Eduardo Javier, with reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries. About four (4) months later, or on January 13, 1992, herein private respondent Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation (PISC), as insurer of the van and subrogee, filed a case for damages against petitioner SILI with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, seeking to recover the sums it paid the assured under a motor vehicle insurance policy as well as other damages, totaling P564,500.00 (P454,000.00 as actual/compensatory damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; P10,000.00 as litigation expenses; and P500.00 as appearance fees.)1 With the issues having been joined upon the filing of the petitioners' answer to the complaint for damages and after submission by the parties of their respective pre-trial briefs, petitioners filed on September 18, 1992 a Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Civil Proceedings grounded on the pendency of the criminal case against petitioner Javier in the Pasig RTC and the failure of respondent PISC to make a reservation to file a separate damage suit in said criminal action. This was denied by the Manila Regional Trial Court in its Order dated July 21, 1993, 2 ruling thus: Answering the first question thus posed, the court holds that plaintiff may legally institute the present civil action even in the absence of a reservation in the criminal action. This is so because it falls among the very exceptions to the rule cited by the movant. It is true that the general rule is that once a criminal action has been instituted, then civil action based thereon is deemed instituted together with the criminal action, such that if the offended party did not reserve the filing of the civil action when the criminal action was filed, then such filing of the civil action is therefore barred; on the other hand, if there was such reservation, still the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action; But, this rule (Section 2, Rule 111, Revised Rules of Court) is subject to exemptions, the same being those provided for in Section 3 of the same rule which states: Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. — In the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action which was been reserved may be brought by the offended party, shall proceed independently of the criminal action, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. Besides, the requirement in Section 2 of Rule 111 of the former Rules on Criminal Procedure that there be a reservation in the criminal case of the right to institute an independent civil action has been declared as not in accordance with law. It is regarded as an unauthorized amendment to our substantive law, i.e., the Civil Code which does not require such reservation. In fact, the reservation of the right to file an independent civil action has been deleted from Section 2, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, in consonance with the decisions of this Court declaring such requirement of a reservation as ineffective. (Bonite vs. Zosa, 162 SCRA 180). Further, the Court rules that a subrogee-plaintiff may institute and prosecute the civil action, it being allowed by Article 2207 of the Civil Code. After their motion for reconsideration of said July 21, 1993 Order was denied, petitioners elevated the matter to this Court via petition for certiorari which was, however, referred to public respondent Court of Appeals for disposition. On February 24, 1995, a decision adverse to petitioners once again was rendered by respondent court, upholding the assailed Manila Regional Trial Court Order in this wise: A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. To subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution — whether it be conviction or acquittal — would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Art. 31, that this action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. In Yakult Phil. vs. CA, the Supreme Court said: Even if there was no reservation in the criminal case and that the civil action was not filed before the filing of the criminal action but before the prosecution presented evidence in the criminal action, and the judge handling the criminal case was informed thereof, then the actual filing of the civil action is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of an express reservation that should be made by the offended party before the prosecution presented its evidence. The purpose of this rule requiring reservation is to prevent the offended party from recovering damages twice for the same act or omission. Substantial compliance with the reservation requirement may, therefore, be made by making a manifestation in the criminal case that the private respondent has instituted a separate and independent civil action for damages. Oft-repeated is the dictum that courts should not place undue importance on technicalities when by so doing substantial justice is sacrificed. While the rules of procedure require adherence, it must be remembered that said rules of procedure are intended to promote, not defeat, substantial justice, and therefore, they should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. Hence, this petition for review after a motion for reconsideration of said respondent court judgment was denied. The two (2) crucial issues to be resolved, as posited by petitioners, are: 1) If a criminal case was filed, can an independent civil action based on quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code be filed if no reservation was made in the said criminal case? 2) Can a subrogee of an offended party maintain an independent civil action during the pendency of a criminal action when no reservation of the right to file an independent civil action was made in the criminal action and despite the fact that the private complainant is actively participating through a private prosecutor in the aforementioned criminal case? We rule for petitioners. On the chief issue of "reservation", at the fore is Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which reads: Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. — In the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action which has been reserved may be brought by the offended party, shall proceed independently of the criminal action, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. There is no dispute that these so-called "independent civil actions" based on the aforementioned Civil Code articles are the exceptions to the primacy of the criminal action over the civil action as set forth in Section 2 of Rule 111.3 However, it is easily deducible from the present wording of Section 3 as brought about by the 1988 amendments to the Rules on Criminal Procedure — particularly the phrase ". . . which has been reserved" — that the "independent" character of these civil actions does not do away with the reservation requirement. In other words, prior reservation is a condition sine qua non before any of these independent civil actions can be instituted and thereafter have a continuous determination apart from or simultaneous with the criminal action. That this should now be the controlling procedural rule is confirmed by no less than retired Justice Jose Y. Feria, remedial law expert and a member of the committee which drafted the 1988 amendments, whose learned explanation on the matter was aptly pointed out by petitioners, to wit: The 1988 amendment expands the scope of the civil action which his deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless waived, reserved or previously instituted. . . . Under the present Rule as amended, such a civil action includes not only recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, but also damages under Article 2176 of the said code. . . . Objections were raised to the inclusion in this Rule of quasi-delicts under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. However, in view of Article 2177 of the said code which provides that the offended party may not recover twice for the same act or omission of the accused, and in line with the policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits, these objections were overruled. In any event, the offended party is not precluded from filing a civil action to recover damages arising from quasi-delict before the institution of the criminal action, or from reserving his right to file such a separate civil action, just as he is not precluded from filing a civil action for damages under Articles 32, 33 and 34 before the institution of the criminal action, or from reserving his right to file such a separate civil action. It is only in those cases where the offended party has not previously filed a civil action or has not reserved his right to file a separate civil action that his civil action is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action. It should be noted that while it was ruled in Abella vs. Marave (57 SCRA 106) that a reservation of the right to file an independent civil action is not necessary, such a reservation is necessary under the amended rule. Without such reservation, the civil action is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless previously waived or instituted. (Emphasis ours, Justice Jose Y. Feria [Ret.], 1988 Amendments to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a pamphlet, published by Central Lawbook Publishing Co., Inc., Philippine Legal Studies, Series No. 3, 5-6).4 Sharing the same view on the indispensability of a prior reservation is Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, whose analysis of the historical changes in Rule 111 since the 1964 Rules of Court is equally illuminating. Thus, 1. Under Rule 111 of the 1964 Rules of Court, the civil liability arising from the offense charged was impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless such civil action was expressly waived or reserved. The offended party was authorized to bring an independent civil action in the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code provided such right was reserved. In the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the same Rule 111 thereof reiterated said provision on the civil liability arising from the offense charged. The independent civil actions, however, were limited to the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, obviously because the actions contemplated in Articles 31 and 2177 of said Code are not liabilities ex-delicto. Furthermore, no reservation was required in order the civil actions in said Articles 32, 33 and 34 may be pursued separately. 2. The present amendments introduced by the Supreme Court have the following notable features on this particular procedural aspect, viz: a. The civil action which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, barring a waiver, reservation or prior institution thereof, need not arise from the offense charged, as the phrase "arising from the offense charged" which creates that nexus has been specifically eliminated. b. The independent civil actions contemplated in the present Rule 111 include the quasi-delicts provided for in Art. 2176 of the Civil Code, in addition to the cases provided in Arts. 32, 33 and 34 thereof. It is necessary, however, that the civil liability under all the said articles arise "from the same act or omission of the accused." Furthermore, a reservation of the right to institute these separate civil actions is again required otherwise, said civil actions are impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the former are waived or filed ahead of the criminal action. (Emphasis supplied.) 5 In fact, a deeper reading of the "Yakult Phils. vs. CA" case6 relied upon by respondent court reveals an acknowledgment of the reservation requirement. After recognizing that the civil case instituted by private respondent therein Roy Camaso (represented by his father David Camaso) against petitioner Yakult Phils. (the owner of the motorcycle that sideswiped Roy Camaso, only five years old at the time of the accident) and Larry Salvado (the driver of the motorcycle) during the pendency of the criminal case against Salvado for reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries, as one based on tort, this Court said: The civil liability sought arising from the act or omission of the accused in this case is a quasi-delict as defined under Article 2176 of the Civil Code as follows: x x x x x x x x x The aforecited rule [referring to the amended Section l, Rule 111] requiring, such previous reservation also covers quasi-delict as defined under Article 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission of the accused (emphasis supplied). But what prompted the Court to validate the institution and non-suspension of the civil case involved in "Yakult" was the peculiar facts attendant therein. Thus, Although the separate civil action filed in this case was without previous reservation in the criminal case, nevertheless since it was instituted before the prosecution presented evidence in the criminal action, and the judge handling the criminal case was informed thereof, then the actual filing of the civil action is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of an express reservation that should be made by the offended party before the prosecution presents its evidence. The distinct factual scenario in "Yakult" simply does not obtain in this case. No satisfactory proof exists to show that private respondent PISC's damage suit was instituted before the prosecution presented its evidence in the criminal case pending in the Pasig Regional Trial Court. Neither is there any indication that the judge presiding over the criminal action has been made aware of the civil case. It is in this light that reliance on the "Yakult" case is indeed misplaced. Now that the necessity of a prior reservation is the standing rule that shall govern the institution of the independent civil actions referred to in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, past pronouncements that view the reservation requirement as an "unauthorized amendment" to substantive law — i.e., the Civil Code, should no longer be controlling. There must be a renewed adherence to the time-honored dictum that procedural rules are designed, not to defeat, but to safeguard the ends of substantial justice. And for this noble reason, no less than the Constitution itself has mandated this Court to promulgate rules concerning the enforcement of rights with the end in view of providing a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases which should not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.7 Far from altering substantive rights, the primary purpose of the reservation is, to borrow the words of the Court in "Caños v. Peralta": 8 . . . to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression and abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short, the attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants. Clearly then, private respondent PISC, as subrogee under Article 2207 of the Civil Code, 9 is not exempt from the reservation requirement with respect to its damages suit based on quasi-delict arising from the same act or ommission of petitioner Javier complained of in the criminal case. As private respondent PISC merely stepped into the shoes of Ms. Jao (as owner of the insured Toyota van), then it is bound to observe the procedural requirements which Ms. Jao ought to follow had she herself instituted the civil case. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 24, 1995 and the Resolution dated April 3, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The "MANIFESTATION AND MOTION TO SUSPEND CIVIL PROCEEDINGS" filed by petitioners is GRANTED. SO ORDERED. Regalado, Melo, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur. Footnotes 1 See Complaint, Rollo, pp. 35-38. 2 Annex F, Rollo, pp. 43-47. 3 Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court reads in part: Sec. 2. Institution of separate civil action. — Except in the cases provided for in Section 3 hereof, after the criminal action has been commenced, the civil action which has been reserved cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action. x x x x x x x x x 4 Petition, pp. 10-11; Rollo, pp. 11-12. 5 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Volume II, 1995 Edition, p. 275. 6 190 SCRA 357, October 5, 1990. 7 Article VIII, Section 5(5), 1987 Constitution. 8 115 SCRA 843. 9 Article 2207. "If the plaintiffs property has been insured, and he has received indemnity from the insurance company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of, the insurance company shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person who has violated the contract. If the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved a party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the person causing the loss or injury. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation