G.R. No. 118436




Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 118436 March 21, 1997 HEIRS OF MANUEL A. ROXAS and TRINIDAD DE LEON VDA. DE ROXAS (in substitution of original petitioner), petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MAGUESUN MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents. ROMERO, J.: Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas, substituted by her heirs,1 instituted this petition for review of the Court of Appeals decision dated December 8, 1994 in "Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas v. Maguesun Management and Development Corporation," (CA G.R. CV No. 38328), alleging reversible error committed by respondent appellate court when it affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite. The issue presented before us is whether or not private respondent Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud in obtaining a decree of registration over two unregistered parcels of land in Tagaytay City, actual fraud being the only ground to reopen or review a decree of registration. The facts of the case are narrated below: On July 2, 1990, herein private respondent Maguesun Management and Development Corporation (Maguesun Corporation) filed an Application for Registration of two parcels of unregistered land located in Barangay Sungay, Tagaytay City (Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, Cad-355, Tagaytay Cadastre) with an area of 3,641 and 10,674 square meters respectively. The original registration case was docketed as Case No. TG-373 before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18, presided over by Judge Julieto Tabiolo. In support of its application for registration, Maguesun Corporation presented a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 10, 1990, executed by Zenaida Melliza as vendor and indicating the purchase price to be P170,000.00. Zenaida Melliza in turn, bought the property from the original petitioner herein, Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas for P200,000.00 two and a half months earlier, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated March 26, 1990 and an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication dated March 24, 1990. Notices of the initial hearing were sent by the Land Registration Authority (the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Authority or NALTDRA) to Hilario Luna, Jose Gil and Leon Luna on the basis of Maguesun Corporation's application for registration. Since Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas was not named as an adjoining owner, occupant or adverse claimant, she was not sent a notice of the proceedings. Publication was made in the Official Gazette and the Record Newsweekly.2 After an Order of general default was issued, the trial court proceeded to hear the land registration case. On October 4, 1990, the Land Registration Authority reported, among other things, that the subject parcels of land had previously been applied for registration in Land Registration Case No. 500, GLRO Record No. 55072 at the Court of First Instance of Cavite by Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon but no decision has been rendered thereon.3 Eventually, on February 13, 1991 the Regional Trial Court granted Maguesun Corporation's application for registration (Land Registration Case No. TG-373) in a three-page decision with the following dispositive portion:4 WHEREFORE, this Court gives imprimatur to the application for registration of said lands described in plan As-04-000108, Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, one with an area of 3,641 and the other with an area of 10,674 square meters, as supported and shown by the corresponding technical descriptions now forming part of the records, in the name of Maguesun Management and Development Corporation, with office address at 521 Edsa, Quezon City, free from all liens and encumbrances and from any other adverse claims of any kind and nature. Upon finality of this Decision, the same ipso facto becomes executory, upon which eventuality the corresponding decree of registration may thus be issued. SO ORDERED. Consequently, the Regional Trial Court issued the Order for Issuance of the Decree on March 14, 1991, after the afore-mentioned Decision in LRC No. TG-373 became final5 but not before it ordered, on February 14, 1991, Land Registration Case No. 500 (GLRO Record No. 55072) applied for by Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon, dismissed. It was only when the caretaker of the property was being asked to vacate the land that petitioner Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas learned of its sale and the registration of the lots in Maguesun Corporation's name. Hence, on April 21, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for review before the Regional Trial Court, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1183 to set aside the decree of registration on the ground that Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud. She alleged that the lots were among the properties she inherited from her husband, former President Manuel A. Roxas, who died on April 15, 1946 and that her family had been in open, continuous, adverse and uninterrupted possession of the subject property in the concept of owner for more than thirty years before they applied for its registration under the Torrens System of land titling. Petitioner further denied that she sold the lots to Zenaida Melliza whom she had never met before and that her signature was forged in both the Deed of Sale and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. In support of her claims, she also listed a number of irregularities in the documents to prove actual fraud. In addition, and perhaps more significantly, she claimed that Maguesun Corporation intentionally omitted her name as an adverse claimant, occupant or adjoining owner in the application for registration submitted to the Land Registration Authority such that the latter could not send her a Notice of Initial Hearing. As a result, an order of general default was issued and Maguesun Corporation's application for registration was granted. She charged Maguesun Corporation's with knowledge or authorship of the fraud owing to the fact that the Maguesun Corporation's president, Manolita Guevarra Sunatay after whom the corporation was named, was her niece. Manolita Suntay is the daughter of Lourdes Guevarra Suntay, a deceased cousin of petitioner Vda. de Roxas who used to help with the lather's business affairs. Manolita Suntay used to take care of the registration and insurance of the latter' s cars.6 The sole issue of the case, as laid down by the trial court after the pre-trial, was whether or not Vda. de Roxas' signatures on the Deed of Absolute Sale and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication in favor of Zenaida Melliza were forged.7 Petitioner, who was then already 92 years of age, testified in open court on February 11, 1992 that she has never met Zenaida Melliza, that she did not sell the subject lots and that her signatures on the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Self-Adjudication were forged.8 A document examiner from the Philippine National Police (PNP) concluded that there was no forgery.9 Upon petitioner's motion, the signatures were re-examined by another expert from National Bureau of Investigation. The latter testified that the signatures on the questioned and sample documents were not written by the same person. 10 Despite the foregoing testimonies and pronouncements, the trial court dismissed the petition for review of decree of registration April 15, 1992. 11 Placing greater weight on the findings and testimony of the PNP document examiner, it concluded that the questioned documents were not forged and if they were, it was Zenaida Melliza, and not Maguesun Corporation, who was responsible. Accordingly, Maguesun Corporation did not commit actual fraud. The court further noted that petitioner Mrs. Trinidad Roxas had not been paying taxes for several years, which fact "exhibited what appeared to be unmistakeable signs of not actually owning (the lots) any more," and that her application for registration was "previously dismissed and abandoned," thus indicating that "petitioner herself is aware that she had already lost . . interest, if not actually her rights, over the property in question. 12 In a decision dated December 8, 1994, 13 respondent court denied the petition for review and affirmed the findings of the trial court. The Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to and demonstrate that there was actual or extrinsic fraud, not merely constructive or intrinsic fraud, a prerequisite for purposes of annuling a judgment or reviewing a decree of registration. Additionally, respondent court stated that the discrepancies or irregularities in the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Self-Adjudication pointed out by petitioner are not patent or obvious, involve matters that are too trivial, requiring knowledge of the intricacies of the law and are "not necessarily and exclusively indicia of extrinsic fraud and/or bad faith — especially when considered in the light of circumstances hereinafter discussed." The records also show, according to the appellate court, that Maguesun Corporation had not concealed from the court either the existence of petitioner or any interest she may have had in the registration proceedings. Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that publication of the initial hearing in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. 14 Hence, the instant petition for review where it is alleged that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Maguesun Corporation had not commit actual fraud warranting the setting aside of the registration decree and in resolving the appeal on the basis of Maguesun Corporation's good faith. Petitioners pray that the registration of the subject lots in the name of Maguesun Corporation be cancelled, that said property be adjudicated in favor of petitioners and that respondent corporation pay moral damages not less than P100,000.00, exemplary damages not less than P36,000.00 and attorney's fees of P60,000.00. We find the petition for review impressed with merit. 1. Registration of untitled land under the Torrens System is done pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Property Registration Decree which amended and codified laws relative to registration of property. 15 Adjudication of land in a registration (or cadastral) case does not become final and incontrovertible until the expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree. Before such time, the decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after hearing, may set aside the decision or decree and adjudicate the land to another party. 16 Absence, minority or other disability of any person affected, or any proceeding in court for reversing judgments, are not considered grounds to reopen or revise said decree. However, the right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud is recognized by law (Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529) as a valid and legal basis for reopening and revising a decree of registration. 17 It is further required that a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration be filed within one year from the date of entry of said decree, that the petitioner has a real and dominical right and the property has not yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser. 18 Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by means of the misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact. 19 Constructive fraud is construed as a fraud because of its detrimental effect upon public interests and public or private confidence, even though the act is not done or committed with an actual design to commit positive fraud or injury upon other persons. 20 Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded as intrinsic where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action, or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated therein, and is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured, so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy. 21 Extrinsic fraud is also actual fraud, but collateral to the transaction sued upon. 22 The distinctions are significant because only actual fraud or extrinsic fraud has been accepted as grounds for a judgment to be annulled or, as in this case, a decree of registration reopened and reviewed. 23 In the oft-cited Macabingkil v. People's Homesite Housing Corporation case, the Court drew from American jurisprudence stating that "relief has been granted on the ground that, by some fraud practiced directly upon the party seeking relief against the judgment or decree, (and) that party has been prevented from presenting all of his case to the court." 24 The "fraud" contemplated by the law in this case (Section 32, P.D. No 1529) is actual and extrinsic, which includes an intentional omission of fact required by law. 25 For fraud to justify a review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral, and the facts upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. 26 Persons who were fraudulently deprived of their opportunity to be heard in the original registration case are entitled to a review of a decree of registration. In Ramirez v. CA, 27 this Court adopted the Court of Appeals' ruling that the suppression of the fact that the applicant spouses possessed the subject ricefield merely as antichretic creditors and the fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation in the application that no other persons had any claim or interest in the said land, constitute specific allegations of extrinsic fraud supported by competent proof. Failure and intentional omission of applicants to disclose the facts of actual physical possession by another person constitutes an allegation of actual fraud. 28 Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person. 29 The Court here finds that respondent Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud in obtaining the decree of registration sought to be reviewed by petitioner. Petitioner Vda. de Roxas contended that Maguesun Corporation intentionally omitted their name, or that of the Roxas family, as having a claim to or as an occupant of the subject property. In the corporation's application for registration filed with the trial court in LRC No. TG-373, the following declaration appears: 6. That the names in full and addresses, as far as known to the undersigned, of the owners of all adjoining properties; of the persons mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 5 (mortgagors, encumbrancers, and occupants) and of the person shown on the plan as claimants are as follows: Hilario Luna, Jose Gil, Leon Luna, Provincial Road all at Tagaytay City (no house No.) 30 The highlighted words are typed in with a different typewriter, with the first five letters of the word "provincial" typed over correction fluid. Maguesun Corporation, however, annexed a differently-worded application for the petition to review case (Civil Case No. TG-1183, "Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas v. Maguesun Management and Development Corporation, et al."). In the copy submitted to the trial court, the answer to the same number is as follows: Hilario Luna, Jose Gil, Leon Luna, Roxas. 31 The discrepancy which is unexplained appears intentional. If the word "Roxas" were indeed erased and replaced with "Provincial Road all at Tagaytay City (no house No.)" in the original application submitted in LRC No. TG-373 but the copy with the word "Roxas" was submitted to the trial court in Civil Case No. TG-1183, it is reasonable to assume that the reason is to mislead the court into thinking that "Roxas" was placed in the original application as an adjoining owner, encumbrancer, occupant or claimant, the same application which formed the basis for the Land Registration Authority in sending out notices of initial hearing. Section 15 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 also requires the applicant for registration to state the full names and addresses of all occupants of the land and those of adjoining owners, if known and if not known, the extent of the search made to find them. Respondent corporation likewise failed to comply with this requirement of law. The truth is that the Roxas family had been in possession of the property uninterruptedly through their caretaker, Jose Ramirez. 32 Respondent Maguesun Corporation also declared in number 5 of the same application that the subject land was unoccupied when in truth and in fact, the Roxas family caretaker resided in the subject property. Respondent corporation is likewise charged with the knowledge of such possession and occupancy, for its President, who signed the Deed of Sale over the property, knew fully well that her grandaunt Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas owned the property. It is reasonable to expect her as a buyer to have inspected the property prior to the sale such that the ascertainment of the current possessors or occupants could have been made facilely. Respondent corporation's intentional concealment and representation of petitioner's interest in the subject lots as possessor, occupant and claimant constitutes actual fraud justifying the reopening and review of the decree of registration. Through such misfeasance, the Roxas family was kept ignorant of the registration proceedings involving their property, thus effectively depriving them of their day in court. 2. Respondent Court of Appeals held that Maguesun Corporation had not concealed from the court either the existence of Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas or any interest she may have in the registration proceedings for the records are replete with references by Maguesun Corporation itself to petitioner. 33 Mention of the late President's name as well as that of petitioner was made principally in the Formal Offer of Exhibits for respondent corporation, in a Copy of Plan of Lots 7231 and 7239, tax declarations and as predecessor-in-interest. However, this is not sufficient compliance with what the law requires to be stated in the application for registration. Disclosure of petitioner's adverse interest, occupation and possession should be made at the appropriate time, i.e., at the time of the application for registration, otherwise, the persons concerned will not be sent notices of the initial hearing and will, therefore, miss the opportunity to present their opposition or claims. 3. Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing was made in the Official Gazette and in the Record Newsweekly, admittedly not a newspaper of general circulation. The Court of Appeals held that pursuant to Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Said provision of law expressly states that "the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. . . ." While publication of the notice in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court, publication in a newspaper of general circulation remains an indispensable procedural requirement. Couched in mandatory terms, it is a component of procedural due process and aimed at giving "as wide publicity as possible" so that all persons having an adverse interest in the land subject of the registration proceedings may be notified thereof. 34 Although jurisdiction of the court is not affected, the fact that publication was not made in a newspaper of general circulation is material and relevant in assessing the applicant's right or title to the land. 4. The allegations of forgery and the discrepancies in the documentary, as well as in the testimonial evidence regarding this issue which are all crucial to this case, compelled the Court to undertake a careful review of the facts of the case. 35 A close scrutiny of the evidence on record leads the Court to the irresistible conclusion that forgery was indeed attendant in the case at bar. Although there is no proof of respondent Maguesun Corporation's direct participation in the execution and preparation of the forged instruments, there are sufficient indicia which proves that Maguesun Corporation is not the "innocent purchaser for value" who merits the protection of the law. In response to the questions fielded by the trial court and by counsel for petitioner, PNP Document Examiner Zacarias Semacio sought to explain all the differences pointed out in the questioned signatures and in the sample signatures as having been caused merely by "natural variation." 36 He concluded that the questioned signatures were not forged. In contrast, Chief of the Questioned Documents Division of the National Bureau of Investigation, Arcadio Ramos, testified with more specificity as befits an expert that the questioned and sample signatures were not written by one and the same person because of "(t)he manner of execution of strokes; the personalized proportional characteristics of letters; the linking/connecting between letters; the structural pattern of letters and other minute details . . . 37 Moreover, petitioner Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas categorically declared that she has never met Zenaida Melliza and did not sell the subject property. 38 Petitioner, then over ninety years old, has no motive to attest to a falsehood. Petitioner and her family also own several other pieces of property, some of which are leased out as restaurants, e.g. Leo's Restaurant and Ma Mon Luk Restaurant. 39 This is an indication that petitioner is not unaware of the value of her properties.ℒαwρhi৷ Hence, it is unlikely that indication that she would sell over thirteen thousand square meters of prime property in Tagaytay City to a stranger for a measly P200,000.00 Finally, even to a layman's eye, the documents, as well as the enlarged photographic exhibit of the signatures, reveal forgery. The questioned signatures taken from the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Self-Adjudication are starkly different from the sample signatures in several documents executed by petitioner. The questioned signatures are smooth and rounded and have none of the jagged and shaky character of petitioner's signatures characteristic of the penmanship of elderly persons. There are also added considerations reflective of the dubious character of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication purportedly executed by petitioner. 40 In it she declares that she is a resident of 22 8th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, when she actually lives in 2 Park Road, North Forbes Park, Makati. She also states that she is the "sole heir of the late Manuel De Roxas who died sometime on the year 1944 at Manila." Petitioner's husband is President Manuel A. Roxas and she refers to herself as Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas. President Roxas was survived by petitioner and their two children, Ma. Rosario Roxas and Gerardo Roxas (who predeceased petitioner). The fact that petitioner was not the sole heir was known to the general public, as well as the demise of the late President on April 15, 1946 while delivering a speech at Clark Field, Pampanga. The aforementioned irregularities are too glaring to have been ignored. If petitioner did in fact execute said Affidavit, there is no reason why she should state facts other than the unadulterated truth concerning herself and her family. Additionally, Zenaida Melliza's non-appearance raises doubt as to her existence. Her given address was Matina, Davao City. How was she related to petitioner and what led her to purchase the subject? Respondent corporation could very well have presented her to prove the legitimacy of their transaction. If petitioner were selling said property, would she not have offered them first to interested relatives such as Manolita G. Suntay? Would an ordinary person sell more than thirteen thousand square meters of prime property for P170,000.00 when it was earlier purchased for P200,000.00? These questions highlight several implausibilities in the alleged sale of the subject property by herein petitioner. As Maguesun Corporation's President who is related to petitioner, Manolita G. Suntay should have verified the sale of the subject property by Zenaida Melliza. Manolita G. Suntay's closeness to petitioner Vda. de Roxas, as one who even registered the latter's car, suggests acquaintance with the late petitioner's properties as well as the possibility that she took advantage of such knowledge. From the foregoing, it is quite clear that respondent corporation cannot tack its possession to that of petitioner as predecessor-in-interest. Zenaida Melliza conveyed not title over the subject parcels of land to Maguesun Corporation as she was not the owner thereof. 41 Maguesun Corporation is thus not entitled to the registration decree which the trial court granted in its decision. Palpably, petitioner has not been interrupted in her more than thirty years of open, uninterrupted, exclusive and notorious possession in the concept of an owner over the subject lots by the irregular transaction to Zenaida Melliza. She therefore retains title proper and sufficient for original registration over the two parcels of land in question pursuant to Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. 42 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 38328 ("Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas v. Maguesun Management & Development Corporation, et al.") promulgated on December 8, 1994 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly, registration of title over the subject parcels of land, described in Plan AS-04-000108, Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, with an area of 3,461 and 10,674 square meters, respectively, as shown and supported by the corresponding technical descriptions now forming part of the Records of LRC No. TG-373, is awarded to herein petitioner Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas and her heirs, herein substituted as petitioners. Upon finality of this Decision, the Land Registration Authority is hereby directed to ISSUE with reasonable dispatch the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title pursuant to Section 39 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. SO ORDERED. Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur. Footnotes 1 The motion to substitute Ruby Roxas-Roxas, Maria Lourdes Roxas-Ojeda and Manuel A. Roxas, heirs of petitioner Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas who died on June 20, 1995, as petitioners in this case was granted on September 13, 1995, Rollo, pp. 118 and 124. 2 The Record Newsweekly (Tinig ng Katagalugan) is a newspaper edited in Bacoor, Cavite and of general circulation in the Provinces of Cavite, Aurora, Batangas, Laguna, Marinduque, Occidental Mindoro, Oriental Mindoro, Palawan, Quezon, Romblon, Rizal and in the Cities of Batangas, Lipa, Cavite, Tagaytay, Trece Martires, San Pablo and Lucena, published every Saturday by the Daily Record, Inc. Records of LRC No. TG-373, p. 31. 3 Report of Silverio G. Perez, Chief, Department of Registration, Land Registration Authority, dated October 4, 1990, Records of LRC No. TG-373, p. 35. 4 Records of LRC No. TG-373, pp. 126-128. 5 Records of LRC No. TG-373, p. 133. 6 Rollo, p. 15. 7 Decision, p. 3; Records of Civil Case No. TG-1183, p. 300. 8 TSN, February 11, 1992, pages 22-37. 9 Questioned Documents Report No. 007-92 issued by the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory Service, dated January 9, 1992, Records of Civil Case No. TG-1183, p. 212. 10 Questioned Documents Report No. 62-292 issued by the Questioned Documents Division of the National Bureau of Investigation, dated February 10, 1992, Records of Civil Case No. TG-1183, p. 220. 11 Decision in Civil Case No. TG-1183, Trinidad de Leon vda. Roxas v. Maguesun Management Corporation et. al., penned by Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo; Records of said civil case, pp. 298-311. 12 Records of Civil Case No. TG-1183, pp. 304-310. 13 Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas v. Maguesun Management and Development Corporation et. al., CA-G.R. No. CV No. 38328, Justice Hector L. Hofileña, ponente, Justices Gloria C. Paras and Salome A, Montoya, concurring; Rollo, pp. 68-76. 14 Rollo, pp. 71-75. 15 Promulgated June 11, 1978. 16 Afable v. Rosario, 60 Phil. 622. 17 Presidential Decree No. 1529, Section 32 provides : Sec. 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. —The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court) a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. . . . (Emphasis and words in parenthesis supplied.) The section is similar to the provision it replaced, Section 38, Act No. 496 as amended by Sec. 3, Act 3621 and Sec. 1, Act 3630. 18 Director of Lands v. CFI Rizal, Branch XII, 152 SCRA 487. 19 Bell v. Henry, 28 Ohio Law Review 528, cited 17A WORDS AND PHRASES 28 (1958); Fraud and Deceit, 37 AM JUR 2d 22 citing Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 24 L ed. 586, and other cases. 20 Ibid. at 23 citing Bank v. Board of Education, 305 N.Y. 119, 111 NE2d 238; also Fraud, 37 CJS 208-215 and at 23 citing Bank v. Board of Education, 305 N.Y. 119, 111 NE2d 238. 21 Ibid. at 25. 22 Ibid. at 24 citing Flood v. Templeton, 152 Cal. 148, 92 P 78, Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co. 261 US 388, 67 L ed. 719, 43 s Ct. 458 and other cases. 23 Ybañez v. CA, 253 SCRA at 551. 24 72 SCRA 344 citing U.S. v. Throckmorton, 25 L. ed. 93, 95. 25 Republic v. Register of Deeds of Quezon, 244 SCRA 537 citing PENA, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 113 (1982). 26 Director of Lands v. CFI Rizal, 152 SCRA 487. 27 G.R. No. L-38185, September 24, 1986, 144 SCRA 292. 28 Nicolas v. Director of Lands, G.R. No. L-19147-48, December 28, 1963, 9 SCRA 934, 938. 29 Estiva v. Alvero, 37 Phil 498, cited in Nicolas v. Director of Lands, supra. 30 Records of LRC No. TG-373, p. 2. 31 Records of Civil Case No. TG-1183, p. 49. 32 Reply, p. 11. Rollo, p. 134. 33 Decision of the Court of Appeals, p. 7, Rollo, p. 74. 34 Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982. 35 Reyes v. CA, G.R. No. 110207, July 11, 1996. 36 TSN, January 23, 1992 in Civil Case No. TG-1183, pp. 33-64. 37 TSN, February 18, 1992 in Civil Case No. TG-1183, p. 30. He explained in part that "(t)he first difference that I have mentioned here in this particular portion of combination of capital letter "T" and "R" in the questioned signature, the initial stroke of letter "T" is much lower to the base line and the small letter "r" is much higher; whereas, in the series of standards, it is either reverse or a little bit farther from the base line. The second difference is the placement of the "i" dot or the formation of the "i" dot is always starting to the right. This is the formation, and the location is below or before the small letter "i" and the other one is just above the small letter "I"; whereas, in the series of standards, the formation is either starting to the right or it is like a comma, and then stubbing straight, stubbing to the right, stubbing to the right, but very seldom, but you can see the formation of the said "I" dot stubbing to the left as exhibited here in the questioned signature. The next difference is the formation of the hump of small letter "m." The hump, your Honor, here is rounded; whereas, in the series of standards, it is angular, which is very much different, and that is significant in handwriting. The next difference is the small letter "d." The small letter "d" in the questioned signature, the body is bigger and the stem is shorter, as well as in small letter "d"; whereas, in the series of standards, it is the reverse or the opposite. The body is smaller and the stem is much longer. Then, the particular portion there, the terminal stroke of letter "d" in the first letter "d", it deviates or separates from the body on the base line which is a little bit or half way from the body of small letter "d", whereas, in the series of standards, this is not curving but going straight and even beyond the base line and it is angular in form. . . ." (pp. 12-14 of the same TSN). 38 TSN of February 11, 1992, in Civil Case No. TG-1183, pp. 36-37. 39 Records of Civil Case No. TG-1183, pp. 238-259. 40 Records of LRC No. TG-373, p. 105. 41 Treasurer of the Phils. v. CA, 153 SCRA 359. 42 Sec. 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 reads in part: "The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court) an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. . . . The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation