EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 102942, April 18, 1997 ]
AMADO F. CABAERO AND CARMEN C. PEREZ, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. ALFREDO C. CANTOS IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BR. VII, AND EPIFANIO CERALDE, RESPONDENTS.
Separate Opinion
REGALADO, J., concurring:
I concur in the result, not only because the majority has adopted my suggestion that the conjoined civil action be reserved1 for separate determination, but specifically because such a remedial solution presents a practical and definitive response to two contending concerns in the court below, and frees the wheels of criminal justice to grind towards the conclusion of the much delayed penal proceeding.
Petitioners are reportedly apprehensive that their counterclaim, being compulsory in nature from their view, may be deemed waived if not duly raised in Criminal Case No. 18826 of the court a quo since the civil action against which that counterclaim is interposed has been impliedly instituted therein. On the other hand, as commendably expounded in the main opinion, the procedural practice, pleadings and contingencies attendant to civil cases may not only relegate the criminal case to the background but may even deny the accused their right to speedy trial since either the trial or appellate courts concerned could be enmeshed in the ramifications arising from the civil case.
Reacting with judicial acuity, the Court notes the seeming hiatus in the law and rules on this point, directs a study and formulation of a remedial Rule thereon, and orders the criminal action to proceed sans consideration of the civil aspect which in effect is deconsolidated from the former and reserved for later adjudication.
I essay this separate opinion, however, as there may be other cases presenting the same factual features, hence involving the same issues which culminated in the long impassé in this case; and because the trial courts may either not apply the procedure adopted here should there be some variances in said cases, or be of the belief that only this Court has the power to motu proprio order the reservation of the civil aspect considering that its joint institution with the criminal case is a right granted to the offended party.
Pending the promulgation of the corresponding Rule addressing the situation which called for the ad hoc resolution thereof in this case, I respectfully submit the following observations which may be of possible assistance in cases of the same mould as the one at bar.
To my mind, and based on the presentation of this case in the main opinion, the trial court did not err in granting the prosecution's motion to dismiss the counterclaim and deny consideration thereof in the criminal proceeding. Its error lay in the grounds it advanced to justify such disposition. For that matter, the reasons adduced by the private prosecutor in his motion to expunge the answer with the counterclaim were off-tangent; and, from the discussion of the ponente, the arguments of petitioners in resisting the dismissal of their counterclaim, while supposedly proffering a solution, would in turn create another problem.
What seems to have been overlooked, however, are the elemental facts which could create a cause of action for and thereby be the basis for pleading that counterclaim. Just like a complaint, a counterclaim must be grounded upon a valid, complete and enforceable cause of action, failing which it is dismissible on that ground or, akin thereto, for prematurity. That is why, in some states in the American jurisdiction, a counterclaim is called a counter-complaint.
The counterclaim involved in the present case is putatively founded upon the alleged malicious prosecution of herein petitioners by the filing of the estafa charge against them in the trial court. Since, however, there is now no crime of malicious prosecution per se and only its civil law concept is maintained,2 the civil action for redress of such grievance, by reason of its affinity with the criminal case from which it arose, was intended by them to be adjudicated through a counterclaim filed therein. Their offered justification for such procedure is that since the estafa case included the civil liability arising therefrom, then the counterclaim can properly be raised to defeat or diminish the recovery sought by the complainant in that civil aspect.
However, in the factual milieu of the present case, it would appear that petitioners do not yet have a cause of action for a civil case of malicious prosecution against private respondent. Denuncia falsa or malicious prosecution essentially means an unfounded criminal action. While the term has been expanded to include unfounded civil suits instituted just to vex and humiliate the defendant despite the absence of a cause of action or probable cause,3 in either case the mere act of submitting the case for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution.4
Thus, as early as 1918 in the case of U .S. vs. Rubal,5 and I am not aware of any substantial deviation from the fundamental doctrine therein, malicious prosecution or false accusation requires that there was a false charge made to an executive or judicial officer whose duty is to investigate or punish the felony, that there was a final judgment of acquittal or order of dismissal by the trial court, and there was an order for the prosecution of the person who made the charge. The requirement that the action finally terminated with an acquittal was underscored more recently in Lao vs. Court of Appeals, et al.6 and Ponce vs. Legaspi, et al.7
Even without the benefit of precedents, the reason for the requirement that the action was finally terminated by dismissal or acquittal is obvious. In our legal system, it is only the proper court that can determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. It is not for the accused to say that he is being maliciously prosecuted and then file a claim for damages based on his own evaluation or surmise. In the instant case, that is exactly what herein petitioners have done. They have filed their counterclaim on the theory that the estafa case against them was a false and malicious charge although that fact is precisely what the trial court still has to determine.
Obviously, therefore, petitioners do not yet have a valid, complete and enforceable cause of action which could constitute the basis and justification for their counterclaim. The pronouncement of the court on the merits of the estafa case and as to whether it was maliciously filed is still to come. Absent that conclusive finding and condition precedent for a claim for damages based on malicious prosecution, the counterclaim of petitioners is without substantive or procedural support. Elsewise stated, it is premature and should be dismissed.
The misgivings of petitioners that their counterclaim being compulsory in nature would be waived unless filed in the criminal action do not merit extended discussion.ℒαwρhi৷ As already explained, that counterclaim is premature. It was, therefore, not yet in existence at the time petitioners filed their answer and, in fact, it is still premature and legally inexistent as of now. Accordingly, even granting that it is conceptually a compulsory counterclaim, even if it was not filed in the criminal case it would not be considered waived.
The Court has heretofore clarified this matter as follows:
We find no cogent reason why such uniform and settled construction of Rule 13 of the Federal Rules should not be applied in the interpretation of the aforesaid sections of Rule 10 of the old Rules of Court. Thus, while Section 6 of Rule 16 of the old Rules defines a compulsory counterclaim as a claim that "arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing party's claim," Section 3 of the same rule requires that such counterclaim must be in existence "at the time" the counter-claimant files his answer.
The counterclaim must be existing at the time of filing the answer, though not at the commencement of the action, for under Section 3 of the former Rule 10 (now Section 8 of Rule 6), the counterclaim or cross-claim which a party may aver in his answer must be one which he may have "at the time" against the opposing party. That phrase can only have reference to the time of the answer. Certainly a premature counterclaim cannot be set up in the answer x x x.
Thus a party who fails to interpose a counterclaim although arising out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence of the plaintiff's suit but which did not exist or mature at the time said party files his answer is not thereby barred from interposing such claim in a future litigation x x x. (Words in parentheses and italics supplied).8
Under the same conditions, therefore, I submit that the trial court can validly dismiss, without prejudice to refiling the same as the subject of a separate action, a counterclaim where the lack of a complete cause of action or the absence of the requisite basis therefor is evident. The same disposition could apply to similar claims, such as those raised in cross-claims or third-party complaints. Such dismissal should, however, be on motion by the adverse party since the trial court can sua sponte dismiss a case and, by analogy, a claim raised by an initiatory pleading only if it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.9
Nonetheless, there is still the question of the propriety of the filing and the admissibility of such initiatory pleadings in a criminal action. This is a proposition on which I take a negative stand, even if the civil aspect of the criminal case is instituted therein. For this reason, I agree that this matter should be specifically dealt with in the Rules of Court, by amendatory or suppletory provisions, rather than by resort to general principles drawn from analogies or implications.
Footnotes
1This is not a novel idea, since the power to reserve the civil aspect is inherent in the Court and has long been exercised by it, such as in U.S. vs. Maquiraya, 14 Phil. 243 (1909); People vs. Oraza, 83 Phil. 633 (1949); and People vs. Miranda, G.R. No. L-17389, August 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 1067.
2 Strebel vs. Figueras, etc., et al., 96 Phil. 321 (1954); see also Arts. 21, 2208(3) and 2219, Civil Code. The counterparts of Art. 326 of the former Penal Code in the Revised Penal Code would be incriminating innocent persons (Art. 363), false testimony (Art. 180), or perjury (Art. 183).
3 Equitable Banking Corporation vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 66070, October 31, 1984.
4 See Manila Gas Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-44190, October 30, 1980, 100 SCRA 602.
5 37 Phil. 577 (1918).
6 G.R. No. 82808, July 11, 1991, 199 SCRA 58.
7 G.R. No. 79184, May 6, 1992, 208 SCRA 377.
8 National Marketing Corporation vs. Federation of United NAMARCO Distributors, Inc., G.R. No. L-22578, January 31, 1973, 49 SCRA 238.
9 Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court.
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