Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 114904 January 29, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DEMETRIO HUBILLA, JR. and SALVADOR PALLE, accused-appellants.
D E C I S I O N
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Accused-appellants Demetrio Hubilla, Jr. and Salvador Palle, members of the Citizen Armed Force Geographic Unit (CAFGU) based in Sta. Cruz, Casiguran, Sorsogon, appeal from the decision of Branch 53 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon 1 finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 91-2987 and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Antonio Rosas, in the amount of P50,000.00. The accusatory portion of the information under which they were tried reads as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of June, 1991, at barangay Sta. Cruz, municipality of Casiguran, province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, each armed with M-14 Rifle, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and shoot one Antonio Rosas thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wound which directly caused the death of said Antonio Rosas to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the trial court in this manner:
The witness to the incident, Reynaldo Halcon, testified among others, that at about 3:30 and 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of June 14, 1991, at Sta. Cruz, Casiguran, Sorsogon, while he and Antonio Rosas were walking along the lower portion of the feeder road on his way home, and Antonio Rosas on his way to work in the field, he heard somebody tell Antonio to lower down his hoe while he was at a distance of about 4 meters from Antonio Rosas; that he hid behind the chinese bamboo and saw the two accused Demetrio Hubilla and Salvador Palle, who were CAFGU members, poking their M-14 rifle to Antonio Rosas; that when Antonio Rosas did not lower down his hoe, as commanded, he was shot near his feet by Demetrio Hubilla, Jr.; that when Antonio Rosas ran, he was again shot by Demetrio Hubilla, Jr., and this time he was hit and fell down; that Salvador Palle was also poking his rifle to the victim but did not fire a shot; that when he approached the victim, the latter was already dead; that he notified the wife that her husband was already dead.
The widow of the victim, Consuelo Rosas, testified that she was at their house at Sta. Cruz, Casiguran, Sorsogon, on June 14, 1991, at about 3:30 to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, when she was informed by Reynaldo Halcon that her husband is already dead; that she immediately went to the place of the incident which is about 50 meters distance and that she found her husband covered with blood and already dead; that he died of a single gunshot wound; that she asked for help and some people went to Casiguran to ask for the help of the police authorities; that they brought the remains of her husband to the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital for autopsy; that Dr. Wilhelmo Abrantes conducted the autopsy and a copy of the autopsy report (Exh. "A") and certificate of death (Exh. "B") were issued; that her husband stayed in wake for four (4) days in their house and that she spent more than P10,000.00; that she felt very sad, considering that she had two minor children, the eldest is 3 years old and the other one is one-half (1/2) month old. On cross-examination she declared that Reynaldo Halcon accompanied her to the place of the incident; that the two accused are residents of the same place, but are staying at the detachment because they are CAFGU members; that they are friends of her husband and she does not know why he was shot.
Dr. Wilhelmo Abrantes testified that he conducted the autopsy on the body of Antonio Rosas and prepared the autopsy report (Exh. "A") showing that the cause of death was shock and hemorrhage due to gunshot wounds; that he likewise signed the certificate of death (Exh. "B").3
The defense had a different version. Appellant Demetrio Hubilla testified that while he and appellant Salvador Palle, a fellow CAFGU member, were walking from their detachment on 14 June 1991 at around 2:00 p.m., the victim, Antonio Rosas, suddenly appeared and attacked them with a hoe. Antonio succeeded in hitting Salvador's hands with the hoe, causing the latter to drop his M-14 rifle to the ground. Antonio got the rifle and squeezed its trigger. However, the rifle failed to discharge. Salvador ran away, while Demetrio shouted at Antonio to drop the rifle and then fired a warning shot into the air. Instead, Antonio loaded and cocked the rifle and aimed it at Demetrio. Fearing for his life, Demetrio shot Antonio and subsequently surrendered himself together with Salvador at Camp Escudero.4
Appellant Salvador Palle testified that at around 4:00 p.m. on the same date, he was walking home with Demetrio Hubilla when Antonio Rosas suddenly struck his rifle with a hoe causing it to fall down. He forthwith fled towards his detachment leaving behind Antonio and Demetrio. As he was running towards his detachment, he heard two shots. He did not know anymore what happened between Demetrio and Antonio. He proceeded to inform Assistant Commander Realoye that his rifle was wrested from him. It was only much later on that he found out that Antonio sustained injuries.5
The trial court did not give credence to the appellants' claim of self-defense. It stated thus:
The version of the accused to the effect that they acted in self-defense is unworthy of belief. Here are two CAFGU MEMBERS fully armed with M-14 rifles allegedly defending themselves against the attack of a person with only a hoe as his weapon. Unless out of his mind, or bent on committing suicide, no one in the ordinary course of events, will dare challenge or attack two people fully armed with M-14 rifles with only a hoe as his weapon, and expect to come out alive and in good health.
It was admitted by the accused Demetrio Hubilla, Jr., that he shot the victim causing his instantaneous death while his companion Salvador Palle, and as testified to by Reynaldo Halcon, poked his rifle to the victim without, however, firing a single shot. These individual but simultaneous acts of the two accused had immobilized the victim and ensured his death. Demetrio Hubilla, Jr., and Salvador Palle are conspirators.
A co-conspirator need not fire a shot if he was present and gave moral support to the assailant. (58 SCRA, p. 450).
Records show that Reynaldo Halcon, the only eyewitness for the prosecution, answered questions in a straight-forward manner, relaying with clarity how the incident actually happened. The plea of self-defense by the accused is not sufficient to overthrow the clear testimony of the prosecution's witnesses.
Accused Salvador Palle testified that the victim attacked him with a hoe. This hit his rifle causing it to fall to the ground. Palle then ran away. He testified though, that he did not see the victim pick up the rifle and point it at him. From this testimony, Palle invoked self-defense. This is flimsy and absurd. Being a CAFGU member, he is supposed to be well-versed in handling firearms, as compared to the victim. Besides, both the accused were armed with M-14 rifles while the victim carried only a hoe. Obviously, there was no reasonable necessity of the use of the firearms to repel the aggression by the victim. Hence, the theory of self-defense is incredible.
The burden of proof in self-defense is upon the accused. (133 SCRA p. 82)6
Accordingly, the trial court disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused DEMETRIO HUBILLA, JR. and SALVADOR PALLE, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER they are hereby penalized to undergo RECLUSION PERPETUA with its accessory penalties.
They are likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity.
With cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.7
The accused-appellants seasonably appealed to us contending that the trial court erred (1) in not appreciating the physical evidence on record that would necessarily uphold their claim of self-defense, and (2) in holding that their claim of self-defense is "incredible" and adopting en toto the version of the prosecution's lone eyewitness.8 They submit that their claim of self-defense is supported by hard physical evidence, namely, the autopsy report showing that the victim was facing Hubilla when he was shot contrary to the testimony of prosecution witness Reynaldo Halcon that the victim was shot while he was running away. Moreover, the assault on Demetrio Hubilla was imminent forcing him to shoot the victim.
At the core of the appellants' assignment of errors is the credibility of eyewitness Reynaldo Halcon. We reiterate that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb the finding of the trial court, unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case.9 This is so because the latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. The appellants have failed to convince us that there is room in this appeal for the application of the exception.
Moreover, the appellants have not shown that the lone eyewitness had any ill-motive against them which would have moved him to falsely implicate them in the death of Antonio Rosas. It is settled that where there is nothing to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. 10
In any event, since the appellants have interposed self-defense the burden of evidence is shifted to them. It is hornbook doctrine that where the accused admits full responsibility for the killing of the victim but invokes self-defense, it is incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the killing was justified and that he incurred no liability therefor. As the burden of evidence is shifted to him, ha must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if the latter were weak, it would not be disbelieved after his open admission of responsibility for the killing. 11 Being a weak defense which, like alibi, can easily be concocted, self-defense must be proven with certainty. The following elements must concur: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. 12
Like the trial court, we too cannot subscribe to the version of the appellants that the victim was the unlawful aggressor. That claim is definitely contrived. Neither the victim nor his hoe could match two CAFGU members and two M-14 rifles. As aptly observed by the trial court: "Unless out of his mind or bent on committing suicide, no one in the ordinary course of events, will dare challenge or attack two people fully armed with M-14 rifles with only a hoe as his weapon, and expect to come out alive and in good health."
The appellants insist that it is not true that the victim was shot while he was running away; he was facing them, as shown by the fatal bullet which entered the frontal neck of Antonio. Such a conclusion is drawn from the following answers of the eyewitness:
FISCAL BORROMEO:
Q After Demetrio Hubilla, Jr. fired his M-14 rifle near the feet of Antonio Rosas, what happened next?
A When Antonio Rosas was able to run, he was again shot by Demetrio Hubilla, Jr.
Q Tell us if Antonio Rosas was hit by the second shot?
A Yes, sir, he was hit.
Q In what part of the body was he hit?
A (WITNESS POINTING TO THE LEFT JAW). 13 (emphasis supplied).
The point of entry of the bullet belies the theory of the appellants, for if indeed the victim was facing them, he would not have been hit on the left side of the neck, as found by the doctor, or the "left jaw" as described by the eyewitness.
We agree with the trial court that conspiracy was present in the instant case. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. For conspiracy to exist, it is not required that there be an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence; it is sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused which point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. 14
Appellant Palle was with Hubilla when they encountered the victim. Although he did not fire the fatal shot, he too jabbed his rifle at the victim thereby helping Hubilla intimidate the victim. After Hubilla hit the victim with the second shot, Palle fled with Hubilla towards their detachment. From the time they confronted the victim up to when they retreated from the scene of the shooting, Palle acted in unison with Hubilla. He cannot claim to have been a passive observer. While he did not fire a single shot, his conduct indicated complete cooperation with Hubilla. His armed presence unquestionably gave encouragement and a sense of security to Hubilla. 15 Hence, his liability is that of a co-conspirator, for where conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all. 16
We depart, however, from the trial court's finding that treachery and evident premeditation attended the killing of the victim.
For treachery to be appreciated, two conditions must be present, to wit: (1) the means of execution employed gives the person no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. 17
In the instant case, the victim, upon encountering the appellants, was told to lower down his hoe. He refused to do so. The appellants thereupon poked him with their rifles and repeated the command, but still he refused to follow the appellants' order. This prompted Hubilla to shoot him near his feet. Whereupon the victim ran, but he was not able to get away, as Hubilla shot him hitting him in the neck. From the incident narrated by eyewitness Reynaldo Halcon we do not find any evidence that the appellants deliberately employed means of execution that would give the victim no opportunity to retaliate or defend himself. The victim was already forewarned or put on guard by the actuations of the appellants in hitting him with their rifles and in shooting near his feet. Treachery cannot qualify the killing to murder when the victim was forewarned of the attack by the assailant, 18 or when the attack was frontal or was not so sudden as to have caught the deceased completely unaware.19 Furthermore, the evidence does not disclose that the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the appellants.
Evident premeditation was not proven by the prosecution either. There is no proof of (1) the time when the appellants determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that they have clung to their determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow them an opportunity to reflect upon the consequences of their act. 20 The encounter between the appellants and the victim was casual, and the attack made by the appellants was at the spur of the moment.
The crime thus proven in this case is not murder, as held by the trial court, but only homicide.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of Branch 53 of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon in Criminal Case No. 91-2987 is AFFIRMED in all respects subject to the above modification. As modified, accused-appellants DEMETRIO HUBILLA, JR. and SALVADOR PALLE are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, instead of murder. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and taking into account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, each is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from Eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) years and Eight (8) months of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum.
Costs against the accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Original Records (OR), 127; Rollo, 11. Per Judge Augusto M. Racelis.
2 OR, 17.
3 Rollo, 11-13.
4 TSN, 21 September 1993, 2-6.
5 TSN, 23 November 1993; 3-6.
6 Rollo, 15-17.
7 Id., 17.
8 Id., 43.
9 People vs. Francisco, 213 SCRA 746 [1992]; People vs. Ramos, 222 SCRA 557 [1993]; People vs. Lucas, 232 SCRA 537 [1994], People vs. Comia, 236 SCRA 185 [1994].
10 People vs. Rostata, 218 SCRA 657 [1993]; People vs. Taneo, 218 SCRA 494 [1993]; People vs. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455 [1994].
11 People vs. De La Cruz, 207 SCRA 632 [1992]; People vs. Ybeas, 213 SCRA 793 [1992]; People vs. Boniao, 217 SCRA 653 [1993]; People vs. Gomez, 235 SCRA 444 [1994].
12 Article 11, Revised Penal Code.
13 TSN, 4 February 1991, 6.
14 People vs. Pama, 216 SCRA 385 [1992]; People vs. Buntan, Sr., 221 SCRA 421 [1993]; People vs. Canillo, 236 SCRA 22 [1994].
15 People vs. Carunungan, 109 Phil. 534 [1960].
16 People vs. Rostata, Jr., 218 SCRA 657 [1993]; People vs. Liquiran, 228 SCRA 62 [1993].
17 People vs. Ybeas, supra note 11; People vs. Suitos, 220 SCRA 419 [1993]; People vs. Talaver, 230 SCRA 281 [1994].
18 People vs. Estrellanes, Jr., 239 SCRA 235 [1994].
19 People vs. Jotoy, 222 SCRA 801 [1993].
20 People vs. Cordero, 217 SCRA 1 [1993]; People vs. Boniao, supra note 11; People vs. Lug-aw, 229 SCRA 308 [1994]; People vs. Ruelan, 231 SCRA 650 [1994].
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