G.R. No. 120640 August 8, 1996
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., ENRIQUE M. COJUANGCO, MANUEL M. COJUANGCO, ESTELITO P. MENDOZA and GABRIEL L. VILLAREAL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), JULIETA C. BERTUBEN, IDE C. TILLAH, EMMANUEL E. CRUZ, SERGIO OSMEÑA III AND TIRSO D. ANTIPORDA, JR., respondents.
Separate Opinion
REGALADO, J., dissenting:
I join Mr. Justice Davide in his well-reasoned and compelling dissent which fortifies his ponencia in Garcia, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al.1 I would just want to add some further views and observations of my own.
It appears to be the postulation of the majority that the aforesaid case of Garcia, Jr. does not apply because it does not involve ill-gotten wealth cases nor the exercise of the PCGG's power of sequestration; whereas the case at bar involves a challenge to the power of the PCGG to vote or make use of the sequestered shares of stock, which is directly related to the PCGG's authority over alleged ill-gotten wealth. Hence, it is theorized that this case falls within the purview of Section 2, Executive Order No. 14 which vests in the Sandiganbayan original and exclusive jurisdiction thereover.
The majority concedes that, as a general rule, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over original actions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto. however, it is insisted that an exception lies where such action involves an incident arising from, or is related to, PCGG cases over alleged ill-gotten wealth within the context of said Section 2 of Executive Order No. 14. This theory is anchored on the holding in PCGG vs. Peña, etc., et al.2 that all cases falling under the aforestated Section 2 are "lodged within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayan's exclusive and original jurisdiction."
This ruling, it is pointed out, was echoed with illustrative examples in Soriano III, et al. vs. Yuzon, etc., et al.3 which held that the Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive jurisdiction over "'all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases,' such as the dispute over the sale of shares, the propriety of the issuance of ancillary writs or provisional remedies relative thereto, the sequestration thereof, which may not be made the subject of separate action or proceedings in another forum." Finally, the majority cites PCGG vs. Aquino, etc., et al. 4 where there was a passing statement that "any attempt to remove special civil actions, similarly involving the powers and functions of the PCGG, from the Sandiganbayan's exclusive jurisdiction would be of no avail."
It will be noted, however, that Garcia, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al. is exactly on all fours with the case at bar. In that case, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and damages, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, was filed with the Sandiganbayan, questioning the propriety of therein petitioner's removal or separation as a director of the UCPB. A motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was filed with and granted by the Sandiganbayan.
When the controversy was elevated to this Court, petitioner Garcia, Jr. argued that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto on the ground that the act of the PCGG in removing him as director of UCPB is a direct exercise of the PCGG's power of sequestration over the UCPB shares of stock. On the other hand, the Solicitor General countered that the removal of petitioner has no bearing whatsoever on the question of whether or not the sequestered shares of UCPB are ill-gotten, hence the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case.
This Court declared that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the original and special civil actions of prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto, because the authority to issue these extraordinary writs involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law. The Court discussed therein the pertinent laws, such as Executive Order No. 14 and Presidential Decrees Nos. 1606, 1860 and 1861, and concluded that, in the absence of a specific statutory grant of jurisdiction to issue the said extraordinary writs, the Sandiganbayan, as a court with only special and limited jurisdiction, cannot exercise jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto filed by petitioner. In fact, if I may add, the conferment of such original jurisdiction is required even for regular courts of general jurisdiction within the integrated judicial system.
It will be noted that in the foregoing case, the Court did not qualify or distinguish whether or not the special civil actions were filed in connection with the sequestration powers of the PCGG. It did not rule on the issue of whether or not the question of removal of petitioner therein as a director can be considered as an exercise of the power of sequestration of the PCGG and is, therefore, covered by Section 2 of Executive Order No. 14. Since the factual milieu of the present case is substantially and almost exactly the same as the factual setting in Garcia, Jr., no compelling reason exists why the ruling therein should not apply to the case at bar.
The exception allegedly enunciated in Peña and Aquino that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over ill-gotten cases and also of "all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases, such as the dispute over the sale of shares, the propriety of the issuance of ancillary writs or provisional remedies relative thereto, the sequestration thereof, which may not be made the subject of separate actions or proceedings in another forum," will not necessarily apply to or be determinative of the present controversy.
The writ of quo warranto is neither an ancillary writ nor a provisional remedy which can be issued by a court, having jurisdiction over a main case, in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction to resolve an incident in that case. The writ of quo warranto is an extraordinary and prerogative writ specifically sought as the principal relief in an action addressed against acts of authority unlawfully asserted, and necessarily requires the exercise of the original jurisdiction of a court.
Since the grant of the prerogative writ of quo warranto presupposes the exercise of original jurisdiction as a sine qua non, an original petition therefor cannot be considered as an ancillary remedy against "incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases." As definitively held in Garcia, et al. vs. De Jesus, et. al.,5 unlike the ancillary writs issued as provisional remedies, the power to issue a writ of quo warranto, just like the other extraordinary writs under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, is never derived by implication. Such power must be expressly conferred.
It is true that the grant of jurisdiction to try actions carries with it all necessary and incidental powers to employ writs, processes and other means essential to make its jurisdiction effective. But, this is on the premise that there is such original jurisdiction expressly and priorly granted from which the necessary and incidental powers may be implied. With respect to the Sandiganbayan, it was never expressly granted original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and quo warranto.
The cases of Peña, (an action for damages, with writ of preliminary injunction, questioning the revocation of the authorization as signatory previously granted to a respondent therein), Aquino, (a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by private respondent before the RTC assailing the sequestration order issued by PCGG), and Soriano III, (involving the question of whether the RTC and SEC can decide the issue of the validity of the sequestration of shares of stock), which are relied upon by the majority in the present case, were all decided in 1988, while the other cited case of Africa vs. PCGG, et al.6 was decided in 1992, all before the decision in Garcia, Jr. was handed down. The doctrine enunciated in Garcia, Jr. should, therefore, be considered as the controlling rule, as those in the aforementioned cases are not in point.
Obviously, because of their disquisition based on the aforesaid previous cases on which they rested their conclusion, the majority found it unnecessary to discuss Republic Act No. 7975. This recent amendment to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, especially on the specific issue involved in the case at bar, does not offer them any solace either. Republic Act 7975, which took effect on May 6, 1995 and vested the Sandiganbayan with exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, 7 is inapplicable to the present case. Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law8 and, as such, that law vesting additional jurisdiction in the court may not be given retroactive effect.9
It is noteworthy that such additional jurisdiction to issue the writs enumerated therein can be exercised by the Sandiganbayan only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, the same limitation imposed on the Court of Appeals before it was given full certiorari jurisdiction by Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129. Also, while said amendatory legislation conferred jurisdiction on the Sandiganbayan to issue the aforementioned extraordinary writs, it refrained from including therein the prerogative writ of quo warranto.
This reluctance to vest full authority in the Sandiganbayan in the matter of the issuance of extraordinary writs may be traceable to the fact that as a court of limited or special jurisdiction, its authority is confined to particular causes, or its jurisdiction can be exercised only under the limitations and circumstances prescribed by its governing statute. 10 In the face of all the foregoing considerations, I cannot accordingly see how and why the majority would wish to sustain its competence to issue a prerogative writ withheld from it both by law and jurisprudence.
Narvasa, C.J., concurs.
Footnotes
1 G.R. No. 114135, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 552.
2 G.R. No. 77663, April 12, 1988, 159 SCRA 556.
3 G.R. No. 74910, August 10, 1988, 164 SCRA 226.
4 G.R. No. 77816, June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 363.
5 G.R. No. 88158, March 4, 1992, 206 SCRA 779.
6 G.R. No. 83831, January 9, 1992, 205 SCRA 38.
7 Sec. 2, R.A. No. 7975, amending Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 1606.
8 Malaloan, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 104879, May 6, 1994, 232 SCRA 249.
9 See Largado vs. Masaganda, etc., et al., L-17624, June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 522.
10 Midwest Piping and Supply Co. vs. Thomas Spacing Mach. Co., 109 Pa. Super. 571, 167 A. 636, 638.
Separate Opinion
DAVIDE, JR. J., dissenting:
I am compelled to take a view contrary to that of my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug.
From the following antecedent facts summarized in the ponencia, to wit:
During the annual meeting of the stockholders of SMC, held on 18 April 1995, the election of fifteen directors for the ensuing year was taken up. Petitioners, along with private respondents, were among the nominees to the board. Private respondents were nominated by Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo of the Presidential Commission on Good Government. ("PCGG") following the registration in their respective names (at the instance of PCGG) of SMC sequestered shares of stock (the "corporate shares"), belonging to some 43 corporate stockholders led by Archipelago Finance and Leasing Corporation, in order to allow the nominees to qualify for the contested board seats.
During the election, the bulk of the votes cast by petitioner Mendoza in favor of his group had come substantially the same sequestered corporate shares of SMC which were used by the PCGG in voting, in turn, for private respondents.
Following the canvass of the votes cast, private respondents landed on the top 15 slots and were accordingly declared to have been the elected members of the SMC Board of Directors for the year 1995-1996. None of the petitioners (Messrs. Estelito Mendoza, Manuel Cojuangco, Enrique Cojuangco, Gabriel Villareal and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., who, respectively, landed 16th to the 20th places) made it.
Petitioner Mendoza protested the results of the election contending that the votes he had cast, particularly those in representation of the corporate shares, had not been duly appreciated and reflected in the results, and that had said votes been properly counted he, Manuel Cojuangco and Enrique Cojuangco would have themselves been duly elected. In reply, SMC Corporate Secretary Jose Feria stood by his verbal ruling during the canvassing of votes that only PCGG, through Chairman Gunigundo, could validly vote the sequestered shares.
it is clear, at least to me, that the grievance of the petitioners has nothing to do with the propriety of the sequestration nor with the ill-gotten or crony-related character of Gunigundo's act. It strictly involves a controversy regarding the election of directors and the counting of their votes, which, pursuant to paragraph (c), Section 51 of P.D. No. 902-A, falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Whatever its connection with or relation to the sequestered shares is purely peripheral. Pursuant to Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan, 2 the controversy does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
In yielding to the contention of the petitioners that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the controversy in the petition for quo warranto, the ponencia gives much stress to the observation in PCGG vs. Peña 3 that:
. . . Under Section 2 of the President's Executive Order No. 14 issued on May 7, 1986, all cases of the Commission regarding "the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally Acquired or Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their Close Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies, Agents or Nominees" whether civil or criminal, are lodged within the "exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan" and all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayan's exclusive and original jurisdiction, subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court. (emphasis supplied)
and the following statement in PCGG vs. Aquino and Marcelo Fiberglass Corp. vs. PCGG:4
It will be noted that the Sandiganbayan was held5 to have exclusive and original jurisdiction. in civil and criminal cases lodged before it, as well as incidents arising from, incidental, or related to such cases, subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court. The attempt to remove special civil actions from the Sandiganbayan's exclusive jurisdiction is of no avail if they similarly involve the powers and functions of the Presidential Commission on Good Government.
as well as this Court's pronouncement in Soriano III vs. Yuson6 and five other cases, to wit:
Now, that exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the Sandiganbayan would evidently extend not only to the principal causes of action, i.e., the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, but also to "all incidents arising from, incidental to or related to, such cases," such as the dispute over the sale of shares, the propriety of the issuance of the ancillary writs or provisional remedies relative thereto, the sequestration thereof, which may not be made the subject of separate actions or proceedings in another forum. . . .
I very respectfully submit that it was never the intention of Peña, Aquino, and Soriano to lodge with the Sandiganbayan, as falling within its exclusive and original jurisdiction, every matter incidental or related to or arising from the sequestration of ill-gotten wealth. Section 2 of E.O. No. 14 which provides as follows:
Sec. 2. The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan, which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof.
must be read together with Section 1 thereof to fully grasp what is meant by the term "cases." As so read, the term simply refers to "cases investigated by [the PCGG] under Executive Order No. 1, dated February 28, 1986, and Executive Order No. 2, dated March 12, 1986, as may be warranted by its findings," as expressly stated in said Section 1. Under Section 2 of E.O. No. 1, the PCGG is charged with the task of assisting the President with regard to the following matters:
(a) The recovery of ill-gotten wealth accumulated by Former president Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship.
(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign to the Commission from time to time.
(c) The adoption of safeguards to ensure that the above practices shall not be repeated in any manner under the new government, and the institution of adequate measures to prevent the occurrence of corruption.
and under Section 3 it is granted with the following powers:
(a) To conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order.
(b) To sequester or place or cause to be placed under its control or possession any building or office wherein any ill-gotten wealth or properties may be found, and any records pertaining thereto, in order to prevent their destruction, concealment or disappearance which would frustrate or hamper the investigation or otherwise prevent the Commission from accomplishing its task.
(c) The provisional take over in the public interest or to prevent its disposal or dissipation, business enterprises and properties taken over by the government of the Marcos Administration or by entities or persons close to former President Marcos, until the transactions leading to such acquisition by the latter can be disposed of by the appropriate authorities.
(d) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of acts by any person or entity that may render moot and academic, or frustrate, or otherwise make ineffectual the efforts of the Commission to carry out its tasks under this order.ℒαwρhi৷
Under E.O. No. 2 (Regarding the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally Acquired or Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, Their Close Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies, Agents, or Nominees), the PCGG is further charged with the duty of investigating any claims with respect to such assets and properties. The President, in the same Executive Order, ordered, inter alia, the freezing of all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos, his wife, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees have any interest or participation.
It therefore follows that what are referred to in Peña as "all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases" which shall "necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayan's exclusive and original jurisdiction," must be those matters which have a substantive nexus to the cases investigated by the PCGG pursuant to its powers under E.O. Nos. 1 and 2. This is precisely what Peña suggests when, in another portion of the ponencia therein, this Court said:
. . . Executive Order No. 14, which defines the jurisdiction over cases involving the ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, his wife, Imelda, members of their immediate family, close relatives, subordinates, close and/or business associates, dummies, agents and nominees, specifically provides in section 2 that "The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal with the Sandiganbayan which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof." Necessarily, those who wish to question or challenge the Commission's acts or orders in such cases must seek recourse in the same court, the Sandiganbayan, which is vested with exclusive and original jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan's decisions and final orders are in turn subject to review on certiorari exclusively by this Court.7
This is also the thrust of Soriano III when it enumerated examples of what matters may be considered as arising from, incidental to, or related to such cases viz., "disputes over the sale of the shares, the propriety of the issuance on ancillary writs or provisional remedies relative thereto, the sequestration thereof."
Now, as to the larger issue of whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto, the ponencia answers it in the affirmative in light of the statement in Aquino that:
. . . The attempt to remove special civil actions from the Sandiganbayan's exclusive jurisdiction is of no avail if they similarly involve the powers and functions of the Presidential Commission on Good Government. (Emphasis supplied).
This should not be construed as establishing a doctrine that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over all special civil actions covered by Rules 62 to 71, inclusive, of the Rules of Court. For one thing, it was a reply to the defense of private respondent Edward Marcelo in justification of his filing with the trial court of an action for certiorari and prohibition to restrain and enjoin the PCGG from sequestering his assets, properties, records, and documents. In the second place, the ratio decidendi in Aquino is actually the following statement of the Court:
Suffice it to say that the matters involved in these cases [G.R. Nos. 77816 and 78753] are orders of the PCGG issued in the exercise of its powers and functions for they involve the sequestration of the assets of private respondent Marcelo Fiberglass Corporation and Edward T. Marcelo, its president. The propriety of said sequestration and any incident arising from, incidental to or related to such sequestration is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
I am not, of course, unmindful of our decision in Africa vs. PCGG,8 where reference is made to the above pronouncement on special civil actions in Aquino. It must, nevertheless, be pointed out that what may have been referred to in Africa as special civil actions filed with the Sandiganbayan were actually complaints for injunction with damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order which, according to this Court, "are in the nature of special and original civil actions for injunction," with a footnote making express reference to Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and Article 26 of the Civil Code which contemplate and authorize original actions for injunction brought specifically to restrain or command the performance of an act. In short, the said actions are not the special civil actions under Rule 65. Generally speaking, injunction is a provisional remedy.
Does the Sandiganbayan have the jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus as well as over petitions for quo warranto?
It is settled that the authority to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law. In Garcia vs. De Jesus,9 this Court held:
In the Philippine setting, the authority to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus involves the exercise of original jurisdiction. Thus, such authority has always been expressly conferred, either by the Constitution or by law. As a matter of fact, the well-settled rule is that jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law (OROSA v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76828-32, 28 January 1991; Facalso v. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-22488, 26 October 1967, 21 SCRA 519). It is never derived by implication. Indeed, "(w)hile the power to issue the writ of certiorari is in some instance conferred on all courts by constitutional or statutory provisions, ordinarily, the particular courts which have such power are expressly designated" (J. Aquino's Concurring Opinion in Pimentel, supra, citing 14 C.J.S. 202; emphasis ours).
Thus, our Courts exercise the power to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus by virtue of express constitutional grant or legislative enactments. To enumerate:
(1) Section 5[1], Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution conferred upon this Court such jurisdiction;
(2) Section 9[1] of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, to the Court of Appeals (then Intermediate appellate Court);
(3) Section 21[1] of the said Act, to Regional Trial Courts;
(4) Section 5[1] of Republic Act No. 6734, on the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to the newly created Shari'ah Appellate Court; and
(5) Article 143[e], Chapter I, Title I, Book IV of Presidential Decree No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Law, to Shari'ah District Court.
With respect to petitions for quo warranto and habeas corpus, original jurisdiction over them is expressly conferred to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Regional Trial Courts by Section 9(1) and Section 21(1), respectively, of B.P. Blg. 129.10
Before the effectivity of R.A. No. 797511 on 6 May 1995, no law vested upon the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. The said law granted it such power but only "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction."12 It must be pointed out that this law was passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate on 16 February 1995 and 20 February 1995, respectively, or four months after this Court promulgated the decision in Garcia. It is to be presumed that Congress was aware of Garcia and its grant to the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over the aforementioned extraordinary writs in aid of its appellate jurisdiction merely confirms the Sandiganbayan's prior lack of such jurisdiction and reveals a legislative intent to grant it for the first time, but on a limited scale. Until now, there is no law granting the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction in quo warranto petitions.
I vote then to DISMISS the instant petition.
Narvasa, C.J., concurs.
Footnotes
1 It provides:
Sec. 5. In addition to the regulatory ad adjudicative functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission . . . it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:
x x x x x x x x x
(a) Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees, officers and managers of such corporations partnerships or associations.
2 237 SCRA 552 [1994].
3 159 SCRA 556 [1988].
4 163 SCRA 362 [1988]
5 Referring to PCGG vs. Pena, supra.
6 164 SCRA 226 [1988].
7 At 564-565.
8 And companion cases, 205 SCRA 38 [1992].
9 206 SCRA 779, 786-787 [1992]. See also, Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan, supra.
10 See Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan, supra.
11 Entitled, "An Act Strengthening the Functional and Structural Organization of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for the Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, as Amended."
12 Section 4.
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