G.R. No. 118597 July 14, 1995
JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET) and AUGUSTO L. SYJUCO, JR., respondents.
Separate Opinion
PUNO, J., concurring:
The ponencia of Mr. Justice Francisco catalogues the many violations of the right to substantive and procedural due process of the petitioner, a minority member of the House of Representatives known for his caustic criticisms of the ruling party. The Court cannot refuse to uphold the constitutional right of petitioner without being dismissed by our people as a cobweb court — good alone in catching the puny but not the powerful.
I wish to limit my opinion to the more enduring issue involving the jurisdiction of this Court to review decisions of our electoral tribunals. Let me fast forward the history of the Court's certiorari jurisdiction vis-a-vis The power of Electoral Tribunals to act as "sole judge" of contests involving their members. Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, legislative power was vested in the Philippine Assembly and the Assembly as a body was the judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of its members.1 Then came the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law. Its section 18 provides: ". . . The Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the election, returns, and qualifications of their elective members."2 Early in the case of Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar,3 this Court, stressing the use of the word "sole" before "judges" held that the grant of power to the Senate and the House of Representatives is "full, clear and complete."4
In 1935, a change was made on the body that will judge the election of members of Congress. Our Constitution of 1935 transferred "in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the Legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal."5 In the 1936 benchmark case of Angara vs. Electoral Commission, et al.,6 this Court observed: "With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court."7 Thus, section 11 of Article VI of our 1935 Constitution provides:
Sec. 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
In Angara, The Court already ruled in language too lucid to misunderstand that while ". . . The Electoral Commission may not be interfered with in the exercise of its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be challenged in appropriate cases over which courts may exercise jurisdiction."8
Angara was followed in 1938 by the case of Morrero vs. Bocar, et al.,9 where this Court specified the ground upon which it may review decisions of the Electoral Commission. In said case, Morrero protested the election and proclamation of Bocar as assemblyman of the third district of Samar. Allegedly, Bocar lacked the age qualification. The Electoral Commission heard the protest and dismissed it. Morrero filed with this Court an original action of prohibition against Bocar and the Auditor General. Initially, the Court had to determine the legal ground upon which it could pass upon the decision of the Commission. It ruled as follows:
x x x x x x x x x
The real object of the present petition is to have this court review the decision of the Electoral Commission and issue an order prohibiting the respondent Auditor General from passing in audit or authorizing in any way the disbursement of funds of the National Assembly as emoluments for the respondent, Juan L. Bocar, and declaring that the latter is without right to continue holding the office of member of the National Assembly from the 3rd district of Samar.
Section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that ". . . The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly." the language of this provision is clear. It vests in the Electoral Commission exclusive jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of a member of the National Assembly. The judgment rendered by the commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference, except, in any event, "upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process of law." (Barry vs. United States ex rel., Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597; 73 Law. Ed., 867. (Emphasis supplied)
Using this standard of arbitrariness, the Court noted that Morrero's protest was duly heard by the Electoral Commission and then dismissed his petition for prohibition.
Our constitutional odyssey took a new turn in 1973, when we adopted the 1973 Constitution which installed a modified form of parliamentary government and a unicameral legislature, the Batasang Pambansa. Its Article XII (c) section 2 (2) vested the COMELEC with the power to "be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of all members of the Batasang Pambansa . . ." in accord with this grant of power, COMELEC did act as sole judge of these contests and aggrieved parties challenged its decisions in this Court by invoking its certiorari jurisdiction, the traditional remedy against acts constitutive of grave abuse of discretion.10
Finally, in 1987, we adopted the present Constitution as an aftermath of the EDSA revolution. Among others, the 1987 Constitution restored the two houses of Congress and their Electoral Tribunals. Its section 17, Article VI provides:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
In 1988, this Court had the occasion to reiterate the established rule that it has the jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of the House Electoral Tribunal on a showing of grave abuse of discretion. We held in Lazatin vs. House Electoral Tribunal, et al., viz:11
x x x x x x x x x
Private respondent in HRET Case No. 46 prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin petitioner herein from discharging his functions and duties as the Representative of the first district of Pampanga during the pendency of the protest. However, on May 5, 1988, the HRET resolved to defer action on said prayer after finding that the grounds therefor did not appear to be indubitable. Private respondent moved for reconsideration, but this was denied by the HRET on May 30, 1988. Thus, private respondent now seeks to have the Court annul and set aside these two resolutions and to issue a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction on the premise that the grounds therefor are too evident to be doubted.
The relief prayed for in private respondent's counter/cross petitioner is not forthcoming.
The matter of whether or not to issue a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction during the pendency of a protest lies within the sound discretion of the HRET as sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives. Necessarily, the determination of whether or not there are indubitable grounds to support the prayer for the aforementioned ancillary remedies also lies within the HRET's sound judgment. Thus, in G.R. No. 80007, where the Court declined to take cognizance of the private respondent's electoral protest, this Court said:
The alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which had been previously ordered by the COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises, to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.
Moreover, private respondent's attempt to have the Court set aside the HRET's resolution to defer action on his prayer for provisional relief is undeniably premature, considering that the HRET had not yet taken any final action with regard to his prayer. Hence, there is actually nothing to review or annul and set aside. But then again, so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Courts stated earlier, the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete and "excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict or curtail it or even affect the same." (Lachica v. Yap, supra, at 143.) as early as 1938 in Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429, 431 [1938]), the Court declared that "(t)he judgment rendered by the (Electoral) Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference, except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process of law." Under the 1987 Constitution, the scope of the Court's authority is made explicit. The power granted to the Court includes the duty "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government" (Art. VIII, Sec. 1). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the HRET's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no grave abuse of discretion that would amount to lack of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed for has been clearly shown. (Emphasis supplied)
In 1991, we decided Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives,12 where the court additionally invoked its expanded jurisdiction under section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to justify the exercise of its jurisdiction over the House Electoral Tribunal. We held:
When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral Tribunals under our constitutional grants of power?
In the later case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1990]), the Supreme Court stated that the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference save only "in the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse." (at pp. 785-786)
In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429 [1938]), the Court ruled that the power of the Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due process." the Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent branches of the Government. It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for remedial action.
The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to speak, to review the decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to determine whether or not they have acted within the bounds of the Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution)
Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide. (See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989]) It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.
As constitutional creations invested with necessary power, the Electoral Tribunals, although not powers in the tripartite scheme of the government, are, in the exercise of their functions independent organs — independent of Congress and the Supreme Court. The power granted to HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. (Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936]).
In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful regard for the balance of powers, must permit this exclusive privilege of the Tribunals to remain where the Sovereign authority has placed it. (See Veloso v. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919]).
It has been argued that under Article VI, Section 17 of the present Constitution, the situation may exist as it exists today where there is an unhealthy one-sided political composition of the two Electoral Tribunals. There is nothing in the Constitution, however, that makes the HRET because of its composition any less independent from the Court or its constitutional functions any less exclusive. The degree of judicial intervention should not be made to depend on how many legislative members of the HRET belong to this party or that party. The test remains the same — manifest grave abuse of discretion.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied)
In sum, our constitutional history clearly demonstrates that it has been our consistent ruling that this Court has certiorari jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of Electoral Tribunals on a showing of grave abuse of discretion. We made this ruling although the Jones Law described the Senate and the House of Representatives as the "sole judges" of the election, returns, and qualifications of their elective members. It cannot be overstressed that the 1935 Constitution also provided that the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House shall be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.13 Similarly, the 1973 Constitution14 transferred to the COMELEC15 The power to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating the election, returns, and qualifications of all members of the Batasang Pambansa. We can not lose sight of the significance of the fact that the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court has not been altered in our 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
Prescinding from these premises, I cannot perceive how this Court's certiorari jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of the Electoral Tribunals of Congress can be doubted under the 1987 Constitutions. In the first place and as aforestated, our 1987 Constitution reiterated the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court on the basis of which it has consistently assumed jurisdiction over decisions of our Electoral Tribunals.16 In the second, place it even expanded17 The certiorari jurisdiction of this Court by defining judicial power as ". . . The duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." in the third place, it similarly reiterated the power of the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and of the House to act as the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members.18
The debates in the Constitutional Commission likewise demonstrate that it was far from the minds of the commissioners to change the rulings of this Court on its certiorari jurisdiction over the Electoral Tribunals. They show their unmistakable intent to retain our rulings in Angara19 and Vera vs. Avelino,20 thus:
MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you.
My questions will be very basic so we can go as fast as we can. In the case of the electoral tribunal, either of the House or of the Senate, is it correct to say that these tribunals are constitutional creations? I will distinguish these with the case of the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan which are created by mandate of the Constitution but they are not constitutional creations. Is that a good distinction?
MR. AZCUNA. That is an excellent statement.
MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, say that either the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the House Electoral Tribunal is a constitutional body?
MR. AZCUNA. It is, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. If it is a constitutional body, is it then subject to constitutional restrictions?
MR. AZCUNA. It would be subject to constitutional restrictions intended for that body.
MR. MAAMBONG. I see, But I want to find out if the ruling in the case of Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, will still be applicable to the present bodies we are creating since it ruled that the electoral tribunals are not separate departments of the government. Would that ruling still be valid?
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, they are not separate departments because the separate departments are the legislative, the executive and the judiciary; but they are constitutional bodies.
MR. MAAMBONG. Although they are not separate departments of government, I would like to know again if the ruling in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 53 Phil. 139, would still be applicable to the present bodies we are deciding on, when the Supreme Court said that these electoral tribunals are independent from Congress, devoid of partisan influence or consideration and, therefore, Congress has no power to regulate proceedings of these electoral tribunals.
MR. AZCUNA. I think that is correct. They are independent although they are not a separate branch of government.21
Any iota of doubt an the matter which may be induced by loose statements made by some Commissioners during the debates ought to disappear when the Constitutional Commission itself ultimately decided to reiterate in the Constitution the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court without excepting from it decisions and orders of the Electoral Tribunalss we have held in Gold Creek Mining Corp. vs. Rodriguez,22 The "fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves."
Quite clearly then, the power of this Court to review decisions of Electoral Tribunals is based on its certiorari jurisdiction which is now even beyond diminution by Congress.23 Again with due respect, I cannot see how the new expanded jurisdiction of this Court in the 1987 Constitution can be used to take away the certiorari jurisdiction of the Court over of the Electoral Tribunals fair reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission will reveal that the primary purpose of the commissioners in expanding the concept of judicial power of this Court by including the duty "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government" is to eliminate the defense of political questions which in the past deprived this Court of the jurisdiction to strike down abuses of power by government. I refer to the summary of the sponsorship speech of the new provision made by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, thus:24
SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF MR. CONCEPCION:
Mr. Concepcion prefaced his sponsorship with the observation that the Judiciary is the weakest of the three branches of government because, unlike the Executive and the Legislative, except for the power of reason, it has nothing to enforce its decisions.
Thereupon, explaining the salient features of the provisions of the Article on the Judiciary, Mr. Concepcion stated that a new provision is proposed to be incorporated in Section 1 defining "judicial power" to include the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
He stated that the provision is a product of past experiences when in cases brought against the government or its officials which had no legal defense at all the then Solicitor-General would set up the defense that said cases involved political questions over which the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction. He stated that such encroachment upon the rights of people continued during martial law.
Citing the case of Javellana vs. The Secretary of Justice, Mr. Concepcion recalled that when the 1971 Constitutional Convention submitted the 1973 Constitution to the President, who, in turn, was to call plebiscite for the ratification of said Constitution, a petition was filed before the Supreme Court questioning the President's authority to appropriate funds either for a plebiscite or a referendum, the power of appropriation being a legislative prerogative. But while the Supreme Court was still hearing the case, he disclosed that the Minister of Justice brought him a copy of the proclamation declaring the adoption of the Constitution through a referendum. He noted that even the Members of the Supreme Court were surprised to learn that a referendum was held, and felt that a referendum could not just substitute for a plebiscitend when other cases were filed to declare the proclamation of the President null and void, said cases were dismissed on the ground that the issue was a political question.
He also cited the case of representation in the Senate Electoral Tribunal wherein the Opposition was entitled to three seats but got only one because there was no other nomination aside from Senator Tañada so the majority party filled up the remaining two seats. The Supreme Court upheld the majority on the ground that it was a political issue.
In another case, he also recalled the issue on whether to grant parity rights to America in exchange of $1 million. The Members of the Minority then were suspended from their seats in Congress because of alleged fraud, threats and intimidation they committed in the election and with nobody to oppose them, the Majority got the required two-thirds vote. When asked whether the number of the Minority should be included in the determination of the two-thirds vote, the Supreme Court decided that it was a political question.
Mr. Concepcion opined that the obvious reason for the suspension was to enable the majority to get the votes necessary for the approval of the bill calling for a plebiscite.
He stated that when the Committee considered the provision that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be prescribed by law, the question as to the scope of judicial power and political question was pronounced.
On the functions of the courts, Mr. Concepcion stated that the Supreme Court and the rest of the lower courts are duty-bound to settle controversies involving conflicts of rights which are demandable and enforceable.ℒαwρhi৷ He stated that there are also rights guaranteed by law, which are, however, not enforceable, such as when a woman reneges from her duties as a wife. He stated that in such case, it would be inimical and odious to the dignity of the woman and to the nobility of human beings to use any form of compulsion. This, he stated, is the reason why the second paragraph of Section 1 speaks of the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or enforceable. He stressed that under this established rule, the courts cannot exercise their powers on hypothetical questions by applying general principles without considering the background of the situation.
Mr. Concepcion pointed out that in a presidential system, the Supreme Court has a more important function because of the separation of powers into three branches: the legislative, the executive and the judiciary. He stressed that each branch is supreme within its own sphere being independent from one another and it is this supremacy which enables the courts to determine whether a law is constitutional or unconstitutional.
By virtue thereof, Mr. Concepcion maintained that the functions of courts of justice is to determine the limit and pronounce judgment on whether or not certain officers of the government have acted within their territory. He stated that if the Judiciary feels that the department or branch concerned has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction amounting to an arbitrary abuse of power, the courts are empowered and duty-bound to render judgment on these matters. He stated that these constitute the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1 which means that the court cannot later on wash its hands by saying that it is a political questions.
x x x x x x x x x
It seems to me off-line to urge that the new definition of judicial power which was precisely crafted to expand The jurisdiction of this Court should now be interpreted to deflate its certiorari jurisdiction over Electoral Tribunals.
I vote to grant the petition.
Mendoza, J., concurs.
Footnotes
1 Francisco, How to Try Election Cases, 1973 ed., p. 606.
2 "This provision had its origin in the Constitution of the United States which, in turn had its inception in the early state constitutions." Veloso v. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919].
3 Op cit.
4 Id., at p. 888.
5 Angara v. Electoral Commission, et al., 63 Phil. 139, 1975.
6 Op cit.
7 Ibid., See also Aruego, the Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. I, 1949 ed., pp. 257-273.
8 Op cit., p. 160.
9 No. 45352, October 31, 1938, 66 Phil. 429.
10 See Aratuc vs. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251 [1979]; Guiao vs. COMELEC; 137 SCRA 356 [1985]; Padilla vs. COMELEC, 137 SCRA 424 [1985].
11 No. L-84297, December 8, 1988, 168 SCRA 391, 403.
12 G.R. Nos. 92191-22, July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 693, 700-701 with J. Padilla dissenting; See also Lerias vs. HRET, et al., 202 SCRA 808; Congressman Manuel Sanchez vs. HRET, et al., G.R. Nos. 112325-26, December 7, 1993.
13 Sec. 11, Article VI, op cit.
14 Sec. 5, Article X of the 1973 Constitution.
15 Article XII (c) (2) (2), 1973 Constitution.
16 Section 5, Article VIII.
17 Section 1, Article VIII.
18 Section 17, Article VI.
19 Op cit.
20 77 Phil. 192 [1946].
21 Proceedings of the Constitutional Commission, July 22, 1986, pp. 111-112.
22 66 Phil. 259, 264 [1938] cited in Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 2nd ed., p. 309.
23 Section 2 of Article VIII, 1987 Constitution. See also section 1, Article X of the 1973 Constitution as amended.
24 Proceedings of the Constitutional Commission, July 10, 1986, pp. 212-213.
Separate Opinion
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
In this petition for certiorari, The Court is once again urged to review, annul and set aside a decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), more particularly, its decision in HRET Case No. 92-019 entitled "Augusto L. Syjuco, Jr. versus Joker P. Arroyo."
I reiterate my dissenting opinion filed in the cases of Bondoc vs. Pineda (201 SCRA 792) and Lerias vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (202 SCRA 808), to the effect that decisions of the Electoral Tribunals, whether of the House of Representatives or Senate, may not be reviewed by this Court by reason of section 17, Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (Emphasis supplied)
I am not unaware of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, invoked by petitioner Arroyo, which, in part, provides:
x x x x x x x x x
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
At this early age of our Constitution, I submit that the two (2) aforequoted provisions in the fundamental law should be harmonized with the recognition that the clear intent of the Constitution is, as its language mandates, to make the Electoral Tribunals the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the two (2) houses of Congress.
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution is often invoked to elevate controversies to this Court where even no specific law or rule of procedure provides for appeal to the Court. More often than not, the party who seeks a ruling from this Court simply alleges that "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has been committed. In other words, litigants now tend to consider section 1, Article VIII as a "catch-all" provision through which any controversy or grievance, whether real or perceived, can be elevated to this Court for adjudication or resolution.
While the intent of the framers of the Constitution was clearly to give this Court the power to review even acts of the two (2) other branches of government in instances where there is grave abuse of discretion committed, it could not, however, have been the intent to put the Supreme Court above The two (2) other great departments of government, which are supposed to be its co-equals. The extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court (under Section 1, Article VIII) should always be construed against allowing the Court's encroachment on the legitimate powers and discretion of the executive and the legislative departments, in keeping with the time-honored and sacred principle of separation of powers.
In the specific case of the Electoral Tribunals, the same Constitution that vests, in Section 1, Article VIII, extraordinary jurisdiction in the Supreme Court effectively limits, in my view, the Court's power to review decisions of the Electoral Tribunals when it (the Constitution) provides that the Electoral Tribunals shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House and the Senate. In my dissent in Lerias, where the majority of the Court chose to review and reverse a ruling of the HRET, I quoted the following excerpts from the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission thus:
MR. MAAMBONG.
Thank you. Madam President. One more question on this point. Could we make a general statement that the jurisdiction of this electoral tribunal, either of the Senate or of the House, is exclusive and unlimited and, therefore, there will be no appeal to the Supreme Court?
MR. AZCUNA.
It is the sole judge, I think that further implies that there is no appeal elsewhere.
MR. MAAMBONG.
In other words, its judgment is final and not appealable.
MR. AZCUNA.
Insofar as the qualifications, returns and elections are concerned. (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing discussion, to my mind, clearly shows the unmistakable intent to make the Electoral Tribunals of the House of Representatives and the Senate the final arbiters insofar as qualifications, returns and election of the members of the Senate and House are concerned, in the same way that the Constitution makes the Supreme Court, sitting en banc, as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President and Vice-President (Section 4, Article VII).
There appears to be a clear and palpable design in the Constitution to make the decisions of the Electoral Tribunals (HRET, SET and PET) final and unappealable. for one, it would be absurd to allow an appeal from a decision of the PET to the Supreme Court whose members comprise the PET itself.
Additionally, it should be noted that the allegations and contentions of petitioner Arroyo are such that they would require a review of factual findings of the HRET which is beyond the Court's authority. It is trite to repeat that this Court is not a trier of facts. It is also for this same reason that I would not draw a line between ordinary appeals (on questions of law) and appeals by certiorari (under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court) from decisions of the Electoral Tribunals to this Court. For, whether the appeal from the Electoral Tribunals to this Court, is on a question of law or grave abuse of discretion, the appeal would in both instances be a review, nothing less, of a decision of the Electoral Tribunals which, by Constitutional proscription and mandate, are the sole judge of issues relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House and Senate.
In fine, the Electoral Tribunals (HRET, SET and PET) are the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of candidates for the House of Representatives, Senate and President or Vice-President respectively, as mandated by the Constitution. Consequently, the decisions of said Tribunals are final and unappealable, except in those very rare instances where the Court is duty-bound to rule on issues involving truly gross violations of the Constitution. In my dissenting opinion in Co v. Electoral Tribunal (199 SCRA 692), I posited that:
The present controversy, it will be observed, involves more than perceived irregularities in the conduct of a congressional election or a disputed appreciation of ballots, in which cases, it may be contended with great legal force and persuasion that the decision of the electoral tribunal should be final and conclusive, for it is by constitutional directive, made the sole judge of contests relating to such matters. The present controversy, however, involves no less than a determination of whether the qualifications for membership in the House of Representatives, as prescribed by the Constitution, have been met. Indeed, this court would be unforgivably remiss in the performance of its duties, as mandated by the Constitution, were it to allow a person, not a natural-born Filipino citizen, to continue to sit as a Member of the House of Representatives, solely because the House Electoral Tribunal has declared him to be so. In such a case, the tribunal would have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as to require the exercise by this Court of its power of judicial review. (Emphasis supplied)
I am not unaware of the possibility that the six (6) other members of the HRET — all members of the House of Representatives — who voted to oust petitioner Arroyo from his congressional seat, may have done so based on purely partisan considerations, even to the extent of disregarding the true mandate of the electorate. The world of politics is indeed not incapable of such sinister plots. But this Court is not the repository of all remedies and reliefs. Petitioner should find his vindication the next time he faces the sovereign electorate (as he did on 8 May 1995).
It is thus unfortunate, in my view, for petitioner Arroyo that the mechanism or system for review of controversies regarding election of members of Congress, provided for in the Constitution, precludes, to my mind, a resort to this Court from decisions of the Electoral Tribunals, save in extremely exceptional circumstances, such as those involving Philippine citizenship (as in the Co case) and perhaps disloyalty to the Republic, in which cases, this Court may review the final decisions of Electoral Tribunals.
Petitioner's allegations of bias and oppression due to political considerations are to me outside the authority and duty of this Court to review and decide. This Court is and should forever be detached from the
Machiavellian world of politics; a contrary stance would impair and destroy the independence and impartiality of this Court. Let the sovereign people in their wisdom review and decide on petitioner's grievances founded on his adversaries' alleged unbridled partisanship. (These words have already been fulfilled as of this writing).
For these reasons, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
Melo, J., concurs.
Separate Opinion
VITUG, J., separate opinion:
Section 17, Article VI, of the Constitution provides that the "Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective Members." (Emphasis supplied)
The majority of my colleagues would this time set aside a decision of the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives. I am afraid that such a pronouncement would be derogatory to the explicit mandate of the fundamental law. Like my colleague, Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, I also believe that the evident Constitutional intendment is to make the tribunals the final arbiters of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of the respective members of Congress.
I certainly cannot question much of what my other esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Ricardo J. Francisco, has said in his ponencia, nor can I dispute the description in Section 1, Article VIII, of the Constitution of judicial power (to include the determination of "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government"), but I would not go so far as to conclude that the Supreme Court can review and pass upon decisions duly promulgated by the Electoral Tribunals on a matter which, by itself no less than a constitutional fiat, is well within their exclusive domain. I must assume that it is only when the assailed action lies beyond their constitutionally vested authority (or, to use the language of the constitution, amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction) that the Court would not be powerless to step in and grant corresponding relief.
Accordingly, I must in this case respect the decision, dated 25 January 1995, of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal but I concur with my colleagues who find private respondent guilty of contempt and imposing thusly on him a fine.
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