A.M. No. RTJ-92-876 September 19, 1994
STATE PROSECUTORS, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Manila, respondent.
Separate Opinion
BELLOSILLO, J.:
In other jurisdictions, it is generally accepted that judges are not accountable by way of either civil suit or discipline for their official acts, even if clearly erroneous. Thus, open disregard of statutes, rules, and cases has been held to be protected official activity. Although a decision may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts concerning a judge's integrity or physiological condition, absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself is insufficient to establish a case against the judge. The rule is consistent with the concept of judicial independence. An honest judge, if he were denied the protection of the extrinsic evidence requirement, might become unduly cautious in his work, since he would be subject to discipline based merely upon the inferences to be drawn from an erroneous decision.1
In our jurisdiction, the law is no different. Thus, this Court has repeatedly held that -
. . . it is a fundamental rule of long standing that a judicial officer when required to exercise his judgment or discretion is not criminally liable for any error he commits provided he acts in good faith, that in the absence of malice or any wrongful conduct . . . the judge cannot be held administratively responsible . . . for no one, called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment, and to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders . . . would be nothing short of harassment or would make his position unbearable.2
A judge cannot be subjected to liability - civil, criminal, or administrative - for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith.3 He cannot be held to account or answer, criminally, civilly, or administratively, for an erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith.4 As a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous.5 It is a general principle of the highest importance to proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself. This concept of judicial immunity rests upon consideration of public policy, its purpose being to preserve the integrity and independence of the judiciary."6 This being settled doctrine, there is no choice but to apply it to the instant case.
The facts: Respondent Manuel T. Muro, a native of Masbate, Masbate, was appointed on 6 November 1986 as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 54, by then President Corazon C. Aquino. A product of the College of Law, Far Easter University, he graduated valedictorian in 1955, magna cum laude, and placed sixth in the Bar examinations. Now he is being charged with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct7 for dismissing motu proprio the eleven (11) cases filed by the Department of Justice Panel of Prosecutors against Ms. Imelda Romualdez Marcos for Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions after President Fidel V. Ramos had announced, which was published in newspaper reports, the lifting of all foreign exchange restrictions.
The majority opinion finds respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and imposes upon him the supreme penalty of dismissal from the service, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification from reemployment in the government service.
With all due respect to my esteemed colleagues, particularly to the ponente who is a recognized authority on various fields of law, I cannot help viewing the circumstances in a different light.
There is no dispute that the order issued by respondent judge has been reversed by the appellate court, which reversal has now become final for failure of the accused to appeal therefrom; hence, no damage has been caused except that complainants had to avail of a judicial remedy to correct the mistake. But, as adverted to, the overturned order alone does not necessarily make respondent judge liable administratively, much more civilly or criminally. To be answerable, the fault of the judge, if any, must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or done in bad faith.8 Plainly said, fault in this regard may exist only when the error appears to be deliberate or in bad faith.9
Thus, bad faith is imputed against respondent judge, first, for insisting that "there was no need to await publication of Circular No. 1353 for the reason that the public announcement made by the President in several newspapers of general circulation lifting foreign exchange controls is total, absolute, without qualification, and immediately effective,"10 and, second, for "dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a motion to quash having been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter."11
But, bad faith is the neglect or refusal to fulfill a duty, not prompted by an honest mistake, but by some interested or sinister motive.12 It implies breach of faith and willful failure to respond to plain and well understood obligation.13 It does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it means breach of a known duty through some motive or interest or ill will.14
Hence, I cannot ascribe bad faith to respondent judge for I see no insidious intentions on his part. If he insists that there really is no need to await the publication of Circular No. 1353, as he does here, it merely shows that he sincerely believes that there is indeed no necessity to await publication. Whether his belief is erroneous or not is thus irrelevant. Further, dismissing motu proprio the eleven criminal cases without affording the prosecution the opportunity to be heard on the matter, erroneous though it may be, is not inescapably indicative of bad faith. The immediate dismissal of the charges is a necessary consequence of the belief that since the restrictions were lifted, no law was then being violated. It is an elementary principle in procedural law and statutory construction that the repeal of a penal law deprives the court of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old law prior to its repeal. Thus, where the crime no longer exists, prosecution of the person charged under the old law cannot be had and the action should be dismissed.15
On the contrary, there is no reason why good faith should not be attributed to respondent judge. Good faith means that the motive that actuated the conduct in question was in fact what the actor ascribes to it, that is, that what he gives as his motive was in truth his motive.16 Hence, if he honestly believes that the bases for the criminal charges against accused have been eliminated and thus strikes down the information and consequently dismisses the charges, respondent judge cannot be criminally, civilly, or even administratively, held liable.
Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration are sufficient defenses protecting a judicial officer charged with ignorance of the law and promulgation of an unjust decision from being held accountable for errors of judgment. This, on the premise that no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the administration of justice can be infallible.17
Respondent judge could not have seriously jeopardized the rights of the prosecution, even if the accused invoked the defense of double jeopardy, since the remedy of certiorari is very much available. Precisely, as has been pointed out in the majority opinion, the defense of double jeopardy is unavailing when the prosecution is denied due process. This is in fact the office of the prevailing doctrine - to correct indiscretions of lower court judges - which does not necessarily make them personally liable. In fact, if respondent judge was indeed in bad faith, he should have given the prosecution an opportunity to be heard, and after a full-blown trial, acquitted the accused. Then, the defense of double jeopardy would have been proper and the accused would have gone scot-free. Thus, in Negado v. Judge Autajay,18 this Court affirmed the conclusions of the Investigating Justice of the Court of Appeals that "[w]hen a person seeks administrative sanction against a judge simply because he has committed an error in deciding the case against such person, when such error can be elevated to a higher court for review and correction, the action of such person can only be suspect."
To equate the failure of accused Marcos to comment on the petition before the appellate court, and consequently invoke the defense of double jeopardy, with the errancy of the assailed order,19 may be indulging in needless speculation. And to imply that the influence of the accused who is a prominent public figure brought about the dismissal order is simply not borne out by the records.
Besides, the challenged order of respondent judge can hardly be considered as grossly erroneous to merit his dismissal. For, while his reasoning may be erroneous, as it turned out when the reversal of his decision by the appellate court became final, it is not at all illogical as even the President of the Republic, with his learned legal advisers, after learning of the dismissal of the cases filed by his administration against the accused, was quoted as saying that Mrs. Marcos was an "accidental" beneficiary of the foreign exchange deregulation policy of his administration.20 Thus, President Fidel V. Ramos further said that "[t]he forex deregulation applies to everybody . . . . Now the cases filed by the government against Mrs. Marcos, numbering about 11 out of 90 have become moot and academic because of the new regulations that have come out of the Monetary Board, but that is to her advantage."21 Where the conclusions of the judge in his decision are not without logic or reason, it cannot be said that he is incompetent or grossly ignorant.22
It has been said that a judge, like Caesar's wife, must not only be pure but beyond suspicion.23 Ideally so.ℒαwρhi৷ But the cold fact is that every overturned decision provokes suspicion especially from the successful appellant who feels certain that the lower court indeed erred.
It is settled that "[a] judge should be mindful that his duty is the application of general law to a particular instance, that ours is a government of laws and not of men, and that he violates his duty as a minister of justice under such system if he seeks to do what he may personally consider substantial justice in a particular case and disregards the general law as he knows it to be binding on him. Such action may have detrimental consequences beyond the immediate controversy. He should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depositary of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law."24 As it has been said, he must interpret the books, and not unload his ideas.
But while a judge must decide in accordance with existing laws and established jurisprudence, his own personality, character, convictions, values, experiences and prejudices are only sublimely insignificant and unconsciously dispensable. In every decision he makes, he is no more and no less human, his own beliefs, perceptions and imperfections, as well as the laws he is bound to apply, all having profound influence on his eventual choice. Thus, Mr. Justice Cardozo of the Supreme Court of the United States once wrote of judges: "We may try to see things as objectively as we please. None the less, we can never see them with any eyes except our own."25 Hence, time and again, lower court judges, if not reversed by the Court of Appeals and this Court, have continued to set new trails in jurisprudence without exactly conforming with what has been settled. yet, whether reversed or merely unregarded, they do not receive displeasure from this Court; on the contrary, they remain to be effective dispensers of everyday justice.
In fine, there is no substantial proof, nay proof beyond reasonable doubt, that respondent judge issued the assailed order in bad faith or with conscious and deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice.
Mr. Justice Malcolm, speaking for this Court In re Horilleno,26 said that "[i]mpeachment proceedings before courts have been said, in other jurisdictions, to be in their nature highly penal in character and to be governed by the rules of law applicable to criminal cases." Mr. Chief Justice Fernando, then Associate Justice of this Court, reiterated the doctrine in Suerte v. Judge Ugbinar27 where he said that "[t]his is to defer the basic concept first announced in 1922 in this jurisdiction . . . in . . . In re Horilleno that proceedings of this character being in their nature highly penal, the charge must, therefore, be proved beyond reasonable doubt. To paraphrase the opinion further, there is no showing of the alleged incompetence and gross ignorance of the law by a preponderance of the evidence, much less beyond a reasonable doubt. Such an exacting standard has been adhered to by this Court in subsequent decisions."28
The law always imputes good faith to judicial action, and the burden is on the one challenging the same to prove want of it. Contraposed with the "exacting standard" required, complainant-prosecutors in the instant case failed to prove the absence of good faith on the part of the respondent judge. Consequently, the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed stands.
I find it difficult to compare the instant case with those cited in the majority opinion. In Padilla v. Judge Dizon,29 respondent not only allowed the accused to go scot-free, leaving the Commissioner of Customs without any relief against the accused, the former likewise ordered the release of US$3,000.00 to the accused. Thus, respondent judge was found guilty not only of gross ignorance of the law, but also of gross incompetence, and grave and serious misconduct affecting his integrity and efficiency, and was consequently dismissed from the service. And, failing to learn a lesson from his earlier administrative case, respondent judge, after his reinstatement, this time erroneously acquitted the defendants in four (4) different cases of illegal possession of firearms. Finally the Court said, "[w]hen it has been clearly demonstrated, as in this case, not only once but four (4) times, that the judge is either grossly incompetent or grossly ignorant of the penal laws . . . . he becomes unfit to discharge his judicial office."30 Unlike former Judge Dizon, this is the first time respondent Judge Muro is being administratively charged.
In Buenavista v. Judge Garcia,31 the Court found respondent guilty of "serious misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, and knowingly rendering an unjust order of judgment" for granting bail to an accused who was charged with statutory rape, for "improper and immoral intervention in brokering a compromise of the criminal cases" against the accused, and thereafter for granting the motion to dismiss the rape case on the basis of an Affidavit of Desistance allegedly executed by the victim who was then a minor. Certainly, the actuations of the respondent judge in the cited case are far worse than the complained indiscretions of herein respondent Judge.
In the proceedings instituted against Judge Jocson,32 he was charged with a litany of administrative cases, six (6) in all, i.e., from gross misconduct to gross ignorance of the law, to incompetence, to partiality. While not all the charges were sufficiently proved, respondent judge was found to be "ignorant of fairly elementary and quite familiar legal principles and administrative regulations, (with) . . . a marked penchant for applying unorthodox, even strange theories and concepts in the adjudication of controversies, (and) exhibits indifference to, and even disdain for due process and the rule of law, applies the law whimsically, capriciously and oppressively, and displays bias and partiality." The Court thus observed, "[t]he different acts of misconduct proven against respondent judge demonstrate his unfitness to remain in office and to continue to discharge the functions and duties of a judge, and warrant the imposition on him of the extreme sanction of dismissal from the service." There is nothing in the records of the instant case which shows that respondent Judge Muro, like former Judge Jocson, exhibits a pattern for applying pecant and unaccepted theories which breed manifest and irreversible injustice.
And, in Uy v. Judge Dizon-Capulong,33 respondent aggravated her ignorance of the law by her refusal to abide by the Decision of the appellate court and later of this Court, showing utter disrespect for and open defiance of higher courts. Consequently, she was not only found guilty of gross ignorance of the law, but also of grave and serious misconduct prejudicial to the interest of the judicial service.
Contrastingly, in a fairly recent case,34 this Court merely imposed a fine of P10,000.00 on respondent judge who entertained the petition for bail filed by the suspects prior to their actual arrest, notwithstanding unrefuted allegations that the accused were allegedly relatives of the congressman who "sponsored" the appointment of respondent to the Judiciary. In other case,35 this Court imposed a fine of P5,000.00 on respondent judge for ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority after he improperly issued a warrant of arrest and set the case for arraignment, in disregard of proper procedure. And, still in another,36 this Court in dismissing the complaint filed against respondent ruled that a judge cannot be condemned unless his error is so gross and patent as to produce an inference of ignorance and bad faith or that he knowingly rendered an unjust decision.
In sum, there is no extrinsic evidence which shows that the assailed order of respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro was inspired by a conscious and corrupt intent to do a disservice and commit an atrocity, and thus his dismissal is uncalled for. Where there is no clear indication from the records that the respondent's assailed decision was inspired by corrupt motives or a reprehensible purpose, and while there may be a misjudgment, but not a deliberate twisting of facts to justify the assailed order, dismissal of respondent judge from the service is not proper.37
Holding respondent judge liable for issuing the challenged order may curtail the independence of judges and send the wrong signals to them who are supposed to exercise their office without fear of reprisal, merely for expressing their uncorrupted views. Regretfully, litigants may suffer and gain eventual justice only after costly and long-drawn-out appeals from erroneous decisions, but these are necessary evils which must be endured to some extent lest judicial independence and the growth of the law be stifled.
Unlike collegial courts which afford their members the luxury of a deliberation, a trial judge in handing down his decisions must brave the loneliness of his solitude and independence.ℒαwρhi৷ And, while this Court may slightly bend backwards if only to avoid suspicion of partiality and cliquism to a brother in the profession, it must also step forward and take the lead to defend him against unsubstantiated tirades which put to shame and disgrace not only the magistrate on trial but the entire judicial system as well. As champion — at other times tormentor — of trial and appellate judges, this Court must be unrelenting in weeding the judiciary of unscrupulous judges, but it must also be quick in dismissing administrative complaints which serve no other purpose than to harass them. In dismissing judges from the service, the Court must be circumspect and deliberate, lest it penalizes them for exercising their independent judgments handed down in good faith.
Respondent judge has impressive academic and professional credentials which, experience shows, are no longer easy to recruit for the judicial service. Above all, he has served the judiciary with creditable distinction. It is unfeeling, if not unfair, to purge him without extrinsic evidence of bad faith and then shatter his hopes of ascending someday the judicial hierarchy which, after all, is the ultimate dream of every sacrificing trial judge.
I VOTE FOR THE EXONERATION OF RESPONDENT JUDGE.
Footnotes
1 Remedies for Judicial Misconduct and Disability: Removal and Discipline of Judges, 41 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 149, cited in Readings on Recruitment and Selection of Judges, Supreme Court (1987), p. 60.
2 Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Judge Villanueva, Adm. Case No. MTJ- 92-643, 27 November 1992, 216 SCRA 121, citing Mendoza v. Judge Villaluz, Adm. Case No. 1797-CCC, 27 August 1981, 106 SCRA 664, in turn citing Evangelista v. Judge Baez, Unnumbered CAR Case, 26 December 1974, 61 SCRA 475; Vda. de Zabala v. Judge Pamaran, Adm. Case No. 200-J, 10 June 1971, 39 SCRA 430; and Barroso v. Judge Arche, Adm. Case No. 216-CFI, 30 September 1975, 67 SCRA 161.
3 Ibid., citing Valdez v. Judge Valera, Adm. Matter No. 1628- CAR, and Olaya v. Judge Valera, Adm. Matter No. 1676-CAR, both promulgated 31 January 1978, 81 SCRA 246.
4 Morada v. Judge Tayao, A.M. No. RTJ-93-978, 7 February 1994, citing In re: Petition for the Dismissal from Service of Judge Baltazar R. Dizon, Adm. Case No. 3086, 31 May 1989, 173 SCRA 719.
5 Ibid., citing, among others, Revita v. Rimando, 98 SCRA 619, and Ubongon v. Mayo, 99 SCRA 30.
6 Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Judge Villanueva, see Note 2, citing Pabalan v. Guevarra, Adm. Matter No. 333-CJ, 24 November 1976, 74 SCRA 53, in turn citing Alzua v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308; Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335; and Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn 249, 72 NW 2d 364, 54 ALR 2d 316.
7 Rule 2.01 of the code of Judicial Conduct provides that "[a] judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary," Rule 3.01 that "[a] judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence," and Rule 3.02 that "[i]n every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion or fear of criticism."
8 Mayor Roa v. Judge Imbing, A.M. No. RTJ-93-935, 11 March 1994.
9 Arpon v. Judge de la Paz, Adm. Matter No. 41-MJ, 28 May 1975, 64 SCRA 156.
10 Majority Opinion, p. 17.
11 Ibid.
12 State v. Griffin, 100 S.C. 331, 84 S.E. 876, cited in Black's Law Dictionary, 4th. Ed., 1951, p. 176.
13 5 Words and Phrases 14, citing Nelson v. Board of Trade, 58 Ill. App. 399.
14 Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw, No. L-18805, 14 August 1967, 20 SCRA 1007.
15 PAFLU v. CFI, No. L-49580, 17 January 1983, 120 SCRA 1; People v. Almuete, No. L-26551, 27 February 1976, 69 SCRA 410; People v. Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225 (1935).
16 18A Words and Phrases 85, citing N.L.R.B. v. James Thompson & Co., C.A.2, 208 F.2d 743, 745.
17 Pilipinas Bank v. Justice Tirona-Liwag, Adm. Matter No. CA-90-11, 18 October 1990, 190 SCRA 834, citing Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Judge Capistrano, Adm. Matter No. R-66- RTJ, 18 March 1988, 159 SCRA 47.
18 Adm. Matter No. R-710-RTJ, 21 May 1993, 222 SCRA 295.
19 See Majority Opinion, p. 20.
20 The Chronicle, issue of 18 August 1992.
21 Ibid.
22 Lampauog v. Judge Villarojo, Adm. Matter No. 381-MJ, 28 January 1974, 55 SCRA 304.
23 See Majority Opinion, p. 15, citing Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1988, 4th ed., pp. 454-455.
24 Canon 18, Canons of Judicial Ethics, cited in the Majority Opinion, p. 16.
25 Cardozo, The Nature of Judicial Process (1921), p. 12.
26 43 Phil. 212 (1922).
27 Adm. Matter No. 88-MJ, 25 January 1977, 75 SCRA 69.
28 Citing Enriquez v. Judge Araula, Adm. Case No. 270-J, 18 December 1973, 54 SCRA 232; Tombo v. Med+ina, Adm. Case No. 929, 17 January 1974, 55 SCRA 13; Lampauog v. Judge Villarojo, see Note 22; Bartolome v. Judge De Borja, Adm. Matter Nos. 1096-CFI and 1114-CFI, 31 May 1976, 71 SCRA 153; De Guzman v. Judge De Leon, Adm. Case No. 1328-MJ, 30 July 1976, 72 SCRA 177; Meimban v. Judge Balite, Adm. Matter No. 131-MJ, 21 August 1976, 72 SCRA 380; Tolentino v. Judge Tiong, Adm. Matter No. 535-MJ, 21 August 1976, 72 SCRA 385; and Amosco v. Judge Magro, Adm. Matter 439-MJ, 30 September 1976, 73 SCRA 107.
29 Adm. Case No. 3086, 23 February 1988, 158 SCRA 127, cited in the Majority Opinion, p. 24.
30 Zuño v. Judge Dizon, A.M. No. RTJ-91-752, 23 June 1993, 223 SCRA 584, cited in the Majority Opinion, p. 26.
31 A.M. No. RTJ-88-246, 19 July 1990, 187 SCRA 598, cited in the Majority Opinion, p. 25.
32 Garganera v. Judge Jocson, A.M. No. RTJ-88-227, Mejorada v. Judge Jocson, A.M. No. RTJ-90-624, Velez v. Judge Jocson, A.M. No. RTJ-88-270, Judge Jocson v. Barredo, A.M. No. P-87-124, Jalandoon v. Judge Jocson, A.M. No. RTJ-88-269, Angodong, vs. Judge Jocson, A.M. No. RTJ-88-267, and Tronco v. Judge Jocson, A.M. No. RTJ-88-279, all promulgated 1 September 1992, 213 SCRA 149, cited in the Majority Opinion, p. 25.
33 Adm. Matter No. RTJ-91-766, 7 April 1993, 221 SCRA 87, cited in the Majority Opinion, p. 25.
34 Dinapol v. Judge Baldado, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-92-898, 5 August 1993, 225 SCRA 110.
35 Alisangco v. Judge Tabiliran, Jr., Adm. Matter No. MTJ-91- 554, 30 June 1993, 224 SCRA 1.
36 Negado v. Judge Autajay, see Note 18.
37 See In Re: Petition for the Dismissal from Service and/or Disbarment of Judge Baltazar R. Dizon, Adm. Case No. 3086, 31 May 1989, 173 SCRA 719.
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