G.R. No. 104961 October 7, 1994
CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO B. ANIAG, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SPECIAL TASK FORCE, respondents.
Ronolfo S. Pasamba for petitioner.
Separate Opinion
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I concur, and reiterate my objections to checkpoints in general as originally expressed in my dissent in the case of Valmonte v. De Villa, 178 SCRA 217, where I said:
The sweeping statements in the majority opinion are as dangerous as the checkpoints it would sustain and fraught with serious threats to individual liberty. The bland declaration that individual rights must yield to the demands of national security ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit the authority of the State even if asserted on the ground of national security. What is worse is that the searches and seizures are peremptorily pronounced to be reasonable even without proof of probable cause and much less the required warrant. The improbable excuse is that they are aimed at "establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region." For these purposes, every individual may be stopped and searched at random and at any time simply because he excites the suspicion, caprice, hostility or malice of the officers manning the checkpoints, on pain of arrest or worse, even being shot to death, if he resists.
x x x x x x x x x
Unless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark era of the truncheon and the barbed wire, with the Court itself a captive of its own complaisance and sitting at the death-bed of liberty.
I hope the colleagues I have behind on my retirement will reconsider the stand of the Court on checkpoints and finally dismantle them altogether as an affront to individual liberty.
Separate Opinion
VITUG, J., concurring:
The ultimate hypothesis of sound governance is not might but the willingness of the governed to accept and subordinate themselves to authority.
When our people gave their consent to the fundamental law of the land, they did not renounce but, to the contrary, reserved for themselves certain rights that they held sacred and inviolable.
One such right is the privilege to be so secured "in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose." Their sole conceded proviso to this rule is when a search warrant or a warrant of arrest is lawfully issued. There are, to be sure, known exceptions, predicated on necessity and justified by good reasons, when warrantless searches and seizures are allowed. It is in this context that I appreciate the ratio decidendi of the Court in Valmonte vs. De Villa (178 SCRA 211). In giving its imprimatur to the installation of checkpoints, the Court clearly has based its decision on the existence at the time of what has been so described as an "abnormal" situation that then prevailed. Evidently, the Court did not have the intention to have its ruling continue to apply to less aberrant circumstances than previously obtaining.
The question has been asked: Between the security of the State and its due preservation, on the one hand, and the constitutionally-guaranteed right of an individual, on the other hand, which should be held to prevail? There is no choice to my mind not for any other reason than because there is, in the first place, utterly no need to make a choice. The two are not incompatible; neither are they necessarily opposed to each other. Both can be preserved; indeed, the vitality of one is the strength of the other.
There should be ways to curb the ills of society so severe as they might seem. A disregard of constitutional mandates or an abuse on the citizenry, I am most certain, is not the answer.ℒαwρhi৷ It might pay to listen to the words of Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz when he said, "(u)nless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark era of the truncheon and the barbed wire, with the Court itself a captive of its own complaisance and sitting at the death-bed of liberty."
It is a welcome note that in the subsequent case of Bagalihog vs. Fernandez (198 SCRA 614), the Court has expressed:
This guaranty is one of the greatest of individual liberties and was already recognized even during the days of the absolute monarchies, when the king could do no wrong. On this right, Cooley wrote: "Awe surrounded and majesty clothed the King, but the humblest subject might shut the door of his cottage against him and defend from intrusion that privacy which was as sacred as the kingly prerogatives.
The provision protects not only those who appear to be innocent but also those who appear to be guilty but are nevertheless to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. The mere fact that in the private respondent's view the crime involved is "heinous" and the victim was "a man of consequence" did not authorize disregard of the constitutional guaranty. Neither did "superior orders" condone the omission for they could not in any case be superior to the Constitution.
While it gives me great comfort to concur with my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, in his ponencia, I would express, nonetheless, the humble view that even on the above constitutional aspect, the petition could rightly be granted.
Separate Opinion
REGALADO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I join Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. in his opinion wherein he concurs with the majority ruling that with respect to petitioner Aniag, Resolution No. 92-0829 of respondent commission should be set aside, not because of an unconstitutional warrantless search but by reason of the fact that he was not actually charged as a respondent in the preliminary investigation of the case.
With regard to petitioner's driver, Ernesto Arellano, although he was not impleaded as a co-petitioner in the present recourse, the nullification of said Resolution No. 92-0829 necessarily applies to him and redounds to his benefit. To the extent, therefore, that the majority opinion thereby reinstate the resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor dismissing the charge against Arellano, I concur in that result.
However, even as a simple matter of consistency but more in point of law, I dissent from the rationale submitted therefor, that is, that Arellano was the victim of an unlawful search without a warrant. The pertinent facts stated by the majority readily yield the conclusion that there was consent on the part of Arellano to the search of the car then under his control, particularly of its baggage compartment where the firearms were discovered. As held in People vs. Excela, et al.,1 consent to a search may be given expressly or impliedly, and as early as People vs. Malasugui,2 the settled rule is that a search may be validly conducted without a warrant if the person searched consented thereto.
I would prefer to sustain the exoneration of Ernesto Arellano on the justifying circumstance that he was acting in obedience to what he innocently believed to be a lawful order of a superior, that is, the instructions of his employer, petitioner Aniag, who was himself acting upon and in compliance with Resolution No. 2323 of respondent commission which was implemented by the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives.
The said justifying circumstance provided in paragraph 6, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code can be given suppletory effect to special laws like B.P. Blg. 881 and R.A. No. 7166 by force of Article 10 of the same Code. There is no prohibition therefor in the cited provisions of B.P. Blg. 881 in relation to R.A. No. 7166, nor is there any legal impossibility for such suppletory application whether by express provision or by necessary implication. And even if the order of petitioner Aniag may be considered as illegal, Arellano acted thereon in good faith3 and under a mistake of fact as to its legality, hence his exculpation is ineludibly dictated. Ignorantia facti excusat.
It being evident from the very records and the factual findings adopted in the majority opinion that no error was committed by the Office of the City Prosecutor in dismissing the charge against Ernesto Arellano for lack of sufficient grounds to engender a well founded belief that a crime had been committed and that he was probably guilty thereof,4 respondent commission acted with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at a contrary conclusion and directing his prosecution in its Resolution No. 92-0829.
Footnotes
1 G.R. No. 76005 April 23, 1993, 221 SCRA 494.
2 63 Phil. 221 (1936).
3 People vs. Beronilla, et al., 96 Phil. 566 (1955).
4 Sec. 1, Rule 112, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended.
Separate Opinion
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:
I regret that I can concur only in the result, viz., the granting of the petition.
Considering the specific issues raised by the petitioner which, as stated in the exordium of the majority opinion, are whether (a) COMELEC Resolution No. 2327, dated 26 December 1991, is unconstitutional, and (b) COMELEC Resolutions No. 92-0829, dated 6 April 1992, and No. 92-0999, dated 23 April 1992, have legal and factual bases, I am unable to agree with the specific disposition declaring (a) illegal the warrantless search conducted by the Philippine National Police (PNP) on 13 January 1992, (b) inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner the firearms seized during such warrantless search, and (c) unconstitutional COMELEC Resolution No. 92-0829.
1. Having declined to rule on the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327 because "this petition may be resolved without passing upon this particular issue" (first paragraph, page 10, Ponencia), this Court may no longer inquire into the constitutionality of the spot checkpoints authorized to be established thereunder. And whether the warrantless search conducted by the PNP at the checkpoint was valid, it being assumed that it would have been, provided there existed a probable cause therefor, is a question of fact whose presentation in this case is either procedurally premature, or one which this Court cannot, with definiteness, resolve considering the obvious paucity of the facts before it. The most the majority opinion can state is that "[t]here was no evidence to show that the police were impelled to do so because of a confidential report leading them to reasonably believe that certain motorists matching the description furnished by their informant were engaged in gunrunning, transporting firearms or in organizing special strike forces. Nor, as adverted to earlier, was there any indication from the package or behavior of Arellano that could have triggered the suspicion of the policemen." Nothing more could be expected at this stage since the records of the proceedings conducted by the Office of the City Prosecutor and the COMELEC are not before this Court. A declaration of invalidity of the warrantless search and of the inadmissibility in evidence of the firearms seized would thus be premature.
It may additionally be relevant to state that the search was not in connection with the crime of illegal possession of firearms, which would have been factually and legally baseless since the firearms involved were licensed and were duly issued to the petitioner by the House of Representatives, but for the violation of the gun ban which was validly decreed by the COMELEC pursuant to its constitutional power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections, plebiscite, initiative, referendum; and recall (Section 2(1), Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution), its statutory authority to have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly, and honest elections (Section 52, Omnibus Election Code), and its statutory authority to promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other laws which the COMELEC is required to enforce and administer (Section 52(c), Id.; Section 35, R.A. No. 7166), in relation to paragraph (q), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code which prohibits the carrying of firearms outside the residence or place of business during the election period unless authorized in writing by the COMELEC, and Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166 which prohibits any person from bearing, carrying, or transporting firearms or other deadly weapons in public places, including any building, street, park, private vehicle, or public conveyance, even if such person is licensed to possess or carry the same during the election period, unless authorized in writing by the COMELEC.
In this case, the petitioner himself admits that on 10 January 1992 he was requested by the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives to return the two firearms issued to him, and that on 13 January 1992, he instructed his driver, Ernesto Arellano, to pick up the firearms from his (petitioner's) house at Valle Verde and to return them to the House of Representatives. That day was already within the election period, which commenced the day earlier pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2314 (In The Matter of Fixing The Schedule of Activities in Connection With the Elections of National and Local Officials on May 11, 1992), promulgated on 20 November 1991. Considering then that the offense for which he was to be charged was for the violation of paragraph (q), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166, which, in view of his aforesaid admissions, renders unnecessary the offer in evidence of the seized firearms, I fail to grasp the rationale of a ruling on the admissibility in evidence of the firearms.
2. COMELEC Resolution No. 92-0829, dated 6 April 1992, should not be set aside on the ground of unconstitutionality. It simply directed the filing of an information against the petitioner and Arellano for the violation of paragraph (q), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166, and directed the petitioner to show cause why he should not be disqualified from running for an elective position, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2327, in relation to Sections 32, 33, and 35 of R.A. No. 7166 and paragraph (c), Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code. Insofar as Arellano is concerned, he is not a petitioner in this case. Moreover, as to him, the resolution was nothing more than a disapproval of the recommendation of the Office of the City Prosecutor to dismiss the complaint against him. As against the petitioner, there was no denial of due process because the petitioner was later heard on his motion for reconsideration. Moreover, the right of an accused to a preliminary investigation is not a creation of the Constitution; its origin is statutory (Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinglupa, Inc. vs. Dominguez, 205 SCRA 92 [1992]).
The fatal flaw of Resolution No. 92-0829 lies in its directive to file the information against the petitioner despite the fact that he was never formally charged before the Office of the City Prosecutor. There was only an "'unofficial' charge imputed against" him. The COMELEC then acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want or excess of jurisdiction.
I vote then to grant the petition, but solely on the ground that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in directing the filing of an information against the petitioner for the violation of paragraph (q), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166.
Melo, J., concurs.
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