G.R. No. 104879 May 6, 1994
ELIZALDE MALALOAN and MARLON LUAREZ, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ANTONIO J. FINEZA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 131, Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City; HON. TIRSO D.C. VELASCO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 88, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Alexander A. Padilla for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for the People of the Philippines.
Separate Opinion
DAVIDE, JR., J.,
The majority opinion enunciates these two principles:
1. Before the criminal action is filed with the appropriate court, a court which has no territorial jurisdiction over the crime may validly entertain an application for and thereafter issue a search warrant in connection with the commission of such crime; and
2. After the filing of the criminal action, the court with which it was filed has primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case; however, under extreme and compelling circumstances, another court may issue a search warrant in connection with said case.
I am unable to agree with the first and with the exception to the second.
A.. By the very definition of a search warrant which the majority opinion adopts, it is clear to me that only a court having territorial jurisdiction over the crime committed can validly entertain an application for and issue a search warrant in connection with said crime. The majority opinion says:
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process. A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court. A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity.
In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and provisions on search warrants, such warrant is definitively considered merely as a process generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. We emphasize this fact for purposes of both issues as formulated in this opinion, with the catalogue of authorities herein.
Invariably, a judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law; also the means of accomplishing an end, including judicial proceedings, or all writs, warrants, summonses, and orders of courts of justice or judicial officers. It is likewise held to include a writ, summons, or order in a judicial proceeding to acquire jurisdiction of a person or his property, to expedite the cause or enforce judgment, or a writ, warrant, mandate, or other processes issuing from a court of justice.
2. It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely a judicial process designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. . . ." (citations omitted)
What are to be underscored in the foregoing definition or disquisition on the concept of a search warrant are the following: (a) it is "in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery," (b) it is generally issued by a court "in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction," and (c) it is "designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case . . . or in anticipation thereof." All of these are premised on the assumption that the court entertaining the application for and issuing the search warrant has jurisdiction over the main case, meaning, of course, the crime in connection with whose commission the warrant was issued.
The writ of discovery is the discovery in federal criminal cases governed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 16 thereof provides:
Upon motion of the defendant at any time after the filing of the indictment or information, the court may order the attorney for the government to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph designated books, papers, documents or tangible objects, obtained from or belonging to the defendant or obtained from others by seizure or process, upon a showing that the items sought may be material to the presentation of his defense and that the request is reasonable. (4 Federal Practice and Procedure with Forms, Rules Edition, 1951 ed., 124).
Note that the required motion is filed after the filing of the indictment or information.
"Ancillary," in reference to jurisdiction can only mean in aid of or incidental to an original jurisdiction. Ancillary jurisdiction is defined as follows:
Ancillary jurisdiction. Power of court to adjudicate and determine matters incidental to the exercise of its primary jurisdiction of an action.
Under "ancillary jurisdiction doctrine" federal district court acquires jurisdiction of case or controversy as an entirety and may, as incident to disposition of matter properly before it, possess jurisdiction to decide other matters raised by case, though district court could not have taken cognizance of them if they had been independently presented. . . ."Ancillary jurisdiction" of federal court generally involves either proceedings which are concerned with pleadings, processes, records or judgments of court in principal case or proceedings which affect property already in court's custody. . . . (Black's Law Dictionary 79 [5th ed., 1979]).
"Incident in the main case" also presupposes a main case which, perforce, must be within the court's jurisdiction. Incident is defined thus:
Incident. Used both substantively and adjectively of a thing which, either usually or naturally and inseparably, depends upon, appertains to, or follows another that is more worthy.ℒαwρhi৷ Used as a noun, it denotes anything which inseparably belongs to, or is connected with, or inherent in, another thing, called the "principal". Also, less strictly, it denotes anything which is usually connected with another, or connected for some purposes, though not inseparably. . . . (Id., at 686)
Reliance upon Section 3 of the Interim or Transitional Rules and Guidelines Implementing B.P. Blg. 129 which reads:
3. Writs and processes. — (a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction issued by a regional trial court may be enforced in any part of the region.
(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court or municipal circuit trial court may be served anywhere in the Philippines, and, in the last three cases, without a certification by the judge of the regional trial court.
is misplaced for the reason that said section refers to writs or processes issued by a court in a case pending before it and not to a case yet to be filed with it or pending in another court.
The absence of any express statutory provision prohibiting a court from issuing a search warrant in connection with a crime committed outside its territorial jurisdiction should not be construed as a grant of blanket authority to any court of justice in the country to issue a search warrant in connection with a crime committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. The majority view suggests or implies that a municipal trial court in Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, or Batanes can validly entertain an application for a search warrant and issue one in connection with a crime committed in Manila. Elsewise stated, all courts in the Philippines, including the municipal trial courts, can validly issue a search warrant in connection with a crime committed anywhere in the Philippines. Simply put, all courts of justice in the Philippines have, for purposes of issuing a search warrant, jurisdiction over the entire archipelago.
I cannot subscribe to this view since, in the first place, a search warrant is but an incident to a main case and involves the exercise of an ancillary jurisdiction therefore, the authority to issue it must necessarily be co-extensive with the court's territorial jurisdiction. To hold otherwise would be to add an exception to the statutory provisions defining the territorial jurisdiction of the various courts of the country, which would amount to judicial legislation. The territorial jurisdiction of the courts is determined by law, and a reading of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 discloses that the territorial jurisdiction of regional trial courts, metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts are confined to specific territories. In the second place, the majority view may legitimize abuses that would result in the violation the civil rights of an accused or the infliction upon him of undue and unwarranted burdens and inconvenience as when, for instance, an accused who is a resident of Basco, Batanes, has to file a motion to quash a search warrant issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in connection with an offense he allegedly committed in Itbayat, Batanes.
Nor can Stonehill vs. Diokno (20 SCRA 383) be an authoritative confirmation of the unlimited or unrestricted power of any court to issue search warrants in connection with crimes committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. While it may be true that the forty-two search warrants involved therein were issued by several Judges — specifically Judges (a) Amado Roan of the City Court of Manila, (b) Roman Cansino of the City Court of Manila, (c) Hermogenes Caluag of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch), (d) Eulogio Mencias of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig Branch), and (e) Damian Jimenez of the City Court of Quezon City (Footnote 2, page 387) — there is no definite showing that the forty-two search warrants were for the searches and seizures of properties outside the territorial jurisdiction of their respective courts. The warrants were issued against the petitioners and corporations of which they were officers and some of the corporations enumerated in Footnote 7 have addresses in Manila and Makati. (pp. 388-89). Rizal (which includes Makati) and Quezon City both belonged to the Seventh Judicial District. That nobody challenged on jurisdictional ground the issuance of these search warrants is no argument in favor of the unlimited power of a court to issue search warrants.
B. I have serious misgivings on the exception to the second principle where another court may, because of extreme and compelling circumstances, issue a search warrant in connection with a criminal case pending in an appropriate court. To illustrate this exception, the Municipal Trial Court of Argao, Cebu, may validly issue a warrant for the search of a house in Davao City and the seizure of any property therein that may have been used in committing an offense in Manila already the subject of an information filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. I submit that the exception violates the settled principle that even in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the first court which acquires jurisdiction over the case acquires it to the exclusion of the other. (People vs. Fernando, 23 SCRA 867, 870 [1968]). This being so, it is with more reason that a court which does not have concurrent jurisdiction with the first which had taken cognizance of the case does not also have the authority to issue writs or processes, including search warrants, in connection with the pending case. Moreover, since the issuance of a search warrant is an incident to a main case or is an exercise of the ancillary jurisdiction of a court, the court where the main case is filed has exclusive jurisdiction over all incidents thereto and in the issuance of all writs and processes in connection therewith. Furthermore, instead of serving the ends of justice, the exception may provide room for unwarranted abuse of the judicial process, wreak judicial havoc and procedural complexities which effective law enforcement apparently cannot justify. I cannot conceive of any extreme and compelling circumstance which the court that first acquired jurisdiction over the case cannot adequately meet within its broad powers and authority.
In the light of the foregoing, and after re-examining my original view in this case, I respectfully submit that:
1. Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed may validly entertain an application for and issue a search warrant in connection with said crime. However, in the National Capital Judicial Region, Administrative Circulars No. 13 of 1 October 1985, and No. 19 of 4 August 1987 must be observed.
2. After the criminal complaint or information is filed with the appropriate court, search warrants in connection with the crime charged may only be issued by said court.
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