Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio
EN BANC
G.R. No. 103276 April 12, 1994
DOMINGO DE GUZMAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division) and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
V.E. Del Rosario & Associates and Eduardo R. Robles for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the People of the Philippines.
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner seeks reversal of his conviction for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. He claims that as his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, he should be accorded the constitutional presumption of innocence. The petitioner presumes too much.
At the time of the incident in question, Domingo de Guzman was the Officer-in-Charge and Assistant Director of the Bureau of Plant Industry. 1 As such, he received the sum of P200,000.00 on December 17, 1985, with authority to disburse it in connection with certain official training programs of the Department of Agriculture. 2 In a disbursement voucher dated February 5, 1986, 3
he claimed credit for the amount but when required later to produce the supporting receipts failed or refused to do so. This led to the filing against him of the corresponding information, 4
to which he pleaded not guilty.
At the trial, the People presented one witness 5 and several exhibits purporting to show that as a public officer the accused had received the said amount but failed to show that it had been lawfully disbursed for the training programs allegedly held at Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur, and Baguio City. 6 After the prosecution had rested, the defense sought but did not obtain leave to file a demurrer to evidence but filed it just the same.7 Under Rule 119, Section 15, of the Rules of Court, this would result in the forfeiture of the right of the defense to submit its own evidence if the demurrer was denied. Ultimately, on November 19, 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Domingo de Guzman y Mateo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH as the minimum, to NINE (9) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as the maximum; to further suffer perpetual disqualification from public office; to indemnify the Government of the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of P200,000.00, and to pay the costs of this action. 8
In the present petition, the respondent court is faulted for basing its conviction on inconclusive evidence and giving credence to the lone government witness as against the documentary evidence of the lawful disbursement of the amount in question. It is argued that in criminal prosecutions every doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused, but this rule was disregarded by the Sandiganbayan.
We see no such doubts in the case before us.
The petitioner himself has admitted having received the sum of P200,000.00 in his capacity as OIC and Assistant Director of the Bureau of Plant Industry. He claims this was spent for training programs in Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur and Baguio City, but there is no positive evidence whatsoever that such training programs were really conducted. He has not presented a single receipt to support his alleged disbursements and show that no undue injury has been caused to the Government. Clearly, all this has resulted in violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, reading as follows:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.. . ..
In her testimony for the prosecution, Josephine Angeles declared that as training officer and chief of the training unit of the Bureau of Plants and Industry from 1985 to 1986, she knew of no training programs conducted by the BPI at Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur, and Baguio City during that period. Such training programs would have been officially brought to her attention if they had actually been held. 9
The petitioner argues, however, that on cross-examination she admitted that there might have been training programs held at that time that might not have been officially communicated to her. It is now suggested that the training programs at Ipil, Zamboanga de Sur, and Baguio City might well have been among such programs.
In the first place, this negative statement cannot prevail against her categorical and positive assertion that as chief of the training program she was supposed to know, and did know, about all such training programs funded by the BPI. In the second place, she said that the training programs that could have been held without her knowledge were those funded not by the BPI but by foreign agencies. In the third place, the mere conjecture that the training programs could have been held is no proof that they were actually held.
The petitioner also places much value on Exhibit E, 10 the petitioner's disbursement voucher carrying the certification of the Chief Accountant that inter alia it "is supported by documents appearing legal and proper." That is a bare statement, however, and there is no explanation of what these documents are, nor are the supporting receipts attached or annexed to the said voucher. As the Sandiganbayan correctly concluded:
. . . When accused claimed credit for the cash advance of P200,000.00 in the Disbursement Voucher, dated February 5, 1986 (Exhibit E), for the expenses incurred during Three Regional Trainings in Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur and Baguio City without any supporting receipts in liquidation thereof, as can be seen from said exhibit itself, and without submitting testimonial or documentary evidence to justify either the cash advance or the alleged expenses, then it stands clearly and positively established that he had misappropriated said amount for his personal use or benefit. The attempt to liquidate the cash advance in question appears to be amateurish and ill-conceived and which sustains anew the prosecution's charge that accused had acted with manifest partiality and evident bad faith in the discharge of his official functions, thus causing undue injury to the government. (Emphasis supplied)
The evidence against the petitioner is in our view sufficient to convict. The government had established that he had received the money and had failed to account for it, thus overcoming the presumption of innocence in his favor. Instead of refuting that evidence, he smugly belittled it as if it were too inconsequential to disprove. Significantly, he sought leave to file a demurrer to evidence, which he filed just the same even if leave was denied by the respondent court.
The petitioner insists that it is not for him to show that the supporting receipts exist; on the contrary, it is for the prosecution to prove that they do not exist. This is, indeed, a strange manner of accounting. As for the possibility that the training programs "might have really occurred," to use Angeles' words, this is a mere speculation that cannot explain the petitioner's failure to account for the P200,000.00 entrusted to him.
The situation before us is starkly simple. The petitioner received P200,000.00 from the government to defray the expenses of training programs. He has not liquidated it short of saying it was spent for some amorphous training programs not on record. Who should prove those training programs? The petitioner, of course. And he should do so with concrete facts and figures supported by receipts, not with the mere undocumented surmise that the training programs could have been held.
We should not stretch the presumption of innocence beyond its reasonable intendment. Let us not forget that it is only a presumption and can yield to contrary evidence of guilt. That evidence has been amply established in this case. The petitioner's conviction was not based on what the Sandiganbayan mistakenly called a presumption of his guilt. The finding of guilt was not a presumption but a conclusion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Bidin, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., dissenting:
With all due respect, I find it most difficult to share the opinion expressed by the majority.
Petitioner has been charged with having violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. The elements of the offense are:
1. That the offender is a public officer;
2. That he has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions; and
3. That he has thereby caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or has given any private party an unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.
Except for the first element, which is conceded, the evidence on record, in my view, is clearly inadequate to justify the conviction of the petitioner.
Undoubtedly, the amount of P200,000.00 was received by, and in the custody of, petitioner with authority to disburse the sum for training programs in the implementation of the agricultural recovery program aforementioned. In convicting petitioner, the Sandiganbayan depended, by and large, on (1) the testimony of lone witness Josephine Angeles that as far as she knew no training programs were funded or held by BPI in 1985 and 1986, and (2) the failure of the petitioner to support his Disbursement Voucher (Exhibit "E"), for expenditures incurred during "Three Regional Trainings in Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur and Baguio City," with supporting receipts in liquidation thereof.
While Josephine Angeles did declare that to her knowledge there have been no training programs held or funded by BPI in 1985 to 1986, on cross-examination, however, she has admitted the possibility of such courses having been given by BPI in the region, since she would only be certain on training seminars coordinated by her. On further questioning, she has even confirmed that such trainings could have "really occurred because there was a report submitted concerning" the same. I also gather that the implementation of training programs which are foreign-funded are not coordinated by the witness. (The records before us are bereft on the source for the funding of the P200,000.00 cash advance.)
The only remaining piece of evidence or, more accurately perhaps, the lack of it, is that petitioner has failed to account, with receipts, for the P200,000.00 cash advance. The majority opinion, I most humbly submit, regrettably has failed to properly take into account Exhibit E — "disbursement voucher, dated February 5, 1986 in liquidation of the cash advance in the amount of P200,000.00 in favor of accused Domingo de Guzman" — certified to by no less than Daniel B. Coloma, Jr., to the effect that said liquidation is "supported by documents, appearing legal and proper."
I am perturbed by the following statement found in the majority opinion:
The situation before us is starkly simple. The petitioner received P200,000.00 from the government to defray the expenses of training programs. He has not liquidated it short of saying it was spent for some amorphous training programs not on record. Who should prove those training programs? The petitioner, of course. And he should do so with concrete facts and figures supported by receipts, not with the mere undocumented surmise that the programs could have been held.
Lest we miss it, petitioner is not being charged with improper accounting. The provision of law under which he stands accused of having violated reads:
Sec. 3. Corrupt Practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.. . ..
I cannot go along with the Sandiganbayan when it has conjectured that petitioner's failure to submit supporting receipts to his Disbursement Voucher, raises the presumption that "he misappropriated said funds and should be . . . sentenced accordingly." In essence, the Sandiganbayan tells petitioner that because he demurred at the evidence of the prosecution, the certification made by Daniel B. Coloma, Jr., on Exh. E, i.e., that the liquidation in the disbursement voucher is properly documented and supported, must now be disbelieved; that petitioner must now thereby be considered to have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross negligence in the discharge of his official and administrative functions; and that he has thereby caused undue injury to the government; and, ergo, he "must be sentenced accordingly." So much, in my view, has been drawn from so little that is given in evidence.
Even remotely assuming that the several assumptions made by the Sandiganbayan are appropriate and sanctionable, I doubt it whether they can measure up to the level of proof beyond reasonable doubt required for conviction.
There are cases, it is true, where prima facie evidence is authorized and sufficient to warrant a conviction. These exceptional cases must, however, be statutorily expressed (see, for instance Art. 217, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Mingoa, 92 Phil. 856; Vallarta vs. Court of Appeals, 150 SCRA 336; Bacasnot vs. Sandiganbayan, 155 SCRA 379) one that is altogether wanting in Republic Act No. 3019 of which violation the petitioner is accused.
The prosecution must stand on the merits of its own case and on the strength of its evidence. An accused, by constitutional fiat, is not under obligation to prove his innocence, for he needs only, if he desires, to disprove that evidence which, without rebuttal, would be enough to establish the requisite moral certainty that can justify conviction. These rules have been observed with constancy and consistency, for they rest not by simple rhetorics or personal inclinations but on valued traditions enshrined in law and jurisprudence.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote for the reversal of the judgment of conviction appealed from.
# Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., dissenting:
With all due respect, I find it most difficult to share the opinion expressed by the majority.
Petitioner has been charged with having violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. The elements of the offense are:
1. That the offender is a public officer;
2. That he has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions; and
3. That he has thereby caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or has given any private party an unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.
Except for the first element, which is conceded, the evidence on record, in my view, is clearly inadequate to justify the conviction of the petitioner.
Undoubtedly, the amount of P200,000.00 was received by, and in the custody of, petitioner with authority to disburse the sum for training programs in the implementation of the agricultural recovery program aforementioned. In convicting petitioner, the Sandiganbayan depended, by and large, on (1) the testimony of lone witness Josephine Angeles that as far as she knew no training programs were funded or held by BPI in 1985 and 1986, and (2) the failure of the petitioner to support his Disbursement Voucher (Exhibit "E"), for expenditures incurred during "Three Regional Trainings in Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur and Baguio City," with supporting receipts in liquidation thereof.
While Josephine Angeles did declare that to her knowledge there have been no training programs held or funded by BPI in 1985 to 1986, on cross-examination, however, she has admitted the possibility of such courses having been given by BPI in the region, since she would only be certain on training seminars coordinated by her. On further questioning, she has even confirmed that such trainings could have "really occurred because there was a report submitted concerning" the same. I also gather that the implementation of training programs which are foreign-funded are not coordinated by the witness. (The records before us are bereft on the source for the funding of the P200,000.00 cash advance.)
The only remaining piece of evidence or, more accurately perhaps, the lack of it, is that petitioner has failed to account, with receipts, for the P200,000.00 cash advance. The majority opinion, I most humbly submit, regrettably has failed to properly take into account Exhibit E — "disbursement voucher, dated February 5, 1986 in liquidation of the cash advance in the amount of P200,000.00 in favor of accused Domingo de Guzman" — certified to by no less than Daniel B. Coloma, Jr., to the effect that said liquidation is "supported by documents, appearing legal and proper."
I am perturbed by the following statement found in the majority opinion:
The situation before us is starkly simple. The petitioner received P200,000.00 from the government to defray the expenses of training programs. He has not liquidated it short of saying it was spent for some amorphous training programs not on record. Who should prove those training programs? The petitioner, of course. And he should do so with concrete facts and figures supported by receipts, not with the mere undocumented surmise that the programs could have been held.
Lest we miss it, petitioner is not being charged with improper accounting. The provision of law under which he stands accused of having violated reads:
Sec. 3. Corrupt Practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.. . ..
I cannot go along with the Sandiganbayan when it has conjectured that petitioner's failure to submit supporting receipts to his Disbursement Voucher, raises the presumption that "he misappropriated said funds and should be . . . sentenced accordingly." In essence, the Sandiganbayan tells petitioner that because he demurred at the evidence of the prosecution, the certification made by Daniel B. Coloma, Jr., on Exh. E, i.e., that the liquidation in the disbursement voucher is properly documented and supported, must now be disbelieved; that petitioner must now thereby be considered to have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross negligence in the discharge of his official and administrative functions; and that he has thereby caused undue injury to the government; and, ergo, he "must be sentenced accordingly." So much, in my view, has been drawn from so little that is given in evidence.
Even remotely assuming that the several assumptions made by the Sandiganbayan are appropriate and sanctionable, I doubt it whether they can measure up to the level of proof beyond reasonable doubt required for conviction.
There are cases, it is true, where prima facie evidence is authorized and sufficient to warrant a conviction. These exceptional cases must, however, be statutorily expressed (see, for instance Art. 217, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Mingoa, 92 Phil. 856; Vallarta vs. Court of Appeals, 150 SCRA 336; Bacasnot vs. Sandiganbayan, 155 SCRA 379) one that is altogether wanting in Republic Act No. 3019 of which violation the petitioner is accused.
The prosecution must stand on the merits of its own case and on the strength of its evidence. An accused, by constitutional fiat, is not under obligation to prove his innocence, for he needs only, if he desires, to disprove that evidence which, without rebuttal, would be enough to establish the requisite moral certainty that can justify conviction. These rules have been observed with constancy and consistency, for they rest not by simple rhetorics or personal inclinations but on valued traditions enshrined in law and jurisprudence.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote for the reversal of the judgment of conviction appealed from.
# Footnotes
1 Decision, Rollo, p. 32.
2 Ibid.
3 Id.
4 Information, Rollo, p. 53.
5 Mrs. Josephine Angeles, Human Resource Management offices of the Department of Agriculture.
6 Decision, Rollo, p. 35.
7 Ibid., p. 36.
8 Id., pp. 4-42.
9 id., p. 35.
10 Pre-trial Order, Rollo, p. 55.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
|
