G.R. No. 96306 August 20, 1993
LORENZO BERICO and VISITACION SANCHEZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Ninth Division), CIRIACO FLORES and FELISA BAREJA, respondents.
Rodolfo A. Manlapaz for petitioners.
Ruperto C. Gadia for private respondent.
Separate Opinion
ROMERO, J.,concurring:
I am in complete agreement with the majority opinion in holding that Article 1544 of the Civil Code finds application in the present case and on the basis thereof, pronounced that private respondents' right over the disputed property prevailed as against petitioner. Clearly, the facts have woven a clear case of double sales with the provisions of Article 1544 governing squarely and exclusively.
The majority opinion correctly set aside petitioner's theory that a trust relation, more particularly a constructive trust, was established between private respondents and themselves in the absence of the element of fraud as contemplated under Article 1456.1äwphï1.ñët
Allow me, however, to add that considering the concept of a constructive trust, the provisions of Article 1456 can hardly come into play in the case at bar.ℒαwρhi৷ Constructive trust is a remedy in equity introduced by American law, but it traces its roots to the legal system of Greece and Rome which adopted it in an effort to temper the rigorous or overly strict application of statute law or where, in light of the peculiar circumstances of a case, the remedy afforded under positive law may be unwarranted or inadequate. This, in application of the legal maxim "summun jus, summa injuria" or "circumstances alter cases."
Aptly, Aristotle defined "equity," whose etymological origin is the Greek word "epiqueia," to be a "correction of the law where, by reason of its universality, it is deficient."
The concept, took a parallel course in England where the term refers to the "jurisdiction and system of rules, principles, practice and remedies developed by the English Courts of Chancery, in those cases that the original Courts of Law (King's Bench, Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, and King's Exchequer) could not, because of technical rules, provide adequate remedy that would render complete justice to a party with a meritorious case."1
From time immemorial, therefore, courts that have had recourse to equity have done so, not in disregard of positive statute law, but precisely in recognition of its doctrinal flaws that may well result in inflicting unintended injustice. Putting it in proper perspective, "it is not the function of equity to assist in creating causes of action where none are alleged."2
In consonance with the above principles, article 1456 on constructive trust is a trust raised by construction of law or arising by operation of law for purposes of equity in order to satisfy by operation of law for purposes of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice where the remedy at law is void or proves deficient. It may, thus, be only invoked to aid justice and not to perpetrate an injustice. Therefore, it would be paradoxical for this Court if it were to believe the petitioners who despite being undoubtedly in bad faith, sought protective cover under the mantle of Article 1456. A call for equity will not countenance petitioners' bad faith which borders on duplicity and fraud. Equity my not be invoked to deprive private respondents of an existing legal right provided under Article 1544; nor may equity purport to establish a right which does not exist in favor of petitioners. Stated otherwise, where the rights of the parties litigants, private respondents in this instance, are clearly defined by statutes, legal principles and precedents, resort to equity finds no favor before the eyes of the courts. In Rodriquez-Luna v. Intermediate Appellate Court,3 the Court, speaking thru Justice Abad Santos, stated: "We are unwilling to apply equity instead of strict law in this case because to do so will not serve the ends of justice." For justice is attained, in the first instance, within the parameters of the applicable existing law. Such is in keeping with the views of the eminent and well-respected civilist, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes of this same Court when he urged upon the courts the exercise of judicial self-restraint in applying the principles of equity to situations such as the instant case. He thus cautioned:
Manifestly, excessive reliance upon equity in solving legal problems possesses certain disadvantages: for one, legal principles become eroded and uncertain in their operation; for another, the application of equity depends on the individual sense of justice of the Courts and becomes variable according to the membership of the Tribunals. In the case of the Supreme Court, especially, it dilutes its essential mission of settling uncertainties of the law through its decisions, and makes difficult to foresee the direction of future awards. Every judgment on the basis of equity becomes an ad hoc adjudication, unusable for other cases, so that previous awards do not serve as a guide, a variability that adversely affects the people's quest for justice, since situations basically similar can lead to different solutions. Hence, equity as a legal tool demands circumspection and realization of the fact that, unless carefully controlled, its tendency is to make the Judiciary assume legislative power.4
On the basis of the foregoing, I vote to DENY the petition. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Footnotes
1 J.B.L. Reyes, "The Trend Toward Equity versus Positive Law in Philippine Jurisprudence," Lecture delivered in the U.P. Law Center Seminar on Analytical Survey of Selected Supreme Court Decisions in Civil Law, 1983 and published with the same title, p. 2.
2 Tracey Development Co. v. People, 106 N.E. 330 (1914).
3 G.R. No. L-62988, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 242.
4 Id., at 16.
Separate Opinion
MELO, J., dissenting:
I agree with the conclusion arrived at by the majority of my distinguished colleagues that petitioner is indeed a buyer in bad faith of the realty in dispute and that his registration of the deeds of sale are ineffective as against private respondents. What I consider to be a fallacy of non-sequitor is the proposition expressed in the ponencia to the effect that private respondents' exclusive dominion had been established by sheer force of Article 1544 of the New Civil Code, independently of any court action instituted precisely to settle the matter of who, as between petitioner and private respondents, enjoys a better right over the same parcel of land which had been alienated to them.
To my mind, only a judicial pronouncement of private respondents' ownership via the complaint for annulment of title initiated below (or any analogous proceeding) can confer the right acknowledged by Article 1544 which could have been realized had prescription not set in. Unfortunately for private respondents, the action they filed in the court, of origin was time-barred since it was filed only on December 4, 1978 or more than ten (10) years after the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1346 in the name of herein petitioner on June 5, 1966.
In plain and simple terms, more paramount to the question of ownership involving a double sale as resolved by Article 1544 is the query on whether it was still proper for private respondents, or any party for that matter, to maintain a suit for enforcement thereof bearing in mind the substantive rules on prescription of actions. All actions, said Justice Gutierrez in Tolentino vs. Court of Appeals (162 SCRA 66 [1988]), have a prescriptive period, unless an exception is provided and are, therefore, susceptible to extinction if not seasonably aired through proper channels within the time-frame fixed by law. In this particular case, I hold the view that private respondents' right of action was extinguished through the inevitable ticking of the clock and for Us to take the cudgels for their indifference by affirming their so-called ownership due to Article 1544 is certainly incongruous, nay, illusory.
I vote to grant the petition.
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