G.R. No. 85041 August 5, 1993
GRACIANO BERNAS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and NATIVIDAD BITO-ON DEITA, respondents.
Rodriguez Dadivas for petitioner.
Orlanda Bigcas-Lumawag for private respondent.
Separate Opinion
BELLOSILLO, J., dissenting:
This may be a faint echo in the wilderness but it is the quaint voice of a woman yearning for justice from this court of last resort. The majority opinion would leave her alone where she is, to wallow in her own misery, and despite her long and winding travails — all for the love of a brother in need — there is no light at the end of the tunnel. There is no relief in sight for her plight. Her only fault was to lend her four (4) small parcels of land to her brother so that the latter could use the fruits thereof for the education of his children in Manila. Now, she cannot get them back because her brother allowed his brother-in-law, who now claims security of tenure as tenant, to work the lands.
Worse, the brother-in-law continues to cultivate the landholdings, even converting the orchards into ricelands as though they were his own and constructing a house of a strong materials thereon, without paying any rent!
Before seeking judicial relief, private respondent went to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) as required by law,1 and obtained a favorable finding that there was no tenancy relationship between her and her brother's brother-in-law. But the courts below disregarded this important piece of evidence which speaks eloquently of the merit of her cause. MAR certified that petitioner was not a tenant of private respondent, hence, the case was proper for trial.
The finding of MAR was confirmed by the Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association (ARBA) when its President certified after an investigation that petitioner did not appear in the Master List of tenant beneficiaries of the barangay. Even his older brother, the barangay captain, after conducting his own investigation, refused to certify that petitioner was a tenant of the holdings of private respondent.
Is private respondent indeed bereft of any remedy in law to recover possession of her landholdings — she who did not employ petitioner nor authorize anyone to employ him as tenant on her land; she who is not even paid any rent by petitioner for the use of her landholdings; she whose landholdings have been converted by petitioner from orchards to ricelands and on which he constructed a house of strong materials, both without first securing authority from her? Under the circumstances, we can only hope that posterity will not condemn us for the fate of private respondent and the many others who may be similarly situated.
My conscience prompts me to dissent from the majority opinion and to vote for the affirmance of the decision of the Court of Appeals, not necessarily on the basis of its rationale, but mainly because I do not subscribe to the view that a usufructuary or legal possessor under Sec. 6, R.A. 3844, as amended, is automatically authorized to employ a tenant without the consent of the landowner. For, the right to hire a tenant is basically a personal right of a landowner, except as may be provided by law. But, certainly nowhere in Sec. 6 of R.A. 3844 does it say that a legal possessor of a landholding is automatically authorized to install a tenant thereon.
Natividad Bito-on Deita owns Lots 794, 801, 840 and 848 of the Cadastral Survey of Panay, Capiz. Lots 794 and 801, with areas of 943 square meters (Exh. "C") and 855 square meters (Exh. "B"'), respectively, are coconut Lands; Lot 840, with an area of 1,000 square meters (Exh. "D"), is planted to bananas, while Lot 848, with an area of 1,146 square meters (Exh. "A"), is riceland. Lot 840 was the owner's homelot on which stood before the family home. Although the trial court found that the total area of the four (4) lots, which are not contiguous, was 5,831 square meters, a closer examination of their tax declarations (Exhs. "A" to "D") reveals that their total productive area is only 3,844 square meters, which can be smaller than a residential lot in a plush village in Metro Manila.
After Natividad recovered these lots from a former tenant in April 1978, she entrusted them to her brother, Benigno Bito-on, so that the latter may be able to support the education of his children in Manila.2 She did not authorize her brother to install a tenant thereon.3 After successfully retrieving a landholding from a tenant at that time, no landowner in his right mind would give his land in tenancy again to avoid the operation of P.D. 27, then at its peak and dreaded by landowners as an unjust deprivation of property rights.
Thereafter, without the knowledge, much less consent, of Natividad, Benigno entered into some arrangement with his brother-in-law, Graciano Bernas, to work the lands. But Natividad was unaware of this arrangement as she was staying in Manila where her husband was then employed. It was not until the latter's retirement and the return of the family to Panay, Capiz, that she learned that Graciano was already working the lands, converting Lots 794, 801 and 840 into ricelands, and constructing on Lot 840 a house of concrete hollow blocks.
It bears emphasizing that, the transfer of possession between Natividad and Benigno was not coupled with any consideration; rather, it was pure magnanimity on the part of Natividad on account of her "dugo" or blood relation with Benigno, which Atty. Herminio R. Pelobello, Trial Attorney II and MAR Investigating Officer, explains —
A "DUGO" system is a personal grant of privilege and a privilege personally granted cannot be delegated or extended to someone else but (is) personal (in) nature. Once the "DUGO" grantee or trustee returns the subject matter of "DUGO", the relationship is terminated . . . . In this instance, Exh. "E" is an expressive documentary evidence of return of "DUGO" property by constructive mode of returning of possession, use and enjoyment of property; same therefore deserves credence to the exclusion of any interested person in tillage therein.
On 13 May 1985, his children having finished schooling in Manila, Benigno returned possession of the property to Natividad, in faithful compliance with their agreement. However, Graciano refused to vacate the premises claiming at first that he was installed thereon by Benigno, although after Benigno denied this allegation, petitioner changed his theory by presenting Monica Bernales Bito-on, wife of Benigno, to testify that she was the civil law lessee who installed Graciano on the lands. This, despite the crux of the evidence spread on record that it was Benigno Bito-on who was given the physical possession of the lands by his sister Natividad, and not Monica who is only her sister-in-law. Incidentally, Monica is the sister of the wife of Graciano Bernas.
On 17 May 1985, fazed by the refusal of Graciano to vacate, Natividad filed a letter-petition4 with the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) seeking clarification of the actual status of Graciano vis-a-vis her landholdings. Accordingly, Graciano was summoned at least three (3) times but the latter refused to attend the scheduled hearings. Consequently, Atty. Herminio R. Pelobello, who was assigned to the case, conducted his investigation and thereafter issued a resolution5 sustaining the complaint of Natividad Bito-on Dieta and concluding, among others that —
. . . out of petitioner's benevolence, generosity and pity of his elder brother's financial hardship, she had the aforesaid lots entrusted to her brother in the nature of DUGO so that (the) latter then possessed the land and enjoy(ed) the . . . fruits thereon for the above purpose beginning the year 1978 up to the 2nd crop of 1985; that upon the surrender or giving back in her favor of the land subject of 'DUGO' there now appears the respondent claiming to be the tenant-tiller on the land who would not relinquish the land in her favor alleging and contending to have been instituted by Monica Bernales who is her sister-in-law.
x x x x x x x x x
It is observed in this letter-petition (that) Filipino family adhered solidarity, sympathy and pity by extending financial help of (to) a close relative by consanguinity. Apparently under the circumstance, the "DUGO" trustee for the benefit of his school children in Manila is Benigno Bito-on . . . . Petitioner feeling morally bound . . . made the institution of "DUGO" relationship among them in order to contributes a solution thereof. But ultimately after the 2nd cropping of 1985 and after the school children of Benigno Bito-on had graduated in college, he returned the property to petitioner as evidenced by Exh. "E".
Now comes to the surprise of petitioner, the respondent spring(s) out and assert(s) his alleged right to tillage so as to prevent landowner to repossess the land subject of "DUGO" upon return which is co-terminous with the period thereof.
On such core, no law or jurisprudence recognizes the right of respondent. Be that as it may, as now happens, with Benigno Bito-on nor his wife Natividad (Monica) Bernas was legally authorized to institute somebody to be tenant-tiller under the circumstance of "DUGO" . . . so as to be entitled to invoke any right or privilege under our Agrarian Laws.
x x x x x x x x x
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, it is now the honest opinion of the undersigned to recommend as it is hereby recommended that the petitioner, Natividad Bito-on Deita, be entitled to the possession, use and enjoyment of the lots subject of 'DUGO' and further, that the respondent constructively and actually delivers to her the same lots indicated in this resolution, upon receipt of copy hereof.
The foregoing resolution of the MAR Investigating Officer may not be well crafted, but it is expressive of his finding that Graciano Bernas was not a tenant-tiller and, consequently, it recommend that "the petitioner, Natividad Bito-on Deita, be entitled to the possession, use and enjoyment of the lots subject of 'DUGO', and further, that the respondent (Graciano Bernas) constructively and actually delivers to her the same lots indicated in this resolution . . . ." concluding that "no law or jurisprudence recognizes the right of respondent."
While Natividad went through the normal legal procedure to obtain relief, Graciano refused to attend the formal investigation and hearing conducted by the MAR, much less heed its recommendation.ℒαwρhi৷ If Graciano was a law-abiding citizen and believed that the law was on his side, he should have submitted to the fact-finding investigation by an administrative agency pursuant to law.
On 24 May 1985, a mediation conference between Natividad and Graciano was held at the residence of Brgy. Captain Felipe Bernas, older brother of Graciano, but it also proved fruitless as Graciano continued to refuse to vacate subject landholdings. To top it all, Brgy. Captain Bernas sided with Graciano and refused to issue a certification as required under P.D. 1508. If Graciano was indeed a tenant of the landholdings, his older brother could have easily issued the required certification.
Consequently, the certification had to be issued by Sulpicio Bering, ARBA President, Panay Chapter,6 dated 27 May 1985, at Barangay Calitan, Panay, Capiz, which confirmed the factual findings of the MAR Investigating Officer —
This is to certify that undersigned in his capacity as President of Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association (ARBA), Panay Chapter, had attended last May 24, 1985 the mediation confrontation among Mrs. Natividad Bito-on-Dieta and Mr. Graciano Bernas accompanied by his wife Adela Bernales that took place right at the residence of Brgy. Captain Felipe Bernas. That the outcome of the conference was fruitless as the Barangay Captain was siding with his younger brother Graciano Bernas, and he (Brgy. Captain) vehemently refused to issue any certification as required under P.D. 1508.
Hence undersigned as President of ARBA Panay Chapter hereby manifest and certify that Graciano Bernas is not among those whose names are entered in our masterlist of tenants so as to suffice as a bona fide member of Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association in Panay, Capiz. It is further stated that Mr. Graciano Bernas is not a leasehold tenant of landowner Mrs. natividad Bito-on Dieta in Barangay Calitan, Panay, Capiz (emphasis supplied).
This certification is being issued to Mrs. Dieta in lieu of the refusal on the part(s) of Brgy. Captain to issue such under the provision of P.D. 1508.
On 21 June 1985, after all her efforts to recover through administrative means failed, Natividad finally instituted an action in the Regional Trial Court of Capiz. But, in deciding the case, the trial court completely disregarded the result of the administrative investigation conducted by Atty. Herminio R. Pelobello of the MAR (Exh. "6") and the Certification of the President of ARBA (Exh. "E") and ruled in favor of Graciano, holding that the transaction between Natividad and Benigno was in the nature of a usufruct so that the latter was legally capacitated to install Graciano as an agricultural lessee whose tenurial right could not be disturbed except for causes enumerated under Sec. 36 of R.A. 3844, as amended,7 and that Natividad failed to establish any of the causes for his termination.
Natividad elevated her cause to the Court of Appeals contending that the transaction between her and her brother Benigno was not in the nature of usufruct but rather one of commodatum. As such, Benigno, as bailee in commodatum, could neither lend nor lease the property loaned to him to a third person since the relationship between the bailor and bailee is personal in character. She also established with her evidence that Graciano converted without her authority three (3) of her parcels of land, particularly those planted to coconut and banana, to ricelands, which is a ground to terminate a tenant, assuming that Graciano was.
The contention of Natividad was sustained by the Court of Appeals, which ordered the ejectment of Graciano. The Court of Appeals ruled that having merely derived his right over the property from the bailee, Graciano could have no better right than bailee Benigno who possessed the landholdings only for a special purpose and for a limited period of time. The spring cannot rise higher than its source
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari filed by Graciano seeking reversal of the decision8 of the Court of Appeals on the issue of whether he is an agricultural lessee of the landholdings entitled to security of tenure.
The resolution of this issue hinges on the proper interpretation of Sec. 6 of R.A. 3844, as amended, otherwise known as "The Agricultural Land Reform Code," which provides:
Sec. 6 Parties to Agricultural Leasehold Relations. — The agricultural leasehold relations shall be limited to the person who furnishes the landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and the person who personally cultivates the same. (emphasis ours).
Those who hold that Graciano is a leasehold tenant anchor their proposition on the above provision of Sec. 6 as they find Benigno a "legal possessor" of the lands and so could legally install a tenant thereon.
I strongly disagree. When Sec. 6 provides that the agricultural leasehold relations shall be limited to the person who furnishes the landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and the person who personally cultivates the same, it assumes that there is an existing agricultural leasehold relation, i. e., a tenant or agricultural lessee already works the land. As may be gleaned from the epigraph of Section 6, it merely states who are "Parties to Agricultural Leasehold Relations," which means that there is already a leasehold tenant on the land. But this is precisely what we are still asked to determine in these proceedings.
To better understand Sec. 6, R.A. 3844, let us refer to its precursor, Sec. 8, R.A. 1199, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 8. Limitation of Relation. — The relation of landholder and tenant shall be limited to the person who furnishes land, either as owner, lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and to the person who actually works the land himself with the aid of labor available from within his immediate farm household.
Again, Sec. 8 of R.A. 1199 assumes the existence of a tenancy relation. But, as its epigraph states, it is a "Limitation of Relation," and the purpose is merely to limit the tenancy "to the person who furnishes land, either as owner, lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and to the person who actually works the land himself with the aid of labor available from within his immediate farm household." Otherwise stated, once the tenancy relation is established, the parties to that relation are limited to the persons therein stated. But, obviously, inherent in their right to install a tenant is their authority to do so; otherwise, without such authority, they cannot install a tenant on the landholding. But, definitely, neither Sec. 6 of R.A. 3844 nor Sec. 8 of R.A. 1199 automatically authorizes the persons named therein to employ a tenant on the landholding.
According to Santos and Macalino, considered authorities on the land reform, the reasons Sec. 6, R.A. 3844, and 8, R.A. 1199, in limiting the relationship to the lessee and the lessor is "to discourage absenteeism on the part of the lessor and the custom, of co-tenancy" under which "the tenant (lessee) employs another to do the farm work for him, although it is he with whom the landholder (lessor) deals directly. Thus, under this custom, the one who actually works the land gets the short end of the bargain, for the nominal or 'capitalist' lessee hugs for himself a major portion of the harvest."9 This custom has bred exploitation, discontent and confusion . . . . The 'kasugpong,' 'kasapi,' or 'katulong' also works at the pleasure of the nominal tenant."10 When the new law, therefore, limited tenancy relation to the landholder and the person who actually works the land himself with the aid of labor available from within his immediate farm household, it eliminated the nominal tenant or middle man from the picture.11
Another noted authority on land reform, Dean Jeremias U. Montemayor,12 explains the reason for Sec. 8, R.A. 1199, the precursor of Sec. 6, R.A. 3844:
Since the law establishes a special relationship in tenancy with important consequences, it properly pinpoints the persons to whom said relationship shall apply. The spirit of the law is to prevent both landholder absenteeism and tenant absenteeism. Thus, it would seem that the discretionary powers and important duties of the landholder, like the choice of crop or seed, cannot be left to the will or capacity of an agent or overseer, just as the cultivation of the land cannot be entrusted by the tenant to some other people. Tenancy relationship has been held to be of a personal character (see Secs. 37 and 44, R.A. 1199, as amended; emphasis supplied).
To argue that simply because Benigno is considered a usufructuary or legal possessor, or a bailee in commodatum for that matter, he is automatically authorized to employ a tenant on the landholding is to beg the question. For, it is not correct to say that every legal possessor, be he a usufructuary or a bailee, is authorized as a matter of right to employ a tenant. His possession can be limited by agreement of the parties or by operation of law. In the case before Us, it is obvious that the tenure of the legal possessor was understood to be only during the limited period when the children of Benigno were still schooling in Manila.
As already stated, Sec. 6 simply enumerates who are the parties to an existing contract of agricultural tenancy, which presupposes that a tenancy already exists. It does not state that those who furnish the landholding, i.e., either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, are authomatically authorized to employ a tenant on the landholding. The reason is obvious. The legal possession, may be restrictive. Even the owner himself may not be free to install a tenant, as when his ownership or possession is encumbered or is subject to a lien or condition that he should not employ a tenant thereon. This contemplates a situation where the property may be intended for some other specific purpose allowable by law, such as, its conversion into a subdivision.
In the case at bar, the transfer of possession was purely gratuitous. It was not made for any consideration except for the "dugo" or blood relationship between Natividad and Benigno. Consequently, the generation of rights arising therefrom should be strictly construed in favor of Natividad. In fact, for lack of consideration, she may take back the land at any time unless she allows a reasonable time for Benigno to harvest the produce of what he may have planted thereon as a possessor in good faith. There is not even any valid obligation on her part to keep Benigno in possession, except as herein adverted to, much less should she be deprived of such possession just because another person was employed by her brother to work the land.
Under the doctrine laid down in Lastimoza v. Blanco,13 Graciano cannot be a lawful tenant of Natividad for the reason that Benigno, after failing to return the landholding to Natividad, already became a deforciant, and a deforciant cannot install a lawful tenant who is entitled to security of tenure. Incidentally, Benigno and Graciano being brothers-in-law, their wives being sisters, and living in a small barangay, Graciano cannot profess ignorance of the very nature of the possession of Benigno as well as the restrictions to his possession.
It may be relevant to consider, for a better appreciation of the facts, the actual condition of the landholdings. As already adverted to, Lots 794 and 801 are coconut lands with an area of 943 square meters (Exh. "C") and 855 square meters (Exh. "B"), respectively, or a total area of 1,798 square meters. With this meager area for the two (2) coconut lands, there is indeed no reason to have them tenanted. The coconut lands need not be cultivated when the coconut trees are already fruit-bearing. Benigno only had to ensure that the fruits thereof were not stolen.
Lot 840 has an area of 1,000 square meters (Exh. "D") and is planted to bananas. Like the coconut lands, no tenant is needed to cultivate it and Benigno only has to keep watch over it against stray animals and protect his harvests. If we take away from this area of 1,000 square meters the homelot reserved for the owner, the remaining portion for production cannot be more than 800 square meters. It can be less, depending on the size of the homelot.
Before Graciano converted Lots 714, 801 and 840 into ricelands, the only riceland then was Lot 848, with an area of 1,146 square meters (Exh. "A"). This is too small for an economic family-size farm to sustain Benigno and his family even if he works it himself.
Considering the size of the landholdings, which have a total productive area of only 3,844 square meters per their tax declarations, there may not be enough produce to pay for the educational expenses of his children if Benigno to hire another person to cultivate the land and share the produce thereof. As a matter of fact, to minimize expenses, the children of Benigno and Monica stayed with Natividad while schooling in Manila.
Since lots 714, 801 and 840 are planted to coconut and banana trees, they are classified as lands planted to permanent crops. Consequently, in order for a person to be considered a tenant of these lands, he must have planted the crops himself before they became fruit-bearing. But, in the case before us, the coconut and banana trees were already fruit-bearing at the time Graciano commenced to work on the lands, hence, he cannot be considered a tenant of these lands.
Consequently, the transfer of possession of the landholding from Natividad to Benigno should be strictly viewed as one for the cultivation alone of Benigno, himself a farm worker, who was not authorized by Natividad to employ a tenant. Benigno's possession was limited only to the enjoyment of the fruits thereof, subject to the will of landowner Natividad. Benigno was not empowered to install a tenant.14
Benigno therefore possessed the land as a mere possessor-cultivator. As such, he was required to personally till or cultivate the land and use the produce thereof to defray the cost of education of his children. Natividad, who entrusted her landholdings to Benigno, was still the agricultural owner-cultivator, who is "any person who, providing capital and management, personally cultivates his own land with the aid of his immediate family and household."15 It must then be held that the cultivation of Benigno was also the cultivation of Natividad. Indeed, the fact that the lands were free of tenants when Natividad entrusted them to Benigno was indicative of her intention to maintain that condition of the landholdings and have them tended personally by Benigno himself.
Accordingly, neither Benigno nor Graciano can be a lessee-tenant who enjoys security of tenure. Benigno could only be an encargado of his sister Natividad, merely enjoying the produce thereof for the intended beneficiaries, his children studying in Manila.
Our attention may be invited to settled jurisprudence that the existence of an agricultural leasehold relationship is not terminated by changes of ownership in case of sale, or transfer of legal possession as in lease.16 But, again, this assumes that a tenancy has already been established. In the instant case, no such relationship was ever created between Natividad and Graciano, the former having simply given her land to Benigno without any authority to install a tenant thereon,17 and only for a limited duration as it was coterminous with the schooling of Benigno's children in Manila.
In a number of cases, this Court has sustained the preservation of an agricultural leasehold relationship between landholder and tenant despite the change of ownership or transfer of legal possession from one person to another. But in all these cases, the facts legally justified the preservation of such relationship. For example, in Endaya v. Court of Appeals,18 Salen v. Dinglasan,19 Catorce v. Court of Appeals,20 and Co. v Court of Appeals,21 the tenants were found to have been instituted by the previous landowners or owners in fee simple. Consequently, the change of ownership of the land did not terminate the tenancy relationship already existing. In Novesteras v. Court of Appeals,22 it was the present landowner himself who instituted the agricultural leasehold relation. In Ponce v. Guevarra,23 although the civil law lessee was barred from installing a tenant under the terms of the original contract of lease, the landowner nonetheless extended the lifetime of the lease. Finally, in Joya v. Pareja,24 the lessor-landowner negotiated for the better terms with the tenant of the civil law lessee upon expiration of the lease.
As may be gleaned from all these seven (7) cases, the landowner himself had a hand in either installing the tenant, or confirming the tenancy relation by extending it, or negotiating directly with the tenant for the better terms upon expiration of the civil lease. For, indeed, the right to install a tenant is a personal right that belongs to the landowner,25 except perhaps in civil lease when the lessee is authorized to sublease the leased premises unless expressly prohibited by agreement of the parties.26
Thus, the agricultural leasehold relations were preserved in these cases because the "legal possessors: therein were clearly clothed with legal authority or capacity to install tenants. But even assuming that they were not so authorized as in the Ponce case where the civil law lessee was expressly barred from installing a tenant under their contract of lease, the subsequent actions of the landowners in extending the lifetime of the lease, or in negotiating for better terms with the tenants, placed the landowners in estoppel from contesting the agricultural leasehold relations. Consequently, the tenants in those cases may be categorized as tenants de jure enjoying tenurial security guaranteed by the Agricultural tenancy Law,27 now by the Agricultural Land Reform Code, as amended. This is not the case before us.
In an attempt to bolster his theory that he was tenant of the landholding, Graciano presented no less than the wife of Benigno, Monica Bernales-Bito-on, who testified that she was the civil law lessee who installed Graciano as tenant. Interestingly, Monica is the sister of Adela Bernales, wife of Graciano. But why should Monica be the civil law lessee and not her husband Benigno who is the brother of landowner Natividad? It is highly improbable that instead of Natividad constituting her brother Benigno as the possessor of the lands, it was Monica who was entrusted with them. That is contrary to common practice an experience. Even The trial court itself found the version of Graciano incredible when it held that Benigno was the legal possessor in the concept of usufructuary. Yet, it ignored this discrepancy — which could have destroyed the credibility of Graciano — when in fact it could have totally negated or disregarded Graciano's assertion of tenancy derived from Monica as civil law lessee. The conclusion is not farfetched that Benigno and Monica were just entrusted with the four (4) lots, three (3) of which were orchards until their unauthorized conversion to ricelands by Graciano, so that the former could avail of the produce thereof for the purpose already stated.
Moreover, the claim of Graciano that he was the duly appointed tenant is belied by a certification issued by the President of the Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association (ARBA), Panay Chapter, stating that, as of 27 May 1985, Graciano Bernas was neither enrolled in the Master List of tenant beneficiaries nor registered as a leasehold tenant of Natividad in Barangay Calitan.28 If he was truly a tenant, he should been vigilant enough to protect his rights and thus have his name registered. After all, at that time, his older brother was the barangay captain of Calitan where the property is situated.
When Natividad invoked Sec. 2, P.D. 316, by referring her ejectment case to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform for preliminary determination, MAR accordingly certified that it was proper for trial, an indication that there was no tenancy relationship between the parties. Such factual finding, unless found to be baseless, binds the court because the law gives exclusive authority to MAR to determine preliminary the issue of tenancy relationship between the contending parties before the court may assume jurisdiction over an agrarian dispute or controversy.29
Indeed, the Investigating Officer of MAR correctly found that no tenancy relation existed between Natividad and Graciano.30 Such factual finding by an administrative agency as the MAR is entitled to the greatest respect and is binding and conclusive upon this court, except when it is patently arbitrary or capricious, or is not supported by substantial evidence.31 Regrettably, these vital informations established in the trial court were simply ignored, to the great prejudice of respondent Natividad who, under the majority opinion, will find herself helplessly without a remedy and all because she upheld the true Filipino tradition of family solidarity by providing succor to a blood brother who needed assistance for the educational advancement of his children.
It may be worth to emphasize that neither the decision of the Court of Appeals nor the discussions in this case mention the unauthorized conversion by Graciano of Lots 794, 801 and 840 into ricelands, thereby impairing the original nature and value of the lands. If for this reason alone, assuming that he was lawfully installed as tenant, Graciano's tenancy should be terminated under Sec. 36, par. (3), for planting crops or using the landholdings for a purpose other than for which they were dedicated.
While this may not have been expressly raised as an issue, it is nevertheless related or incidental to the issues presented by the parties for which evidence was adduced in the trial court by private respondent without objection from petitioner. We should not disregard the evidence if only to arrive at a fair and just conclusion.
Some may have apprehensions that should Sec. 6 of R.A. 3844 be construed as not to vest the legal possessor with automatic authority to install tenants, it would in effect open the floodgates to their ejectment on the mere pretext that the legal possessor was not so authorized by the landowner. This is a more imagined than real. The landowner has the burden of proving that the legal possessor was not authorized to install tenants and, more often than not, the legal possessor is so empowered. In civil law, lease, for the instance, where there is consideration, the general rule is that the lessee can sublease the leased holding unless there is an express prohibition against subletting in the contract itself.32 Thus, in order for the lessee to be barred from subletting, the contract of lease must expressly stipulate to that effect." In this case, the transaction between brother and sister was not for any material consideration nor was it intended to defeat any purpose of law. There is not even any insinuation that Benigno was only being used by Natividad to oust Graciano from the lands.
In any event, should the majority still hold that Sec. 6 of R.A. 3844 authorizes the persons therein enumerated to institute a tenant automatically, although I strongly disagree, it should at most be made to apply only to transfers of legal possession where there is material consideration, and not where such transfers are absolutely gratuitous or purely out of benevolence because of personal or blood relationship. Unfortunately for Natividad, her benevolence does not seem to evoke reciprocal benevolence from this Court.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, I have to dissent from the majority opinion and reiterate my vote to AFFIRM the judgment under review.
Meanwhile, I can only hope that, in the end, the real meaning of justice in this case is attained.
Feliciano, Davide, Jr. and Melo, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 P.D. 316.
2 Tsn, 13 February 1986, p. 6
3 Ibid., p. 8.
4 Exh. "F", RTC Record, p. 101.
5 Exh. "G", RTC Records, pp. 102-104.
6 Exh. "E", RTC Record, p. 100.
7 Sec. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. — . . . (1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes . . . . (2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any of the terms and conditions of the contract or any provisions of this Code unless his failure is caused by fortuitous event or force majeure; (3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the landholding for a purpose other than what has been previously agreed upon; (4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven agricultural farm practices . . . . (5) The land or other substantial improvement thereon is substantially damaged or destroyed or has unreasonably deteriorated through the fault or negligence of the agricultural lessee; (6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls due . . . . (7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in violation of the terms of paragraph 2 of Section 27.
8 Penned by Justice Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes, concurred in by Justices Serafin N. Camilon and Pedro A. Ramirez.
9 Santos and Macalino, The Agricultural Land Reform Code, 1963 Ed., p. 11.
10 Id., pp. 213-214.
11 Id. p. 214.
12 Montemayor, Jeremias U., Labor, Agrarian and Social Legislation, Vol. III, 1968 ed., p. 40.
13 G.R. No. L-14697, 28 January 1961, 1 SCRA 231.
14 Tsn, 13 February 1986, p. 8.
15 Sec. 166, par. (22), R.A. 3844.
16 Endaya v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88113, 23 October 1992.
17 See note 14.
18 See note 16.
19 G.R. No. 59082, 28 June 1991, 198 SCRA 623.
20 G.R. No. 59762, 11 may 1984, 129 SCRA 210.
21 G.R. No. 65298, 21 June 1988, 162 SCRA 390.
22 G.R. No. L-36654, 31 march 1967, 149 SCRA 47.
23 G.R. Nos. L-19629 and 19672-92, 31 March 1964, 10 SCRA 649.
24 106 Phil. 645 (1959).
25 Montemayor, Jeremias U., op. cit.
26 Art. 1650, New Civil Code.
27 Lastimoza v. Blanco, supra.
28 Exh. "E", RTC Record, p. 100.
29 Sec. 12, par. (b), subpar. (2), of P.D. 946.
30 Exh. "G", RTC Records, pp. 102-104.
31 Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G. R. NO. 89425, 25 February 1992, 206 SCRA 506.
32 Art. 1650, New Civil Code.
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