Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 88158 March 04, 1992
DANIEL GARCIA AND TEODORO O'HARA, Petitioners,
vs.
ERNESTO DE JESUS AND CECILIA DAVID, AND THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 97108-09 March 4, 1992
TOMAS TOBON UY, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JOSE C. NEYRA, Respondents.
Dissenting Opinion
BIDIN, J.:
With all due respect to the arguments advanced in the majority opinion penned by my esteemed colleague, Madame Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, it is my humble submission that the Commission on Elections is empowered to issue the assailed prerogative writs, hence, this dissent.
The majority opinion holds that in the absence of any specific conferment upon the COMELEC, either by the Constitution or by legislative fiat, the COMELEC is bereft of jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
The ponencia further maintains the proposition that "(i)n the Philippine setting, the authority to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus involves the exercise of original jurisdiction" (Decision, p. 8) and that it is original jurisdiction that is exercised in the issuance of said writs (Ibid., p. 10).
The foregoing postulations overlook the fact that the subject writs may also be issued not only in the exercise of original jurisdiction but also in aid of appellate jurisdiction as now conferred upon the Court of Appeals (Sec. 9 [1], BP 129). Inasmuch as the Court of Appeals had been issuing writs of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 9 [1], BP 129, and before that Sec. 4, Rule 65, it cannot be said that certiorari is limited to the exercise of original jurisdiction only.
The ponencia states that the COMELEC Rule cannot pattern its certiorari jurisdiction after that of the Court of Appeals because the latter's jurisdiction to issue the prerogative writs is specifically provided by law, while on the other hand, no statutory provision grants the COMELEC with similar powers. Relying on the case of Pimentel v. Comelec (101 SCRA 769 [1980]), the main ponencia is likewise of the view that in the absence of an express statutory provision granting the COMELEC the power to issue the special writs, such authority cannot be deduced by mere implication.
In Pimentel, this Court ruled that the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus in election contests cognizable by the then Court of First Instance and appealable to the Commission on the ground that such jurisdiction was not conferred to it by constitutional or statutory enactment. It must be noted, however, that the Pimentel case was decided under the 1973 Constitution which limited the Commission's jurisdiction over election contests relating to the members of the Batasang Pambansa, elective provincial and city officials, and excluded therefrom election contests involving municipal and barangay officials. Such limitation no longer holds true under the present state of the law. Neither is this a case where the COMELEC justifies its assumption of jurisdiction by applying, by analogy, Sec. 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court as it did in the case of Pimentel.
In entertaining the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by private respondents, the COMELEC now does not trace its authority to the provisions of the Rules of Court but rather to the constitution itself. This constitutional grant of power to the COMELEC, which, in my considered view, authorizes the latter to issue the prerogative writs, marks the point of departure from the majority opinion.
"Section 2 (2), Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution now grants the COMELEC appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal official decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction, as follows:
"Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
x x x
"(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction." (Underscoring supplied)
Taken in conjunction with Sec. 3, Art. IX-C, which empowers the Commission to promulgate its rules of procedure, the above constitutional grant of appellate jurisdiction to the COMELEC over election cases cognizable by the trial courts of general or limited jurisdiction is broad enough to cover petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
It is significant to note that no similar provision granting respondent COMELEC with rule-making power as provided in the present Constitution is found in the 1973 Constitution, the fundamental law in force when the Pimentel case was decided. Such constitutional conferment of rule-making power in favor of the COMELEC necessarily implies, if not in itself inherent, the authority of the Commission to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in aid of its appellate jurisdiction expressly conferred by the constitution. For one thing, it is elementary that the function of the writ is to keep an inferior court within its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction (Central Bank v. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 429 [1989]; Calagui v. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 564 [1990]; Brillo v. Buklatan, 87 Phil. 519 [1950]). How can the COMELEC effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction over election cases cognizable by trial courts if it could not issue auxiliary writs necessary to keep them within their jurisdictional confines? It would be highly incongruous, if not outright illogical, to split the jurisdiction of respondent COMELEC by depriving it of appellate jurisdiction over certiorari proceedings involving election cases decided by trial courts while at the same time vesting it with jurisdiction over the ultimate appeal thereon from decisions rendered in the same case and by the same trial courts.
As aforesaid, the 1987 Constitution grants the respondent Commission not only appellate jurisdiction over election contests cognizable by the trial courts but also broad rule-making power to expedite the disposition of election cases. The COMELEC's assumption of certiorari jurisdiction is consistent with the constitutional mandate to expedite the disposition of election cases.
The power to issue special writs also flows from the existence of appellate jurisdiction is a doctrinal pronouncement and settled jurisprudence. It has been held that "grant of jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to its effective exercise and to make all orders that will preserve the subject of the action and give effect to the final determination of the appeal" (Kjellander v. Kjellander (132 P 1170 [1913]). Premises considered, the COMELEC may issue writs of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
The Court must not lose sight of the fact of the origin and historical development of the special writs as it was understood in common law jurisdiction from where it evolved and carried over to the Philippine court system (i.e., from Act 190 through RA 296 to BP 129) that "(t)he writ of certiorari does not owe its existence to a constitutional provision or statutory enactment. It is a common law writ, of ancient origin, and one of the most valuable and efficient remedies which came to us with that admirable system of jurisprudence" (Tennessee Cent. R. Co. v. Campbell, 75 SW 1012 [1903]).
More importantly, "(i)t is an established doctrine that one of the essential attributes of appellate jurisdiction, and one of the inherent powers of the appellate court, is the right to make use of all writs known to the common law, and, if necessary, to invent new writs or proceedings in order to suitably exercise the jurisdiction conferred (Wheeler v. Northern Colorado Irrigation Co., 11 P 103 [1886]; citing Attorney General v. Railroad Cos., 35 Wis. 425; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137; U.S. v. Commissioners, 1 Morris, (Iowa,) 42; Attorney General v. Blossom, 1 Wis. 277).
The ponencia posits that such a view obtaining in foreign jurisdictions cannot apply in the country's judicial system since the subject writs are specifically characterized as original special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.ℒαwρhi৷ If the subject writs are original in character, why then can the Court of Appeals exercise the same in aid of its appellate jurisdiction? Concededly because of BP 129. But then again, doesn't the Constitution itself grants such appellate jurisdiction to the COMELEC? Do we still need a statutory enactment for such conferment of certiorari jurisdiction? Is the constitutional grant of appellate jurisdiction not enough? The ponencia stresses that the grant of power to the COMELEC must be express. I believe, however, that the constitutional provision investing the COMELEC with appellate jurisdiction is clear and broad enough to comprehend the issuance of the questioned writ.
The power to be the "judge x x x of x x x contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of any public official is essentially judicial. As such, x x x, it belongs exclusively to the judicial department, except only insofar as the Constitution provides otherwise." (Lopez v. Roxas, 17 SCRA 756 [1966]; citing Matthews, American Constitutional System; Cooley, Thomas M., A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations, Vol. 1, pp. 270-271, 1927 ed.; 23 W & P 147 [1965 Pocket Part]; State ex rel. Tanner v. Duncan, 10 So. 2d 507, 511, 23 W & P 148, supra). In granting the COMELEC with the powers and functions to "exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction" (Sec. 2 [2], Art. IX-C, Constitution), the Constitution vested upon the COMELEC judicial powers to decide all contests relating to elective local officials as therein provided.
As defined in the Constitution, "(j)udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government" (Sec. 1, par. 2, Art. VIII). Since the COMELEC, in discharging its appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 2 (2), Art. IX-C, acts a court of justice performing judicial power and said power includes the determination of whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that the COMELEC, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This, I believe, is the constitutional intent although not spelled out in black and white.
On this score, the classic pronouncement of Justice Holmes in his landmark dissent should serve as a timely reminder:
"The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other. x x x When we come to the fundamental distinctions it is still more obvious that they must be received with a certain latitude or our government could not go on." (Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 US 189 [1927])
In upholding the authority of the COMELEC to issue the subject writs, I do not wish to imply that as a general proposition, the COMELEC is superior over the Regional Trial Courts. (The case of People v. Delgado cited in the ponencia involves criminal prosecutions which are, undoubtedly, within the province of the regional trial courts.) However, a criminal case instituted by the People is one thing; an electoral contest involving private litigants is another. As a general rule, Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over criminal cases. The COMELEC has none. In other words, what is at issue here is not a criminal prosecution, or a civil action for that matter, but rather an election contest involving as it does public interest calling for a proper resolution before an appropriate body. As to which forum is superior in litigations relating to election contests involving local public officials, as in the case at bar, there is no doubt the COMELEC has jurisdictional ascendancy since it has appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or involving elective baranqay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction (Sec. 2 [2], Art. IX-C, Constitution; underscoring supplied).
In Angara v. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 139 [1936]), the Court held:
"The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duly enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission." (citing Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, pp. 138-139; underscoring supplied).
The above doctrine was reiterated by this Court in the case of Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal (168 SCRA 391 [1988]) and should find application to the similar power conferred upon the COMELEC in aid of its appellate jurisdiction in the exercise of its judicial function. In the absence of a constitutional proscription, I submit that this Court should not narrow down the appellate and incidental powers which the constitution confers upon the respondent COMELEC.
And finally, in the 1941 case of Sumulong v. COMELEC (73 Phil. 288), this Court had occasion to note that:
"The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with restriction that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization. The Commission may err, so may this court also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created -- free, orderly and honest elections. We may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere. Politics is a practical matter x x x."
x x x
"There are no ready-made formulas for solving public problems. Time and experience are necessary to evolve patterns that will serve the ends of good government. In the matter of the administration of the laws, relative to the conduct of elections, x x x, we must not by any excessive zeal take away from the Commission on Elections the initiative which by constitutional and legal mandates properly belongs to it. Due regard to the independent character of the Commission, as ordained in the Constitution, requires that the power of this Court to review the acts of that body should, as a general proposition, be used sparingly, but firmly in appropriate cases. We are not satisfied that the present suit is one of such cases." (underscoring supplied)
In issuing the assailed writs, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, the COMELEC did not overstep its authority nor did it act in a capricious, whimsical or despotic manner amounting to grave abuse of discretion equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Accordingly, I vote to DISMISS the instant petitions.
Footnotes
1 "Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc."
Concurring Opinion
CRUZ, J.:
I concur, and would add only the following brief observations.
It is argued that the competence of the Commission on Elections to issue writs of certiorari is derived from its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving elective barangay officials. I do not believe that this power can be that simply and easily implied nor am I persuaded by the cases cited, which are of American origin and have no application here. In our country, the controlling rule is found in the Constitution, which clearly says that it is only Congress that has the power to "define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts," subject only to certain specified limitations. (Article VIII, Section 2). Conformably, every judicial tribunal must trace its power to issue writs of certiorari to an express authorization from the legislature and not to mere inference. I know of no such tribunal that exercises this power on the sole justification that it is an appellate court.
The Supreme Court itself derives its power to issue writs of certiorari not by implication only from its appellate jurisdiction but by an express grant in Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution.⌊aшΡhi⌊ Furthermore, it may exercise this power only "as the law or rules of Court may provide" under paragraph 2 of that section, which means that the conferment is not automatic or self-executing. Without such implementation, this Court is powerless to issue writs of certiorari in the appealed cases mentioned in that provision even if it is the highest court in the land.
We cannot be less strict with the Commission on Elections, which is essentially only an administrative body. If even the Supreme Court itself can be so inhibited by no less than the Constitution, I see no logic in allowing the Commission on Elections a wider latitude in the exercise of what is clearly a judicial power. And on such a fragile ground. While I may concede that this agency can exercise the power if expressly allowed by the legislature, I reject the notion that it can claim such jurisdiction by mere implication.
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