Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992
ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Separate Opinion
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the majority decision penned by Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano but am at a loss for reasons why an experienced Judge should insist on proceeding to trial in a sensational murder case without preliminary investigation inspite of the vigorous and continued objection and reservation of rights of the accused and notwithstanding the recommendations of the Prosecutor that those rights must be respected. If the Court had faithfully followed the Rules, trial would have proceeded smoothly and if the accused is really guilty, then he may have been convicted by now. As it is, the case has to go back to square one.
I agree with Justice Isagani Cruz "that the trial court has (apparently) been moved by a desire to cater to public opinion to the detriment of the impartial administration of justice." Mass media has its duty to fearlessly but faithfully inform the public about events and persons. However, when a case has received wide and sensational publicity, the trial court should be doubly careful not only to be fair and impartial but also to give the appearance of complete objectivity in its handling of the case.
The need for a trial court to follow the Rules and to be fair, impartial, and persistent in getting the true facts of a case is present in all cases but it is particularly important if the accused is indigent; more so, if he is one of those unfortunates who seem to spend more time behind bars than outside. Unlike the accused in this case who enjoys the assistance of competent counsel, a poor defendant convicted by wide and unfavorable media coverage may be presumed guilty before trial and be unable to defend himself properly. Hence, the importance of the court always following the Rules.
While concurring with Justice Feliciano's ponencia, I am constrained to add the foregoing observations because I feel they form an integral part of the Court's decision.
Separate Opinion
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I was one of the members of the Court who initially felt that the petitioner had waived the right to preliminary investigation because he freely participated in his trial and his counsel even cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. A closer study of the record, however, particularly of the transcript of the proceedings footnoted in the ponencia, reveals that he had from the start demanded a preliminary investigation and that his counsel had reluctantly participated in the trial only because the court threatened to replace him with a counsel de oficio if he did not. Under the circumstances, I am convinced that there was no waiver. The petitioner was virtually compelled to go to trial. Such compulsion and unjustified denial of a clear statutory right of the petitioner vitiated the proceedings as violative of procedural due process.
It is true that the ruling we lay down here will take the case back to square one, so to speak, but that is not the petitioner's fault. He had the right to insist that the procedure prescribed by the Rules of Court be strictly observed. The delay entailed by the procedural lapse and the attendant expense imposed on the Government and the defendant must be laid at the door of the trial judge for his precipitate and illegal action.
It appears that the trial court has been moved by a desire to cater to public opinion to the detriment of the impartial administration of justice. The petitioner as portrayed by the media is not exactly a popular person. Nevertheless, the trial court should not have been influenced by this irrelevant consideration, remembering instead that its only guide was the mandate of the law.
Separate Opinion
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I regret that I cannot agree with the majority opinion in this case. At this point, after four (4) prosecution witnesses have already testified, among them an eyewitness who identified the accused as the gunman who shot Eldon Maguan inside his car in cold blood, and a security guard who identified the plate number of the gunman's car, I do not believe that there is still need to conduct a preliminary investigation the sole purpose of which would be to ascertain if there is sufficient ground to believe that a crime was committed (which the petitioner does not dispute) and that he (the petitioner) is probably guilty thereof (which the prosecutor, by filing the information against him, presumably believed to be so).
In the present stage of the presentation of the prosecution's evidence, to return the case to the Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation under Rule 112 of the 1985 Rule on Criminal Procedure would be supererogatory.
This case did not suffer from a lack of previous investigation. Diligent police work, with ample media coverage, led to the identification of the suspect who, seven (7) days after the shooting, appeared at the San Juan police station to verify news reports that he was the object of a police manhunt. Upon entering the station, he was positively identified as the gunman by an eyewitness who was being interrogated by the police to ferret more clues and details about the crime. The police thereupon arrested the petitioner and on the same day, July 8, 1991, promptly filed with the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal, a complaint for frustrated homicide against him. As the victim died the next day, July 9, 1991, before an information could be filed, the First Assistant Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for frustrated homicide, filed an information for murder on July 11, 1991 in the Regional Trial Court, with no bail recommended.
However, the Provincial Prosecutor, acting on the petitioner's omnibus motion for preliminary investigation and release on bail (which was erroneously filed with his office instead of the court), recommended a cash bond of P100,000 for his release, and submitted the omnibus motion to the trial court for resolution.
Respondent Judge Benjamin Pelayo must have realized his impetuosity shortly after he had issued: (a) his order of July 12, 1991 approving the petitioner's cash bail bond without a hearing, and (b) his order of July 16, 1991 granting the Prosecutor leave to conduct a preliminary investigation, for he motu propio issued on July 17, 1991 another order rescinding his previous orders and setting for hearing the petitioner's application for bail.
The cases cited in page 15 of the majority opinion in support of the view that the trial of the case should be suspended and that the prosecutor should now conduct a preliminary investigation, are not on all fours with this case.ℒαwρhi৷ In Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354 and People vs. Monton, 23 SCRA 1024, the trial of the criminal case had not yet commenced because motions to quash the information were filed by the accused. Lozada vs. Hernandez, 92 Phil. 1053; U.S. vs. Banzuela, 31 Phil. 565; San Diego vs. Hernandez, 24 SCRA 110 and People vs. Oandasan, 25 SCRA 277 are also inapplicable because in those cases preliminary investigations had in fact been conducted before the informations were filed in court.
It should be remembered that as important as is the right of the accused to a preliminary investigation, it is not a constitutional right. Its absence is not a ground to quash the information (Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354). It does not affect the court's jurisdiction, nor impair the validity of the information (Rodis vs. Sandiganbayan, 166 SCRA 618), nor constitute an infringement of the right of the accused to confront witnesses (Bustos vs. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640).
The petitioner's motion for a preliminary investigation is not more important than his application for release on bail, just as the conduct of such preliminary investigation is not more important than the hearing of the application for bail. The court's hearing of the application for bail should not be subordinated to the preliminary investigation of the charge. The hearing should not be suspended, but should be allowed to proceed for it will accomplish a double purpose. The parties will have an opportunity to show not only: (1) whether or not there is probable cause to believe that the petitioner killed Eldon Maguan, but more importantly (b) whether or not the evidence of his guilt is strong. The judge's determination that the evidence of his guilt is strong would naturally foreclose the need for a preliminary investigation to ascertain the probability of his guilt.
The bail hearing may not be suspended because upon the filing of an application for bail by one accused of a capital offense, "the judge is under a legal obligation to receive evidence with the view of determining whether evidence of guilt is so strong as to warrant denial of bond." (Payao vs. Lesaca, 63 Phil. 210; Hadhirul Tahil vs. Eisma, 64 SCRA 378; Peralta vs. Ramos and Provincial Fiscal of Isabela, 71 Phil. 271; Padilla vs. Enrile, 121 SCRA 472; Ilagan vs. Ponce Enrile, 139 SCRA 349; People vs. Albofera, 152 SCRA 123)
The abolition of the death penalty did not make the right to bail absolute, for persons charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong, are not bailable (Sec. 3, Art. III, 1987 Constitution). In People vs. Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489, we called down the trial court for having granted the motion for bail in a murder case without any hearing and without giving the prosecution an opportunity to comment or file objections thereto.
Similarly this Court held in People vs. Bocar, 27 SCRA 512:
. . . due process also demands that in the matter of bail the prosecution should be afforded full opportunity to present proof of the guilt of the accused. Thus, if it were true that the prosecution in this case was deprived of the right to present its evidence against the bail petition, or that the order granting such petition was issued upon incomplete evidence, then the issuance of the order would really constitute abuse of discretion that would call for the remedy of certiorari. (Emphasis supplied.)
The petitioner may not be released pending the hearing of his petition for bail for it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is not in the custody of the law (Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, 2 SCRA 888).
I respectfully take exception to the statements in the ponencia that the "petitioner was not arrested at all" (p. 12) and that "petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a warrant" (p. 130). Arrest is the taking of the person into the custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense (Sec. 1, Rule 113, Rules of Court). An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest (Sec. 2, Rule 113, Rules of Court). When Go walked into the San Juan Police Station on July 8, 1991, and placed himself at the disposal of the police authorities who clamped him in jail after he was identified by an eyewitness as the person who shot Maguan, he was actually and effectively arrested. His filing of a petition to be released on bail was a waiver of any irregularity attending his arrest and estops him from questioning its validity (Callanta vs. Villanueva, 77 SCRA 377; Bagcal vs. Villaraza, 120 SCRA 525).
I vote to dismiss the petition and affirm the trial court's order of July 17, 1991.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
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