The Sandiganbayan was, to be sure, quite correct in emphasizing to Oñas on July 1, 1988 that by filing a demurrer to evidence, she was waiving the right to present evidence. That cautionary advice was entirely justified by the governing provision then in force, Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure — a provision having no counterpart in the 1964 Rules and obviously meant to alter the jurisprudential principle therefore obtaining — said Section 15 reading as follows:
SEC. 15. Demurrer to Evidence. — When after the prosecution has rested its case, the accused files a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.
But the law was changed after Oñas' demurrer to evidence had been overruled, verdict rendered against her, her motion for reconsideration of her conviction denied by Resolution promulgated on November 9, 1988 and before she could take an appeal to this Court. On November 13, 1988, the 1988 amendments to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (Rules 110-126, Rules of Court) went into effect. Section 15, Rule 119, was amended to read as follows:
SEC. 15. Demurrer to Evidence. — After the prosecution has rested its case, the Court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with prior leave of court.
If the Court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. (n)
Pursuant to the time-honored rule to which attention is drawn by the Solicitor General, that adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, the amended provision should have been applied to Oñas, specially since it is favorable to her. So does this Court now rule; Section 15, Rule 119, as lastly amended, applies as regards Oñas. Since she sought and was granted leave to file a demurrer to evidence, and she made an explicit reservation to present evidence in the event of denial of her demurrer withdrawing an earlier waiver made by her, her situation falls within said Section 15, Rule 119, as amended. Not having expressly waived the right to adduce evidence, she did not lose the right to do so after her motion for dismissal was denied. Hence, the Court is constrained to regard as grave error, because contrary to the letter and spirit of the applicable law (albeit probably unintended), the Sandiganbayan's act of ruling otherwise under the circumstances, and convicting Oñas on the basis only of the evidence of the prosecution.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SET ASIDE (1) the Order of the Trial Court of July 27, 1987 — declaring the case submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution, the accused Londoño being deemed to have waived the right to present evidence by filing a demurrer to evidence; (2) the Order of October 28, 1987 — denying Londoño's motion of September 19, 1987; and (3) the Decision promulgated on January 26, 1988, and to REMAND the case to the Trial Court for reception of the appellant's evidence and such further proceedings as are required by law, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
1 178 SCRA 261, 265-267; see also, Peo. v. Ciobal, 184 SCRA 464, promulgated by the First Division on April 20,1990, per Gancayco, J., and the extended Resolution of the Third Division of this Court dated September 19, 1989 in G.R. No. 78759 entitled "Bonalos v. People".
2 Branch III, Hon. Wenceslao R. Villanueva, Jr., presiding.
3 Original record, p. 412.
4 Id., pp. 441-449.
5 Id., pp. 416, 417, 427, 428, 436.
6 Id., pp. 453-457.
7 Id., p. 458.
8 Id., pp. 459-462.
9 Id., p, 469.
10 Id., pp, 468-469.
11 Id., p. 473.
12 Id., p. 505.
13 Id., SEE pp. 485-499.
14 Id., p. 507.
15 178 SCRA 261, 265-267, SEE footnote 1, ante.
16 Footnotes omitted.