WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of respondent ECC is hereby set aside and the Government Service Insurance System is ordered to pay petitioner the sums of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) as death benefits, One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) as funeral expenses and One Thousand and Two Hundred Pesos (P1,200,00) as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting opinion:
I regret that I have to express my dissent in this case.
The majority opinion tries to infuse elements of the defunct Workmens Compensation Act into the present scheme under the new Employees Compensation Law. Only Congress can do this. We have to interpret the law as it now exists, not as it used to be or as we want it to become.
The two systems, the former workmens compensation system and the present employees' compensation scheme are quite different. The Court's old rulings on the presumption of compensability, controversion, adversarial procedure and levels of payment, among others, no longer apply. The new law uses the social security principle in the handling of Workmens Compensation not the old system where the employer and the employee oppose each other and where so many presumptions in favor of the worker were evolved to correct the imbalance.
In Raro v. Employees Compensation Commission, et al, 172 SCRA 845 [1989], we stated:
The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing — that the illness was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. To say that since the proof is not available, therefore, the trust fund has the obligation to pay is contrary to the legal requirement that proof must be adduced. The existence of otherwise non-existent proof cannot be presumed.
In Navalta v. Government Service Insurance System (G.R. No. 46684, April 27, 1988) this Court recognized the fact that cancer is a disease of still unknown origin which strikes people in all walks of life, employed or unemployed. Unless it be shown that a particular form of cancer is caused by specific working conditions (e.g. chemical fumes, nuclear radiation, asbestos dust, etc.) we cannot conclude that it was the employment which increased the risk of contracting the disease.
I am afraid that the evidence presented to show that cirrhosis of the liver is caused by employment does not meet the standards required under the new Employees' Compensation Law. We are again engaging in presumptions.
I cannot see how the work of a public school teacher difficult though it may be, creates hazards which naturally cause the liver sickness. The disease from which the late Mr. Librea suffered is one to which mankind in general is exposed or afflicted, irregardless of the nature of this work. (Erese v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 138 SCRA 192, 199 [1985]). It is not caused by the employment nor is the risk of contracting cirrhosis of the liver increased by the work of a teacher.
I therefore vote to DENY the petition.
# Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting opinion:
I regret that I have to express my dissent in this case.
The majority opinion tries to infuse elements of the defunct Workmens Compensation Act into the present scheme under the new Employees Compensation Law. Only Congress can do this. We have to interpret the law as it now exists, not as it used to be or as we want it to become.
The two systems, the former workmens compensation system and the present employees' compensation scheme are quite different. The Court's old rulings on the presumption of compensability, controversion, adversarial procedure and levels of payment, among others, no longer apply. The new law uses the social security principle in the handling of Workmens Compensation not the old system where the employer and the employee oppose each other and where so many presumptions in favor of the worker were evolved to correct the imbalance.
In Raro v. Employees Compensation Commission, et al, 172 SCRA 845 [1989], we stated:
The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing — that the illness was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. To say that since the proof is not available, therefore, the trust fund has the obligation to pay is contrary to the legal requirement that proof must be adduced. The existence of otherwise non-existent proof cannot be presumed.
In Navalta v. Government Service Insurance System (G.R. No. 46684, April 27, 1988) this Court recognized the fact that cancer is a disease of still unknown origin which strikes people in all walks of life, employed or unemployed. Unless it be shown that a particular form of cancer is caused by specific working conditions (e.g. chemical fumes, nuclear radiation, asbestos dust, etc.) we cannot conclude that it was the employment which increased the risk of contracting the disease.
I am afraid that the evidence presented to show that cirrhosis of the liver is caused by employment does not meet the standards required under the new Employees' Compensation Law. We are again engaging in presumptions.
I cannot see how the work of a public school teacher difficult though it may be, creates hazards which naturally cause the liver sickness. The disease from which the late Mr. Librea suffered is one to which mankind in general is exposed or afflicted, irregardless of the nature of this work. (Erese v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 138 SCRA 192, 199 [1985]). It is not caused by the employment nor is the risk of contracting cirrhosis of the liver increased by the work of a teacher.
I therefore vote to DENY the petition.