G.R. No. 81093




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 81093 March 6, 1990 PORAC TRUCKING, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Fifteenth Division), HON. EUGENIO S. LABITORIA, In his capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC-Macabebe, Pampanga (Branch LV) and EMERENCIANA GUEVARRA, respondents. Ernesto L. Pineda for petitioner. Atlee T. Viray for private respondent. SARMIENTO, J: This is a petition for review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in "Emerenciana Guevarra, plaintiff-appellee v. Porac Trucking Inc., defendant-appellant," 1 promulgated on July 20, 1987, and the Resolution of the same court dated December 15, 1987, 2 denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the herein petitioner Porac Trucking, Inc. [hereafter, simply PORAC TRUCKING]. The case at bar arose from a complaint for damages filed by the private respondent Emerenciana Guevarra in the Regional Trial Court, Branch LV at San Fernando, Pampanga 3 against PORAC TRUCKING and Albert Mercado, in a joint and several capacity, arising from a collision incident involving the truck owned by the petitioner while driven by a certain Albert Mercado, and the mini Isuzu cargo truck of Guevarra. The lower court issued summons directed to Albert Mercado and PORAC TRUCKING, ordering them to answer the complaint. While Albert Mercado received the personal service of summons on April 28, 1984, a certain Hermie Lansangan, according to the Sheriff, refused to receive the copy of the summons for PORAC TRUCKING. Thus the Sheriff's return on PORAC TRUCKING, dated April 28, 1984, remains unsigned. On June 11, 1984, the lower court declared PORAC TRUCKING in default. Later, a certain Atty. Rodolfo Macalin filed a "Motion for Leave to File Answer Beyond Reglementary Period" attaching thereto the answer of the supposed defendants. Thereafter, the lower court took this "appearance" of Atty. Macalino to mean the voluntary submission by PORAC TRUCKING to its jurisdiction. On June 21, 1985, the lower court rendered a decision in favor of Guevarra and against defendants Mercado and PORAC TRUCKING. A motion for execution was filed by Guevarra on August 14, 1985 and the writ was subsequently issued on August 23, 1985. It was only on November 12, 1985 that the petitioner, represented by its in-house counsel, filed a "Petition for Relief from Judgment with Prayer for Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction." This time, the lawyer was not Atty. Macalino. Although a restraining order was issued against the implementation of the writ of execution, the lower court eventually issued a resolution dismissing the "Petition for Relief from Judgment . . ." On April 8, 1986, the petitioner appealed alleging that the defect in the service of summons was never cured by the unauthorized appearance of Atty. Macalino. 4 On the merits, the petitioner alleges that the appellee Guevarra has waived all claims from the accident with the execution of her "Affidavit of Desistance." In the said "Affidavit of Desistance" or "Release of Claim," it appears that Guevarra had received from First Integrated Bonding and Insurance Co., Inc. (FIBICI), insurer of her vehicle, the amount of P19,579.80. This amount was in turn received by FIBICI from Rico General Insurance, the insurer of PORAC TRUCKING, with the stated purpose that: . . . this RELEASE may be pleaded in bar to any suit of (sic) proceeding which I/WE or anyone in my/our behalf, may have taken or may be taken in connection with the accident hereinbefore mentioned . . . 5 However, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the judgment appealed from and dissolving the preliminary injunction it earlier issued enjoining the implementation of the writ of execution, in effect granting the claim filed by Guevarra against PORAC TRUCKING. On August 14, 1988, the petitioner filed this petition for review after its Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the respondent court on December 15, 1987. The only issue for our resolution is whether or not the summons was properly served on the petitioner so as to confer jurisdiction on the then Court of First Instance over PORAC TRUCKING, the then defendant. Section 13 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Sec. 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership — If the defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly registered, service may be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors. As held in Delta Motor Sales Corp. v. Mangosing 6 cited in the recent case of Rebollido v. Court of Appeals: 7 The purpose of the rule is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons may be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do with legal papers served on him or in other words to bring home to the corporation notice of the filing of the action. In the present case, the summons was supposed to have been received by a certain Hermie Lansangan who refused to acknowledge the receipt thereof. He refused to sign for the petitioner corporation. And rightly so, for he was certainly not the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of the directors of PORAC TRUCKING. As a matter of fact, the capacity, if any, in which Lansangan would bind the corporation was never established. It appears that the only relationship Lansangan had with the petitioner corporation was that he acted as middle man for specific delivery contracts. 8 In some cases, the Court has been liberal in bending this rule whenever the resulting circumstance would facilitate the administration of justice, and in requiring only "substantial compliance". 9 These exceptions were allowed only because of the peculiar circumstances attending the case, namely that: 1) there was actual receipt of the summons by the person served, meaning the possession of the copy of the summons was transferred from the Sheriff to the person served; 2) there was a signature on the Sheriff's return or receipt by the person served; and 3) there was actual receipt of the summons by then defendant corporation, now petitioner, through the person on whom the legal papers were actually served. In the case at bar, none of these requisites is present, nor do they appear to have been complied with. Hence the case should be returned to the trial court for the proper hearing on the merits in order to preclude any possible infringement of due process. And who is Atty. Rodolfo Macalino? He is the lawyer of Rico General Insurance Corporation, the insurer of PORAC TRUCKING. Rico General Insurance Corporation worked for a settlement of the claim arising from the said accident with First Integrated Bonding and Insurance, the insurer of Emerenciana Guevarra. And that is where Atty. Macalino's role begins and ends as far as this case is concerned. Certainly, the lawyer of the insurance company did not ipso facto become the lawyer for the insured in all subsequent litigations arising from the accident. And this is as it should be, notwithstanding the claims of one Edgardo Simon, Manager of Rico General Insurance, who declared under oath that when he learned of the pendency of the civil case against the driver and the PORAC TRUCKING, he himself had instructed their house counsel, Atty. Macalino, to represent PORAC TRUCKING. Simon, however, specifically stated that he never informed PORAC TRUCKING about the move. Neither was Atty. Macalino ever hired by PORAC TRUCKING to represent it in any case. It would seem now that this elaborate scheme was devised to insure the right to subrogation of Rico General Insurance in case a judgment favorable to PORAC TRUCKING were to be rendered. And yet as an officer of the court, Atty. Macalino should have known better than to appear in a case on behalf of another at the mere prodding of his client. However we leave the hearing of the merits of the case to the trial court since the private respondent had failed to comment 10 on the veracity of the called "Release of Claims." Nevertheless this document must be presented in evidence and litigated on by the parties to establish once and for all the extent of their interests for a full satisfaction of their claims. In any case, the unsolicited appearance of Atty. Rodolfo Macalino, in the absence of a client-lawyer relationship with the petitioner corporation, is unbecoming of a member of the bar, to say the least. The remanding of the case must be without prejudice to the investigation of his actuations. The presiding judge of the court a quo is hereby ordered to undertake this investigation and report to the court his findings and recommendations within thirty days from receipt hereof. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the trial court for the proper proceedings. SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur. Footnotes 1 CA-G.R. CV No. 08936, Chua, Segundino G., ponente; Lapeña, Jr., Nicolas P., and Ejercito, Bienvenido C., JJ. Rollo, 18. 2 Rollo, 37. 3 Civil Case No. 84-0039 (M). 4 Memorandum on Appeal, Original Records, AC-G.R. CV No. 08936, p. 33. 5 Rollo, 33. "Release of Claim" signed by Emerenciana Guevarra, Annex "C" to the Petition for Relief from Judgment filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch LV, in Civil Case No. 84-0039-M. See Original Records, AC-G.R. CV No. 08936. 6 No. L-41667, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 602. 7 G.R. No. 81123, February 28, 1989. 8 Affidavit of Maria Adelaida C. Dizon, attached as Annex F to the Petition for Relief from Judgement filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch LV, in Civil Case No. 84-0039-M; supra note 5. 9 G & G Trading Corp. v. Court of Appeals, No. 78299, February 29, 1988, 158 SCRA 469; Rebollido v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 7. 10 Resolution of the Second Division, Supreme Court, June 8, 1988 for G.R. No. 81093, Rollo, 58. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation