After going thoroughly over the evidence, adduced by the party litigants herein, this Court finds, and so holds, that plaintiffs Cresenciano Prado and Orlando de la Guison are agricultural tenants of the defendant. Hence, they are entitled to the by of tenure as provided for under Section 7, R.A. 3844.
As revealed by the evidence. plaintiffs are residing at Hda. Mercedes, owned by the defendant herein, situated at Barrio Ma-ao, Bago City. They are cultivating a palay landholding in the said hacienda and religiously paying rentals to the landholder, Ma. Luisa Vda. de Donato.
Plaintiff Orlando de la Guison is a tenant of Ma. Luisa Vda. de Donato since 1971 in the palay portion of the latter's hacienda. Thus, in the affidavit of Zacarias Maypa dated October 30, 1979 (Exh. "F") the affiant declares that the aforementioned plaintiff is a tenant since 1971 and that he religiously paid his lease rental to the landholder, Ma. Luisa Vda. de Donato. This declaration is corroboration by another witness for the plaintiff, Jose Arandilla in his affidavit dated October 30,1979 (Exhibit "G").
Plaintiff Cresenciano Prado is a tenant of the defendant herein since 1963 but it is only in 1972 that he became a leasehold tenant with a yearly rental of fifty (50) cavans. The landholding of plaintiff Prado was formerly 1.56 have but later on it was increased to 6.16 hectares. The increase of area of cultivation of plaintiff Prado was certified by no other than Carlito Mamon, team leader 1 of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform at Bago City, when he issued a certification to the effect that plaintiff is a tenant-tiller of Maria Luisa Vda. de Donato cultivating an area of 6.16 hectares, situated at Hda. Mercedes, Bago City (Exhibit "K"). Moreover, an affidavit of Manuel Cayagas dated August 2. 1978 (Exhibit "C") can not escape our attention. In the aforementioned declaration, Cayagas declared that he has inspected the landholding of plaintiff Prado because the latter is going to secure loan (Exhibit "B") from the Rural Bank of Murcia amounting to P2,400.00 to be spent in the expenses for his farm cultivation. Such aforementioned amount was actually secured by Prado from the said Rural Bank.
Faced by the preponderance of evidence above-mentioned we conclude nothing except that plaintiffs herein are agricultural tenants of the defendants herein.
As defined by law a "tenant is a person who himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by another, with the latter's consent for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in money, or both, under the leasehold tenancy system. Likewise, as ruled by the Honorable Court of Appeals in the case of Pedro Montero vs. Necitas Rama, et al, CA-G.R. No. SP-07204, March 28,1978, the essential requisites of tenancy relationship which are the following to wit:
(1) the parties are landholder and tenant;
(2) the subject in litigation is an agricultural land;
(3) there is consent;
(4) the purpose is agricultural production;
(5) consideration;
have been concurrently satisfied by the plaintiff herein which convince this court that they are working in the land of the defendant in the concept of tenants.
Although it does not show in evidence that express consent of the landholder, Ma. Luisa Vda. de Donato, has been solicited by the plaintiffs herein, however, this fact may not disrupt or prejudice the theory of the plaintiffs that they are tenants. As provided by law consent may be given orally or in writing, express or implied.
By allowing the plaintiffs to cultivate the landholding in question and in receiving the owner's share of the produce defendant impliedly recognized the plaintiffs as tenants and there arose between them implied contract of tenancy. In the case of de la Cruz vs. Castro (CA-G.R. No. 47039-K, January 5, 1972) the Court of Appeals has held that by allowing a person to cultivate the land and accepting share or rental from him is an eloquent example of implied consent.
On the other hand, the contention of defendant that plaintiffs herein are not her tenants is pointless, flimsy and baseless. The theory of the defendant that Hda. Mercedes is a sugar land and hence plaintiffs herein worked thereat as cane laborers is belied by the fact that there are portions of the said hacienda that are planted to palay especially the lowland portion where the Bago irrigation system can reach. If indeed plaintiffs are her sugar cane laborers why is it that plaintiffs have a farmholding in the said hacienda and are giving share of their produce to the landowner thereof. This aforementioned fact can not alienate nor distort the attention of this Court that plaintiffs herein are agricultural tenants of defendant Ma. Luisa Vda. de Donato in her land situated at Hda. Mercedes, Barangay Ma-ao, Bago City.