G.R. No. L-59690




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-59690 October 28, 1987 LUIS HAGOSOJOS, petitioner vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and ARACELI H. VDA. DE HAGOSOJOS, FRED HAGOSOJOS, HEIDI HAGOSOJOS, HENRY HAGOSOJOS, ARACELI HAGOSOJOS-ALINDOGAN, assisted by her husband, RAMON ALINDOGAN, and LOURDES HAGOSOJOS-NICOLAS, assisted by her husband, JOSE NICOLAS, respondents, SARMIENTO, J.: This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal and setting aside of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR No. 63307-R, entitled Luis Hagosojos vs. Araceli Vda. de Hagasojos, et al., which set aside the decision dated December 5, 1975, and the order dated July 12, 1976 of the then Court of First Instance of Sorsogon in Civil Case No. 363 2 approving the Compromise Agreement entered into by the parties. The facts that gave rise to the present controversy are as follows: Anastacio Hagosojos contracted two marriages during his lifetime. His first marriage on February 14, 1920 with Jacinta Jaucian (according to the Petition, while the Compromise Agreement copied in the Decision and quoted in the Record On Appeal states the surname of Jacinta as "Guardian") produced three off-springs, namely: the petitioner, Luis Hagosojos, and the two other private respondents, Araceli Hagosojos-Alindogan and Lourdes Hagosojos-Nicolas. More than five years after the demise of Jacinta Jaucian on April 4, 1959, but without the conjugal partnership assets of the first marriage having been partitioned and distributed, he got married a second time on December 21, 1965, to Araceli Hian Out of the second marriage were born the other private respondents, Fred, Heidi, and Henry, all surnamed Hagosojos. On January 22, 1973, Anastacio donated to Henry, who was then only seven years young, Lot No. 2736, containing an area of 15,529 square meters, a portion of the property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-740 which was part of the conjugal partnership assets of the first marriage. The donation was accepted on behalf of Henry by his mother, Araceli. There is nothing in the records of this case as to whether or not the deed of donation was registered. On May 29, 1974, to compel the partition and distribution of the conjugal partnership assets of the first marriage, the petitioner, together with his two sisters, private respondents Araceli Hagosojos-Alindogan and Lourdes Hagosojos-Nicolas, filed the corresponding complaint against their father, Anastacio. While the case was still pending however, Anastacio died on August 21, 1974, which compelled Luis to file an amended complaint substituting as defendant Araceli Vda. de Hagosojos in her personal capacity and as guardian of the minors Fred, Heidi, and Henry Hagosojos. For one reason or another, Araceli Hagosojos - Alindogan and Lourdes Hagosojos - Nicolas surprisingly refused to side with their brother of full blood, petitioner Luis Hagosojos, in the amended complaint, and were thus impleaded as defendants. The parties tried to settle their conflict amicably during the course of the proceedings in the trial court. As a result, Araceli Vda de Hagosojos, assisted by her counsel, drew up a compromise agreement which she presented to the petitioner for approval. When Luis agreed, he and his stepmother, Araceli, together with their lawyers, signed the Compromise Agreement. On December 4, 1975, they submitted the same to the trial court for approval. Accordingly, the trial court, on December 5, 1975, rendered a decision providing inter alia that the whole property covered by original Certificate of Title No. P-740 shall pertain to the children of the first marriage, as stipulated in the Compromise Agreement. On April 5, 1976, after the judgment had long become final, the private respondents Araceli Vda. de Hagosojos and her children Fred, Heidi, and Henry, filed a "Motion to Amend Decision Based On Mistake" wherein they alleged, among others. xxx xxx xxx 3. That the Compromise Agreement was vitiated by mistake in that defendant Araceli H. Vda. de Hagosojos for herself and her co-defendants children in good faith signed the Compromise Agreement not knowing that the portion of land designated as Cad. Lot No. 2736 covered by O.C.T. No. P-740 which had long been transferred to his son, defendant Henry Hagosojos by donation was erroneously left out and substituted by a portion covered by O.C.T. No. P-741 ... 3 xxx xxx xxx They claimed that Lot No. 2736 consisting of 15,529 square meters could no longer be validly given to the children of the first marriage, In lieu of Lot No. 2736, the private respondents then offered to the petitioner as property pertaining to the children of the first marriage, several parcels of land which were among the properties originally assigned in the Compromise Agreement to the heirs of the second marriage. The trial court, on June 18, 1976, denied the private respondents motion and ruled that, "the court arrived at the unalterable conclusion that it has no power or authority to amend, alter or modify the judgment entered on December 5, 1975 based on a compromise agreement dated December 4, 1975, signed not only by the opposing parties but by their respective counsels. 4 Undaunted by this initial setback, the private respondents on June 23, 1976, filed a "Motion to Set Aside Compromise Agreement" based on the same ground as their earlier motion. They followed up the motion with a "Supplemental Pleading" on July 7, 1976 in which they interposed the additional argument that the decision of December 5, 1975 (approving the Compromise Agreement) had not yet become final and executory since "there was no project of partition yet submitted by the parties and approved by the Court. x ... " 5 The petitioner opposed. So, on July 12, 1976, the trial court issued an order denying the private respondents' supplemental pleading. 6 Unconvinced by the trial court's rulings, the private respondents elevated the case to the respondent Court of Appeals, which, in a four-page decision promulgated on April 30, 1981, reversed the judgment of the trial court. 7 Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the instant petition and assigned four errors allegedly committed by the respondent appellate court, to wit: ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS COMMITTED A MISTAKE THAT VITIATED THEIR CONSENT. II. THE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED SERIOUSLY IN HOLDING THAT THE JUDICIAL AGREEMENT MAY STILL BE SET ASIDE ON GROUND OF MISTAKE AFTER IT HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY. III. THE COURT OF APPEALS MOST GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DONATION OF LOT NO. 2736, PERTAINING TO THE HEIRS OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE BUT DONATED TO HENRY HAGOSOJOS IS NULL AND VOID. IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS INCURRED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FAILING TO EXTEND RELIEF TO ARACELI AND LOURDES HAGOSOJOS, AS HEIRS OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND PARTIES TO THE CASE. 8 We find the petition impressed with merit. 1. The private respondents assert that mistake vitiated their consent in entering into the Compromise Agreement with the petitioner. They insist that respondent Araceli H. Vda. de Hagosojos in signing the Compromise Agreement dated December 4, 1975, forgot that Lot No. 2736, one of those covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-740 had already been donated by Anastacio Hagosojos to his minor son, Henry Hagosojos, and thus could no longer be assigned in the Compromise Agreement to the children of the first marriage. Thus, the private respondents argue that the trial court's judgment approving the Compromise Agreement is null and void and must perforce be set aside. This claim, which was upheld by the respondent appellate court, is unfounded. We find the alleged mistake of respondent Araceli and of her lawyer not a mistake at all. It is more of negligence, which is inexcusable, and certainly can not be inflicted on the petitioner and his sisters of the full blood. It is inexcusable because the Compromise Agreement was prepared by the private respondents' lawyer without any intervention whatsoever on the part of the petitioner or his counsel. Moreover, the deed evidencing the alleged donation of Lot No. 2736 to private respondent Henry Hagosojos, was an the while in the possession of his mother. There is no gain-saying the conclusion that had she and her counsel exercised, in the preparation of the Compromise Agreement, the standard of care required of an ordinarily prudent man to bestow upon his important business, 9 then the entire controversy would have been obviated. II. The second assignment of error is well founded in law and jurisprudence. For indeed the respondent Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the decision dated December 5, 1975 of the trial court. That decision which approved the Compromise Agreement had long become final and executory. 10 It may no longer be set aside nor in any manner modified. Even if the private respondents in fact committed in good faith a mistake or were excusably negligent and thus there would have been a valid ground to justify the setting aside of the questioned decision by the trial court, the equitable relief afforded by Rule 38 of the Rules of Court would remain unavail ling to them. Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 38 state: Sec. 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from judgment or other proceeding thereof. — When a judgment or order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken, against a party in a Court of First Instance through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same cause praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside. Sec. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification. — A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or order was entered. or such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. In the instant case, while the decision of the trial court was received by the respondents as early as December 5, 1975, the private respondents filed their "Motion To Amend Decision Based On Mistake" only on April 5, 1976, or one hundred twenty one (121) days after they learned of the assailed judgment, or sixty one (61) days late. Likewise, their "Motion To Set Aside Compromise Agreement" was filed on June 23, 1976, or two hundred (200) days after they learned of the judgment, or one hundred forty (140) days way out of time. Clearly then, both motions, even if we are to treat them as petitions for relief from judgment, were filed unseasonably. The decision affirming the Compromise Agreement has become final and executory. (As a matter of law, a judgment on compromise becomes final and immediately executory upon approval thereof by the proper court). 11 In a recent case 12 where the Petition For Relief was denied although filed only one (1) day late, or sixty-one (61) days from receipt of the notice of dismissal (in fact the private respondent learned of the dismissal on the same day), we also denied the petition for review on certiorari. Speaking through Justice Paras, this Court said: xxx xxx xxx It is undisputed that the Petition for Relief in this case was filed 61 days from receipt of the notice of dismissal or one day late. In fact, the records show that counsel for private respondent learned of the dismissal on the same day, April 29, 1967, when he arrived late for the hearing so that the Petition for Relief was at least eight (8) days late. The records further show that counsel for private respondent did not move for reconsideration of the Order of dismissal, nor for new trial. Neither did he appeal, thereby allowing the decision to become final and executory. As a last-resort, he could have availed of the sixty day period provided for by Rule 38 to file a Petition for Relief from Judgment but again he allowed this opportunity to lapse. Indeed, to him is applicable, the well known maxim that "equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. (Henson v. Director of Lands, 55 Phil. 586). In the case of Turqueza v. Hernando (97 SCRA 488 [1980]) the Supreme Court in disallowing the reopening of the case which has become final, ruled that there is no justification in law and in fact, for respondent judge's void act of ordering the reopening of the case which has become final and executory. Thus the Court held: The Court has said time and again that the doctrine of finality of judgments is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error the judgments of courts must become final at some definite date fixed by law. The law gives an exception or "last chance" of a timely petition for relief from judgment within the reglementary period (within 60 days from knowledge and 6 months from entry of judgment) under Rule 38 supra, but such grace period must be taken as "absolutely fixed, inextendible, never interrupted and cannot be subject to any condition or contingency. Because the period fixed is itself devised to meet a condition or contingency (fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect), the equitable remedy is an act of grace, as it were, designed to give the aggrieved party another and last chance and failure to avail of such last chance within the grace period fixed by the statute or Rules of Court is fatal (Turqueza v. Hernando, supra). In expressly reiterating the abovequoted decision, the Supreme Court in Arcilla v. Arcilla (138 SCRA 566 [1985]), held that the Rule is that, for a petition for relief under Rule 38 to be entertained by the court, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that he has faithfully and strictly complied with the provisions of said Rule. Consequently, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the said petition was filed within the reglementary period specified in Sec. 3, of the same, otherwise on this ground alone. the petition should be dismissed. For the foregoing reasons, neither can private respondent invoke "equity as a ground for the reopening of the case "there being an express provision of law under which the remedy can be invoked." (Barrios v. Thong & Co., 7 SCRA 535, 542-543 [1963]). The rule is, equity follows the law" and as discussed in Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence Vol. 2 pp. 188-189 (as cited in Appellant's Brief, p. 20), the meaning of the principle is stated as follows: There are instances, indeed, in which a court of equity gives a remedy. where the law gives none, but where a particular remedy is given by the law, and that remedy is bounded and circumscribed by particular rules, it would be very improper for the court to take it up where the law leaves it and to extend it further than the law allows. xxx xxx xxx Additionally, the private respondents' motion to set aside the Compromise Agreement is fatally defective, because it is not verified and not accompanied with affidavits showing the mistake relied upon and the facts constituting their good and substantial cause of action. On this score alone the trial court would have been correct in dismissing their motion. For in order that relief from judgment may be granted under Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court, there must be a strict observance of the requirements. 13 III. There is merit in the third assignment of error. Paragraph 3 of the Compromise Agreement explicitly provides that "on February 15, 1967, a liquidation and partition of all the properties enumerated in paragraph, one (l) among the heirs of the first and second marriage was made ..." 14 Among those specifically designated in favor of the heirs of the first marriage was the whole property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-740 comprised of six lots including lot No. 2736." 15 In view of that partition in 1967. Anastacio could no longer donate Lot No 2736 to Henry on January 22. 1973 because it had already been adjudicated "To The Heirs of the First Marriage" as the Compromise Agreement specifically states. On the other hand, even it he (Anastacio) is included among the "Heirs of the First Marriage" he could not donate a specific lot by metes and bounds, but only an aliquot part of the whole mass of properties which he and his three children of his first marriage (with Jacinta Jaucian) co-owned. 16 Even in the unlikely event that the statement regarding the liquidation and partition on February 15, 1967 would be found to be a mistake, still Anastacio could not have validly donated Lot No. 2736 to Henry. Considering that all the properties specified in the Compromise Agreement were described conjugal partnership properties of the first marriage, it follows that upon the death of Jacinta, the conjugal partnership evolved into a co-ownership between her surviving spouse Anastacio, and her three children, the petitioner and the two other private respondents, Araceli Hagosojos-Alindogan and Lourdes Hagosojos-Nicolas. Anastacio became the owner of 5/8 of the mass of properties while each of the three children, of 1/8. Thus, even in such a situation, and pending the partition of the properties owned in common and the adjudication in his favor Lot No. 2736, Anastacio could not validly donate the same at that time he claimed he did within the purview of the law on co-ownership. IV. In view of the foregoing, there is no need to be labor the fourth assigned error. We find the trial court's decision approving the Compromise Agreement sufficient protection to the interests and welfare of the two other children of the first marriage, private respondents Araceli Hagosojos-Alindogan and Lourdes Hagosojos-Nicolas. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the Decision dated April 30, 1981 of the Court of Appeals is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision dated December 5, 1975 and the Order of July 12, 1976 of the then Court of First Instance of Sorsogon in Civil Case No. 363 approving the Compromise Agreement, are hereby REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondent Araceli H. Vda. de Hagosojos. SO ORDERED. Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera and Padilla JJ., concur. Footnotes 1 Penned by Justice Edgardo L. Paras, with the concurrence of Justices Venicio Escolin and Mariano A. Zosa, Sixth Division. 2 Both penned by Judge Severino de Leon. 3 Record on Appeal, 6; Rollo, 115. 4 Id. 19; Rollo, 128. 5 Id, 34; Rollo, 143. 6 Id, 35; Rollo, 144. 7 Rollo, 59. 8 Brief for Petitioner, i; Rollo, 172. 9 Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol. II, 563. 10 De los Reyes vs. Ugarte, 75 Phil. 505; Enriquez vs. Padilla, 77 Phil. 373: Bodiongan vs. Ceniza, et al., 102 Phil. 750; Periquet vs. Reyes supra; Samonte vs. Samonte, No. L-40683, June 27, 1975, 64 SCRA 524 (1975); De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-52733, July, 2 3 198 5, 137 SC R 730 (1985). 11 De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals. supra. 12 Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. Hon. Ludivico D. Arciaga, et al., No. L-29701. March 16, 1987. 13 Palomares vs. Jimenez, 90 Phil 773; J.M. Tuason & Co. vs. De la Cruz, No. L-4883, March 25,1953; Samonte vs. SAmonte supra Ong Tiao Seng vs. C.A., No. L-41192-93, January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA 417 (1978); Concepcion vs. Presiding Judge, Br. V, CFI of Bulacan, No. L-35489, December 15, 1982, 119 SCRA 222 (1982); Director of Lands vs. Romamban No. L-36948, August 28,1984,131 SCRA 431 (1984); Arcilla vs. Arcilla. No. L-46674, September 16, 1985, 138 SCRA 560 (1985). 14 Records on Appeal, Id, 2; Rollo, 111. 15 Id 16 Mercado vs. Liwanag, No. L-14429, June 20, 1962, 5 SCRA 472 (1962); Santos vs. Buenconsejo, No. L-21036, June 23, 1965, 14 SCRA 407, (1965); Diversified Credit Corp. vs. Rosado No. L-27933, December 24, 1968, 26 SCRA 470 (1968); Villanueva vs. Florendo, No. L-33158, October 17, 1985, 139 SCRA 3291(985). The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation