Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 2756 November 12, 1987
PRUDENTIAL BANK, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JOSE P. CASTRO and ATTY. BENJAMIN M. GRECIA, respondents.
PER CURIAM: On April 11, 1985, the late Pio Pedrosa, former President of complainant Prudential Bank, filed this Administrative Complaint praying that Judge Jose P. Castro, former Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, Branch LXXXV, be disciplinarily dealt with and that Disbarment proceedings be instituted against respondent Atty. Benjamin M. Grecia.
This Decision deals only with the Disbarment Case against Respondent Grecia, the Complaint as against respondent Judge Castro having been decided by this Court en banc on June 5, 1986.
The Complaint alleges, among others:
x x x x x x x x x
3. In 1976, 1979 and 1983, Macro Textile Mills Corporation (MACRO for short) applied for and was granted credit facilities by the bank secured by real estate mortgages.
4. MACRO having repeatedly defaulted on its obligations, the bank finally applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of its mortgages over TCT No. 261842. The sale was conducted, consummated and registered in the day book of the register of deeds and annotated on the title itself.
5. On August 2, 1984, MACRO through Atty. Mario E. Valderrama filed a complaint for annulment of mortgage and to enjoin foreclosure.
6. On August 6, 1984, MACRO through new counsel here respondent Benjamin M. Grecia filed an amended complaint alleging and claiming P50,000,000.00 actual and compensatory damages and P20,000,000. 00 as value of the mortgaged property.
7. On the same day, August 6, 1984, respondent Judge Jose P. Castro issued an order restraining the register of deeds of Quezon City "from acting on, and completing by affixing his signature on, the assailed registration of the sale at public auction of the mortgage property described under TCT No. 261842 subject of this action"
x x x x x x x x x
8. On the same day, August 6, 1984, respondent Judge Jose P. Castro also issued an order of attachment of the properties of the bank "to the value of the said demands of costs of suit.. ...
9. The writ of attachment having been attempted to be executed against the bank, the bank posted on August 16, 1984 a P10 million bond to discharge it and filed a motion to discharge attachment without prejudice. Respondent judge never acted on said bond or motion.
10. On August 10, 1984, the day scheduled for the hearing of respondent MACRO's application for pre injunction, the bank filed a motion to discharge restraining order and opposition to application for preliminary injunction and attachment. Respondent judge never resolved the motion nor approved the bond.
11. For the filing of the complaint, the clerk of court collected only the amount of P210.00 evidenced by Official Receipt Nos. 6328484 and 6328645 both dated August 2, 1984. ...
Since the original complaint interposed a P50 million claim for damages and sought the annulment of mortgage over a property worth several millions although its value was not stated and since the amended complaint increased the claim for damages to P70 million and also sought the annulment of mortgage over a property now stated to be worth P20 million, the bank filed a motion on August 15, 1984 to collect the proper filing fees which at least should have been P139,900.00. Despite motions to resolve dated August 17, September 3 and October 26, 1984, respondent Judge Jose P. Castro took no action whatsoever.
11. Respondent Judge Jose P. Castro rendered on November 16, 1984 (notice received November 26, 1984) summary judgment annulling the bank's mortgage and ordering the bank to pay P30 million as actual damages and P3 million as exemplary damages plus 20% attorneys' fees for respondent Atty. Benjamin M. Grecia-despite opposition. ...
x x x x x x x x x
12. On February 7, 1985, respondent Judge Jose P. Castro issued an order denying the bank's 19-page (excluding affidavits) motion for reconsideration as pro-forma and on February 13, 1985 an order granting MACRO's motion for execution of his summary judgment as final and executory on the ground that the allegedly pro forma motion for reconsideration did not toll the running of the period of appeal.
x x x x x x x x x
(b) He issued that writ of execution notwithstanding the timely filing by petitioner of a notice of appeal.
The bank's counsel having received notice of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on February 13, 1985, on that same day of their receipt of said notice, the bank filed their notice of appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court-though it still had four (4) days left of its 15-day period of appeal.
(c) Worse, the execution of said writ of execution was attempted on a Friday, at 3:55 P.M., with a demand for the moneys of the bank's tellers rather than for other assets.
At 3:55 P.M., Friday, February 15, 1985, the sheriff accompanied by MACRO's Atty. Benjamin Grecia (respondent here) and several other deputy sheriffs and men swooped down on the bank's branches and principal office to enforce the writ of execution dated February 14, 1985. They demanded delivery to them of all available cash money but, it having been closing house, the tellers had already brought their cash to the vaults which were then closed. They thereupon took the boxes and coin counters, adding machines, typewriters, etc. and set them near the doors of the bank. At past midnight, they left with notice that they would resume execution on Monday morning at the principal office of the bank and its branches.
With those boxes, coin counters, adding machines, typewriters, etc. sequestered, the bank and its branches would not be able to service depositors and clients next Monday-and feared that if it could not service its depositors and clients a 'run' might occur.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 69907 intervened that early Monday morning with a restraining order.
x x x x x x x x x
16. Attached hereto as Annex "N" hereof is a list of other cases involving other parties which show a 'joint venture' between respondent Judge Jose P. Castro and respondent Atty. Benjamin M. Grecia.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Supreme Court order the investigation of respondents Judge Jose P. Castro and Atty. Benjamin M. Grecia. 1
Answering the charge for disbarment, Respondent Grecia avers, inter alia: (1) that the facts and proceedings alleged in the complaint do not constitute any of the recognized grounds for disbarment besides the fact that they are the very subject matter of the appeal taken to the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. CV No. 05611 still pending thereat, so that the complaint is improper and premature; (2) that the charge is purely and plainly an unfounded grievance of a party which lost its case in the Trial Court against the lawyer of the party which prevailed in that case and is intended merely to harass, embarrass and degrade him and to deprive him of his livelihood; (3) that the collection of the docket fee is an act within the province of the clerk of court which cannot be imputed to respondent nor serve as a ground for his disbarment; (4) that the "list of other cases involving other parties ... show a 'joint venture' between respondents is an empty and a gratuitous conclusion, an unjust, improper and insupportable accusation, which renders the complaint insufficient and, consequently dismissible," nine (9) out of the fourteen (14) cases in the list being cases of other lawyers, and that the proper parties to make the charge of a "joint venture" being the parties in the "other cases;" and (5) that in almost thirty (30) years of law practice, respondent has not once betrayed his oath of office but has observed photographic fidelity to the Canons of Legal Ethics.
On May 8, 1986, Respondent Grecia filed a Motion to Dismiss Disbarment Complaint and for Early Resolution of the Case on the ground that the Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on April 23, 1986 in AC-G.R. No. 05611 (Case No. Q-42349 of the RTC of Quezon City) entitled "Macro Textiles Mills Corp., Plaintiff-Appellee vs. Prudential Bank & Trust Co., et al., Defendants-Appellants" "conclusively sustained and upheld the facts involved and proceedings taken in Case No. Q-42349; overruled the arguments advanced by the complainant bank against said facts and proceedings; and with the exception of a modification of the sums of damages and attorney's fees awarded to Macro, affirmed the decision of the trial court."
On June 5, 1986, the Court en banc rendered a Per Curiam Decision as against respondent Judge Jose P. Castro, which is quoted in full below in order to furnish the proper backdrop to the Disbarment Case against Respondent Grecia.
Prudential Bank (Complainant Bank) instituted this administrative case on April 11, 1985, praying this Court to investigate Respondent Judge Jose P. Castro, presiding over Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch LXXXV, Quezon City, (Respondent Judge), and Atty. Benjamin M. Grecia (Respondent Grecia), in connection with their actuations in a civil case (the RTC CASE), tried and decided by Respondent Judge and where plaintiff was represented by Respondent Grecia.
The RTC CASE was entitled "Macro Textile Mills Corporation, Plaintiff, vs. Prudential Bank & Trust Co., AKA The Prudential Bank and Benjamin Baens del Rosario, Notary Public for Quezon City, Defendants." Plaintiff in the RTC CASE shall hereinafter be referred to simply as MACRO. It was the registered owner of a 19,493 sq. m lot in Quezon City, covered by TCT No. 261842 (the 'MACRO PROPERTY'), alleged to have a value of about P20 million.
What has been prayed for by Complainant Bank is the exercise by this Court of its power to discipline Respondent Judge, and the initiation of proceedings for the disbarment or suspension of Respondent Grecia.
Based on documents submitted to this Court, the relevant facts upon which this Resolution is based may be stated as follows:
1. The President and General Manager of MACRO is named Go Cun Uy. He is also a partner of, or a signatory for, a partnership named Galaxy Tricot Manufacturing Co. (GALAXY, for short ).
2. As of January 24, 1983, MACRO and GALAXY, together, were indebted to Complainant Bank in the principal sum of P9,510,000.00
3. On the said date of January 24, 1983, MACRO, through o Cun Uy, executed a mortgage over the MACRO PROPERTY (notarized" on January 26, 1983) in favor of Complainant Bank to guarantee the then, as well as future, obligations of MACRO and/or GALAXY in favor of the mortgage.
4. More than a year after, or on April 11, 1984, Complainant Bank sent a letter of demand to MACRO/GALAXY demanding payment of their pending obligations in the total sum of Pl1,629,503.92 exclusive of interest.
5. On July 12, 1984, Benjamin Baens del Rosario, as a Notary public for Quezon City, issued a "Notice of Sale By Notary," scheduled for August 6, 1984, for the extra-judicial foreclosure sale of the MACRO PROPERTY.
6. On August 2, 1984, MACRO filed the complaint in the RTC CASE through Atty. Mario E. Valderama, alleging principally that Go Cun Uy had no authority to mortgage the MACRO PROPERTY and that his execution of the mortgage was due to fraudulent manipulations of Complainant Bank. The Complaint further stated that MACRO was entitled "to actual damages amounting to at least P50,000,000.00 as well as to compensatory damages." Preliminary attachment was prayed for on 'so much of the properties of defendant Bank and defendant Notary as may be sufficient to satisfy any judgment that may be rendered against them.
7. Four days thereafter, or on August 6, 1984, the Complaint was amended over the signature of Respondent Grecia. The amendments are of no substantial relevance to this Resolution. The same prayer for preliminary attachment was reiterated.
8. On the same date of August 6, 1984, Respondent Judge, stating that the sale had not taken place on that date, issued an Order temporarily restraining the Register of Deeds of Quezon City from registering any Deed of Sale of the MACRO PROPERTY.
9. Respondent Judge then resolved the RTC Case through a summary judgment rendered on November 16, 1984. In the Decision, the mortgage of the MACRO PROPERTY was declared null and void, and Complainant Bank and Notary Public del Rosario were ordered to pay MACRO more than P33 million in damages plus 20% attorney's fees.
10. Further, paragraph 2 of the dispositive part of the Decision provided as follows:
2. The Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel immediately the registration and annotation of the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage dated January 26, 1983, as well a its foreclosure, notice of sale and certificate of sale on the Original Transfer Certificate of Title No. 261842;
The foregoing paragraph 2 is of primary relevance to this Resolution. What will be noted therein is that the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 261842, still in the possession of Complainant Bank, was not declared cancelled. The continued existences of that owner's duplicate could prevent the registration of a sale of the MACRO PROPERTY without it being surrendered to the Register of Deeds as the law requires the production of the owner's duplicate certificate whenever any voluntary instrument is presented for registration (Sec. 53, P.D. No, 1529, the Property Registration Decree).
11. On December 7, 1984, Complainant Bank filed a Motion reconsideration of the summary judgment.
12. Without ruling on Complainant Bank's Motion for Reconsideration, Respondent Judge, in an Order dated January 7, 1985, amended paragraph 2 of his Decision, by directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City—
... to cancel immediately the registration of the Deed of real estate mortgage dated January 24, 1983 on the back of TCT No. 261842 pursuant to the aforesaid decision, and to issue in favor of the plaintiff another owner's copy of said transfer certificate of title after said cancellation, in lieu of the copy in the possession of the defendant-bank which is hereby deemed cancelled.
The amendment of paragraph 2 ordered the cancellation of the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 261842, in the possession of Complainant Bank, and the issuance of a new owner's duplicate of said TCT to MACRO. Thus, MACRO was placed in a position to dispose of the MACRO PROPERTY.
13. (a) Seven days thereafter, or on January 14. 1985, MACRO sold the MACRO PROPERTY to Falconi Marketing and Manufacturing, Inc. (FALCONI, for short) for P6 million.
(b) On January 15, 1985, TCT No. 261842 was cancelled and TCT No. 326740 was issued in the name of FALCONI.
14. On February 7, 1985, Respondent Judge denied Complainant and Bank's Motion for Reconsideration 'not only for being pro forma but also for lack of merit.' Upon receipt of the corresponding Order on February 13, 1985, Complainant Bank filed a notice of appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court.
15. Consequent to the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Complainant Bank, Respondent Judge, in his Order of February 13, 1985, considered his Decision in the RTC CASE to be final and ordered the issuance of a Writ of Execution, which also constituted a denial of Complainant Bank's appeal.
16. (a) On February 18, 1985, Complainant Bank came to this Court on Mandamus/Certiorari (G.R. No. 69907), asking that Respondent Judge be ordered to allow its appeal from the Decision rendered in the RTC CASE to the Intermediate Appellate Court and to annul the Order and Writ of Execution he had previously issued.
(b) Probably because of the Order of this Court restraining execution of the Decision in the RTC CASE, Respondent Judge, on March 13, 1985, gave course to the appeal of Complainant Bank to the Intermediate Appellate Court.
17. (a) On April 1, 1985, Complainant Bank caused a Notice of Lis Pendens to be annotated on FALCONI's title.
(b) In G.R. No. 69907, this Court, on May 31, 1985, set aside the Resolution of January 7, 1985 of Respondent Judge.
(c) On June 26, 1985, the Acting Register of Deeds of Quezon City denied the request of Complainant Bank, invoking this Court's resolution in G.R. No. 69907, for the cancellation of TCT No. 326740 in the name of FALCONI.
(d) Sometime in June, 1985, FALCONI instituted a Complaint against Complainant Bank and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City for the cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens on its TCT No. 326740, which case is pending before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch LXXXVI.
(e) On September 23, 1985, this Court in G.R. No. 69907, ordered the Register of Deeds (i) to cancel the new owner's DUPLICATE OF TCT No. 261842; (ii) to restore the old TCT No. 261842, with the annotated mortgage lien in favor of Complainant Bank; and (iii) to cancel TCT No. 326740 in the name of FALCONI
Nothing in this Resolution should be construed as a determination of a factual issue in the controversy between Complainant Bank and MACRO in the RTC CASE, which is now pending before the Intermediate Appellate Court. This Resolution deals only with the steps taken by Respondent Judge in regards to the RTC CASE when he was still acting on it. Considered in the light of the facts related above, we find he had committed serious and grave misfeasance in connection with his actuations in the said RTC CASE in that:
(a) In both original and amended Complaints in the RTC CASE, it was apparent that MACRO was suing for an amount of at least P50 million. On the very date of August 6, 1984, when the Amended Complaint was filed, which was only four days after the original Complaint was instituted, Respondent Judge was already aware, per his Order of attachment, that MACRO "in its verified complaint and affidavit," was asking defendants "to pay the sum of P50,000,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages which plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant in this case.
In the original and amended Complaints, the prayers did not ask for damages specifically in the sum of more than P50 million, clearly in order to avoid payment of filing fees of more than P100,000.00. The filing fee actually paid was only P210.00.
Ordinarily, a Trial Judge may be excused from immediately noting a mistake made by the Clerk of Court in assessing filing fees. However, considering Respondent Judge's realization of the mistake, on August 6, 1984, the date he issued his Order for preliminary attachment, and his actuations thereafter in the RTC CASE, his failure to require payment of the correct amount of filing fees indicated his partiality towards, not to say confabulation with, MACRO and/or its lawyers.
(b) The summary judgment was ill-conceived. For one thing, the Amended Complaint had charged Complainant Bank with fraud and deceit. Under the law, good faith is to be presumed, and the fraud and deceit imputed to Complainant Bank cannot be other than a question of fact, which should have been resolved after due reception of evidence pro and contra. There was nothing in the Answer, and in its pleadings in connection with MACRO's Motion for summary judgment, which could indubitably be deemed an admission, or proof, of Complainant Bank's alleged fraud and deceit. Respondent Judge's statements to the contrary are bereft of veracity.
Worse errors have been committed by Trial Judges but, in the RTC CASE, the erroneous promulgation of the summary judgment indicates, in the light of the entire scenario, that the error was deliberate in order to favor plaintiff, or that it was in actual confabulation with plaintiff and its lawyers.
(c) The issuance of the summary judgment was bad enough. The grant therein of damages in the amount of more than P33 million, plus 20% attorney's fees, when the property involved in the litigation was alleged in the amended complaint (Annex "F") as 20 million (sold to FALCONI for 6 million) immediately raises the thought that Respondent Judge had really taken a stand of partiality in favor of MACRO and its lawyers.
(d) The Order of January 7, 1985 of Respondent Judge also shows his partiality to, or his confabulation with MACRO and the latter's lawyers.
The summary judgment was rendered on November 16, 1984, and notice thereof was served on Complainant Bank on November 26, 1984. The latter filed a Motion for Reconsideration on December 6, 1984. If, as Respondent Judge has ruled, the Motion for Reconsideration was pro forma, the summary judgment became final on December 11, 1984. Respondent Judge, therefore, would no longer have authority to amend his Decision on January 7, 1985. When the Motion for Reconsideration was denied on February 7, 1985, Respondent Judge should also have set aside his Order of January 7, 1985 amending the summary judgment. It can now become clear that deferment of action on Complainant Bank's Motion for Reconsideration was precisely for the purpose of allowing amendment of the Decision on January 7, 1985.
The Order of January 7, 1985 was set aside in G.R. No. 69907. It is now for us to state herein that Respondent Judge, in issuing such Order, clearly intended to favor MACRO by allowing it to sell, as it did sell, the MACRO property to FALCONI on January 14, 1985.
(e) Respondent Judge, in his Order of March 13, 1985, gave course to the appeal of Complainant Bank although he had already ruled that the latter had lost the right of appeal. That Order of March 13, 1985 was issued after Complainant Bank had instituted G.R. No. 69907 on February 19, 1985, asking that Respondent Judge be ordered to allow its appeal from the summary judgment. The Order of March 13, 1985 was clearly intended to render G.R. No. 69907 moot and academic. Said Order was disrespectful of this Court. If at all Respondent Judge should have come to this Court in said G.R. No. 69907, to ask for leave to allow the appeal of Complainant Bank with admission that he had realized that his previous denial of the appeal was erroneous. And it may be recalled that, in De Leon VS. Castro, 104 SCRA 241 (1981), this Court had occasion to state that Respondent Judge's 'submission of false certificate of service under Section 5 of the Judiciary Law is not excusable
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES:
l. Respondent Judge is hereby ordered dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and pay and which prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities. This decision is immediately executory.
2. The Complaint for disbarment and suspension of respondent Atty. Benjamin M. Grecia is hereby referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. Let the relevant pleadings in this case in regards to Respondent GRECIA, and relevant pleadings as well as the Decision in G.R. No. 69907 be furnished the Solicitor General for the purpose.
SO ORDERED. 2
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of the dispositive portion of the Decision above-quoted, the Disbarment Case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
On March 4, 1987, this Court received the Solicitor General's Report recommending:
WHEREFORE, for lack of evidence, it is respectfully recommended that the disbarment case against respondent be dismissed.
The recommendation of dismissal was predicated on the principal findings 1) that complainant failed to prove with preponderant evidence that Respondent Grecia and Judge Castro had an existing "unholy alliance or joint venture" in disposing of the Macro Case in favor of MACRO; 2) that based on the pleadings submitted by complainant "it cannot be definitely established that any deliberate misrepresentation was committed much less who, specifically, had perpetrated it" since "the motion for summary judgment and the amended complaint involved were filed by two collaborating lawyers, namely, respondent and Atty. Mario Valderrama," who however, has not been charged "for unknown reasons;" and (3) "on the matter of the non-payment of the correct amount of filing fees, no evidence was presented by complainant to prove that respondent was responsible for such omission or for that matter that he did not encourage and compel his client to pay the right amount."
The Court resolves differently, however (Sec. 4, Rule 139). As pointed out in the Per Curiam Decision of this Court against respondent Judge, partiality and confabulation are clearly discernible from the actuations of respondents in the Macro Case.
In the original Complaint filed on August 2, 1984 by Atty. Valderrama and in the Amended Complaint filed on August 6, 1984 over the signature of Respondent Grecia in the Macro Case, the prayers were silent as to the amount of damages being demanded, clearly in order to avoid payment of filing fees of approximately P139,000.00. The filing fee actually paid was only in the amount of P210.00. Complainant Bank filed a Motion for the collection of the proper filing fees but Respondent Judge denied the same only on November 19, 1984 after the summary judgment had been rendered on November 16, 1984 and despite the three Motions to Resolve filed by Complainant Bank on August 17, October 26, and September 3, all in 1984. 3
The reason for the denial was that the certification of the Clerk of Court as to the correct amount of the docket fee to be paid by plaintiff was not submitted and for "lack of merit and for being moot and academic. 4
Respondent Grecia filed the Amended Complaint on August 6, 1984, and on the same day Respondent Judge issued an Order of Attachment. A P10M bond had to be posted by Complainant Bank to discharge it accompanied by a Motion to Discharge Attachment, which Respondent Judge, resolved on August 21, 1984.
The summary judgment was rendered by Respondent Judge on November 16, 1984 despite the allegation of fraud and deceit in the Complaint, thereby resulting in the avoidance of trial and the presentation of witnesses, and the Bank was ordered to pay P30M as actual damages, P3M as exemplary damages plus 20% attorney's fees when the property involved in the litigation was alleged in the Amended Complaint as P20M (and was sold to Falconi for P6M).
Complainant Bank filed a Motion for Reconsideration of that Decision on December 7, 1984 but Respondent Judge did not rule on it and instead amended that judgment on January 1985 by directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to issue another owner's copy of the transfer certificate of title in MACRO's favor in lieu of the owner's copy in the possession of Complainant Bank, which was deemed cancelled. Thereby MACRO was placed in a position to dispose of the mortgaged property, which it sold on January 14, 1985 to Falconi Marketing and Manufacturing, Inc., for P6M.
Respondent Judge denied the Motion for Reconsideration only on February 7, 1985 for being pro forma Complainant Bank filed a Notice of Appeal on February 13, 1985. On the same day, February 13, 1985, Respondent Judge considered the Summary Judgment final and ordered the issuance of a Writ of Execution notwithstanding the timely notice of appeal filed by Complainant Bank Execution was implemented two (2) days thereafter, or on February 15, 1985 at 3:55 P.M., with Respondent Grecia included in the group, which went to the Bank premises to enforce execution, leaving said place "at past midnight."
With the issuance of the Writ of Execution, which also constituted the denial of the appeal, Respondent Judge had foreclosed Complainant Bank's right to appeal had it not been for the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 69907 promulgated on May 31,1985 entitled "Prudential Bank, et al. vs. Hon. Jose P. Castro, Macro Textile Mills Corporation, et al.," ordering Respondent Judge to give due course to the appeal.
Respondents' foregoing actuations reveal an "unholy alliance" between them and a clear indication of partiality for the party represented by the other to the detriment of the objective dispensation of justice. Writs of Attachment and Execution were issued and implemented with lightning speed; the case itself was railroaded to a swift conclusion through a summary judgment; astronomical sums were awarded as damages and attorney's fees; and topping it all, the right to appeal was foreclosed by clever maneuvers.
The Court also takes judicial notice of a strikingly similar modus operandi followed in "Manchester Development Corporation, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, Cityland Development Corporation, et als. (G.R. No. 75919, May 7, 1987; Civil Case No. Q-43867, RTC Quezon City), where the original complaint was filed by the same Atty. Mario E. Valderrama and was originally pending before Respondent Judge's Sala. Thus he staggering sum claimed in the Complaint of about P78M but the clear attempt to limit the filing fees to P410.00 by the simple expedient of limiting the prayer to such sums of money as "may be duly proved during the trial;" the fraud alleged in the complaint; the issuance of a writ of attachment by Respondent Judge the day after the filing of the Complaint after the approval of a P10M bond issued by Stronghold Insurance Co., a company blacklisted in Quezon City; the immediate implementation of the attachment the day after its issuance with the garnishment of the operating funds of Cityland, and the denial by Respondent Judge of the Motion to Strike Out Complaint filed by Cityland for the reasons that the insufficiency of the filing fee is not a ground for dismissal citing Magaspi vs. Ramolete (115 SCRA 193) and that the action was one for specific performance. If respondent Judge was unable to see the case to completion, and perhaps resolve it in the same manner as he did the Macro Case, it was only by reason of the reraffle ordered by this Court of that case, with 22 others, to all the Regional Trial Court Judges of Quezon City, "with the exception of Respondent Judge," in this Court's Resolution of June 18,1985 in Adm. Matter No. 85-6-7899-RTC.
While it was Atty. Valderrama, who was counsel of record in the Manchester case, considering the striking similarity in the pattern of the cases he and Respondent Grecia handled, signing either singly or as co-counsel (as in the Amended Complaint, 5 and in the Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration in the Macro Case), 6 a close collaboration between them is evident. In actual fact, a joint venture did exist between Macro and Manchester known as the Macro Manchester Realty Corporation. 7 The Court takes further judicial notice of other cases where a similar modus operandi particularly in respect of astronomical sums claimed but minimal docket fees paid, is apparent, with one of the parties represented by either Respondent Grecia or Atty. Valderrama, and the common denominator being that the cases pended before Respondent Judge. A summary of those cases was made in a Report, dated October 2, 1985, to the Acting Court Administrator Arturo Buena submitted by then Executive Judge Ernani Cruz Patio in Case No. AM 85-10-8752-RTC as a consequence of a letter complaint of Atty. Antonio Bautista in connection with the Manchester case.
Thus, in Civil Case No. Q-35093, RTC, Quezon City, entitled "Ocean Park Development Corporation vs. Kumho Construction & Engineering, Inc.," which was also pending before Respondent Judge, with counsel for plaintiff therein being Respondent Grecia, for "Trespass or Destruction, Illegal Occupation of Real Property with Damages and Writ of Attachment and Injunction," the body of the complaint alleged that defendant therein had inflicted damages on the plaintiff in the total sum of approximately P13M but the prayer merely asked for payment of "such sums as may be proved during the trial." The filing fee paid was P200.00.
In Civil Case No. Q-41177, RTC, Quezon City, entitled "Manuel Chua Uy Po Tiong vs. Sun Insurance Office Ltd." (incidentally, the President of Manchester is the same Manuel Chua Uy Po Tiong for "Sum of Money, Damages with Writ of Preliminary Attachment" for alleged fraudulent cancellation of an insurance policy issued by defendant therein, the body of the complaint mentioned the damages suffered by plaintiff in the amount of around P30-M, but again the prayer asked for the payment of "such amounts as may be proved during the trial" and the filing fee paid was P200.00. The original complaint was filed by Atty. Valderrama while Respondent Grecia filed the Amended Complaint therein. The case was before Respondent Judge's Sala.
In Civil Case No. Q-41229, RTC, Quezon City, entitled Kumho Construction & Engineering, Inc. vs. Atty. Vicente E. del Rosario" the body of the complaint claimed damages in the sum of P3M but, true to form, the prayer asked for "such sums as may be proved during the trial" and the filing fee paid was P200.00. Counsel for Kumho was Atty. Mario E. Valderrama; the Court before which the case was pending was that of Respondent Judge, who, by the way, also rendered a summary judgment therein.
The modus operandi in the foregoing cases, taken cognizance of by this Court either judicially or administratively, reveal the hidden maneuvers of a nefarious network, with respondents as the prime movers. Those cases sufficiently provide the basis for the determination of respondents' administrative liability without need for further inquiry into the matter under the principle of res ipsa loquitur (People vs. Hon. Manuel Valenzuela, G.R. Nos. L-63950-60, April 19, 1985, 135 SCRA 712; Resolution, In The Matter Of Proceedings For Disciplinary Action Against Atty. Wenceslao Laureta, etc., in G.R. No. 68635, entitled "Eva Maravilla Ilustre vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.," May 14, 1987). The imposition of disciplinary sanctions against respondents is warranted as we were already constrained to do in respect of Respondent Judge. Their questionable operations have blotted the image of both Bench and Bar and have been inimical to public interest and welfare. Their unethical misdeeds call for the supreme sanction. Indeed, those actuations would have passed unnoticed but for this Administrative Complaint filed by a highly respected member of the business community, and the disclosure by concerned colleagues in the profession appalled by respondents' anomalous actuations in a string of cases.
Respondent Grecia has been proven to be lacking in fidelity to his oath of office essential to his continuance as an attorney-at-law.
The affirmance on April 23, 1986 by the Court of Appeals in AC G. R. CV No. 0561 1 * of the Summary Judgment rendered by Respondent Judge in the Macro Case, for which reason, Respondent Grecia had moved to dismiss this case against him on May 8, 1986 is not a ground for the dismissal of this Disbarment Case, the said Decision not having attained finality besides the fact that the issue herein is the fitness of Respondent Grecia to continue in the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Benjamin M. Grecia is hereby DISBARRED for having proven himself unfit to continue in the pursuit of the profession.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J, took no part.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 1- 13.
2 Prudential Bank vs. Judge Jose P. Castro, et al., Adm. Case No. 2756, June 51986142 SCRA 223-232.
3 Rollo, pp. 308-313.
4 Ibid, p. 172.
5 Rollo, P. 59, (AM No. 2756).
6 Ibid., p. 307.
7 Decision, Court of Appeals, p. 9, AC-G.R. CV No. 05611, Macro Textile Mills Corporation vs. Prudential Bank, et al.).
* Penned by Mr. Justice Serafin A. Camilon and concurred in by Messrs. Justices Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr., Jose C. Campos, Jr., and Bienvenido C. Ejercito.
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