I associate myself with Justice Plana's position. Additionally, I would like to answer the question posed by Justice Patajo who asks: "Can We compel the President to designate another body to try the case pending before PAEC or appoint temporary commissioners while respondents are still holding office?
No, this Court cannot compel the President to designate another body or appoint temporary commissioners. It would be unthinkable for this Court to compel the President of the Philippines to do anything at anytime. What this Court should do is to restrain the commissioners from further acting in PAEC Licensing Proceedings No. 1-77. What the President does thereafter is for him to decide. This Court does not tell him what to do. It cannot because of the separation of powers and the obvious fact that he is not a party to the proceedings.
I dissent. G.R. No. 68474 is an action filed on September 1, 1984 for mandamus and injunction wherein the petitioners, as taxpayers and citizens, prayed that the Philippine Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and the National Power Corporation be ordered to give public notice and hold a public hearing and give the petitioners copies of the contracts with Westinghouse.
G.R. No. 70632 is an action filed on April 27, 1985 by the petitioners, as citizens and taxpayers, for prohibition and injunction praying that the PAEC be enjoined from hearing the NPC's motion for a license to operate the Bataan Nuclear Plant.
The instant case of G.R. No. 70632 should be DISMISSED because the petitioners HAVE NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PROHIBITION AND INJUNCTION (See dissent in G.R. No. 68474 dated May 14,1985,395-B, Vol. 11, Rollo).
As taxpayers and citizens, they have no legal standing to file the petition. Generally, a citizen and taxpayer cannot invoke judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action (Subido vs. Sarmiento, 108 Phil. 150, 157).
Prohibition is not the same as injunction. Lawyers often make the mistake of confusing prohibition with injunction. Basically, prohibition is a remedy to stop a tribunal from exercising a power beyond its jurisdiction. The PAEC has been acting within its jurisdiction. Prohibition does not lie against it.
Prohibition is an extraordinary prerogative writ of a preventive nature, its proper function being to prevent courts or other tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with which they are not vested (73 C.J.S. 10).
This Court has no original jurisdiction to issue the writ of injunction. Hence, that remedy cannot be invoked here.
The matter of the operation of a nuclear plant is a political question. It is a question of policy as to which the Executive Department has discretional authority (Tanada and Macapagal vs. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051, 1067).
No justiciable controversy is involved in the instant case. The great public interest involved in the dispute does not justify the petitioners in USING THIS COURT TO INTERFERE with the hearings conducted by the PAEC and with its interlocutory orders.
Its decisions are reviewable by the Appellate Court in accordance with section 9 of the Judiciary Revamp Law in relation to section 36 of Republic Act No. 5207. The petitioners should not be allowed to use this Court as an instrument to stop the operation of the nuclear plant. This Court is not competent, and it has no jurisdiction in this case, to determine its safety. This case cannot be utilized for making a pronouncement as to its safety.
Secretary Vicente Abad Santos in his opinion dated February 27, 1976 held that the nuclear plant contract is lawful (p. 1 1 1, Vol. 1, Rollo of G.R. No. 68474).
The matter of safety had been passed upon by a Commission composed of Justices Puno, Vasquez and Bautista in a 140-page report dated November 13, 1979 and by the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1984 and in 1985. (See Comment of NPC dated November 20, 1985, Vol. IV, Rollo of G.R. No. 68474.)
Petitioners should resort to other forums for the articulation of their opposition to the nuclear plant. It is not wrong to oppose the nuclear plant. What is wrong is to employ this Court without justification as a weapon for opposing it.
G.R. No. 70632 should be DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT. The restraining order should be lifted. As already shown, G.R. No. 68474 had become MOOT.
PATAJO, J., dissenting:
I vote for the dismissal of G.R. No. 68474 for being moot and academic joining in this score the separate opinion of the Chief Justice.
I vote also for the dismissal of G.R. No. 70632, said action being premature. There is no showing that the competence of PAEC Commissioners to seat on the case had been properly brought against said Commissioners and the latter had denied said challenge. More importantly prohibition or injunction is not the proper remedy to question the competence or qualification of one properly appointed to an office or position. If respondent Commissioners have been validly appointed as PAEC Commissioners prohibition will not lie to prevent them from performing their functions on the ground that they do not possess necessary competence or know how to do their job.
I believe, further, that the pamphlets and articles published by PAEC regarding the safety of nuclear plants which have not been shown to have been prepared by the Commissioners themselves can be taken as evidence of bias in favor of granting the license to operate the nuclear plant in question. I am more inclined to believe that said articles refer to the safety of nuclear plants per se and not particularly to the Bataan nuclear plant. I trust that respondent Commissioners can still be objective in their disposition of the petition pending before them and can decide the same on the basis of the evidence presented during the continuation of the hearing. From their decision the aggrieved party can appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court.
Another important consideration that must not be overlooked is that if respondent PAEC Commissioners are disqualified who will try the case? Can We compel the President to designate another body to try the case pending before PAEC or appoint temporary commissioners while respondents are still holding office? Would not such a dilemma result in a stalemate and further delay? It is no answer to said dilemma as suggested by petitioners that respondent Commissioners could resign and pave the way for the appointment of their replacements. For them to resign would be a virtual admission of the claim of petitioners that they are incompetent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the Court's resolution but am registering a dissent insofar as Commissioner Reynaldo Suarez is concerned. The PAEC exercises both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. During the hearings involving tens of billions of pesos of public funds, the immediate resolution of difficult procedural questions is often necessary. Complex issues calling for the application of an entirely new field of substantive law are raised before the Commission. Resultant criminal prosecutions or civil suits are ever present possibilities. I believe that the constitutional requirement of due process calls for the appointment of a qualified "law member" in the Commission. Commissioner Suarez, a former Nueva Ecija Regional Trial Court Judge and prominent practising lawyer of Angeles City is qualified for the position. Regarding the official pamphlets issued by PAEC, all except one of the pamphlets were issued before Commissioner Suarez' appointment to the Commission and as for the one exception, there is no showing that he was involved or had anything to do with its preparation and issuance.
Considering the foregoing, the law member should not be included in the Court's action regarding the respondent Philippine Atomic Energy Commission.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
I associate myself with Justice Plana's position. Additionally, I would like to answer the question posed by Justice Patajo who asks: "Can We compel the President to designate another body to try the case pending before PAEC or appoint temporary commissioners while respondents are still holding office?
No, this Court cannot compel the President to designate another body or appoint temporary commissioners. It would be unthinkable for this Court to compel the President of the Philippines to do anything at anytime. What this Court should do is to restrain the commissioners from further acting in PAEC Licensing Proceedings No. 1-77. What the President does thereafter is for him to decide. This Court does not tell him what to do. It cannot because of the separation of powers and the obvious fact that he is not a party to the proceedings.
AQUINO, C.J., dissenting
I dissent. G.R. No. 68474 is an action filed on September 1, 1984 for mandamus and injunction wherein the petitioners, as taxpayers and citizens, prayed that the Philippine Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and the National Power Corporation be ordered to give public notice and hold a public hearing and give the petitioners copies of the contracts with Westinghouse.
This prayer had been granted by the respondents. As noted by the Solicitor General, that case had been terminated (pp. 370-371, Vol. 11, Rollo of G.R. No. 68474, p. 410 Vol. II, Rollo of G.R. No. 70632). Therefore, G.R. No. 68474 had become MOOT and ACADEMIC.
G.R. No. 70632 is an action filed on April 27, 1985 by the petitioners, as citizens and taxpayers, for prohibition and injunction praying that the PAEC be enjoined from hearing the NPC's motion for a license to operate the Bataan Nuclear Plant.
In its resolution of August 29, 1985 this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the PAEC from further proceeding in the licensing proceedings. The petitioners had participated in the hearings on said motion. They used about 153 hours out of the 205 hours consumed in the course of the hearings (p. 413, Vol. I 1, Rollo of G. R. No. 70632).
The instant case of G.R. No. 70632 should be DISMISSED because the petitioners HAVE NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PROHIBITION AND INJUNCTION (See dissent in G.R. No. 68474 dated May 14,1985,395-B, Vol. 11, Rollo).
As taxpayers and citizens, they have no legal standing to file the petition. Generally, a citizen and taxpayer cannot invoke judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action (Subido vs. Sarmiento, 108 Phil. 150, 157).
Prohibition is not the same as injunction. Lawyers often make the mistake of confusing prohibition with injunction. Basically, prohibition is a remedy to stop a tribunal from exercising a power beyond its jurisdiction. The PAEC has been acting within its jurisdiction. Prohibition does not lie against it.
Prohibition is an extraordinary prerogative writ of a preventive nature, its proper function being to prevent courts or other tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with which they are not vested (73 C.J.S. 10).
This Court has no original jurisdiction to issue the writ of injunction. Hence, that remedy cannot be invoked here.
The matter of the operation of a nuclear plant is a political question. It is a question of policy as to which the Executive Department has discretional authority (Tanada and Macapagal vs. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051, 1067).
No justiciable controversy is involved in the instant case. The great public interest involved in the dispute does not justify the petitioners in USING THIS COURT TO INTERFERE with the hearings conducted by the PAEC and with its interlocutory orders.
Its decisions are reviewable by the Appellate Court in accordance with section 9 of the Judiciary Revamp Law in relation to section 36 of Republic Act No. 5207. The petitioners should not be allowed to use this Court as an instrument to stop the operation of the nuclear plant. This Court is not competent, and it has no jurisdiction in this case, to determine its safety. This case cannot be utilized for making a pronouncement as to its safety.
Secretary Vicente Abad Santos in his opinion dated February 27, 1976 held that the nuclear plant contract is lawful (p. 1 1 1, Vol. 1, Rollo of G.R. No. 68474).
The matter of safety had been passed upon by a Commission composed of Justices Puno, Vasquez and Bautista in a 140-page report dated November 13, 1979 and by the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1984 and in 1985. (See Comment of NPC dated November 20, 1985, Vol. IV, Rollo of G.R. No. 68474.)
Petitioners should resort to other forums for the articulation of their opposition to the nuclear plant. It is not wrong to oppose the nuclear plant. What is wrong is to employ this Court without justification as a weapon for opposing it.
G.R. No. 70632 should be DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT. The restraining order should be lifted. As already shown, G.R. No. 68474 had become MOOT.
PATAJO, J., dissenting:
I vote for the dismissal of G.R. No. 68474 for being moot and academic joining in this score the separate opinion of the Chief Justice.
I vote also for the dismissal of G.R. No. 70632, said action being premature. There is no showing that the competence of PAEC Commissioners to seat on the case had been properly brought against said Commissioners and the latter had denied said challenge. More importantly prohibition or injunction is not the proper remedy to question the competence or qualification of one properly appointed to an office or position. If respondent Commissioners have been validly appointed as PAEC Commissioners prohibition will not lie to prevent them from performing their functions on the ground that they do not possess necessary competence or know how to do their job.
I believe, further, that the pamphlets and articles published by PAEC regarding the safety of nuclear plants which have not been shown to have been prepared by the Commissioners themselves can be taken as evidence of bias in favor of granting the license to operate the nuclear plant in question. I am more inclined to believe that said articles refer to the safety of nuclear plants per se and not particularly to the Bataan nuclear plant. I trust that respondent Commissioners can still be objective in their disposition of the petition pending before them and can decide the same on the basis of the evidence presented during the continuation of the hearing. From their decision the aggrieved party can appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court.
Another important consideration that must not be overlooked is that if respondent PAEC Commissioners are disqualified who will try the case? Can We compel the President to designate another body to try the case pending before PAEC or appoint temporary commissioners while respondents are still holding office? Would not such a dilemma result in a stalemate and further delay? It is no answer to said dilemma as suggested by petitioners that respondent Commissioners could resign and pave the way for the appointment of their replacements. For them to resign would be a virtual admission of the claim of petitioners that they are incompetent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the Court's resolution but am registering a dissent insofar as Commissioner Reynaldo Suarez is concerned. The PAEC exercises both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. During the hearings involving tens of billions of pesos of public funds, the immediate resolution of difficult procedural questions is often necessary. Complex issues calling for the application of an entirely new field of substantive law are raised before the Commission. Resultant criminal prosecutions or civil suits are ever present possibilities. I believe that the constitutional requirement of due process calls for the appointment of a qualified "law member" in the Commission. Commissioner Suarez, a former Nueva Ecija Regional Trial Court Judge and prominent practising lawyer of Angeles City is qualified for the position. Regarding the official pamphlets issued by PAEC, all except one of the pamphlets were issued before Commissioner Suarez' appointment to the Commission and as for the one exception, there is no showing that he was involved or had anything to do with its preparation and issuance.
Considering the foregoing, the law member should not be included in the Court's action regarding the respondent Philippine Atomic Energy Commission.
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