G.R. No. L-53983




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-53983 September 30, 1982 SPOUSES LUCIANA DALIDA and PEDRO DALIDA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JESUS P. ARLEGUI, Presiding Judge, CFI, 8th Judicial District, Branch VII, Balayan, Batangas and AGUSTIN T. RAMOS, respondents. CLAO Ministry of justice for petitioners. Geofredo F. Mabunga for respondents. DE CASTRO, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch VII which ordered herein petitioners to vacate the premises in question. The facts of the case are as follows: Tomas Benitez was the bona fide and the registered holder of Revocable Permit Application No. V-13279 issued by the Bureau of Lands on August 15, 1945 which allowed him to occupy and possess a parcel of land located at Bonbon, Balayan, Batangas. While the original land area applied for by Benitez was for 4,000 square meters, his right to the land was disputed by adjoining land owners. To settle the dispute the area covered by Recoverable Permit Application No. V-13279 was reduced to 2,200 square meters for Benitez. On October 19, 1971 Tomas Benitez died. On August 27, 1975 his widow Conchita Benitez conveyed all their rights to the 2,200 square meters lot to Agustin Benitez, private respondent herein. On August 30, 1975 Conchita Benitez formally advised spouses Pedro Dalida and Luciana Dalida, petitioners herein, who were then employed as caretakers of the land, to vacate the property and turn over the same to private respondent Agustin Ramos. The spouses did not heed the instruction of Benitez and instead, on September 25, 1975, applied with the Bureau of Lands for a miscellaneous sales application over 4,000 square meters of land, including that property covered by Revocable Permit Application No. V-13279 in the name of Tomas Benitez. On November 18, 1975 private respondent sent a demand letter to petitioner spouses to vacate and turn over the premises to the former. Fr failure of petitioners to leave the property, a complaint for illegal detainer dated January 17, 1976 was filed by private respondent before the Municipal Court of Balayan. In an answer dated January 23, 1976 petitioners alleged that they were never employed as caretakers; that they were in actual and peaceful occupation and possession of the land in question since 1946; and that they occupied the land when it was still forested and were the ones who cleared and cultivated the same and introduced improvements thereon. After trial and hearing the court a quo rendered a decision dated November 28, 1978 in favor of private respondent ordering petitioners to vacate the premises in question. The said court held that petitioners were merely caretakers for the whole length of time of their stay in the premises. On Appeal to the Court of First Instance, the said court in a decision dated August 17, 1979 affirmed in toto the decision of the court a quo. Petitioners then filed a petition for review dated October 25, 1979 before the Court of Appeals and on March 10, 1980, the said court, as earlier mentioned, dismiss the petition for lack of merit and affirmed the judgment sought to be reviewed; hence, this present case, petitioners presenting the sole issue as to: WHETHER OR NOT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS THE BETTER RIGHT OF POSSESSION AS AGAINST THE PETITIONERS Petitioners argue that although there exists Revocable Permit Application No. V 13279 in favor of private respondent, the said application was never approved by the Bureau of Lands. Such being the case, the land in question still' belongs to the State forming part of the public domain since no title thereto either by sale or lease has been issued by the government. Petitioners claim that in a proceeding for unlawful detainer, the' only issue is who between the litigants has a better right to the physical possession of the property. Since they have been in actual, open and continuous possession of the land in dispute from 1946 up to the present, they should be given the preferential right to the land being the actual occupants as against private respondent who only stepped into the shoes of applicant Tomas Benitez, who never actually possessed the land. As appearing from the records of this case, these arguments have been brought out by petitioners in their memorandum dated November 21, 1977 ¹ filed in the court a quo and its petition for review dated October 25, 1979 ² presented before the Court of Appeals. We agree with petitioners that in an action for illegal detainer the main issue is the determination of who between the rival claimants has a better right of possession with a view to protecting the same and preventing disorder and breaches of the peace. As found out by the court a quo, the Court of First Instance and finally the Court of Appeals, private respondent and/or his predecessor-in-interest, bona fide applicant of the land in dispute, had been in open, actual, exclusive and uninterrupted possession of the property in question in the concept of an owner for over thirty (30) years and petitioners were in fact residing on the same property as caretakers hired to oversee the land and the improvements thereon. On this point, We have to restate the settled rule in this jurisdiction that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive on this Court. In Fortun vs. Novero, ³ this Court, reiterating the ruling in a long line of cases, stressed that on appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court, the latter may not review the findings of fact of the former. The rule, of course, is not absolute, and among the accepted exceptions are: the conclusion is grounded entirely on speculation and conjectures, or the inferences made are manifestly absurd or impossible, or there is a grave abuse of discretion, or the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, or the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the submission of both appellant and appellee. ⁴ None of these enumerated exceptions obtains in the instant case. There is therefore no reason for Us to disturb the aforementioned findings of the Court of Appeals. We have painstakingly gone over the records of the case to settle the question as to whether or not the Revocable Permit Application No. V-13279 was approved by the Bureau of Lands. In the hearing before the court a quo, Rodolfo V. Torres, District Land Officer of the Bureau of Lands in Batangas City, testified that an order was issued by their office on July 17, 1963 giving due course to the application of Tomas Benitez. ⁵ Likewise, he testified that their records show that the corresponding permit fee under Revocable Permit Application No. V-13279 of Tomas Benitez had been paid from the year 1956 up to 1960; that a permit had been paid on the same application on March 25, 1965. ⁶ The testimony of said official supported by exhibits relative to the claim of private respondent was given credit by the court a quo. Conclusion and findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons. This is so because the trial court is in a better position to examine real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witness while testifying in the case. ⁷ It is thus clear that private respondent's predecessor-in-interest was a bona fide applicant of the land in dispute and in his favor was duly issued a permit pursuant to Revocable Permit Application No. V-13279 dated 1945. Petitioners, on the other hand, have nothing giving them any right to possession other than that of mere caretakers as in the allegation of private respondent, who, by reason of the permit abovementioned, have solid basis of their claim to the right of possession with petitioners merely as caretakers. There are compelling reasons of policy supporting the recognition of a right in a bona fide applicant who has occupied the land applied for. Recognition of the right encourages actual settlement; it discourages speculation and land-grabbing. It prevents conflicts and the overlapping of claims. It is an act of simple justice to the diligence of the pioneer, without which land settlement can not be encouraged or emigration from thickly populated areas hastened. ⁸ WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed is affirmed. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on November 18, 1981 is hereby lifted. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and Escolin, JJ., concur. Separate Opinions ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring: I reiterate my view that when a decision of the Court of Appeals is sustained for the same reasons given by it, as in this case, it is not time economical to write a decision because a simple denial of the petition for lack of merit is sufficient. For this reason I vote to deny the petition. Separate Opinions ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring: I reiterate my view that when a decision of the Court of Appeals is sustained for the same reasons given by it, as in this case, it is not time economical to write a decision because a simple denial of the petition for lack of merit is sufficient. For this reason I vote to deny the petition. Footnotes 1 Annex "F" of Petition, pp, 30-32, Rollo. 2 Annex "L" of Petition, pp. 80-82, Rollo. 3 23 SCRA 1330. Se also Perido vs. Perido, 63 SCRA 97; Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 737; Ramirez Telephone Corporation vs. Bank of America, 29 SCRA 191; Lucero vs. Loot, 25 SCRA 687; Tan vs. Court of Appeals, 20 SCRA 54. 4 Vargas vs. Court of Appeals, 91 SCRA 195. 5 Annex "G " of Petition, Decision of the Municipal Court, p. 46, Rollo. 6 Annex "G" of Petition, Decision of the Municipal Court, pp. 43-44, p. 58, Rollo, 7 People vs. Balili, 92 SCRA 552. 8 Pitargue vs. Sorilla, 92 Phil. 17 The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation