Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-52741 March 15, 1982
SALUD RAMOS,
petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ALEJANDRO CATAMBAY and ADELA MENDENACELI, respondents.
DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court to review the decision 1 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 58743-R, entitled "Salud Ramos, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Alejandro Catambay and Adela Mendenaceli, defendants-appellants," promulgated on February 5, 1980, setting aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Seventh Judicial District, Branch II, which declared petitioner as the rightful owner of the litigated parcel of land described in paragraph 3 of her complaint and ordering the private respondents to execute the necessary deed of reconveyance in her favor.
Records show that the property in question was owned and registered in the name of Gabriel Ramos, married to Francisco Catambay under Transfer Certificate of Title No.13823. 2 On June 18, 1928, the spouses mortgaged the above-mentioned land with the Philippine National Bank to guarantee payment of a loan in the amount of P500. The couple died on September 19, 1930 and March 26, 1930, respectively, leaving the said land burdened with the mortgage in favor of PNB, and were survived by their only child Catalina Ramos. Being the only heir, Catalina Ramos summarily settled and adjudicated to herself the descendible estate of her parents, including the land in question, and as a result of which, she was issued a new Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25961 for said land, upon cancellation of T.C.T. No. 13823, her parent's title. Meanwhile, or on May 12, 1933, the mortgage in favor of PNB was cancelled as shown in the memorandum of encumbrances appearing on T.C.T. No. 13823. 3
After Catalina Ramos became the registered owner of the aforesaid land, she sold it to respondent Alejandro Catambay as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Registered Property 4 dated December 30, 1933, on the basis of which, the latter was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25962 5 on May 12, 1934, cancelling T.C.T. No. 25961 in the name of the former. It also appears that since 1934 and every year thereafter, respondent Catambay has been paying the realty tax due on said property and had declared the same in his name. 6
On March 13, 1973, petitioner filed a complaint 7 for reconveyance against private respondents with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, praying that she be declared the sole and absolute owner of the questioned parcel of land, which covers an area of 159.791 square meters, originally owned by the spouses Gabriel Ramos and Francisca Catambay, but which was inherited by her late mother, Catalina Ramos, as the only heir of said spouses. Petitioner alleged, in substance, in her complaint that during the lifetime of said spouses, they mortgaged the property to the Philippine National Bank; that upon their death, her mother Catalina Ramos, paid the mortgage indebtedness with the Bank partly from funds coming from the private respondents, Alejandro Catambay and Adela Mendenaceli, for which reason Catalina Ramos was made to sign a document guaranteeing payment of the amount advanced by said respondents; that Catalina Ramos died intestate last June 18, 1943; that in May 1971, she discovered for the first time that the title to said property had already been transferred in the name of private respondents by virtue of an extrajudicial adjudication executed by her mother pursuant to which the original certificate of title in the name of Gabriel Ramos and Francisca Catambay was cancelled and a new one issued in the name of her mother, who thereafter executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the private respondents; that the aforestated extrajudicial adjudication and deed of sale were fictitious and simulated because private respondents, who claim to be the owners of the litigated property, were guilty of fraud in obtaining the signature of her mother to a document to which they claimed was merely to guarantee payment of the money advanced by them for the redemption of the property from the bank, but which in reality was a deed of sale.
Answering said complaint, 8 private respondents denied the material allegations thereof, and alleged as special and affirmative defense that the property was sold to them by Catalina Ramos on December 30, 1933, after she became the owner thereof by virtue of a summary adjudication as the only heir of the original owners, and that by virtue of the registration of the deed of sale in their favor, they were issued T.C.T. No. 25962 on May 12, 1934, and that since then, or for a period of more than 39 years, they had been in possession of said property as the exclusive owners thereof publicly, peacefully and adversely against the whole world and had religiously paid the real estate taxes thereof since 1934. They likewise alleged that the action is already barred by the statute of limitations.. Private respondents furtherquestioned the legal capacity of petitioner to bring the action since her right to inherit as heir of Catalina Ramos, claiming to be the latter's natural child, had not been duly established, because said Catalina had left a legitimate son.
After hearing, the lower court rendered judgment 9 on October 22, 1975, declaring, as earlier indicated, the petitioner as the rightful owner of the litigated land and ordered private respondents to execute the necessary deed of reconveyance in her favor. However, on appeal at the instance of private respondents, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the lower court and dismissed petitioner's complaint. Hence, the present recourse filed be petitioner.
It is worthy of note that private respondents have in their favor the presumption of regularity in the issuance of the certificate of title in their names in the ordinary course of law. The questioned deed of absolute sale, being a public document, is by law likewise entitled to full faith and credit upon its face by the Courts unless it is shown by competent evidence that its execution was tainted by defects or irregularities that would warrant its declaration of nullity. The person claiming its invalidity, therefore, has the burden of producing such evidence to support his allegation because the presumption prevails until it is overcome. In order to contradict this, as petitioner attempted to do, it is incumbent upon her to prove said claim with clear, convincing, strong and Irrefutable proof, more than merely preponderant evidence which will not suffice. 10
The evidence adduced by the petitioner in her attempt to prove that private respondents were guilty of fraud because what the latter had represented to her mother, Catalina Ramos, as a mere document guaranteeing repayment of the amount advanced by them for the payment of the mortgage indebtedness of Gabriel Ramos and Francisca Catambay with the bank was actually a deed of sale and this fact, petitioner claimed, she discovered only in May 1971 when she checked the title of the litigated property with the Office of the Register of Deeds, has not resulted in defeating the validity, authenticity and force of the questioned deed of absolute sale executed by Catalina Ramos in favor of private respondents as well as the transfer certificate of title subsequently issued in the name of the latter. We have conscientiously reviewed the evidence and the entire records of the case and We see no reason to disagree with the conclusion made by the Court of Appeals that the evidence presented by petitioner to overcome the presumptions adverted to, failed far short of the requirement of clear, strong and convincing evidence. As aptly found by said court, thus:
As a matter of fact, the only evidence presented by plaintiff to support her claim that defendants were guilty of fraud in the execution of the deed of sale and that they had deceived plaintiff's mother by making her sign a deed of sale upon their representation that the same was merely a document guaranteeing payment of the amount advanced by them for the redemption on of the property from the Philippine National Bank was the testimony of plaintiff that her mother told her that defendants had no interest on the land in question because it was merely mortgaged to them.
Q. You said awhile ago that your mother died in 1943. My question is: Before the death of your mother, were you able to talk to her regarding the land mortgaged to Catambay?
A. Yes, sir. I asked my mother before she died that my uncle, Kuya Ardong have interest on the land or on their homestead land but she said that he could not make [sic] interest on the land because it was merely mortgaged to him. (T.S.N. March 8, 1974, page 18.)
Although plaintiff testified that her mother was made to sign a document by defendant Alejandro Catambay which, according to him was merely a document evidencing her mother's indebtedness to she did not elaborate nor explain further the basis of her statement. Her testimony on this point merely was:
Q. Now after Mr. Catambay has paid the loan with the Philippine National Bank, do you remember if there is any document signed by your mother?
A. Yes, sir. She was made to sign a document which, according to Alejandro Catambay, was merely a document evidencing her indebtedness to him (T.S.N. March 8, 1974, page 14.)
Was she present when her mother signed the document which was supposed to be merely a document evidencing her mother's indebtedness to Catambay? From whom then did she learn that at the time her mother signed the document which, as it now appears, is a deed of sale Alejandro Catambay told her that the document she was signing was merely a document evidencing her indebtedness to Catambay? Whoever her informant was, be it her mother or another person present during the occasion, her testimony as quoted above is purely hearsay.
We have conscientiously studied the testimony of plaintiff and her witness and We are unable to find any evidence other than that quoted above, which refers to the execution of the deed of sale, much less to the deception of defendants in securing the signature of Cataum Ramos to the deed of sale (Exhibit "1").
We find, therefore, no evidence sufficient to justify Our declaring the deed of sale executed by plaintiff's mother in favor of defendants to be other than what it purports and which would justify Us in making a finding that defendants were guilty of fraud in securing title in their name over the property in question on the basis of a simulated or fictitious deed of sale. On this basis alone, We would be justified in sustaining defendants' title to the property under the certificate of title issued in their name in 1934. 11
Even from the standpoint of acquisitive prescription, which seems to be more decisive, it appears too clear that private respondents have acquired title to the land in suit by virtue of possession in the concept of an owner. It is of record that private respondents have been in continuous possession of the litigated parcel of land since they bought the same in 1934 and since then, have been paying the real estate taxes due thereon and had declared said property in their name for taxation purposes. As correctly ruled by the appellate court, "while tax declaration and tax receipts are not necessarily evidence of title, they are strong evidence of possession for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes year after year for a property that is not in his actual possession."
The records of the case further disclose that petitioner's complaint for reconveyance was filed in the lower court only on March 13, 1973, 39 years after the registration of the deed of absolute sale in favor of private respondents and the issuance of a certificate of title in their name exclusively on May 12, 1934, from which latter date petitioner's cause of action, if any, must be deemed to have commenced, since the registration of the aforesaid deed of sale in the office of the Registry of Deeds constitutes a constructive notice to the whole world of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. 12
Since the prescriptive period in this case had already run since May 12, 1934 prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code on August 30, 1950, there can be no doubt that the former laws on prescription apply here, pursuant to Article 1116 of the Civil Code. Under Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure formerly in force, adverse possession ripened into ownership after the lapse of ten (10) years, good or bad faith of the possessor being immaterial. for purposes of acquisitive prescription. In like manner, an action to recover title to or possession of immovable Property prescribed in the same period of 10 years. 13 The instant case, not having been filed within 10 years from the time the cause of action accrued on May 12, 1934, prescribed in 1944 because the complaint was filed only on March 13, 1973, about 39 years later. Consequently, the possession of private respondents over the litigated property ripened into full ownership in 1944, ten years after May 12, 1934, when their possession which was actual, open, public and continuous, under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claims, commenced.
It becomes apparent, therefore, based on the foregoing considerations, that apart from being the vendee of the parcel of land in question as evidenced by the questioned deed of sale, which may be a source of respondents' right of ownership over the property, their said light had been rendered indisputable when the favorable effects of acquisitive prescription had set in on their side. Even the thirty-year period fixed in the new Civil Code for the acquisition of ownership by extraordinary prescription or for the extinction of the right of action over immovables, had expired when the present action was filed.
In view of the above, We deem it no longer necessary to have a detailed discussion on the other points raised by the parties, especially on the applicability of the doctrine of laches to the instant case. Suffice it to say, since May 12, 1934, when the deed of sale was registered in the office of the registry of Deeds and a certificate of title was issued in the name of private respondents, Catalina Ramos had not, impugned the validity and efficacy of said documents until her death on June 18, 1943. Petitioner, who claimed to be an heir of said Catalina Ramos, had likewise failed to dispute said documents until she filed her complaint in the lower court on March 13, 1973, almost thirty years after the death of her alleged mother. Finally, the ruling in Sotto v. Teves, 86 SCRA 154, invoked by herein petitioner, is not applicable to this case, the facts not being in all fours.
WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed for lack of merit. No special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED
Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, Ericta and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
the petition raises factual questions and I would have dismissed it by minute resolution instead of writing a time-consuming decision. I concur in the result
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
the petition raises factual questions and I would have dismissed it by minute resolution instead of writing a time-consuming decision. I concur in the result
Footnotes
1 Annex "E "Petition pp. 53-62, Rollo.
2 Exhs. "A" & "B", Records of Exhibits.
3 p. 2, Record on Appeal.
4 Exh. " 1 ", Records of Exhibits.
5 Exh. "2", Id.
6 Exchs."4, 4-A to 4-D" & "5, 5-A to 5-H ", Id.
7 Annex "A" Petition, pp. 34-38, Rollo.
8 Annex "B "Petition pp. 39-42, Id.
9 Annex "D" Petition, pp. 46-52, Id.
10 Robinson v. Villafuerte, 18 Phil. 171: Camacho v. Municipality of Baliuag, 28 Phil. 466; Mendezona v. Phil. Sugar Estates Development Co., 41 Phil. 475; of Jocson v. Estacion, G.R. No. L-41867, July 22,1935, cited in Lopez v. Casaclang 24 SCRA 731.
11 pp, 6-7, CA Decision, Annex "E" Petition.
12 Gatioan v. Gaffud 27 SCRA 706; see also Gerona v. De Guzman, 11 SCRA 153, cited in Balbin v. Medalla, G.R. No. L-46410, October 30, 1981.
13 Banawa v. Mirano 97 SCRA 517: Ongsiaco v. Dallo 27 SCRA 161.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
