EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-50581-50617 January 30, 1982
RUFINO V. NUÑEZ, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concuring:
I have read with great care the concurring and dissenting opinion of our learned colleague, Mr. Justice Makasiar, and I fully agree with the view that P.D. 1606 has unduly and improperly placed the Sandiganbayan on a higher plane than the Supreme Court insofar as the matter of automatic releases of appropriations is concerned, which definitely should not be the case. I must say emphatically that if such a provision was conceived to guarantee the Sandigan's independence, it is certainly unwise to assume that the Supreme Court's independence is unworthy of similar protection. Strong as my feeling in this respect is, I am aware that my objection to the provision in question is not ground enough to render the same unconstitutional. In expressing myself as I do, I am just adding my little voice of protest in order that hopefully those concerned may hear it loud and clear and thus give the Supreme Court its deserved superior status over the Sandiganbayan.
I regret, however, I cannot agree with the constitutional structures expressed by Justice Makasiar. I am more inclined to agree with our honored and distinguished Chief Justice, whose learning in constitutional law is duly respected here and abroad, that the arguments against the constitutionality of P.D. 1606 advanced by its critics lack sufficient persuavity.
It should not be surprising nor unusual that the composition of and procedure in the Sandiganbayan should be designed and allowed to be different from the ordinary courts. Constitutionally speaking, I view the Sandiganbayan as sui generis in the judicial structure designed by the makers of the 1971 Constitution. To be particularly noted must be the fact that the mandate of the Constitution that the National Assembly "shall create", it is not under the Article on the Judiciary (Article X) but under the article on Accountability of Public Officers. More, the Constitution ordains it to be "a special court." To my mind, such "special" character endowed to the Sandiganbayan carries with it certain concomittants which compel that it should be treated differently from the ordinary courts. Of course, as a court it exercises judicial power, and so under Section 1 of Article X, it must be subordinate to the Supreme Court. And in this respect, I agree with Justice Makasiar that the rule-making power granted to it by P.D. 1606 must of constitutional necessity be understood as signifying that any rule it may promulgate cannot have force and effect unless approved by the Supreme Court, as if they have originated therefrom. Section 5(5) of the Constitution empowers the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the Sandiganbayan is one of those courts, "special" as it may be.
I am of the considered opinion, nonetheless, that the special composition of the Sandiganbayan and the special procedure of appeal provided for it in P.D. 1606 does not infringe the constitutional injunction against ex-post facto laws. The creation of a special court to take cognizance of, try and decide crimes already committed is not a constitutional abnormality. Otherwise, there would be chaos in the prosecution of offenses which in the public interest must be dealt with more expeditiously in order to curtail any fast surging tide of evil-doing against the social order.
Since the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court, it is obviously improper to make appeals therefrom appealable to another collegiate court with the same number of judges composing it. We must bear in mind that the Sandiganbayan's primary and primordial reason for being is to insure the people's faith and confidence in our public officers more than it used to be. We have only to recall that the activism and restlessness in the later '60's and the early '70's particularly of the youth who are always concerned with the future of the country were caused by their conviction that graft and corruption was already intolerably pervasive in the government and naturally they demanded and expected effective and faster and more expeditious remedies. Thus, the Tanodbayan or Ombudsman was conceived and as its necessary counterpart, the Sandiganbayan.
It must be against the backdrop of recent historical events that I feel We must view the Sandiganbayan. At this point, I must emphasize that P.D. 1606 is a legislative measure, and the rule-making power of the Supreme Court is not insulated by the Charter against legislature's attribute of alteration, amendment or repeal. Indeed, it is the Supreme Court that cannot modify or amend, much less repeal, a rule of court originated by the legislative power.
Accordingly, the method of appeal provided by P.D. 1606 from decisions of the Sandiganbayan cannot be unconstitutional.ℒαwρhi৷ If a new or special court can be legitimately created to try offenses already committed, like the People's Court of Collaboration times, I cannot see how the new procedure of appeal from such courts can be faulted as violative of the Charter.
True, in criminal cases, the Constitution mandates that the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But once the Sandiganbayan makes such a pronouncement, the constitutional requirement is complied with. That the Supreme Court may review the decisions of the Sandiganbayan only on questions of law does not, in my opinion, alter the fact that the conviction of the accused from the factual point of view was beyond reasonable doubt, as long as the evidence relied upon by the Sandiganbayan in arriving at such conclusion is substantial.
Since the creation of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court's power of review over decisions of the former even in criminal cases has been limited statutorily or by the rules only to legal questions. We have never been supposed to exercise the power to reweigh the evidence but only to determine its substantiality. If that was proper and legal, and no one has yet been heard to say the contrary, why should We wonder about the method of review of the decisions of the Sandiganbayan under P.D. 1606? With all due respect to the observation of Justice Makasiar, I believe that the accused has a better guarantee of a real and full consideration of the evidence and the determination of the facts where there are three judges actually seeing and observing the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses. It is Our constant jurisprudence that the appellate courts should rely on the evaluation of the evidence by the trial judges, except in cases where pivotal points are shown to have been overlooked by them. With more reason should this rule apply to the review of the decision of a collegiate trial court. Moreover, when the Court of Appeals passes on an appeal in a criminal cases, it has only the records to rely on, and yet the Supreme Court has no power to reverse its findings of fact, with only the usual exceptions already known to all lawyers and judges. I strongly believe that the review of the decisions of the Sandiganbayan, whose three justices have actually seen and observed the witnesses as provided for in P.D. 1606 is a more iron-clad guarantee that no person accused before such special court will ever be finally convicted without his guilt appearing beyond reasonable doubt as mandated by the Constitution.
Separate Opinions
MAKASIAR, J., concurring and dissenting:
Some provisions in the Sandiganbayan violate not only the constitutional guarantees of due process as wen as equal protection of the law and against the enactment of ex post facto laws, but also the constitutional provisions on the power of supervision of the Supreme Court over inferior courts as well as its rule-making authority.
All the relevant cases on due process, equal protection of the law and ex post facto laws, have been cited by the petitioner, the Solicitor General, and the majority opinion; hence, there is no need to repeat them here.
It should be noted that petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1606 on the ground that it impairs the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court and its power of supervision over inferior courts.
It should likewise be emphasized that in the opinion of the Writer, the provisions of P.D. No. 1606 which he does not impugn, remain valid and complete as a statute and therefore can be given effect minus the challenged portions, which are separable from the valid provisions.
The basic caveat for the embattled citizen is obsta principiis - resist from the very beginning any attempt to assault his constitutional liberties.
I
PARAGRAPH 3, SECTION 7 OF P.D. NO. 1606 DENIES PETITIONER DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
1. Persons who are charged with estafa or malversation of funds not belonging to the government or any of its instrumentalities or agencies are guaranteed the right to appeal to two appellate courts - first, to the Court of Appeals, and thereafter to the Supreme Court. Estafa and malversation of private funds are on the same category as graft and corruption committed by public officers, who, under the Decree creating the Sandiganbayan. are only allowed one appeal - to the Supreme Court (par. 3, Sec. 7, P.D. No. 1606). The fact that the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court does not generate any substantial distinction to validate this invidious discrimination Three judges sitting on the same case does not ensure a quality of justice better than that meted out by a trial court presided by one judge. The ultimate decisive factors are the intellectual competence, industry and integrity of the trial judge. But a review by two appellate tribunals of the same case certainly ensures better justice to the accused and to the people.
It should be stressed that the Constitution merely authorizes the law-making authority to create the Sandiganbayan with a specific limited jurisdiction only over graft and corruption committed by officers and employees of the government, government instrumentalities and government-owned and -controlled corporations. The Constitution does not authorize the lawmaker to limit the right of appeal of the accused convicted by the Sandiganbayan to only the Supreme Court. The Bill of Rights remains as restrictions on the lawmaker in creating the Sandiganbayan pursuant to the constitutional directive.
It is also clear that paragraph 3, Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606 trenches upon the due process clause of the Constitution, because the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals and thereafter to the Supreme Court was already secured under Sections 17 and 29 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, otherwise known as R.A. No. 296, as amended, and therefore also already part of procedural due process to which the petitioner was entitled at the time of the alleged commission of the crime charged against him. (Marcos vs. Cruz, 68 Phil. 96, 104 [1939]; People vs. Moreno, 77 Phil. 548, 555; People vs. Casiano, 1 SCRA 478 [1961]; People vs. Sierra, 46 SCRA 717; Fernando, Phil. Constitution, 1974 ed., pp. 674-675). This is also reiterated in Our discussion hereunder concerning the violation of the constitutional prohibition against the passage of ex post facto laws.
2. Then again, paragraph 3 of Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606, by providing that the decisions of the Sandiganbayan can only be reviewed by the Supreme Court through certiorari, likewise limits the reviewing power of the Supreme Court only to question of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, and not questions of fact nor findings or conclusions of the trial court. In other criminal cases involving offenses not as serious as graft and corruption, all questions of fact and of law are reviewed, first by the Court of Appeals, and then by the Supreme Court. To repeat, there is greater guarantee of justice in criminal cases when the trial court's judgment is subject to review by two appellate tribunals, which can appraise the evidence and the law with greater objectivity, detachment and impartiality unaffected as they are by views and prejudices that may be engendered during the trial.
3. Limiting the power of review by the Supreme Court of convictions by the Sandiganbayan only to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, likewise violates the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused, which presumption can only be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt (See. 19, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution).
Even if in certiorari proceedings, the Supreme Court, to determine whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion, can inquire into whether the judgment of the Sandiganbayan is supported by the substantial evidence, the presumption of innocence is still violated; because proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be equated with substantial evidence. Because the Supreme Court under P.D. No. 1606 is precluded from reviewing questions of fact and the evidence submitted before the Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court is thereby deprived of the constitutional power to determine whether the guilt of the accused has been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt - by proof generating moral certainty as to his culpability -- and therefore subverts the constitutional presumption of innocence in his favor which is enjoyed by all other defendants in other criminal cases, including defendants accused of only light felonies, which are less serious than graft and corruption.
4. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan is composed of a presiding Justice and 8 associate Justices, sitting in three divisions of 3 Justices each (Sec. 3, P.D. No. 1606). Under Section 5 thereof, the unanimous vote of three Justices in a division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of the judgment. In the event that the three Justices do not reach a unanimous vote, the Presiding Justice shall designate two other Justices from among the members of the Court to sit temporarily with them, forming a division of five Justices, and the concurrence of the majority of such division shall be necessary for rendering judgment.
At present, there are only 6 members of the Sandiganbayan or two divisions actually operating. Consequently, when a member of the Division dissents, two other members may be designated by the Presiding Justice to sit temporarily with the Division to constitute a special division of five members. The fact that there are only 6 members now composing the Sandiganbayan limits the choice of the Presiding Justice to only three, instead of 6 members from whom to select the two other Justices to compose a special division of five in case a member of the division dissents. This situation patently diminishes to an appreciable degree the chances of an accused for an acquittal. Applied to the petitioner, Section 5 of P.D. No. 1606 denies him the equal protection of the law as against those who will be prosecuted when three more members of the Sandiganbayan will be appointed to complete its membership of nine.
P.D. No. 1606 therefore denies the accused advantages and privileges accorded to other defendants indicted before other trial courts.
5. Section 1 of P.D. No. 1606 further displays such arbitrary classification; because it places expressly the Sandiganbayan on "the same level as the Court of Appeals." As heretofore stated, the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court and not an appellate court; its jurisdiction is purely limited to criminal and civil cases involving graft and corruption as well as violation of the prohibited drug law committed by public officers and employees of the government, its instrumentalities and government-owned or -controlled corporations. The Court of Appeals is an appellate tribunal exercising appellate jurisdiction over all cases - criminal cases, civil cases, special civil actions, special proceedings, and administrative cases appealable from the trial courts or quasi-judicial bodies. The disparity between the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan is too patent to require extended demonstration.
6. Even the Supreme Court is not spared from such odious discrimination as it is being down-graded by Section 14 of P.D. No. 1606, which effectively makes the Sandiganbayan superior to the Supreme Court; because said Section 14 expressly provides that "the appropriation for the Sandiganbayan shall be automatically released in accordance with the schedule submitted by the Sandiganbayan" (emphasis supplied). There is no such provision in any law or in the. annual appropriations act in favor of the Supreme Court. Under the 1982 Appropriations Act, the funds for the Supreme Court and the entire Judiciary can only be released by the Budget Ministry upon request therefor by the Supreme Court. Sometimes compliance with such request is hampered by bureaucratic procedures. Such discrimination against the Supreme Court - the highest tribunal of the land and the only other Branch of our modified parliamentary-presidential government - the first Branch being constituted by the merger or union of the Executive and the Batasang Pambansa - emphasizes the peril to the independence of the Judiciary, whose operations can be jeopardized and the administration of justice consequently obstructed or impeded by the delay or refusal on the part of the Budget Ministry to release the needed funds for the operation of the courts.
II
P.D. NO. 1606 VIOLATES THE GUARANTEE AGAINST EX POST FACTO LAWS -
1. WE ruled in Kay Villegas Kami (Oct. 22, 1970, 35 SCRA 429) that an ex post facto law is one which alters the rules of evidence and authorizes conviction upon less testimony than the law required at the time the crime was committed, or deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled. The indictment against herein petitioner accused him of graft and corruption committed "from July 20, 1977 up to and including January 12, 1978" (Annex A, p. 24, rec.), long before the creation of the Sandiganbayan on December 10, 1978 by P.D. No. 1606 which expressly repealed P.D. No. 1486, the original charter of the Sandiganbayan promulgated on June 11, 1978.
As heretofore stated, before the creation of the Sandiganbayan on December 10, 1978, all persons accused of malversation of public funds or graft and corruption and estafa were entitled to a review of a trial court's judgment of conviction by the Court of Appeals on all questions of fact and law, and thereafter by the Supreme Court also on both questions of fact and law. This right to a review of the judgment of conviction by two appellate tribunals on both factual and legal issues, was already part of the constitutional right of due process enjoyed by the petitioner in 1977. This vital right of the accused has been taken away on December 10, 1978 by P.D. No. 1606, thus placing herein petitioner under a great disadvantage for crimes he allegedly committed prior to 1978.
2. As a necessary consequence, review by certiorari impairs the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, which requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to rebut the presumption (Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). P.D. No. 1606 thus in effect reduces the quality and quantity of the evidence requisite for a criminal conviction.
The conviction of petitioner is thus facilitated or made easier by P.D. No. 1606, which was not so prior to its promulgation.
The Sandiganbayan could not be likened to the People's Court exclusively trying cases against national security whose decisions were appealable directly only to the Supreme Court (Sec. 13, CA 682); because at the time the People's Court Act or C.A. No. 682 was enacted on September 25. 1945, the Court of Appeals was no longer existing then as it was abolished on March 10, 1945 by Executive Order No. 37 issued by President Sergio Osmena soon after the Liberation. Consequently, the People's Court Act could not provide for appeal to the Court of Appeals which was revived only on October 4, 1946 by R.A. No. 52. But even under Section 13 of the People's Court Act appeal to the Supreme Court is not limited to the review by certiorari. The Supreme Court can review all judgments of the People's Court both on questions of fact and of law.
III
SECTION 9 OF P.D. NO. 1606 CLASHES WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY OF THE SUPREME COURT -
Section 9 of P.D. No. 1606 authorizing the Sandiganbayan to promulgate its own rules of procedure without requiring the approval thereof by the Supreme Court, collides with the constitutional rule-making authority of the Supreme Court. to pro- promulgate rules of court for all courts of the land (par. 5, Sec. 5 of Art. X of the New Constitution).
IV
P.D. NO. 1606 SUBVERTS THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF SUPERVISION OVER INFERIOR COURTS INCLUDING THE SANDIGANBAYAN -
Section 10 of P.D. No. 1606 authorizing the Sandiganbayan to "administer its own internal affairs, to adopt such rules governing the constitution of its divisions, the allocation of cases among them and other matters relating to its business," without requiring the approval of the Supreme Court also contravenes the constitutional power of supervision over the Sandiganbayan as an inferior trial court. It cannot be disputed that the Sandiganbayan is an inferior court.
2. Likewise, Section 12 of P.D. No. 1606 vesting the Sandiganbayan with the power to select and appoint its personnel including a clerk of court and three deputy clerks of court and to remove them for cause without reserving to the Supreme Court the authority to approve or disapprove such appointments and to review such removals, aggravates the violation of the constitutional power of supervision of the Supreme Court over inferior courts.
3. Section 13 of P.D. 1606 also contravenes the constitutional power of the Supreme Court to supervise inferior courts; because said Section 13 requires the Sandiganbayan to submit an annual report directly to the President without coursing the same to the Supreme Court for review' and approval.
That the Sandiganbayan is a specially favored court is further shown by the General Appropriations Act of 1982 which states that "all appropriations provided herein for the Sandiganbayan shall be administered solely by the Presiding Justice, ..." (par. 1, Sp. Provisions XXV on the Judiciary, p. 538, Gen. Appropriations Act of 1982). This particular provision impairs likewise the constitutional power of administrative supervision vested in the Supreme Court over all inferior courts (Sec. 6, Art. X, 1972 Constitution). It should be emphasized that the same General Appropriations Act of 1982 expressly provides that the disposition of all the appropriations for the Court of Appeals, Court of Tax Appeals, Circuit Criminal Courts, and the Court of Agrarian Relations is expressly subject to the approval of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (pp. 539-541, General Appropriations Act of 1982).
The authority delegated expressly by the Constitution to the law-maker to create the Sandiganbayan does not include the authority to exempt the Sandiganbayan from the constitutional supervision of the Supreme Court.
All the challenged provisions of P.D. No. 1606, namely, Sections 7 (par. 3), 9, 10, 12 and 13 are separable from the rest of its provisions without affecting the completeness thereof, and can therefore be declared unconstitutional without necessarily nullifying the entire P.D. No. 1606. The valid provisions amply determine what is to be done, who is to do it, and now to do it - the test for a complete and intelligible law (Barrameda vs. Moir, 25 Phil. 44; Edu vs. Ericta, Oct. 20, 1970, 35 SCRA 481, 496-497). As a matter of fact, Section 15 acknowledges such separability although under the jurisprudence it is merely a guide for and persuasive, but not necessarily binding on, the Supreme Court which can declare an entire law unconstitutional if the challenged portions are inseparable from the valid portions.
Section—1 of P.D. No. 1606 can be considered valid by just considering as not written therein the phrase "of the same level as the Court of Appeals.
Section 5 of P.D. No. 1606 could likewise be validated by simply appointing three more members of the Sandiganbayan to complete its membership.
Paragraph 3 of Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606 can be declared unconstitutional without affecting the completeness and validity of the remaining provisions of P.D. No. 1606; because in the absence of said Paragraph 3, Section 17 and 29 of the Judiciary Act of 1984, as amended,can apply.
However, the challenged provisions, especially Sections 9, 10, 12 and 13 could remain valid provided it is understood that the powers delegated thereunder to the Sandiganbayan are deemed subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.
Teehankee and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Fernandez, J., concurs and dissent
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