On October 31, 1979, Armando Matilla was arraigned with the assistance of a counsel de oficio, Jose Q. Baltazar (3 tsn October 31, 1979). Armando at first pleaded guilty. But after he said that he had confessed due to maltreatment, the trial court entered a plea of not guilty for him.
Later, at the hearing on November 27, 1979, Matilla manifested through counsel that he wanted to plead guilty to an amended charge for murder. He made the same manifestation during the hearing on February 28, 1980 (pp. 44 and 63, Record).
The minutes of the hearing on March 5, 1980 show that Matilla, when re-arraigned, pleaded guilty to the clime charged, which is highway robbery with homicide, after he was allowed to withdraw his plea of not guilty (p. 69, Record). 'The trial court in its decision dictated in open court on that date, March 5,1980, noted that Matilla pleaded guilty.
After the accused had pleaded guilty and before the judgment of conviction was rendered, the trial court required the fiscal to present his evidence.
Lydia Llantada Cosep, a public school teacher, testified that at about three o'clock in the afternoon of May 19, 1979, her mother, Mrs. Llantada, the victim in this case, a resident of Barangay Anislag, Calbayog City, visited her in her house at Barangay Trinidad of the same city. The distance between the two barangays is about three kilometers.
At about five o'clock on that afternoon, her mother left her house. Mrs. Llantada boarded a tricycle going to the highway where she would get transportation in returning to Barangay Anislag. Lydia offered to pay her fare but Mrs. Llantada said that she would pay her own fare. She showed to Lydia her money. "May-ada aco P30", said Mrs. Llantada.
The next morning at around six o'clock a policeman informed Lydia that her mother was found dead on the national highway in a place caned Macacabalo, a part of Barangay Cagsalaosao. The house nearest that place was about a hundred meters away. Her mother's money was missing.
Basilio Abes, 70, a neighbor of Mrs. Llantada, testified that in the evening of May 19, 1979 he met her on the highway near the camp of De la Riva. She was accompanied by Lebajo and Armando Matilla. Abes pointed in court to a person with a harelip who turned out to be Matilla.
Eugenia Petos, a resident of Oquendo, Calbayog City, testified that at about nine o'clock in the evening of May 19, 1979 Lebajo and two persons, one of whom had a harelip, appeared in her store and wanted to buy food. As there was no food, they just drank water.
The three appeared to be panicky or frightened and were out of breath. After drinking water, they left. Worried that there was something wrong, Petos closed her store.
Zacarias Dagum, also a resident of Oquendo, saw Lebajo and Matilla eating in a restaurant that same evening of May 19, 1979. They looked worried and fidgety.
The fiscal had filed a motion to discharge Lebajo so that he could be utilized as a State witness. The trial court denied the motion. It regarded as unnecessary Lebajo's presentation as a witness because of Matilla's plea of guilty (37 tsn March 5, 1980). The trial court subsequently dismissed the case against Lebajo for lack of evidence (pp. 82-83, Record).
The trial court in convicting Matilla reasoned out that his second plea of guilty, which superseded his prior plea of not guilty, cured the defects of his extrajudicial confession.
It should be noted that Matilla did not testify at the trial and did not appeal from the judgment of conviction.
His learned and able counsel de oficio, designated to present his side in this review of the death penalty, contends that the trial court erred in accepting Matilla's plea of guilty, in lieu of his prior plea of not guilty, because it did not ascertain whether he had grasped fully the meaning and consequences of his plea.
The Solicitor General agrees with the counsel de oficio that Matilla had made an improvident plea of guilty.
We hold that the trial court was justified in convicting the accused on the basis of his second plea of guilty.
It is true that the transcript of the stenographic notes for the hearing on March 5, 1980 does not reveal how Matilla withdrew the plea of not guilty entered for him by the trial court at the hearing on October 31, 1979 and substituted it with his second plea of guilty.
That omission was the fault of the stenographer, not of the trial court. As stated earlier, the minutes of the hearing prepared by the clerk of court unquestionably prove that Matilla entered a plea of guilty to replace his previous plea of not guilty (p. 69, Record).
The trial court in its decision dictated in open court made repeated references to Matilla's second plea of guilty. If no such plea had been made, as intimated by counsel de oficio and the Solicitor General, then Matilla's counsel would have called the trial judge's attention to that discrepancy.
It is also true that the prosecution's oral evidence, which was received after the plea of guilty was made, does not prove Matilla's guilt. It has very little probative value.
On the other hand, as already adverted to, the extrajudicial confession, which was Identified by the police investigator, is not admissible under the Constitution.
Nevertheless, it should be underscored that at Matilla's first arraignment on October 31, 1979, when the trial court, following the recurring admonition of this Court to trial judges in capital cases, interrogated him, he freely and spontaneously pleaded guilty with the assistance of his counsel. Aside from pleading guilty, he admitted having killed and robbed Mrs. Llantada, It is significant that admission was a confession of guilt which was distinct from his plea of guilty.
To all indications, he was aware of the consequences of his judicial admission of the killing and robbery on the national highway. Matilla's separate and voluntary admission of guilt, made in open court, when he was assisted by counsel and was not acting under duress or cajolery, is conclusive as to his guilt.
Of course, that judicial confession was rendered inoperative when moments later during the arraignment in the course of judicial interrogation, Matilla said that lie confessed because he was maltreated. At that juncture, the trial court entered a plea of not guilty for him, a plea which Matilla confirmed and which cancelled his plea of guilty.
But four months later, Matilla, before trial, was rearraigned. At the re-arraignment, he withdrew his plea of not guilty and restored his original plea of guilty.
Matilla's second plea of guilty automatically revived his judicial confession of guilt. Not only that. As correctly rationalized by the trial court, his second plea of guilty validated his extrajudicial confession (Exh. B). It removed any reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
In retrospect, it would appear that Matilla withdrew his original plea of guilty because it was impressed upon him by the trial court that his mea culpa would result in his electrocution.
But it is clear that when he withdrew his plea of not guilty and substituted it with a plea of guilty, he was fully cognizant of the grave consequences of that second plea of guilty because he made the withdrawal long after he had pleaded not guilty and after the fiscal had repeatedly refused to accede to his request that the charge be changed to murder.
The crime committed by Matilla is highway robbery with homicide penalized with death as a single indivisible penalty under the aforementioned Presidential Decree No. 532 which provides:
SEC. 2. Definition of Terms.-The following terms shall mean and be understood, as follows:
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e. Highway Robbery,/Brigandage.—The seizure of any person for ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes, or the taking away of the property of another by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things of other unlawful means, committed by any person on any Philippine Highway."
SEC. 3. Penalties.—Any person who commits piracy or highway robbery/brigandage as herein defined, shall, upon conviction by a competent court be punished by:
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b. Highway Robbery/Brigandage —The penalty of reclusion temporal in its minimum period shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are committed during or on the occasion of the commission of robbery or brigandage, the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed. If kidnapping for ransom or extortion, or murder or homicide, or rape is committed as a result or on the occasion thereof, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 532 repealed pertinent portions of the Revised Penal Code.
Matilla's plea of guilty has no effect on the death penalty which is imposable upon him (Art. 63, Revised Penal Code).
Hence, the trial court did not err in imposing the death penalty. However, the requisite ten votes cannot be obtained for the affirmance of the death penalty.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is affirmed with the modification that the death penalty is commuted to reclusion perpetua.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., took no part.
Barredo, J., I register my vote for the imposition of capital punishment.
Abad Santos, J., concur in the result.
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