Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 1106-CFI January 24, 1977
ARMANDO B. CLEDERA,
complainant,
vs.
DELFIN VIR. SUNGA, DISTRICT JUDGE, BRANCH I CFI, CAMARINES SUR, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
MUNOZ PALMA, J.:
Respondent Judge Delfin Vir. Sunga of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch I, was charged in a complaint filed by Atty. Armando B. Cledera with "dishonesty, partially, abuse of authority, insubordination and falsificationof official documents." We required respondent to comment on the complaint and upon receipt of the same (pp. 41-45, rollo) the matter was referred to Justice Vicente Santiago, Jr. of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation. (p. 118, rollo)
The report of Justice Vicente Santiago, Jr. dated August 9, 1976 shows the following:
The case was set for hearing on several dates with notices to both complainant and respondent but the hearing could not proceed due to motion for postponement of Atty. Clederaon the ground of ill health, he having suffered mild strokes which resulted in paralysis of his boby and confinement in a hospital. Sometimes on August 6, 1976, respondent Judge filed with the Honorable Investigator a motion to dismiss the complaint for the reason that the complainant had died and was interred on July 10, 1976, thereby rendering the charges moot and academic. A certification on the death of Armando B. Cledera was submitted by respondent.
In view of the death of the complainant and there being no testimonial or documentary evidence submitted to substantiate the charges, the investigating Justice recommends the dismissal of this complaint.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this administrative complaint is dismissed without prejudice however to its reinstatement by any other interested party.
So Ordered.
Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and Martin, JJ., concur.
Castro, C.J., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:
To my mind, there is no question about the correctness of the result reached. The case must be dismissed. This brief opinion therefore is primarily a concurrence. That would be in line with the well- settled principle first announced by Justice Malcolm in the leading case of In re Horrilleno, 1 decided as far back as 1922, to the effect that the guilt of a judge against whom an administrative complaint is lodged "must be proved beyond reasonable doubt." 2 Here there is no proof at all. To repeat, concurrence is more than indicated. The dissenting part then is certainly minimal. It is induced by caution, ex abundante to repeat a well-worn phrase. As far as the opinion of the Court goes, it can be truly said that Justice Munoz Palma has lived up to the usual care with which she handles her assignments as ponente for the Court. If I add a few words of dissent then, it is only to express my conviction that with the administrative supervision over inferior courts now vested in this Tribunal, I would not rule out the power . of this Court in appropriate cases to look into an administrative complaint through an investigator, whether from its staff or from the judiciary, even if the complainant is no longer available. There may be reliable witnesses, and the liability of respondent, if any, ascertained. That to me is to assure effectiveness of the competence now vested in this Court. Hence this observation by way of a dissent.
However, to repeat, as to this particular case, I am in agreement with the result reached.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:
To my mind, there is no question about the correctness of the result reached. The case must be dismissed. This brief opinion therefore is primarily a concurrence. That would be in line with the well- settled principle first announced by Justice Malcolm in the leading case of In re Horrilleno, 1 decided as far back as 1922, to the effect that the guilt of a judge against whom an administrative complaint is lodged "must be proved beyond reasonable doubt."2 Here there is no proof at all. To repeat, concurrence is more than indicated. The dissenting part then is certainly minimal. It is induced by caution, ex abundante to repeat a well-worn phrase. As far as the opinion of the Court goes, it can be truly said that Justice Munoz Palma has lived up to the usual care with which she handles her assignments as ponente for the Court. If I add a few words of dissent then, it is only to express my conviction that with the administrative supervision over inferior courts now vested in this Tribunal, I would not rule out the power . of this Court in appropriate cases to look into an administrative complaint through an investigator, whether from its staff or from the judiciary, even if the complainant is no longer available. There may be reliable witnesses, and the liability of respondent, if any, ascertained. That to me is to assure effectiveness of the competence now vested in this Court. Hence this observation by way of a dissent.
However, to repeat, as to this particular case, I am in agreement with the result reached.
Footnotes
Fernando, J.;
1 43 Phil. 212.
2 Ibid, 215. Cf. Enriquez v. Araula, Adm. Case No. 270-J, Dec. 18, 1973, 54 SCRA 232; Tombo v. Medina, Adm. Case No. 929, Jan. 17, 1974, 55 SCRA 13; Lampauog v. Villarojo, Adm. Case No. 381-MJ, Jan. 28, 1974, 55 SCRA 304; Bartolome v. de Borja, Adm. Case No. 1096, May 31, 1976, 71 SCRA 153; De Guzman v. De Leon, Adm. Case No. 1328-,MJ, July 30, 1976; Meimban v. Balite Adm. Case No. 131-MJ, Aug. 21, 1976; Tolentino v. Tiong, Adm. Case No. 535-MJ, Aug. 21, 1976: Amosco v. Magro, Adm. Case No. 439-MJ, Sept. 30,1976.
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