A.M. No. 1267




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION A.M. No. 1267 October 29, 1976 CARMENCHU MADERAZO, complainant, vs. Atty. BENJAMIN DEL ROSARIO, respondent. R E S O L U T I O N FERNANDO, J.: The impression yielded by this administrative complaint against respondent Benjamin del Rosario, a member of the bar, is that it was not so much the lapse from the moral standard consisting of his having represented himself as separated from his wife, and thus enabling him, presumably after the proper courtship, to live maritally with petitioner Carmenchu Maderazo, but his having abandoned her after a son was born to them. She was thus constrained to file an action for recognition of the child and for his support before the Juvenile and Domestic Relation Court of Quezon City. He was required to answer the complaint. That he did, denying specifically each and every allegation. There was, in addition, the special and affirmative defense that such case for support constituted a prejudicial question which should first be resolved before action is taken on this administrative complaint. The matter was referred to the Solicitor General's Office on February 21, 1974 for investigation, report and recommendation. The report and recommendation was submitted to this Court on October 1, 1976 by Acting Solicitor General Hugo Gutierrez. 1 It was therein set forth that the issue raised is whether "disciplinary action should be taken against respondent Atty. Benjamin del Rosario for having allegedly conabited with the complainant Carmenchu V. Maderazo, as her husband, out of which cohabitation as son named Jonathan M. del Rosario was allegedly born of the couple; and for having thereafter abandoned both the complainant and the child." 2 It was then stated: "The complainant in this case adduced no evidence in support f her complainant against the respondent. There is, therefore, no iota of evidence at all to show that respondent is guilty of the charges filed against him." 3 Further: On the other hand, complainant herself had executed an affidavit marked as Exhibit '1' for the respondent, stating that she was misled by a close relative into filing this administrative complaint against respondent; that the respondent is not the father of her child Jonathan del Rosario, as she had never had any intimate relations with him; that she could not substantiate or prove the allegations in her complaint, which are not true; and that she executed said affidavit for the purpose of dismissing with prejudice the instant administrative case. Moreover, complainant's own lawyer, Atty. Pablito A. Gahol, declared in the investigation of this case that the aforementioned affidavit was voluntarily and freely executed by the complainant. Said affidavit and Atty. Gahol's testimony, coupled with the repeated failure of complainant to appear at the investigation of this case, not only shows her [lack of interest] in prosecuting this case, but strengthens the belief that her instant complaint cannot indeed be substantiated." 4 It was likewise pointed out: "For his part, the respondent affirmed the allegations in his motion to dismiss and denied all the material allegations of the complaint filed against him. Respondent also introduced in evidence the order dated April 22, 1974 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City in Civil Case No. QE-00616 'For Support and Recognition of child, which was filed by the complainant in behalf of her child Jonathan M. del Rosario. In said order which respondent marked as his Exhibit '2', the Court dismissed the complaint on the basis of a joint motion filed by the parties therein" 5 Under the above circumstances, considering the facts of record, it is understandable why Acting Solicitor General Gutierrez recommended "that this case be dismissed." 6 That is to conform with the settled law on the subject. It goes back to the In re Tionko opinion of Justice Malcolm, 7 a 1922 decision. Thus: "The serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges preferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance with his oath." 8 Since then, such a principle has been adhered to. 9 In the absence of any evidence demonstrating culpability, the administrative charge cannot prosper. WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint against Benjamin del Rosario is dismissed. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on his record. Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur. Footnotes 1 He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Alicia V. Sempio-Diy and Solicitor Amado D. Aquino. 2 Report and Recommendation, 6. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid, 6-7. 5 Ibid, 7. 6 Ibid, 8. 7 43 Phil. 191. 8 Ibid, 194. 9 Cf. Javier v. Cornejo, 63 Phil. 293 (1936); De Guzman v. Tadeo, 68 Phil. 554 (1939); In re Attorney C.T. Oliva, 103 Phil. 312 (1958); Blanza v. Arcangel, Adm. Case No. 492, Sept. 5, 1967, 21 SCRA 1; Magno v. Gellada, Adm. Case No. 767, Dec. 20, 1971, 42 SCRA 549; Misamin v. San Juan, Adm. Case No. 1418, Aug. 31, 1976. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation