A.M. No. 532-MJ July 25, 1975
PAULA S. QUIZON, ET. AL.,
complainants,
vs.
JUDGE JOSE G. BALTAZAR, JR., respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
CONCEPCION JR., J.:
Complainants Paula S. Quizon, Teresita G. Hipolito, Victoria Samia, Benjamin S. Vergara, Romulo de Jesus, Benigno Ramos, and Honorato Layug are teachers and officers of the Parent-Teachers Association of Dolores Elementary School, Mabalacat, Pampanga. In a letter to the Secretary of the Department of Public Information dated October 2, 1972, the said complainants, together with six others, aired their complaint against the Barrio Captain and other barrio officials of Barrio Dolores, Mabalacat, Pampanga for abuses and harassment allegedly perpetrated by the said officials against the signatories to the letter. Because of this letter, Barrio Captain Amado M. Rimorin, on his behalf and on behalf of the other barrio officials, filed a complaint for libel against the complainants herein which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2368 in the Municipal Court of Mabalacat, Pampanga, presided by respondent herein, Judge Jose G. Baltazar, Jr. The preliminary investigation of the case was set by respondent for December 4, 1972 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. Due to the non-appearance of their lawyer, Mrs. Paula S. Quizon requested for a postponement as soon as the court session was opened at 9:00 o'clock. Respondent denied the motion and proceeded with the preliminary investigation although the accused were not represented by counsel. The preliminary investigation lasted less than one hour. The next day respondent issued a warrant of arrest against the complainants herein. The said warrant was served the very same day at nighttime. After complainants had been taken into custody, Mr. Flor Quizon, the son of Mrs. Paula S. Quizon, went to respondent's house in the middle of the night to ask for the reduction of the bail bond of his mother which had been set at P1,000.00. Instead of acting on it immediately, respondent waited until the next day when he reduced the bail bond to P300.00. However, the complainants had to spend the night in jail.
Because respondent is neither a judge of the municipal court of the city or capital of the province, complainants charge respondent with grave ignorance of the law and criminal negligence in conducting the preliminary investigation of a libel case, in violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 4363 amending Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code. 1 Complainants also claim that respondent acted with partiality in his official actuations relative to Criminal Case No. 2368 of the Mabalacat Municipal Court because Barrio Captain Amado M. Rimorin and his councilmen are fanatical political followers of Mayor Walfredo C. Halili who is identified to be a close friend of respondent.
The provisions of Act No. 4363 amending Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code are so clear and unmistakable that there can be no room for doubt or even interpretation. In taking cognizance of the libel case, respondent was clearly without jurisdiction. The kindest thing we can say of him is that he is ignorant of the plain and categorical provisions of law. Moreover, as early as April 5, 1967 the Department of Justice circularized 2 all city judges and municipal judges relative to the provisions of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No. 4363 as follows:
It should be noted from these provisions that a complaint or information for libel may be filed only in the Court of First Instance. The preliminary investigation of the criminal case may, however, be conducted by the city court of the city or the municipal court of the capital of the province where the case is filed. (p. 190, rollo).
There can therefore be no excuse for respondent's error of law. But there are other matters that have not escaped our observation. To begin with the letter 3 of complainants to the Secretary of the Department of Public Information, and which forms the basis for the libel complaint, is clearly a privileged communication, so inoffensively worded that not even a single name of the barrio officials referred to as committing the abuses and harassment is mentioned. This fact alone should have alerted respondent to act with extreme caution. Aside from this, the accused in the libel case are all teachers, five of them being ladies, and members of the Parent-Teachers Association of Barrio Dolores, Mabalacat. Respondent therefore acted injudiciously and with the unjustified haste in denying the motion to postpone the preliminary investigation on the ground that the accused therein had no counsel, especially if we consider that it was the first time that a motion to postpone was ever made.1äwphï1.ñët
In proceeding with the preliminary investigation and in terminating the same within less than an hour, without any written record of the proceedings taken, respondent again violated a clear mandate of the law as required by Section 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended which provides as follows:
No warrant of arrest shall be issued by any municipal judge in any criminal case filed with him unless he first examines the witness or witnesses personally, and the examination shall be under oath and reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers.
To top it all, after complainants were arrested at nighttime, and when a petition to reduce the bail bond was presented to respondent at his house to enable complainants to obtain their temporary release and thus be spared from having to spend the night in jail, respondent did not act on the petition then and there but instead waited until the next morning, as if to insure that complainants would have to stay in jail for at least that night.
Wittingly or unwittingly, respondent allowed himself to become a tool for harassment.
As to the charge of partiality, complainants' evidence in this regard is not all too clear and convincing. On the contrary, it appears that complainant Mrs. Paula S. Quizon through her counsel, Atty. Zoilo And in, also filed a libel case against Barrio Captain Amado Rimorin, et al. on December 14, 1972 before the Municipal Court of Mabalacat, Pampanga, and the respondent after conducting the preliminary investigation in the said case, also ordered the arrest of Amado M. Rimorin and his co-accused.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent is hereby found guilty of grave ignorance of the provisions of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 4363 and of the provisions of Section 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, for which he shall suffer the penalty of suspension without pay for a period of six (6) months, effective upon receipt of this resolution.
Barredo, Antonio and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
It is easy to concur in the ably-penned opinion of Justice Concepcion. It is pithy and concise and yet comprehensive, disposing succinctly and neatly all the legal issues involved. Even the most cursory perusal thereof renders quite manifest the marked deficiency in the knowledge of the law of respondent Judge, regrettably in a most sensitive area, freedom of thought. The fact that because of such ignorance a grave injury was occasioned complainants, lady-teachers at that, exercising their rights as citizens, necessarily calls for a penalty proportionate to the gravity of the offense. While all these points are accorded due consideration in the resolution of the Court, I feel that nothing would be lost if there be reference to certain fundamentals in a constitutional regime. Hence this brief concurrence.
1. It hardly speaks well of the legal background of respondent Judge or his present knowledge of the law when he failed to discern the obvious inroad that a lax application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on libel would make on freedom of expression. That has been a settled constitutional law doctrine as far back as United States v. Bustos,1 a 1918 decision, one particularly relevant as the offended party to alleged defamatory remarks was a justice of the peace, like the present respondent, an occupant of the bench exercising jurisdiction over a municipality. To quote from the landmark opinion of Justice Malcolm: "The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abcesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation: the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual is less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for the common good."2 It could be concluded, as pointed out in Lopez v. Court of Appeals:3
"There is an impressive recognition in our decisions of the curtailment to which press freedom would be subjected if an action for libel were not rigorously scrutinized to remove doubts as to its being utilized to penalize the exercise of that constitutional right."4
2. It is that basic premise that explains the adoption of the procedural rules in libel prosecutions. The basic aim is to avoid harassment and to minimize the trouble and expense incident to every municipal judge, in far-flung provincial places assuming jurisdiction over such cases, not a few of which are filed precisely to ward off unwelcome criticism and thus stifle freedom of thought. In addition to what has been so clearly setforth in Justice Concepcion's opinion, it is not amiss to refer to Jalandoni v. Endaya:5 "There is no need to make mention again that it is court of first instance that is specifically designated to try a libel case. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code so provides. Its language is categorical; its meaning is free from doubt. This is one of those statutory provisions that leaves no room for interpretation. All that is required is application. What the law ordains must then be followed. It is as simple as that. It did not appear to be so to respondent Judge. He would go ahead. He therefore did invite a suit of this character bent as he was on treading grounds where his presence was, to put it as its mildest, unwelcome."6 Further: "Moreover, reference to decided cases ever since the effectivity of Article 360 will make clear that such an adamantine stand is far from justified. A case where a municipal court has been sustained in its determination to go ahead and try on the merits a prosecution for libel is yet to make its appearance in the judicial scene. If the law remains what it is, as seems likely, it will be a long, long wait."7 While not exactly in point, the above excerpts shed additional illumination to the procedural point at issue.
3. A word more. It is a truism that the learning process in law does not stop upon graduation from college and admission to the bar. There should be, on the contrary, more sustained intellectual effort on the part of the members of the legal profession. Certainly, judges are not exempt from this obligation. It is even more incumbent on them as they are thought of as the "oracles of the law." There is likely then to be a disillusionment in the judicial process if, as did happen here, an occupant of the bench was found to be woefully lacking in legal knowledge. Nor is this the only deplorable aspect of this unfortunate occurrence. There is an even more imperative need for proficiency in the law under a regime of martial rule. The efforts for improvement in the mode of administering the government in all its manifold complexity would come to naught if our people can harbor the suspicion that judges do not even know what the law is. Moreover, as officials are vested solely with power, only the people enjoying rights, there being a need then for the conferment by law of such authority, it is of the essence that before any one in the government service assumes any function, he must be able to point to a statutory provision that enables him to do so. A constitutional official, of course, is in the vantage position of having recourse to the fundamental law as the source of his power. What exacerbates the failing of respondent Judge is that it is difficult to avoid the suspicion that he acted the way he did to favor barrio officials. Now that barangays are given more extensive participation in affairs of state, there should be more, not less, scrutiny of the mode of performance of their functions by local officials. All that the facts show in this case was a complaint being ventilated against barrio officials. The Bustos case, on its face, seems to be applicable. Without passing judgment on the matter, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that complainants were made to suffer for exercising their constitutional rights of freedom of expression and freedom of petition. There appeared to be then inexcusable ignorance on the part of respondent Judge not only as to the scope of his jurisdiction but also as to the applicable mandates of the Constitution, authoritatively construed.
He is fully deserving of the punishment inflicted. As a matter of fact, it can be said that he has not been made to feel the full weight of this Tribunal's displeasure. Ignorance on the part of judges is hardly to be condoned. I have no choice, as intimated at the outset, but to concur.
Respondent suspended for six years without pay.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
It is easy to concur in the ably-penned opinion of Justice Concepcion. It is pithy and concise and yet comprehensive, disposing succinctly and neatly all the legal issues involved. Even the most cursory perusal thereof renders quite manifest the marked deficiency in the knowledge of the law of respondent Judge, regrettably in a most sensitive area, freedom of thought. The fact that because of such ignorance a grave injury was occasioned complainants, lady-teachers at that, exercising their rights as citizens, necessarily calls for a penalty proportionate to the gravity of the offense. While all these points are accorded due consideration in the resolution of the Court, I feel that nothing would be lost if there be reference to certain fundamentals in a constitutional regime. Hence this brief concurrence.
1. It hardly speaks well of the legal background of respondent Judge or his present knowledge of the law when he failed to discern the obvious inroad that a lax application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on libel would make on freedom of expression. That has been a settled constitutional law doctrine as far back as United States v. Bustos,1 a 1918 decision, one particularly relevant as the offended party to alleged defamatory remarks was a justice of the peace, like the present respondent, an occupant of the bench exercising jurisdiction over a municipality. To quote from the landmark opinion of Justice Malcolm: "The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abcesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation: the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual is less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for the common good."2 It could be concluded, as pointed out in Lopez v. Court of Appeals:3
"There is an impressive recognition in our decisions of the curtailment to which press freedom would be subjected if an action for libel were not rigorously scrutinized to remove doubts as to its being utilized to penalize the exercise of that constitutional right."4
2. It is that basic premise that explains the adoption of the procedural rules in libel prosecutions. The basic aim is to avoid harassment and to minimize the trouble and expense incident to every municipal judge, in far-flung provincial places assuming jurisdiction over such cases, not a few of which are filed precisely to ward off unwelcome criticism and thus stifle freedom of thought. In addition to what has been so clearly setforth in Justice Concepcion's opinion, it is not amiss to refer to Jalandoni v. Endaya:5 "There is no need to make mention again that it is court of first instance that is specifically designated to try a libel case. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code so provides. Its language is categorical; its meaning is free from doubt. This is one of those statutory provisions that leaves no room for interpretation. All that is required is application. What the law ordains must then be followed. It is as simple as that. It did not appear to be so to respondent Judge. He would go ahead. He therefore did invite a suit of this character bent as he was on treading grounds where his presence was, to put it as its mildest, unwelcome."6 Further: "Moreover, reference to decided cases ever since the effectivity of Article 360 will make clear that such an adamantine stand is far from justified. A case where a municipal court has been sustained in its determination to go ahead and try on the merits a prosecution for libel is yet to make its appearance in the judicial scene. If the law remains what it is, as seems likely, it will be a long, long wait."7 While not exactly in point, the above excerpts shed additional illumination to the procedural point at issue.
3. A word more. It is a truism that the learning process in law does not stop upon graduation from college and admission to the bar. There should be, on the contrary, more sustained intellectual effort on the part of the members of the legal profession. Certainly, judges are not exempt from this obligation. It is even more incumbent on them as they are thought of as the "oracles of the law." There is likely then to be a disillusionment in the judicial process if, as did happen here, an occupant of the bench was found to be woefully lacking in legal knowledge. Nor is this the only deplorable aspect of this unfortunate occurrence. There is an even more imperative need for proficiency in the law under a regime of martial rule. The efforts for improvement in the mode of administering the government in all its manifold complexity would come to naught if our people can harbor the suspicion that judges do not even know what the law is. Moreover, as officials are vested solely with power, only the people enjoying rights, there being a need then for the conferment by law of such authority, it is of the essence that before any one in the government service assumes any function, he must be able to point to a statutory provision that enables him to do so. A constitutional official, of course, is in the vantage position of having recourse to the fundamental law as the source of his power. What exacerbates the failing of respondent Judge is that it is difficult to avoid the suspicion that he acted the way he did to favor barrio officials. Now that barangays are given more extensive participation in affairs of state, there should be more, not less, scrutiny of the mode of performance of their functions by local officials. All that the facts show in this case was a complaint being ventilated against barrio officials. The Bustos case, on its face, seems to be applicable. Without passing judgment on the matter, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that complainants were made to suffer for exercising their constitutional rights of freedom of expression and freedom of petition. There appeared to be then inexcusable ignorance on the part of respondent Judge not only as to the scope of his jurisdiction but also as to the applicable mandates of the Constitution, authoritatively construed.
He is fully deserving of the punishment inflicted. As a matter of fact, it can be said that he has not been made to feel the full weight of this Tribunal's displeasure. Ignorance on the part of judges is hardly to be condoned. I have no choice, as intimated at the outset, but to concur.
Respondent suspended for six years without pay.
Footnotes
1 Section 1, Act No. 4363 provides: "... "Preliminary investigation of criminal actions for written defamations as provided for in the chapter shall he conducted by the provincial or city fiscal of the province or city, or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the province where such actions may be instituted in accordance with the provisions of this article."
2 Circular No. 27 dated April 5, 1965.
3 Rollo, pp. 18-19.
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
1 37 Phil. 7831.
2 Ibid, 740-741.
3 L-26549, July 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 116.
4 Ibid, 123-124.
5 L-23894, January 24, 1974, 55 SCRA 261.
6 Ibid, 263-264.
7 Ibid, 264.
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