G.R. No. L-30978




Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-30978 September 30, 1974 FORTUNATO MEDINA, petitioner, vs. GEN. MANUEL T. YAN, BRIG. GEN VICENTE RAVAL, and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. Amelito R. Mutuc for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz for respondents. FERNANDEZ, J.:p This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction, praying that judgment be rendered: (1) Annuling and setting aside all the actuations, orders, and resolutions of the respondent Court of Appeals, more particularly the resolution dated February 1, 1969, denying petitioner's motion for certification of this case to the Supreme Court; the resolution dated March 13, 1969 denying petitioner's "Urgent Motion for Release of Petitioner-Detainee", the resolution dated June 10, 1969 denying petitioner's "Motion for Reconsideration"; and the resolution dated June 21, 1969 requiring Atty. Amelito R. Mutuc to show cause why he should not be held liable and dealt with for contempt of court and suspended from the practice of law as member of the Philippine Bar; (2) Prohibiting respondent Court of Appeals from enforcing the aforesaid resolution dated June 21, 1969, regarding the contempt and suspension charge against aforenamed Amelito R. Mutuc, as well as from proceeding further with the case at bar; and (3) Ordering the respondent Court of Appeals to certify the appeal and to have all the records of the same forwarded to this Court. Pending these proceedings a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued ex parte was sought, to enjoin, restrain and prohibit the respondent Court of Appeals from proceeding further with this case, more particularly with the enforcement of its resolution of June 21, 1969, requiring Atty. Amelito R. Mutuc to explain why he should not be held for contempt of court and suspended from the practice of law. On September 4, 1969, this Court adopted a resolution restraining the respondent Court of Appeals from proceeding further with case No. CA-G.R. No. 42658-R, entitled "Fortunato Medina, petitioner-appellee vs. Gen. Manuel T. Yan and Brig. Gen. Vicente Raval, respondents-appellants", more particularly with the enforcement of its resolution of June 21, 1969, re: Contempt and Suspension of Atty. Amelito R. Mutuc." For a clear perspective of the present petition, the events leading thereto are set forth as follows: At 6:00 o'clock in the morning of November 23, 1968 petitioner Fortunato Medina, a Filipino citizen who was in Saigon, South Vietnam, employed as a laborer in an American company, was arrested and apprehended by the South Vietnam Police and some members of the Philippine Civic Action Group (PHILCAG) at the instance of the Philippine Military Attache in that city, and kept in custody until 6:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, when he was flown to Manila under escort by two Philippine Military Attache personnel aboard an Air Vietnam plane, arriving in Manila about 9:00 o'clock that same evening. At the Manila International Airport, he was met and arrested by a team of Intelligence Service Officers of the Philippine Constabulary and taken to Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, where he was interrogated and kept in custody until the morning of the following day, November 24, 1968, when he was turned over to the lst PC Zone Headquarters at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga. In the early morning of November 27, 1968 petitioner Medina was transferred to the custody of the 174th PC Command Officer at Bano, Arayat, Pampanga. At 11:00 o'clock the same morning he was delivered to the custody of the Chief of Police of Arayat, Pampanga, in view of the absence of the Municipal Judge. On November 29, 1968 petitioner Medina, through counsel, filed a petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court to secure his release from confinement in the Office of the Chief of Police of Arayat. This Court, acting on the petition, issued on the same day the writ of habeas corpus, made returnable to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch. On December 3, 1968, a trial on the merits was held by the Honorable Judge Honorato B. Masakayan, Presiding Judge, Branch V, Quezon City branch, Court of First Instance of Rizal. On January 2, 1969, the Honorable Judge Masakayan rendered a decision ordering the respondents or whoever acts in their place and stead, to immediately set free and release petitioner Fortunato Medina from custody. On January 9, 1969, the Solicitor General as counsel for the respondent, filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals "on the ground that the said decision is not in accordance with law and the evidence adduced in the case." Acting on said "Notice of Appeal", the lower court in its order of January 15, 1969, ordered that "the record of the case together with evidence, oral and documentary, be transmitted to the Court of Appeals." On January 27, 1969 Atty. Amelito Mutuc, counsel for petitioner Medina, filed a "Motion for Certification of Appeal to the Supreme Court," which motion was opposed by the Office of the Solicitor General on the ground that since questions of fact are involved in the appeal, the proper appellate jurisdiction lies with the Court of Appeals, and that if the appeal were certified to the Supreme Court, appellants will be estopped from raising questions of fact and will, therefore, be deprived of due process of law. The motion for certification of appeal to the Supreme Court was denied by the respondent Court of Appeals in a resolution dated February 1, 1969. On February 14, 1969, pending appeal, Atty. Amelito R. Mutuc filed an "Urgent Motion for Release" without bond, of the petitioner Medina, to which counsel for the respondents filed an opposition in its answer dated February 24, 1969. The motion was denied by respondent Court of Appeals in a resolution rendered on March 13, 1969, which we quote: For resolution by this Court is the motion dated February 14, 1969, filed by petitioner-appellee praying that he be ordered released without bail during the pendency of this appeal. The Solicitor General filed an opposition thereto. As the trial court which rendered judgment did not fix the bond for the release of petitioner pending appeal by respondents and as said court has now lost jurisdiction over the case, LET PETITIONER BE RELEASED PENDING APPEAL UPON FILING A SURETY BOND OF P5,000.00. A motion to reconsider the above-quoted resolution of the Court of Appeals, was denied by said court in its resolution of June 10, 1969. Before the respondent Court of Appeals (4th Division) could act on petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the following news item attributed to Atty. Amelito Mutuc, petitioner's counsel of record, appeared in the May 8, 1969 issue of the Manila Times, on pp. 1 and 22-A thereof: Mutuc Hits Appeals Court Ruling A division of the Court of Appeals was denounced by former Ambassador Amelito R. Mutuc yesterday for, he said, "knowingly abetting the perpetration of a gross and rank injustice' on a dissident suspect. Mutuc spoke of the case of Fortunato Medina, a Filipino worker who was arrested by armed forces and intelligence officers in Saigon last year and forcibly flown to Manila. Since his arrest last Nov. 23, Medina has been detained without any criminal case being filed in court against him. He is now at the Arayat municipal jail. The case in the Court of Appeals arose from a petition for habeas corpus filed by Mutuc with the Supreme Court. The high court had given due course to the case and made the writ returnable to the Quezon City court of first instance. Detention Illegal The lower court later ruled that Medina's detention was illegal since there was no pending criminal case against him. The court ordered his immediate release. But the solicitor general's office appealed the ruling to the CA. Mutuc then filed an urgent motion before the CA for Medina's release without posting bail on the basis of the lower court's findings and the fact that the man is a pauper. Mutuc said the CA fourth division denied this motion and ordered that Medina post a P5,000.00 bail bond for his provisional liberty. Reconsideration Arguing that Medina's detention is illegal, Mutuc sought for the reconsideration of the CA order. The solicitor general's office opposed this latest motion, and this is now pending before the CA. Mutuc said in his statement: "It is unthinkable, deplorable, and shocking to see in our midst — in a country which has prided itself as being a proud example of a vibrant democracy and a firm adherent to the rule of law — this said law spectacle of a man kept illegally for 165 days without any criminal complaint pending against him." Extremely Dubious Mutuc said that the appeal of the Solicitor General was filed under "extremely dubious circumstances" because the notice of appeal was filed even before the copy of the decision of the lower court was mailed to him. On May 9, 1969, the issue of the Manila Times, pp. 1 and 14-A, carried a news item that petitioner Medina had escaped from confinement in the municipal jail of Arayat, Pampanga, upon advice of his counsel, Atty. Amelito Mutuc. The same issue of the Manila Times, p. 14-A thereof, carried a statement of Atty. Mutuc to this effect: I have advised him (Medina) to escape. After all, his detention is illegal. It is the only way to regain his freedom. Atty. Mutuc commenting upon a proposed action of the Office of the Solicitor General to have him cited for contempt and to institute disbarment proceedings against him, issued the following statement appearing in the May 11, 1969, p. 1, issue of the Manila Times: I am ready and willing to be imprisoned : or stripped of my privilege as a lawyer if the Supreme Court so decrees that my cause is not just and that I am in error. On June 21, 1969 the Court of Appeals issued a resolution as follows: Considering that the statements attributed to Atty. Amelito Mutuc as well as the news items based thereon, as above set forth, are grossly defiant offensive and derogatory to the dignity and integrity of the members of the Fourth Division of this Court; that they are evidently intended to browbeat, intimidate and hold them in contempt and ridicule by imputing to them the act of "knowingly abetting the perpetration of a gross and rank injustice", and that said statements and news reports tend to degrade and obstruct the free, just and impartial administration of justice on a matter then actually pending consideration by this Court; and Considering further that the act of Atty. Amelito Mutuc of advising, encouraging and practically assisting in the escape of the petitioner-appellee, Fortunato Medina, from the custody of the law as a detention prisoner, in utter disregard of the order of this Court requiring him to post a bond of P5,000.00 for his release, constitutes a deliberate and wanton violation of his oath as a lawyer, particularly that portion thereof where he swears that he will "obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities" of the Republic of the Philippines and will conduct himself as a lawyer with "all good fidelity as well to the courts" as to his clients; WHEREFORE, Atty. Amelito Mutuc is hereby required to show cause within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice hereof why he should not be held liable and dealt with for contempt of court, and why he should not be suspended under Rule 138, Section 28, of the Rules of Court, from the practice of law as a member of the Philippine Bar. As already adverted to above, the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus seeks to annul the above-quoted resolution and all other pertinent orders, resolutions, of respondent Court of Appeals, and prohibit it from proceeding further with the case, and to compel it to certify said case to this Court on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The present controversy centers upon the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to entertain the appeal brought to it by the Solicitor General from the judgment or the Hon. Honorato B. Masakayan, presiding judge, Branch V, Court of First Instance of Rizal, ordering the release of petitioner Fortunato Medina from custody of the Chief of Police of Arayat, Pampanga. Petitioner argues that where a petition for habeas corpus has been originally filed with the Supreme Court, as in this case, and this Court makes the writ returnable to a lower court, it does so merely for purposes of expediency, convenience and a speedy and inexpensive determination of the proceedings, and the role of the lower court is just to receive evidence for the Supreme Court, as if the Supreme Court assigned one of its members to receive evidence on the case. Hence, any appeal from the judgment of the court to which the writ was made returnable, must be taken to the Supreme Court, not to the Court of Appeals, and the case would be before the Supreme Court by virtue of its original jurisdiction and not on account of its appellate jurisdiction. The stand taken by petitioner is devoid of merit. The principal issue raised in the present petition has already been definitely ruled upon by Us in the case of Saulo vs. Brig. General Cruz, etc., (109 Phil. 378, Aug. 31, 1960) wherein We held that the court to which this Court makes the writ returnable, does not thereby become merely a recommendatory body, whose findings and conclusion are devoid of effect, unless and until this Court decides to act on the "recommendation", but that such court acquire the authority and the duty to inquire into the facts and the law pertinent to the legality or illegality of petitioner's detention and to order his discharge from confinement should it find that he is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained. Further clarifying Our ruling, We stated that the court or the judge to whom the writ is made returnable takes the case for determination on the merits and its findings, either for the release of the detainee or for sustaining his custody, if not appealed on time, can become final just as it may in ordinary case. The pertinent fact and Our ruling in said case follow: In G.R. No. L-14819, a petition for habeas corpus was filed before this Court by and in behalf of petitioner Alfredo B. Saulo. We issued, on December 24, 1958, a writ ordering respondent Pelagio Cruz, as the Commanding General of the Philippine Constabulary, to submit, within five (5) days from notice, an answer returnable to the Court of First Instance of Manila. xxx xxx xxx Upon such findings, the lower court rendered decision, concluding that the filing of Criminal Case No. 46410 amounted to the delivery of accused petitioner, who was arrested without warrant, to the proper court as provided under Section 17, Rule 100 of the Rules of Court (citing Sayo, et al. vs. Chief of Police, 80 Phil., 859). The Court consequently denied the petition for habeas corpus. Hence, this appeal: However, petitioners appeal appears to have been filed out of time, as pointed out by the Solicitor General. The records disclose that the notice of appeal was filed eleven (11) days after a copy of the lower court's decision, denying the petition, was served upon petitioner's counsel (on May 12, 1959 as per sheriffs return). As provided by Section 18, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, petitioner should have perfected his appeal within twenty-four (24) hours from notice of judgment: SEC. 18. Appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be perfected by filing with the clerk of court or the judge who rendered the judgment, within twenty-four (24) hours from notice of such judgment, a statement that the person making it appeals from the judgment rendered. It has been consistently held that the reglamentary period for appeal is not only mandatory but jurisdictional on the courts and that an appeal filed out of time may be sought to be dismissed at any stage of the proceedings in the appellate court. In petitioner's "manifestation" dated October 12, 1959, it is contended that since the case for habeas corpus was heard by the Manila Court of First Instance, "not by virtue of its original jurisdiction but merely by delegation", this Court should have the final say regarding the issues raised in the petition, and only its decisions, not that of the court of First Instance, should be regarded as operative. The logic is more apparent than real. While the petition for habeas corpus was originally filed with this Court, the only question that was immediately involved was the propriety of the issuance of a writ that would order the respondent to show cause why the detention of the person in whose behalf the writ was asked for should not be considered illegal, and that, therefore, the petitioner be ordered discharged from custody. The Rules authorize that once the writ is issued the same may be made returnable before a Court of First Instance (Sec. 2, Rule 102, Rules of Court), and not necessarily to us. The court designated does not thereby become merely a recommendatory body, whose findings and conclusion are devoid of effect, unless and until we decide to act on the "recommendation". By filing a notice of appeal with the Court below, the appellant impliedly admitted that the decision appealed was not merely recommendatory or fact-finding. In our resolution dated March 19, 1959, resolving the question of jurisdiction of the lower court, we stated the following: "Moreover, it is apparent from sections 12 to 15 of said Rule 102 that the court or judge to whom the writ is returned shall have the authority and the duty to inquire into the facts and the law pertinent to the legality or illegality of petitioner's detention and to order his discharge from confinement, should it appear satisfactorily "that he is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained," xxx xxx xxx "In point of practice, when a writ of habeas corpus is, conformably to law, made returnable to a court other than that issuing the writ, the court to which the writ is returned, or the judge thereof, possesses full authority to examine all issues raised in the case and to settle the same. In the language of the American jurisprudence: "After a return to a writ, the court or judge to whom the return is made must pass upon all questions of both law and fact and determine the ultimate question whether the prisoner is wrongfully restrained of his liberty. It is necessary for the court to determine the weight and credibility of evidence where the testimony is conflicting. "... With further reference to habeas corpus proceedings in Federal courts, it is expressly provided by statute that the court or judge before whom the prisoner may be brought shall proceed in a summary way to determine the facts of the case, by bearing the testimony and arguments, and thereupon to dispose of the prisoner as law and justice may require. (25 Am. Jur., p. 245.)" In other words, the court or the judge to whom the writ is made returnable takes the case for determination on the merits (See 39 C.J.S p. 603, sec. 58 and case cited therein), and its findings, either for the release of the detainee or for sustaining his continued custody, if not, appealed on time, can become final just as it may in an ordinary case. (Saulo vs. Brig. Gen. Cruz, etc., 109 Phil., 378, 379, 381-383) (Emphasis ours.) We also advert to the earlier case of Saulo vs. Brig. Gen. Cruz, 105 Phil. 315 (March 19, 1959), wherein this Court, citing Sections 12 to 15 of Rule 102 (the same provisions as in the present Rules) stated that the court or judge to whom the writ is returnable shall have the authority and the duty to inquire into the facts and the law pertinent to the legality or illegality of petitioner's detention and to order his discharge from confinement, should it appear that he is being unlawfully imprisoned or restrained. The Court ruled: In other words, said writ of habeas corpus plays a role somewhat comparable to a summons, in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of said writ, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent. Once authority over the latter has thus been established, the appellate court issuing the writ, or the court of first instance to which the writ has been made returnable — acting in place of the appellate court — may render a decision, which — like other decisions of the Supreme Court and of courts of first instance — may be enforced anywhere in the Philippines. In point of practice, when a writ of habeas corpus is, conformably to law, made returnable to a court other than that issuing the writ, the court to which the writ is returned or the judge thereof possesses full authority to examine all issues raised in the case and to settle the same. It is clear, therefore, that when this Court issued the writ of habeas corpus making the same returnable before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City branch, said court acquired the power and authority to determine the merits of the case, and not merely to act as a referee, in the same manner as We would have if the writ had been returnable before this Court. (See C.J.S 603, citing Ex parte Smith, 300 P. 635; Ex parte Gonsher,. 294 P. 159; People vs. Booker, 51 Cal. 317.) Mr. Justice Castro correctly observed during the deliberation of the Court in this case, that there is no valid reason why a habeas corpus case originally filed in the Court of First Instance should be appealed to the Court of Appeals, while one filed originally with the Supreme Court and made returnable to the Court of First Instance should be appealable directly to Us, when a review of the findings of facts of the Court of First Instance is necessary. The view that the appeal should be made direct to this Court because when a petition for writ of habeas corpus with Us he wants his case to be decided as expeditiously as possible, is clearly untenable; otherwise, We would be unduly hampered in the exercise of Our discretion1 when to hear and decide directly a habeas corpus as We did in the habeas corpus cases under Martial Law, and when We should make the writ returnable to a Court of First Instance so that the case may not unduly clog the already over-burdened docket of this Court. Considering that the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City branch, had jurisdiction to try the habeas corpus case and render judgment thereon as though the same was originally filed with it, any judgment rendered by it is appealable to the proper appellate court which, in this case, is the Court of Appeals, appellants having signified in their notice of appeal their intention to raise both questions of law and fact. The Court of Appeals being the proper court to which the appeal was brought, its actuations, orders and resolutions in connection therewith, particularly those dated February 1, 1969, March 13, 1969, June 10, 1969 and June 21, 1969 were, therefore, done and issued in the lawful exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, the petition is, as it is hereby DENIED, and respondent Court of Appeals authorized to proceed with the determination of the appealed case, and all incidents thereof. The restraining order dated September 4, 1969, issued by this Court against the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby LIFTED. No costs. So ordered. Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee, Antonio, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur. Barredo, Makasiar and Esguerra, JJ., took no part. Separate Opinions FERNANDO, J., dissenting: It is with regret that I find myself unable to accept the conclusion reached by my brethren. I must perforce dissent, this with due recognition that the opinion penned by Justice Fernandez commends itself for its thoroughness, comprehensiveness and lucidity. It must be admitted likewise that it is characterized by sustained, even formidable, logic. If I entertain a different view then it is because I proceed from a distinct major premise. The writ of habeas corpus, to my mind, following the classic statement of Justice Malcolm, in the landmark case of Villavicencio v. Lukban:1 "was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty."2 Rightly then could Chafee refer to the writ as "the most important human rights provision" in the American Constitution.3 He explained why: "Perhaps Dr. Johnson went too far in telling Boswell, "The Habeas Corpus is the single advantage our government has over that of other countries." Still, such great liberties as worship and speech will go on somehow, despite laws, but not liberty of the person. Censorship can be evaded; prosecutions against ideas may break down; a prison wall is there. Only habeas corpus can penetrate it. When imprisonment is possible without explanation or redress, every form of liberty is impaired. A man in jail cannot go to church or discuss or publish or assemble or enjoy property or go to the polls."4 From such a standpoint, it appears to me that to require in a case like the present, where the petition was filed with this Court but subsequently indorsed to a court of first instance, that an appeal on questions of fact should go to the Court of Appeals would be to prolong unnecessarily the period of detention when, as events may turn out, the applicant is entitled to his liberty. Hence this dissent. 1. The opinion of the Court states: "The principal issue raised in the present petition has already been definitely ruled upon by Us in the case of Saulo v. Brig. General Cruz, etc., (109 Phil. 378, Aug. 31, 1960) wherein We held that the court to which this Court makes the writ returnable, does not thereby become merely a recommendatory body, whose findings and conclusion are devoid of effect, unless and until this Court decides to act on the "recommendation", but that such court acquires the authority and the duty to inquire into the facts and the law pertinent to the legality or illegality of petitioner's detention and to order his discharge from confinement should it find that he is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained. Further clarifying Our ruling, We stated that the court or the judge to whom the writ is made returnable takes the case for determination on the merits and its findings, either for the release of the detainee or for sustaining his custody, if not appealed on time, can become final just as it may in an ordinary case."5 I reach a different conclusion. For me the Saulo ruling goes no further than to indicate that once referred to a lower court an application for habeas corpus could be decided by it, as was made clear in the above citation from the opinion. It does not appear unreasonable then to assert that nothing previously decided has settled the specific question before us, which is not the finality of the lower court decision but where to appeal the case. It would seem, to me at least, that the principle there applied is not controlling here. Assuming the obscurity of the Saulo opinion, it is illumined when the light of the fundamental purpose of the privilege of the writ of habeas corps is thrown on it, namely, the speedy release from unlawful detention. Such a fundamental postulate should not become dormant. If in a state of quiescence, it must be revived. If the Saulo decision goes that far, however, it may be time to call for re-examination. There is, to myes Your Honor mean to say that when martial law is declared and I, for instance, am detained by the military authorities, I cannot avail of the normal judicial processes to obtain my liberty and question the legality of my detention? DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): If I am not mistaken, Your Honor, you are referring to the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. DELEGATE ADIL: Yes, Your Honor, that is correct. DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): In that case, Your Honor, I take it that when martial law is proclaimed, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is ipso facto suspended and, therefore, if you are apprehended and detained by the military authorities, more so, when your apprehension and detention were for an offense against the security of the State, then you cannot invoke the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and ask the courts to order your temporary release. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, like some other individual rights, must have to yield to the greater need of preserving the State. Here, we have to make a choice between two values, and I say that in times of great peril, when the very safety of the whole nation and this Constitution is at stake, we have to elect for the greater one. For, as I have said, individual rights assume meaning and importance only when their exercise could be guaranteed by the State, and such guaranty cannot definitely be had unless the State is in a position to assert and enforce its authority. DELEGATE ADIL: Since martial law was declared by President Marcos last September 21, 1972, and announced on September 23, 1972, the President has been issuing decrees which are in the nature of statutes, regulating, as they do, various and numerous norms of conduct of both the private and the public sectors. Would you say, Your Honor, that such exercise of legislative powers by the President is within his martial law authority? DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): Certainly, and that is the position of this Committee. As martial law administrator and by virtue of his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the President could exercise legislative and, if I may add, some judicial powers to meet the martial situation. The Chief Executive must not be harmstrung or limited to his traditional powers as Chief Executive. When martial law is declared, the declaration gives rise to the birth of powers, not strictly executive in character, but nonetheless necessary and incident to the assumption of martial law authority to the end that the State may be safe. DELEGATE ADIL: I am not at all questioning the constitutionality of the President's assumption of powers which are not strictly executive in character. Indeed, I can concede that when martial law is declared, the President can exercise certain judicial and legislative powers which are essential to or which have to do with the quelling of rebellion, insurrection, imminent danger thereof, or meeting an invasion. What appears disturbing to me, and which I want Your Honor to convince me further, is the exercise and assumption by the President or by the Prime Minister of powers, either legislative or judicial in character, which have nothing to do with the conditions of rebellion, insurrection, invasion or imminent danger thereof. To be more specific, Your Honor, and to cite to you an example, I have in mind the decree issued by the President proclaiming a nationwide land reform or declaring land reform throughout the Philippines. I suppose you will agree with me, Your Honor, that such a decree, or any similar decree for that matter, has nothing to do with the invasion, insurrection, rebellion or imminent danger thereof. My point, Your Honor, is that this measure basically has nothing to do with the restoration of peace and order or the quelling of rebellion or insurrection. How could we validly say that the President's assumption of such powers is justified by the proclamation of martial law? DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): As I have repeatedly stated, Your Honor, we have now to abandon the traditional concept of martial law as it is understood in some foreign textbooks. We have to look at martial law not as an immutable principle, Rather, we must view it in the light of our contemporary experience and not in isolation thereof. The quelling of rebellion or lawlessness or, in other words, the restoration of peace and order may admittedly be said to be the immediate objective of martial law, but that is to beg the question. For how could there really be an enduring peace and order if the very causes which spawned the conditions which necessitated the exercise of martial powers are not remedied? You cite as an example the decree on land reform. Your Honor will have to admit that one of the major causes of social unrest among peasantry in our society is the deplorable treatment society has given to our peasants. As early as the 1930's, the peasants have been agitating for agrarian reforms to the extent that during the time of President Quirino they almost succeeded in overthrowing the government by force. Were we to adopt the traditional concept of martial law, we would be confined to merely putting down one peasant uprising after another, leaving unsolved the maladies that in the main brought forth those uprisings. If we are really to establish an enduring condition of peace and order and assure through the ages the stability of our Constitution and the Republic, I say that martial law, being the ultimate weapon of survival provided for in the Constitution, must penetrate deeper and seek to alleviate and cure the ills and the seething furies deep in the bowels of the social structure. In a very real sense, therefore, there is a profound relationship between the exercise by the martial law administrator of legislative and judicial powers and the ultimate objective of martial law. And I may add that in the ultimate analysis, the only known limitation to martial law powers is the convenience of the martial law administrator and the judgment and verdict of the people and, of course, the verdict of history itself. DELEGATE LEVISTE (O.): Your Honor, just for purpose of discussion, may I know from you whether there has been an occasion in this country where any past President had made use of his martial law power? DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): I am glad that you asked that question, Your Honor, because it seems that we are of the impression that since its incorporation into the 1935 Constitution, the martial law provision has never been availed of by the President. I recall, Your Honor, that during the Japanese occupation, President Laurel had occasion to declare martial law, and I recall that when President Laurel declared martial law, he also assumed legislative and judicial powers. We must, of course, realize that during the time of President Laurel, the threats to national security which precipitated the declaration came from the outside. The threats therefore, were not internal in origin and character as those which prompted President Marcos to issue his historic proclamation. If, in case — as what happened during the time of President Laurel — the declaration of martial law necessitated the exercise of legislative powers by the martial law administrator, I say that greater necessity calls forth the exercise of that power when the threats to national security are posed not by invaders but by the rebellious and seditious elements, both of the left and right, from within. I say that because every rebellion, whether in this country or in other foreign countries, is usually the product of social unrest and dissatisfaction with the established order. Rebellions or the acts of rebellion are usually preceded by long suffering of those who ultimately choose to rise in arms against the government. A rebellion is not born overnight. It is the result of an accumulation of social sufferings on the part of the rebels until they can no longer stand those sufferings to the point that, like a volcano, it must sooner erupt. In this context, the stamping out of rebellion must not be the main and only objective of martial law. The Martial law administrator should, nay, must, take steps to remedy the crises that lie behind the rebellious movement, even if in the process, he should exercise legislative and judicial powers. For what benefit would it be after having put down a rebellion through the exercise of martial power if another rebellion is again in the offing because the root causes which propelled the movement are ever present? One might succeed in capturing the rebel leaders and their followers, imprison them for life or, better still, kill in the field, but someday new leaders will pick up the torch and the tattered banners and lead another movement. Great causes of every human undertaking do not usually die with the men behind those causes. Unless the root causes are themselves eliminated, there will be a resurgence of another rebellion and, logical the endless and vicious exercise of martial law authority. This reminds me of the wise words of an old man in our town: That if you are going to clear your field of weeds and grasses, you should not merely cut them, but dig them out. PRESIDING OFFICER TUPAZ (A.): With the indulgence of the Gentleman from La Union, the Chair would want to have a recess for at least ten minutes. DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In fact, I was about to move for it after the grueling interpellations by some of our colleagues here, but before we recess, may I move for the approval of Section 4? PRESIDING OFFICER TUPAZ (A.): Are there any objections? There being none, Section 4 is approved. It is for the foregoing reasons that I find continued martial law to be a political question under the new Charter. The present Constitution does not give the Supreme Court any power to 'cheek the exercise of a supremely political prerogative. If there is any checking or review of martial law, the Constitution gives it, not to the Supreme Court, but to the National Assembly. Ultimately, the checking function is vested in the people. Whether the National Assembly expresses displeasure and withdraws its confidence from the Prime Minister through election of a successor or the Prime Minister asks the President to dissolve the National Assembly under Article VIII, Section 13, the issue of martial law ultimately rests with the people. Anything dependent upon the popular will is, of course, political. Although the interim National Assembly has not yet been convened, the intent of the Constitutional Convention to make the question political is clear. Exclusive of the Transitory Provisions, other provisions of the present Charter may be cited. The Bill of Rights, Article IV, Section 15 had added "or imminent danger thereof" to the 1935 provision. It now reads — SEC. 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion, insurrection, rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it. Article IX, Section 16, another new provision reads — SEC. 16. All powers vested in the President of the Philippines under the nineteen hundred and thirty-five Constitution and the laws of the land which are not herein provided for or conferred upon any official shall be deemed, and are hereby, vested in the Prime Minister, unless the National Assembly provides otherwise. All the foregoing features of the new Constitution strengthen and do not decrease the exclusivity and political nature of the power to proclaim martial law and to lift it. XIV GRANTING THAT THE CONTINUATION OF MARTIAL LAW IS NOT POLITICAL BUT JUSTICIABLE, IT IS STILL VALID UNDER THE TEST OF ARBITRARINESS Even if we grant that the continuation of martial law and the determination when to lift it are justiciable in character, Our decision is still the same. Correctness of the President's acts, I must repeat, is not the test. Assuming that the Court has jurisdiction to determine when martial law should he lifted, the test is still arbitrariness. Aside from asserting that there was no basis for the initial proclamation of martial law, the petitioners insist there is no real emergency in the country today. Petitioner Diokno cites various newspaper items reporting statements of the President and defense officials. Among them are assurances of the President that reservists won't undergo combat duty, statements of Defense Secretary Ponce Enrile citing gains in peace and order, disclosures of commanding generals that the Mindanao rebellion is crushed and Tarlac is now peaceful, and reports from Nueva Ecija that the rebel backbone is broken. (Supplemental Petition and Motion for Immediate Release dated June 29, 1973.) The petitioners assert that the "actual state of war aspect was dropped from general orders as early as September 30, 1972 and that the transformation of a New Society has become the new theme. It is the second purpose — the building of a New Society — that is now being emphasized everywhere. The instruments of mass communication that have been allowed to often drum this theme without ceasing. Very little space and time is del district. (Emphasis ours.) Fernando, J., dissenting: Separate Opinions FERNANDO, J., dissenting: It is with regret that I find myself unable to accept the conclusion reached by my brethren. I must perforce dissent, this with due recognition that the opinion penned by Justice Fernandez commends itself for its thoroughness, comprehensiveness and lucidity. It must be admitted likewise that it is characterized by sustained, even formidable, logic. If I entertain a different view then it is because I proceed from a distinct major premise. The writ of habeas corpus, to my mind, following the classic statement of Justice Malcolm, in the landmark case of Villavicencio v. Lukban:1 "was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty."2 Rightly then could Chafee refer to the writ as "the most important human rights provision" in the American Constitution.3 He explained why: "Perhaps Dr. Johnson went too far in telling Boswell, "The Habeas Corpus is the single advantage our government has over that of other countries." Still, such great liberties as worship and speech will go on somehow, despite laws, but not liberty of the person. Censorship can be evaded; prosecutions against ideas may break down; a prison wall is there. Only habeas corpus can penetrate it. When imprisonment is possible without explanation or redress, every form of liberty is impaired. A man in jail cannot go to church or discuss or publish or assemble or enjoy property or go to the polls."4 From such a standpoint, it appears to me that to require in a case like the present, where the petition was filed with this Court but subsequently indorsed to a court of first instance, that an appeal on questions of fact should go to the Court of Appeals would be to prolong unnecessarily the period of detention when, as events may turn out, the applicant is entitled to his liberty. Hence this dissent. 1. The opinion of the Court states: "The principal issue raised in the present petition has already been definitely ruled upon by Us in the case of Saulo v. Brig. General Cruz, etc., (109 Phil. 378, Aug. 31, 1960) wherein We held that the court to which this Court makes the writ returnable, does not thereby become merely a recommendatory body, whose findings and conclusion are devoid of effect, unless and until this Court decides to act on the "recommendation", but that such court acquires the authority and the duty to inquire into the facts and the law pertinent to the legality or illegality of petitioner's detention and to order his discharge from confinement should it find that he is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained. Further clarifying Our ruling, We stated that the court or the judge to whom the writ is made returnable takes the case for determination on the merits and its findings, either for the release of the detainee or for sustaining his custody, if not appealed on time, can become final just as it may in an ordinary case."5 I reach a different conclusion. For me the Saulo ruling goes no further than to indicate that once referred to a lower court an application for habeas corpus could be decided by it, as was made clear in the above citation from the opinion. It does not appear unreasonable then to assert that nothing previously decided has settled the specific question before us, which is not the finality of the lower court decision but where to appeal the case. It would seem, to me at least, that the principle there applied is not controlling here. Assuming the obscurity of the Saulo opinion, it is illumined when the light of the fundamental purpose of the privilege of the writ of habeas corps is thrown on it, namely, the speedy release from unlawful detention. Such a fundamental postulate should not become dormant. If in a state of quiescence, it must be revived. If the Saulo decision goes that far, however, it may be time to call for re-examination. There is, to myes Your Honor mean to say that when martial law is declared and I, for instance, am detained by the military authorities, I cannot avail of the normal judicial processes to obtain my liberty and question the legality of my detention? DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): If I am not mistaken, Your Honor, you are referring to the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. DELEGATE ADIL: Yes, Your Honor, that is correct. DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): In that case, Your Honor, I take it that when martial law is proclaimed, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is ipso facto suspended and, therefore, if you are apprehended and detained by the military authorities, more so, when your apprehension and detention were for an offense against the security of the State, then you cannot invoke the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and ask the courts to order your temporary release. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, like some other individual rights, must have to yield to the greater need of preserving the State. Here, we have to make a choice between two values, and I say that in times of great peril, when the very safety of the whole nation and this Constitution is at stake, we have to elect for the greater one. For, as I have said, individual rights assume meaning and importance only when their exercise could be guaranteed by the State, and such guaranty cannot definitely be had unless the State is in a position to assert and enforce its authority. DELEGATE ADIL: Since martial law was declared by President Marcos last September 21, 1972, and announced on September 23, 1972, the President has been issuing decrees which are in the nature of statutes, regulating, as they do, various and numerous norms of conduct of both the private and the public sectors. Would you say, Your Honor, that such exercise of legislative powers by the President is within his martial law authority? DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): Certainly, and that is the position of this Committee. As martial law administrator and by virtue of his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the President could exercise legislative and, if I may add, some judicial powers to meet the martial situation. The Chief Executive must not be harmstrung or limited to his traditional powers as Chief Executive. When martial law is declared, the declaration gives rise to the birth of powers, not strictly executive in character, but nonetheless necessary and incident to the assumption of martial law authority to the end that the State may be safe. DELEGATE ADIL: I am not at all questioning the constitutionality of the President's assumption of powers which are not strictly executive in character. Indeed, I can concede that when martial law is declared, the President can exercise certain judicial and legislative powers which are essential to or which have to do with the quelling of rebellion, insurrection, imminent danger thereof, or meeting an invasion. What appears disturbing to me, and which I want Your Honor to convince me further, is the exercise and assumption by the President or by the Prime Minister of powers, either legislative or judicial in character, which have nothing to do with the conditions of rebellion, insurrection, invasion or imminent danger thereof. To be more specific, Your Honor, and to cite to you an example, I have in mind the decree issued by the President proclaiming a nationwide land reform or declaring land reform throughout the Philippines. I suppose you will agree with me, Your Honor, that such a decree, or any similar decree for that matter, has nothing to do with the invasion, insurrection, rebellion or imminent danger thereof. My point, Your Honor, is that this measure basically has nothing to do with the restoration of peace and order or the quelling of rebellion or insurrection. How could we validly say that the President's assumption of such powers is justified by the proclamation of martial law? DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): As I have repeatedly stated, Your Honor, we have now to abandon the traditional concept of martial law as it is understood in some foreign textbooks. We have to look at martial law not as an immutable principle, Rather, we must view it in the light of our contemporary experience and not in isolation thereof. The quelling of rebellion or lawlessness or, in other words, the restoration of peace and order may admittedly be said to be the immediate objective of martial law, but that is to beg the question. For how could there really be an enduring peace and order if the very causes which spawned the conditions which necessitated the exercise of martial powers are not remedied? You cite as an example the decree on land reform. Your Honor will have to admit that one of the major causes of social unrest among peasantry in our society is the deplorable treatment society has given to our peasants. As early as the 1930's, the peasants have been agitating for agrarian reforms to the extent that during the time of President Quirino they almost succeeded in overthrowing the government by force. Were we to adopt the traditional concept of martial law, we would be confined to merely putting down one peasant uprising after another, leaving unsolved the maladies that in the main brought forth those uprisings. If we are really to establish an enduring condition of peace and order and assure through the ages the stability of our Constitution and the Republic, I say that martial law, being the ultimate weapon of survival provided for in the Constitution, must penetrate deeper and seek to alleviate and cure the ills and the seething furies deep in the bowels of the social structure. In a very real sense, therefore, there is a profound relationship between the exercise by the martial law administrator of legislative and judicial powers and the ultimate objective of martial law. And I may add that in the ultimate analysis, the only known limitation to martial law powers is the convenience of the martial law administrator and the judgment and verdict of the people and, of course, the verdict of history itself. DELEGATE LEVISTE (O.): Your Honor, just for purpose of discussion, may I know from you whether there has been an occasion in this country where any past President had made use of his martial law power? DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): I am glad that you asked that question, Your Honor, because it seems that we are of the impression that since its incorporation into the 1935 Constitution, the martial law provision has never been availed of by the President. I recall, Your Honor, that during the Japanese occupation, President Laurel had occasion to declare martial law, and I recall that when President Laurel declared martial law, he also assumed legislative and judicial powers. We must, of course, realize that during the time of President Laurel, the threats to national security which precipitated the declaration came from the outside. The threats therefore, were not internal in origin and character as those which prompted President Marcos to issue his historic proclamation. If, in case — as what happened during the time of President Laurel — the declaration of martial law necessitated the exercise of legislative powers by the martial law administrator, I say that greater necessity calls forth the exercise of that power when the threats to national security are posed not by invaders but by the rebellious and seditious elements, both of the left and right, from within. I say that because every rebellion, whether in this country or in other foreign countries, is usually the product of social unrest and dissatisfaction with the established order. Rebellions or the acts of rebellion are usually preceded by long suffering of those who ultimately choose to rise in arms against the government. A rebellion is not born overnight. It is the result of an accumulation of social sufferings on the part of the rebels until they can no longer stand those sufferings to the point that, like a volcano, it must sooner erupt. In this context, the stamping out of rebellion must not be the main and only objective of martial law. The Martial law administrator should, nay, must, take steps to remedy the crises that lie behind the rebellious movement, even if in the process, he should exercise legislative and judicial powers. For what benefit would it be after having put down a rebellion through the exercise of martial power if another rebellion is again in the offing because the root causes which propelled the movement are ever present? One might succeed in capturing the rebel leaders and their followers, imprison them for life or, better still, kill in the field, but someday new leaders will pick up the torch and the tattered banners and lead another movement. Great causes of every human undertaking do not usually die with the men behind those causes. Unless the root causes are themselves eliminated, there will be a resurgence of another rebellion and, logical the endless and vicious exercise of martial law authority. This reminds me of the wise words of an old man in our town: That if you are going to clear your field of weeds and grasses, you should not merely cut them, but dig them out. PRESIDING OFFICER TUPAZ (A.): With the indulgence of the Gentleman from La Union, the Chair would want to have a recess for at least ten minutes. DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In fact, I was about to move for it after the grueling interpellations by some of our colleagues here, but before we recess, may I move for the approval of Section 4? PRESIDING OFFICER TUPAZ (A.): Are there any objections? There being none, Section 4 is approved. It is for the foregoing reasons that I find continued martial law to be a political question under the new Charter. The present Constitution does not give the Supreme Court any power to 'cheek the exercise of a supremely political prerogative. If there is any checking or review of martial law, the Constitution gives it, not to the Supreme Court, but to the National Assembly. Ultimately, the checking function is vested in the people. Whether the National Assembly expresses displeasure and withdraws its confidence from the Prime Minister through election of a successor or the Prime Minister asks the President to dissolve the National Assembly under Article VIII, Section 13, the issue of martial law ultimately rests with the people. Anything dependent upon the popular will is, of course, political. Although the interim National Assembly has not yet been convened, the intent of the Constitutional Convention to make the question political is clear. Exclusive of the Transitory Provisions, other provisions of the present Charter may be cited. The Bill of Rights, Article IV, Section 15 had added "or imminent danger thereof" to the 1935 provision. It now reads — SEC. 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion, insurrection, rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it. Article IX, Section 16, another new provision reads — SEC. 16. All powers vested in the President of the Philippines under the nineteen hundred and thirty-five Constitution and the laws of the land which are not herein provided for or conferred upon any official shall be deemed, and are hereby, vested in the Prime Minister, unless the National Assembly provides otherwise. All the foregoing features of the new Constitution strengthen and do not decrease the exclusivity and political nature of the power to proclaim martial law and to lift it. XIV GRANTING THAT THE CONTINUATION OF MARTIAL LAW IS NOT POLITICAL BUT JUSTICIABLE, IT IS STILL VALID UNDER THE TEST OF ARBITRARINESS Even if we grant that the continuation of martial law and the determination when to lift it are justiciable in character, Our decision is still the same. Correctness of the President's acts, I must repeat, is not the test. Assuming that the Court has jurisdiction to determine when martial law should he lifted, the test is still arbitrariness. Aside from asserting that there was no basis for the initial proclamation of martial law, the petitioners insist there is no real emergency in the country today. Petitioner Diokno cites various newspaper items reporting statements of the President and defense officials. Among them are assurances of the President that reservists won't undergo combat duty, statements of Defense Secretary Ponce Enrile citing gains in peace and order, disclosures of commanding generals that the Mindanao rebellion is crushed and Tarlac is now peaceful, and reports from Nueva Ecija that the rebel backbone is broken. (Supplemental Petition and Motion for Immediate Release dated June 29, 1973.) The petitioners assert that the "actual state of war aspect was dropped from general orders as early as September 30, 1972 and that the transformation of a New Society has become the new theme. It is the second purpose — the building of a New Society — that is now being emphasized everywhere. The instruments of mass communication that have been allowed to often drum this theme without ceasing. Very little space and time is del district. (Emphasis ours.) Fernando, J., dissenting: Footnotes 1 39 Phil. 778 (1919). 2 Ibid, 788-789. 3 Chafee How Human Rights Got Into the Constitution, 51 (1952). 4 Ibid. 5 Decision, 7. 6 Ibid 11. 7 Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, 66 (1921). 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid, 112. 10 Ibid, 113. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation