EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29025 October 4, 1971
Spouses MOISES P. PALISOC and BRIGIDA P. PALISOC, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ANTONIO C. BRILLANTES and TEODOSIO V. VALENTON, owner and President, respectively, of a school of arts and trades, known under the name and style of "Manila Technical Institute" (M.I.T.), VIRGILIO L. DAFFON and SANTIAGO M. QUIBULUE, defendants-appellees.
Leovillo C. Agustin for plaintiffs-appellants.
Honorato S. Reyes for appellee Brillantes, et al.
Villareal, Almacen Navarra & Amores for appellee Daffon. .
Separate Opinions
REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring: .
I concur with the opinion of Mr. Justice Teehankee but would like to clarify that the argument of the dissenting opinion of the effect that the responsibility of teachers and school officers under Articles 2180 should be limited to pupils who are minors (below the age of majority) is not in accord with the plain text of the law. Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to the following effect: .
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.ℒαwρhi৷
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages.
Examination of the article shows that where the responsibility prescribed therein is limited to illegal acts during minority, the article expressly so provides, as in the case of the parents and of the guardians. It is natural to expect that if the law had intended to similarly restrict the civil responsibility of the other categories of persons enumerated in the article, it would have expressly so stated. The fact that it has not done so indicates an intent that the liability be not restricted to the case of persons under age. Further, it is not without significance that the teachers and heads of scholarly establishments are not grouped with parents and guardians but ranged with owners and managers of enterprises, employers and the state, as to whom no reason is discernible to imply that they should answer only for minors.
Giorgi, in his well-known "Teoria de las Obligaciones en el Derecho Moderno", Volume 5, page 404, No. 272 (Sp. Ed.), after noting the split among commentators on the point it issue, observes with considerable cogency that —
272. Ante esta variedad de opiniones, ninguna de las cuales se funds en argumentos merecedores de seria ponderacion, no es facil tomar un partido. Esto no obstante, debiendo manisfestar nuestra opinion, nos acercamos a la de los que no estiman necesaria la menor edad del discipulo o del aprendiz; porque si el aforismo ubi voluit dixit, ubi noluit tacuit, no es siempre argumento seguro para interpreter la ley, es infalible cuanto se refiere a una misma disposicion relative a varios casos. Y tal es el art. 1.153. Lo que haya establecido important poco si, elevandones a los principios de razon, puede dudarse de la oportunidad de semajante diferencia; porque la voluntad cierta del legislador prevalece in iure condito a cualquier otra consideracion. Por otra parte, si bien se considera, no puede parecer extrano o absurdo el suponer que un discipulo y un aprendiz, aunque mayores de edad, acepten voluntariamente la entera vigilancia de su preceptor mientras dura la educacion. Ni parece dudoso desde el momento que los artesanos y los preceptores deben, al par de los padres, responder civilmente de los daños comitidos por sus discipulos, aun cuando estos esten faltos de discernimiento.
Similarly, Planiol-Ripert, in their "Droit Civil Pratique," Volume VI, No. 635 (Spanish version), say that —
635. Personas de quien responde. — Si bien la responsibilidad del maestro es originalmente una estension de la de los padres (1), el art. 1384 no especifica que los alumnos y aprendices han de ser menores de edad, por lo que la presuncion de culpa funcionara aun cuando sean mayores (2); pero, la vigilancia no tendra que ser ejercida en iguales terminos. Aun respecto a los menores variara segun la edad, extremo que tendra que ternese en ceunta a los fines de apreciar si el maestro ha podido impedir el acto nocivo o no.
I submit, finally, that while in the case of parents and guardians, their authority and supervision over the children and wards end by law upon the latter reaching majority age, the authority and custodial supervision over pupils exist regardless of the age of the latter. A student over twenty-one, by enrolling and attending a school, places himself under the custodial supervision and disciplinary authority of the school authorities, which is the basis of the latter's correlative responsibility for his torts, committed while under such authority. Of course, the teachers' control is not as plenary as when the student is a minor; but that circumstance can only affect the decree of the responsibility but cannot negate the existence thereof. It is only a factor to be appreciated in determining whether or not the defendant has exercised due diligence in endeavoring to prevent the injury, as prescribed in the last paragraph of Article 2180.
Barredo, J., concurs.
Separate Opinions
MAKALINTAL, J., dissenting:
I vote to affirm the decision appealed from. I see no reason to depart from the doctrine laid down by this Court in Mercado v. Court of Appeals, 108 Phil. 414, where the clause "so long as they remain in their custody" used in Article 2180 of the Civil Code was construed as referring to a "situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the (latter's) control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents." I think it is highly unrealistic and conducive to unjust results, considering the size of the enrollment in many of our educational institutions, academic and non-academic, as well as the temper, attitudes and often destructive activism of the students, to hold their teachers and/or the administrative heads of the schools directly liable for torts committed by them. When even the school authorities find themselves besieged, beleaguered and attacked, and unable to impose the traditional disciplinary measures formerly recognized as available to them, such as suspension or outright expulsion of the offending students, it flies in the face of logic and reality to consider such students, merely from the fact of enrollment and class attendance, as "in the custody" of the teachers or school heads within the meaning of the statute, and to hold the latter liable unless they can prove that they have exercised "all the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage." Article 2180, if applied as appellants construe it, would be bad law. It would demand responsibility without commensurate authority, rendering teachers and school heads open to damage suits for causes beyond their power to control. Present conditions being what they are, I believe the restrictive interpretation of the aforesaid provision enunciated in Mercado should be maintained.
With particular reference to the case at bar, one other factor constrains me to dissent. The opinion of the majority states: "Here, the parents of the student at fault, defendant Daffon, are not involved, since Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic incident." This statement is of course in accordance with Article 2180, which says that "the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." Note that for parental responsibility to arise the children must be minors who live in their company. If, as stated also in the opinion of the majority, "the rationale of (the) liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child," then it stands to reason that (1) the clause "so long as they remain in their custody" as used in reference to teachers and school heads should be equated with the phrase "who live in their company" as used in reference to parents; and (2) that just as parents are not responsible for damages caused by their children who are no longer minors, so should teachers and school heads be exempt from liability for the tortious acts of their students in the same age category. I find no justification, either in the law itself or in justice and equity, to make a substitute parent liable where the real parent would be free from liability.
Zaldivar, Castro and Fernando, JJ., concur.
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