G.R. No. L-26619 March 27, 1971
ZENITH FILMS, INC.,
petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE B. HERRERA AND UNITED FILMS ENTERPRISES INC., respondent-appellee.
Antonio P. Coronet for petitioner-appellant.
Syquia Law Offices for respondents-appellees.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 65628 dismissing the herein appellant's petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction.
On April 12, 1966 the United Films Enterprises, Inc. filed a complaint in the City Court of Manila (Civil Case No. 147654) for the recovery of a sum of money against Zenith Films, Inc. The summons, which was received by the defendant on April 19, 1966, ordered him to answer the complaint and to enter trial on May 5, 1966 at 2 o'clock in the afternoon. Instead of answering the complaint the defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that venue was improperly laid, that the plaintiff had no legal capacity to sue and that the complaint stated no cause of action. With specific reference to the first ground, the motion averred that since the complaint was a personal action based on a written contract allegedly executed in the State of New York, U.S.A. and since venue had not been agreed upon, it should be the place of execution of said contract in accordance with Section 1, b (2), of Rule 4. The second ground is that while the complaint alleges that the plaintiff is a foreign corporation there is no averment that it was licensed to do business in the Philippine courts in view of Section 69 of the Corporation Law.
A copy of the motion to dismiss was served on the plaintiff on April 23, 1966. Contending that the motion to dismiss was "no motion at all and is nothing but a piece of paper filed with the court" because it contained no notice hearing, the plaintiff moved to declare the defendant in default for failure to file its answer within the five-day period prescribed in Section 4 of Rule 5. The City Court, without having notified or heard the defendant on the motion, sustained the plaintiff and ordered the reception of the latter's evidence, after which judgment by default was renderedon April 30,1966, as follows:
JUDGMENT by default is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering the latter to pay unto the former the sum of $1,150.00 in Philippine currency at the legal exchange rate of P3.92 per $1.00 with legal interest thereon from June 25, 1965 until fully paid; to pay the sum of P500.00 as attorney's fees aside from the costs of suit.
Defendant's motion to Dismiss is denied and the same is hereby dismissed.
On May 5, 1966, the date stated in the summons for the trial, the defendant's counsel appeared before the City Court and was thereupon informed that the case had already been decided. On the following day the defendant filed a motion to lift the order of default and to set aside the judgment, alleging that the said order was improper because the motion to dismiss had suspended the running of the period within which to file an answer. In its order dated May 14, 1966, the City Court denied the motion.
On June 2, 1966 the defendant filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction with the Court of First Instance of Manila, praying that the judgment by default and the order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss be annulled; that respondent Judge be declared without jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner; and that said respondent be directed to dismiss civil case No. 147654.
Upon motion of the respondents the lower court dismissed the petition in an order dated July 22, 1966, which states:.
Upon careful consideration of the motion filed by the respondents, the Honorable Judge Jose B. Herrera and United Films Enterprises, Inc., to dismiss the petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction presented by the petitioner, Zenith Films, Inc., against said respondents, on the ground, among others that said petition for certiorari is not the proper remedy for the reason that the remedy of appeal is available, the Court finds that said motion is well founded and, therefore, the petition is hereby dismissed without costs.
The case is before us on appeal by the petitioner from the foregoing order of dismissal.
The only issue here is whether or not the Court of First Instance erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground that it was not the proper remedy. In the resolution of this issue the inquiry must be, in turn, whether or not the City court committed a grave abuse of discretion in declaring the appellant in default and rendering judgment for the appellee upon evidence presented by it ex parte.
Section 4 of Rule 5, concerning procedure in inferior courts, provides that "the direction contained in the summons must be that the defendant answer the complaint, and produce his evidence at a stated place, day , and hour, which shall not be less than two (2) days nor more than five (5) days after the service of the summons if it be served in the municipality or city in which the action is brought ..." WhiIe it devolves I upon the court itself to observe the time limitation thus fixed when it issues the summons, the clear import ofthe provision is that a defendant has up to the date set for trial within which to file his answer to the complaint. The City Court in this case did not observe the time limitation, for it ordered the appellant "to answer the complaint and to enter trial on May 5, 1966, at 2 o'clock in the afternoon" — more than five (5) days after the service of summons on April 19; but it is clear, not only from the wording of the summons itself but also from the import of Section 4 of Rule 5, as indicated above, that the appellant had until May 5, 1966 to answer the complaint. Consequently, the mere fact that it filed a motion to dismiss instead of answering and that the said motion did not contain a notice of heating did not deprive it of the right to file an answer to the complaint within the period expressly stated in the summons, that is, up to May 5, nor justify the court in advancing the date for the reception of the appellee's evidence and rendering a default judgment.
The requirement that a motion must contain a notice directed to the parties concerned, stating the time and place for the hearing thereof is found in Section 5 of Rule 15, concerning procedure in Courts of First instance; and this particular provision is not one of those expressly made applicable in inferior courts by Section 19 of Rule 5. But without Passing on the question of whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss was "a mere scrap of paper" for lack of notice of hearing or, in other words, whether or not Section 5 of Rule 15 applies to inferior courts at all, what the City Court in the instant should have done was to wait until May 5, 1966 to see if the defendant would file an answer; and only if it failed to do so would the Court be justified in entering an order of default. For the Court to ignore the terms of its own summons and maintain the judgment it had rendered without hearing the defendant was a grave abuse of discretion properly correctable by certiorari.
Assuming that the defendant could have appealed from the default judgment —1 a question we do not find it necessary to decide here categorically — such appeal would not have discharged its proper function any differently from the remedy of certiorari pursued by herein appellant under the peculiar circumstances of this particular case. All that the appellant could have raised on appeal in the Court of First Instance was the legal question of whether or not he had been correctly declared in default; and a negative ruling by the said Court on that question would have had the effect of having the case remanded to the court of origin for the filing of an answer and for the trial of the case on the merits, which was precisely the relief asked for the petition for certiorari. In short, to deny this remedy on the ground that appeal was available was to give primacy to form over substance and forsake unnecessarily the court's fundamental duty to inquire into the facts in order to be able to judge accordingly.
WHEREFORE, the order of the Court of First Instance dismissing the appellant's petition for certiorari is set aside; the writ prayed for is hereby granted and the case remanded to the Court of origin for further proceeding after giving the defendant therein the opportunity to answer the complaint within such period as may be fixed by said Court in accordance with the Rules. Costs against respondent-appellee.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernanando, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I fully concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Makalintal ordering the remand of the case to the city court of Manila as the court of origin in order to give petitioner-appellant (defendant therein) its right to a day in court.
I wish to add these brief remarks on the imperative need on the part of trial courts, such as respondent court. to observe due circumspection and to exercise sound discretion in the application of the procedural rules so as "to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding."1 The Rules of Court are indispensable for the prevention of needless delays and dilatory tactics and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial business. But as the Court has time and again stated since the early case of Alonso vs. Villamor,2 the procedural rules should not be applied in a rigid, technical sense nor misapplied to the prejudice of the substantial rights of a party. Hasty and arbitrary judgments or dismissals, which are premised merely on indecisive imperfections of form and technicalities that are incompatilble with the :fundamental object of the Rules of Court to facilitate the application of substantial justice to the rival claims of contending parties,3
and which consequently are violative of due process, serve but to add unnecessarily to the burden of the courts as well as of the parties.
Here, a simple collection case has been derailed for five years since the filing of the complaint in 1966 as a consequence of respondent court's imprudent action of treating as "a scrap of paper" defendant's timely motion to dismiss of April 23, 1966, because it carried no notice of hearing and magnifying beyond proportion the consequences thereof. Respondent court, upon plaintiff's ex-parte petition, forthwith declared defendant in default and rendered ex-parte judgment against defendant on April 30, 1966, five days in advance of the very date set by its summons (May 5, 1966) for defendant to file its answer and to enter trial — when obviously defendant intended to submit the legitimate grounds of its dismissal motion for respondent court's resolution on the scheduled date of trial. Had respondent court not rashly disregarded its own summons and instead waited for the day of trial, it could have properly ruled favorably on defendant's motion to dismiss or rendered judgment after trial, as defendant, under the Rules, should then have been ready to file its answer in the event of an adverse resolution and to enter trial. At the least, respondent court should have set aside its default judgment and granted the motion immediately filed by the surprised defendant upon learning on the scheduled date of answer and trial that judgment by default had already been rendered in advance against it.
The paramount interests of justice would thus have been served and a judicious determination of the. matter in litigation with due hearing expediently obtained, without the useless waste of time, expense and effort futilely incurred in these proceedings.
Order set aside; writ prayed for granted case remanded to court of origin for further proceedings.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I fully concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Makalintal ordering the remand of the case to the city court of Manila as the court of origin in order to give petitioner-appellant (defendant therein) its right to a day in court.
I wish to add these brief remarks on the imperative need on the part of trial courts, such as respondent court. to observe due circumspection and to exercise sound discretion in the application of the procedural rules so as "to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding."1 The Rules of Court are indispensable for the prevention of needless delays and dilatory tactics and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial business. But as the Court has time and again stated since the early case of Alonso vs. Villamor,2 the procedural rules should not be applied in a rigid, technical sense nor misapplied to the prejudice of the substantial rights of a party. Hasty and arbitrary judgments or dismissals, which are premised merely on indecisive imperfections of form and technicalities that are incompatilble with the :fundamental object of the Rules of Court to facilitate the application of substantial justice to the rival claims of contending parties,3
and which consequently are violative of due process, serve but to add unnecessarily to the burden of the courts as well as of the parties.
Here, a simple collection case has been derailed for five years since the filing of the complaint in 1966 as a consequence of respondent court's imprudent action of treating as "a scrap of paper" defendant's timely motion to dismiss of April 23, 1966, because it carried no notice of hearing and magnifying beyond proportion the consequences thereof. Respondent court, upon plaintiff's ex-parte petition, forthwith declared defendant in default and rendered ex-parte judgment against defendant on April 30, 1966, five days in advance of the very date set by its summons (May 5, 1966) for defendant to file its answer and to enter trial — when obviously defendant intended to submit the legitimate grounds of its dismissal motion for respondent court's resolution on the scheduled date of trial. Had respondent court not rashly disregarded its own summons and instead waited for the day of trial, it could have properly ruled favorably on defendant's motion to dismiss or rendered judgment after trial, as defendant, under the Rules, should then have been ready to file its answer in the event of an adverse resolution and to enter trial. At the least, respondent court should have set aside its default judgment and granted the motion immediately filed by the surprised defendant upon learning on the scheduled date of answer and trial that judgment by default had already been rendered in advance against it.
The paramount interests of justice would thus have been served and a judicious determination of the. matter in litigation with due hearing expediently obtained, without the useless waste of time, expense and effort futilely incurred in these proceedings.
Order set aside; writ prayed for granted case remanded to court of origin for further proceedings.
Footnotes
1 Rule 1. section 2.
2 16 Phil. 316 (1910).
3 See Udam vs. Amon, 23 SCRA 837 (1968) and cases cited.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
