Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30570 July 29, 1969
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and HON. ANDRES REYES, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch VI), petitioners,
vs.
BRAULIO STO. DOMINGO and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Jesus G. Barrera and Suanes and Dallete for petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada.
Salonga, Ordoñez, Yap, Sicat and Associates and Neptali Gonzales for respondent.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada invokes the authority of this Court to overturn the judgment of the Court of Appeals — voting three to two — which (1) declared that the Court of First Instance of Rizal acted with grave abuse of discretion for not resolving on the merits respondent Braulio Sto. Domingo's motion for reconsideration of its decision of October 29, 1968, and (2) nullified said trial court's order of November 25, 1968 which held final and executory the decision aforementioned declaring petitioner the winner in the election contest for the mayoralty of San Juan, Rizal.
The controlling facts may be recited as follows:
In the local elections in San Juan, Rizal held on November 14, 1967, candidates for Mayor were then incumbent Mayor Nicanor Ibuna, Nacionalista Party official candidate; respondent Braulio Sto. Domingo, Liberal Party official candidate; petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, independent; and Enrique Lenon, also independent. On December 31, 1967, the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed Braulio Sto. Domingo as elected Mayor with 7,926 votes as against Joseph Ejercito Estrada with 7,882, or a plurality of 44 votes. Nicanor Ibuna ran third with 6,775 votes. Enrique Lenon obtained 55 votes. In due course, petitioner Estrada lodged an election protest, and respondent Sto. Domingo counter-protested, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 1 On October 29, 1968, judgment was rendered in said election protest, thus:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby annuls and sets aside the proclamation of the protestee, Dr. Braulio Sto. Domingo and hereby proclaims and declares the protestant, Joseph Ejercito Estrada as the Mayor duly elected for the Municipality of San Juan, Province of Rizal in the elections held on November 14, 1967, with a plurality of 192 votes, with costs against the protestee.
Sto. Domingo's counsel was served with copy of the decision on October 30, 1968.
At 1:45 p.m. on November 4, 1968, the last day of the five-day period to appeal statutorily fixed by Section 178, Revised Election Code, Sto. Domingo filed a motion to reconsider the decision. Copy of the motion was sent to Estrada's counsel by registered special delivery mail and with notice that the motion would be heard on the following Saturday, November 9, 1968 at 8:30 a.m. Attached to the motion was registry receipt 17713. Sto. Domingo therein averred that the trial judge erred (1) in reviewing and annulling the decisions of the other branches of the same court on the exclusion of voters; (2) in rejecting "Boyong" and "Dr. Boyong" votes; (3) in rejecting protestee's (private respondent's) evidence on the tampering of ballots after revision; and (4) in appreciating certain ballots.
Came the morning of November 9, 1968. Sto. Domingo and his counsel appeared in court. Absent were Estrada and his counsel, both of whom until then had not received copy of the motion. For lack of proof that Estrada had received notice of the motion for reconsideration of November 4, 1968, the hearing thereof was reset for November 16, 1968 at 8:30 a.m.
In the afternoon of November 9, 1968 Estrada, who got wind of what took place in the trial court that morning filed an "omnibus motion" alleging that Sto. Domingo's motion for reconsideration was not legally sanctioned, flimsy and frivolous, a mere scrap of paper, and intended for delay. He prayed that motion be stricken out and that the judgment be immediately executed as it had become final and executory. The omnibus motion he set for hearing on November 12, 1968 at 8:30 a.m.
Parenthetically, Estrada's counsel was personally served a copy of the motion for reconsideration only on November 11, 1968 upon the court's verbal order given on the 9th of November. The copy sent by registered mail reached his counsel only on November 13, 1968, four days after it was set for hearing (November 9, 1968, 8:30 a.m.).
At the November 12 hearing, the judge advised the parties to submit memoranda of authorities and reset both the omnibus motion and the motion to reconsider on November 16, 1968.
It was on the scheduled hearing of November 16 that Sto. Domingo completed proof of service by mail of his motion for reconsideration by the presentation of the registry return card postmarked November 13, a certification by the Acting Postmaster of Makati as to the mailing of registered letter No. 17713 on November 4, 1968, and the affidavit of Manuel B. Busico who posted the mail. Estrada's counsel orally moved for the immediate resolution of the pending incidents. The judge was ready to rule on the motions. Sto. Domingo demurred, pleaded that his memorandum and opposition to the omnibus motion be first considered; that in the event of an adverse resolution he be allowed at least five (5) days from receipt to enable him to procure extraordinary relief from the Court of Appeals. The judge thereupon declared that he would promulgate the resolution in open court on November 23, 1968, a Saturday.
On November 19, 1968, Sto. Domingo filed a cautionary notice of appeal, manifesting that he would appeal to the Court of Appeals in the event his motion for reconsideration be thwarted. Admittedly, however, he withdrew the cautionary notice of appeal later. This withdrawal was granted by the court on November 21, 1968.
On November 20, 1968, upon Sto. Domingo's urgent motion, the judge calendared the promulgation of the resolution for Monday, November 25, 1968, at 8:30 a.m.
Allegedly informed that resolution on his reconsideration motion would be adverse to him, Sto. Domingo's counsel sought the judge in the morning of November 23, 1968, asked the latter to give him a copy of the order before the close of office hours on that day. The judge declined, instead he stated that the order would be read and released in open court the following Monday, November 25, 1968.
A hectic day, November 25, began at 7:30 a.m. when Sto. Domingo's counsel saw the judge to ask for a copy of the order. The judge told him to wait until the order shall have been read in open court. An hour later, 8:30 a.m., when the case was called, Sto. Domingo's counsel requested that the case be called again at 10:00 a.m. purportedly on the ground that he would first ask for the postponement of another case in Caloocan City. The court granted the request. At 10:00 a.m., the disputed order was read and promulgated in open court. The parties secured their copies of the order at 10:15 a.m. The dispositive portion of the order reads: "IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, it is the opinion of the Court that the reconsideration of its decision dated October 29, 1968 is not in order as the same had already become final and executory."
Then and there, Sto. Domingo's counsel orally moved to reconsider. The judge after hearing the arguments of the parties denied the motion. 2 Sto. Domingo's counsel was prepared to meet this contingency. He drew from his pocket and exhibited to the judge a copy of the Court of Appeals' restraining order.
It developed that some two hours earlier, at 8:04 a.m. on November 25, Sto. Domingo's counsel lodged with the Court of Appeals a three-pronged double spaced 15-page petition with Annexes A to J for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction. 3 Counsel secured in the appellate court in about an hour's time a full-page single spaced typewritten summons and a one-and-a-half page single spaced temporary restraining order enjoining the Court of First Instance of Rizal "from executing any order and/or writ of execution ... in Election Case No. 10545" and from declaring the decision in said case "final and executory."
Upon the other hand, with equal dispatch, Estrada tried to fend off Sto. Domingo's move when he filed with the Court of Appeals, although belatedly, at 10:43 a.m., a 5-page opposition to the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus attaching thereto his oath of office.
At 10:52 a.m. before the trial court adjourned, a bailiff of the Court of Appeals served on then Judge Andres Reyes, presiding over the trial court, the summons and restraining order; and at 11:50 a.m. likewise served the summons and restraining order upon Estrada.
After hearing, respondent Court of Appeals rendered the disputed decision of February 13, 1969, mentioned at the start of this opinion. Reconsideration thereof was denied by said court, again voting three to two, on May 22, 1969.
1. The forefront question to draw our attention is the correctness of the temporary restraining order of November 25, 1968 issued ex parte by the Court of Appeals promptly upon the filing therein of the certiorari, prohibition and mandamus petition. The directive in that restraining order is that respondents before the Court of Appeals refrain "from executing any order and/or writ of execution issued by respondent Judge declaring the decision in Election Case No. 10545 of the CFI-Rizal final and executory, from removing petitioner from his office as municipal mayor of San Juan, Rizal, from installing respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada in petitioner's place as said mayor, and from otherwise molesting, disturbing petitioner in, or excluding him from, his lawful exercise and performance of his duties, rights and prerogatives as municipal mayor, until further orders from this court." Well to remember is that the restraining order was issued even before the trial court could release the very order complained of in the petition.
The averments in Sto. Domingo's petition before the Court of Appeals upon which the restraining order was issued are:
17. — That while petitioner has been unable to secure an official copy of the resolution of respondent Judge (for reasons hereinafter stated) he has been reliably informed (and because of the afore-mentioned circumstances and the persistent reports circulated by followers of respondent 'Estrada' that he [Estrada] will 'sit as Mayor on Monday', has reason to believe) that at the hearing at 8:30 o'clock this morning (Nov. 25, the respondent Judge will in open court (1) disregard or strike out petitioner's motion for reconsideration as prayed for by respondent 'Estrada' on the ground that the Election Code does not provide for a motion for reconsideration but only for appeal and that there was no proof of service of the motion, both of which are incorrect; (2) declare as final and executory his decision ousting petitioner as Municipal Mayor of San Juan and installing respondent Estrada in petitioner's stead; (3) order the execution or enforcement of said decision with the petitioner considered notified of said order in open court (as in a criminal case) and to abide by the same (while respondent 'Estrada' takes his 'oath' as mayor immediately if not also 'in open court'); and thereby deprive petitioner of any opportunity to contest the said order and execution in the appellate courts before they are carried out by the respondents over his objection.
18. — That the aforesaid actuations of respondent Judge have given rise to serious anxiety and great tension among the parties and their followers, as well as among the people of San Juan, Rizal and, as this petition is being filed by petitioner, the respondent 'Joseph Ejercito Estrada' and his men, many of whom are armed, are reported to be poised to forcibly execute the order to be issued by respondent Judge this morning while the petitioner's men, despite his instructions and advice to them to keep the peace and to ignore the taunts and challenges hurled at them by respondent 'Estrada' and his men, may not be able to restrain themselves if unduly provoked or harmed, and unless a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction is issued by this Honorable Court against the respondents, their employees, agents, men and representatives, violence and disorder, and possibly bloodshed, are likely to break out in the municipality of San Juan, Rizal to the consequent injury not only of the parties and their men, but also of other people, and the petitioner will be forcibly and unlawfully removed from his office as mayor without due process of law.
19. — That in spite of petitioner's efforts to secure a copy of the respondent judge's resolution up to the close of office hours last Saturday, he has been unable to do so, he being informed that the said Order would be read in open court this morning and any written order would be released only thereafter; hence, the inability of petitioner to attach a copy of said resolution to this Petition which, because of the extraordinary circumstances above cited, has to be filed even before receipt of said copy. Petitioner, however, shall file said copy by way of supplemental pleading immediately upon receipt thereof this morning if the same is reduced to writing by respondent Judge.
20. — That by the foregoing acts — the disregard or striking out of petitioner's motion for reconsideration of his decision without just and legal ground, the denial of petitioner's remedy of appeal from said decision as provided by law, and the execution of the said decision although the same is not yet final and executory (by reason of petitioner's motion for reconsideration and also the cautionary notice of appeal), and the opportunity given to respondent 'Joseph Ejercito Estrada' and his men to forcibly and unlawfully remove petitioner from his office as mayor immediately without giving petitioner adequate opportunity to seek relief from the appellate courts — the respondent Judge has unlawfully neglected the performances of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from his office as Judge, unlawfully excludes the petitioner from enjoyment or exercise of his legal right to move for the reconsideration of respondent Judge's decision and to appeal therefrom, and likewise unlawfully sanctions the petitioner's removal from his lawful office without due process of law.
We take a grave view of the averments in Sto. Domingo's petition before the Court of Appeals just transcribed. We particularly note his statement that later on that day, November 25, the judge in open court would disregard or strike out petitioner's (Sto. Domingo's) motion for reconsideration, declare final his decision, and order the execution or enforcement thereof. All of these upon the allegation that Sto. Domingo had "been reliably informed" of the contents of the trial court's yet unreleased order. What is disturbing is that the information thus obtained constitutes the substance of the lower court's resolution eventually promulgated on that day, November 25.
Whatever merit may be accorded to the averments in the petition before the Court of Appeals aforesaid, our deepening concern for public policy will prevent us from lending support to the appellate court's restraining order. For, the information was secured upon a betrayal of trust. Not by the trial judge; he had consistently refused to divulge the contents of the resolution prior to its promulgation. The only logical conclusion is that the information must have been given by those closely associated with the judge in the discharge of his official duties.
Decisions or orders of courts must be kept inviolate until they shall have been promulgated or released. Officials and employees of the courthouse must be strictly enjoined against giving any information in advance as to what will be done by the judge. No opportunity should be afforded the unscrupulous litigants, their lawyers, friends, relatives, sympathizers or those with power or influence to go to court employees and by insidious means and even bribery acquire advance information on the desired judgment or order of the court. Employees should be made to understand that they are not to succumb to greed, to temptations for advancement in public service, that cause them to destroy the integrity of court proceedings or court records. A relaxation of this rule would embolden officials and employees of courts to seek out interested parties in a case, give them the so-called "inside information" on the decision or order, or furnish them with copy of an unreleased decision or order, or hide, destroy or steal court records, or hold unserved a decision or resolution to promote a party's cause — thereby to earn a quick peso. Some such occurrence as has happened in this case should be stamped out. A contrary proposition would breed graft and corruption and erode confidence in the administration of justice.
Since the information procured is the "fruit of the poisonous tree" 4 — the betrayal of trust — private respondent should not be allowed to benefit by it. Information immorally extracted cannot be dignified with the imprimatur of courts of justice. For this reason alone, we hold that there was abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals in granting the restraining order on the basis of the allegations rooted on what Sto. Domingo calls "reliable information".
But herein respondent Sto. Domingo avers that petitioner Estrada and his men, many of whom were armed, were reportedly poised to forcibly execute the order enforcing the judgment as yet to be issued in the morning of November 25. Said respondent told the Court of Appeals that a restraining order was a necessity to forestall impending bloodshed because his men, in the words of his petition before the appellate court, "despite his instructions and advice to them to keep the peace and to ignore the taunts and challenges hurled at them by respondent 'Estrada' and his men, may not be able to restrain themselves if unduly provoked or harmed."
This is an imagined wrong. It is so easy to conjure some such situation. Rumors may be blown into hysteria. Surely, the trial judge is not a party to this alleged scheme. Nor will he consent, we are sure, to be a party to such dastardly acts.
It is because of this that courts should be careful, indeed very cautious, in giving in to averments such as are heretofore recited. Courts should be on guard against litigants who swell up a picture into an alarming situation. We do not hesitate to say that at the time the petition (lodged in the Court of Appeals as early as 8:04 a.m.) was being thought of, framed in the minds of the lawyers and eventually typewritten, there was no such grave problem of threatening armed clashes or bloodshed as would call for the remedy of a restraining order from the Court of Appeals. If tension such as was depicted by Sto. Domingo existed, it would not have escaped notice of the trial judge. He was at the vortex of the alleged ominous events. Representations then could have been made to him in view of the alleged turbulence of the atmosphere either to do away with the oral promulgation of the resolution altogether, or after the promulgation thereof, to have its enforcement delayed so that appropriate relief may be had in the appellate courts. So it is, that the averment in the Court of Appeals' petition that the judge would purportedly refuse to afford respondent Sto. Domingo's opportunity to seek aid from the appellate courts is premature and at best pure conjecture. And, if it were really true that there was the gathering momentum leading to violence, we believe that guardians of the law should likewise have known of the same — which is not even suggested in the record — and readied themselves to forestall armed clashes.
It thus results that there is a remedy elsewhere other than in the form of a premature restraining order from the Court of Appeals.
Besides, if the judge would declare his decision final and executory, as he later on did, and the forces of respondent Sto. Domingo would resist petitioner Estrada's takeover, such a resistance would certainly be patently illegal and indeed even criminal. Surely, impending bloodshed can never be a valid ground to restrain a lawful assumption of office. What will happen to the rule of law?
It is in the context heretofore recited that we hold that the Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing ex parte the restraining order here complained of. For this reason, we strike down the said restraining order.
2. We face the problems ahead with an eye to the nature of election contest proceedings.
The statutory scheme clearly mapped out in the Revised Election Code is that proceedings in election protests are special and expeditious. The periods for filing pleadings are short. Trials are swift. Decisions in municipal election contests are to be handed down in six months after the protest is presented. The time to file a notice of appeal is cut short to five days from notice of the decision. Appeal is to be decided within three months after the case is filed with the clerk of the court to which appeal is taken. Preferential disposition of election contests except as to habeas corpus proceedings is set forth in the law. 5 Even the Rules of Court make it abundantly clear that election cases enjoy preferential status. 6 The proceedings should not be encumbered by delays. All of these are because the term of elective office is likewise short. There is the personal stake of the contestants which generates feuds and discords. Above all is the public interest. Title to public elective office must not be left long under cloud. Efficiency of public administration should not be impaired. It is thus understandable that pitfalls which may retard the determination of election contests should be avoided. Courts should heed the imperative need for dispatch. Obstacles and technicalities which fetter the people's will should not stand in the way of a prompt termination of elections contests.
Since 1966, when this Court in Lagumbay vs. Climaco 7 projected the pressing need to strike a blow at the "pernicious 'grab-the-proclamation-prolong-the-protest' slogan of some candidates or parties", we observe, to our dismay, that courts of justice still have to cope with oft-recurring cases which come about in utter disregard of this rule. 8
These are the desiderata which should be uppermost in the mind of courts of justice, if only to give substance to the constitutional precept that "[s]overeignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." 9
3. The thrust of Sto. Domingo's petition before the Court of Appeals is that therein respondent Judge Andres Reyes did not resolve his motion for reconsideration on the merits; that accordingly mandamus should issue to compel him so to do; and that in the event the resolution be adverse, the judge be directed to give due course to his cautionary notice of appeal.
The majority decision of the Court of Appeals gave its nod to the posture so taken and directed the judge "to act upon and resolve petitioner's [private respondent's] motion for reconsideration of the decision in said case on the merits."
A reading of the November 25 order of Judge Andres Reyes brings about the salient points thereof, viz:
To begin with, the Court does not believe that the filing of a motion for reconsideration in an election case is in order ....
x x x x x x x x x
And even granting for the sake of argument that the aggrieved party can file a motion for reconsideration, the instant motion filed by Braulio Sto. Domingo is pro forma and therefore, did not suspend the running of the period of appeal. It is pro forma because the said motion for reconsideration was but a repetition of the contents of the memorandum filed by the said protestee and in a small way, a refutation of a portion of the memorandum filed by the protestant, which the movant could have refuted by filing a reply memorandum before the case was submitted for decision. To make it short, the motion for reconsideration merely makes reference to the contents of the memorandum filed by other parties which had already been considered by the Court before rendering its decision. (Arnaldo vs. Bernabe, 87 Phil. 379)
Not only this, even granting for the sake of argument again, that the instant motion for reconsideration was not pro forma, still the Court believes that the filing of the said motion was fatally defective, and such being so, the motion is but a mere scrap of paper which did not stop the running of the period for appeal. ....
The motion lacked the required affidavit. The affidavit is a very important requirement considering the fact that a registry receipt does not show the nature of the contents of the letter that has been mailed. The deficiency was not cured when the movant Braulio Sto. Domingo submitted the affidavit of a certain Manuel Busico which is dated November 13, 1968, or four (4) days after the date when said motion was set for hearing. The failure therefore of the protestee to attach the affidavit to the motion was fatal.
And not only this. The failure of the protestee to comply with the requirements of Section 2, Rule 37, Section 4, Rule 15 and Section 8, Rule 3 ... is likewise fatal. A copy of the motion for reconsideration was not served on the protestants three (3) days before the date set for hearing. The record shows that the protestant received the copy of the motion for reconsideration of the protestee only on November 13, 1968 or four (4) days after the said motion was set for hearing by the movant on November 9, 1968."
Nothing more forcefully downgrades the charge that the judge did not fully resolve the motion for reconsideration than the recitals in the order just quoted. To be sure, Section 12, Article VIII, Constitution, and Section 1, Rule 36, Rules of Court which require express findings of fact in a decision, both have no application to the questioned order. Here involved is not a decision on the merits but a mere order upon a motion to reconsider. The judge could simply dish out a routine capsule-form order "Denied for lack of merit" or "Motion for reconsideration denied". And yet, that kind of order would serve to immunize the judge against an unlawful neglect-of-duty charge. But the judge did not merely content himself with a perfunctory order. He wrote a reasoned out five-page resolution.
Nor is it correct to tag the judge's order with failure to consider the motion for reconsideration on the merits. Meaning should be attached to the judge's statement that the motion for reconsideration is pro forum because the same is "but a repetition of the contents of the memorandum filed by the said protestee and in a small way, a refutation of a portion of the memorandum filed by the protestant, which the movant could have refuted by filing a reply memorandum before the case was submitted for decision." The judge added that: "To make it short, the motion for reconsideration merely makes reference to the contents of the memorandum filed by both parties which had already been considered by the Court before rendering its decision." Implicit in these statements is that the judge waded through private respondent's motion for reconsideration, read and examined the merits of the arguments therein, compared them with those set forth in private respondent's memorandum and then came to the conclusion that the arguments advanced would not change the result. Had the judge found in that motion for reconsideration some argument of weight or substance which would bring about a conclusion different from that reached in his decision, surely enough, he would have spelled it out and written it in an amended decision. For, the presumption is that a judge performs his duty to the best of his knowledge and ability. Since the judge did not change his decision, then under the circumstances his November 25 order amounted to a denial of the motion for reconsideration on the merits. And this is quite clear from the dispositive part thereof which stated that the order was "IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS".
We thus find ourselves unable to go along with the Court of Appeals' insistence that the judge's statement that the motion was pro forma is not to be taken as a resolution of the motion on the merits. The reasons the appellate cotext gave are: first, such pro forma finding "merely supported [i.e., for the sake of argument] the main thesis ... that the decision 'had already become final and executory'"; and second, it is inconsistent for the judge "to say that the remedy of reconsideration is not available and at the same time pass upon it [the motion] on the merits." Courts at times do not hesitate to avail of all grounds to throw out a motion or pleading. It is not uncommon to read in decisions or orders some such statement as this: Viewed from any angle, the petition in this case should be dismissed." 10
For these reasons, it is difficult to hew to the Court of Appeals' view that the judge so unlawfully neglected his duty to rule on the merits of the motion for reconsideration. It bears repeating that the judge did more than what was expected; that instead of mechanically writing "Denied for lack of merit", he examined the arguments set forth in said motion and explained as cogently as he could why it should not be granted. His order meets the rigid standards expected of his judicial position.
And more. In the resolution of a motion for reconsideration, judges wiled sound discretion. As Mr. Justice Edilberto Soriano of the Court of Appeals, in his dissent to the resolution denying reconsideration, aptly observed, "[h]ow he was going to go about it, or upon what ground or grounds, is of little moment." The fact is that the judge's duty under the premises is to grant or deny. He did deny. He is not remiss in his duty. We, accordingly, hold that the trial court's order of November 25, 1968 properly ruled on private respondent's motion for reconsideration.
4. The conclusion just reached brings us to the next question: Did private respondent's motion for reconsideration arrest the five-day period for appeal set forth in Section 178 of the Revised Election Code?
To repeat, the motion for reconsideration of the decision was based on four grounds, namely, the court erred (1) in reviewing and annulling the decisions of the other branches of the same Court of First Instance in exclusion cases; (2) in rejecting the so-called "Boyong" and "Dr. Boyong" votes; (3) in rejecting protestee's evidence on the tampering of ballots after revision; and (4) in appreciating certain ballots. And we have said that the lower court in rejecting this motion ruled that it was pro forma in that the matters therein discussed "had already been considered by the Court before rendering its decision." There is much to the trial judge's statement just quoted.
On the first ground which refers to the decision of the other branches of the Court of First Instance in exclusion cases, it is clear from the decision that this matter had already been brought to the attention of the trial judge before the decision was rendered. Said the trial judge:
According to the protestee, 659 out of 1,508 excluded voters were able to vote, and 285 of them voted for Estrada, 95 for Sto. Domingo, and 279 for Ibuna. This was determined by a matching conducted by a witness for the protestee by the name of Major Catalino Hernandez. To represent the facts clearer, the results of this matching are tabulated and appears on page 8 of Protestee's memorandum.
The protestee vigorously claims that the ballots cast by these excluded voters should be deducted from the number of votes credited to Estrada, Sto. Domingo, and Ibuna. 11
On the so-called "Boyong" and "Dr. Boyong" votes, there is the admission on the part of counsel for Sto. Domingo (during the course of oral arguments before the trial judge on November 25, 1968 in support of his verbal motion to reconsider the denial of his motion for reconsideration of the decision) that "we raised this question in our memorandum because of the exception laid down in the case of Abrea vs. Lloren but also on the principle of idem sonans." 12
On the alleged tampered ballots, the trial judge, on pages 56 and 57 of the decision, explained quite in detail how, after this case had been submitted for decision, the protestee (respondent Sto. Domingo), on August 27, 1968, moved to reopen the case alleging evidence to show that said ballots were tampered. Of the 264 ballots, respondent Sto. Domingo only claims 31 ballots stating: "By our count, a total of 31 ballots wherein the protestee was voted for Mayor were rejected by the Court as marked ballots because of such 'marks' as '3 stars', swastika figures, drawings of bottles of beer and the word 'toma', likeness of human face, carbon traces, 'Jr. 007', '...' below OFFICIAL BALLOT, etc. appearing thereon." On the question of whether these 31 ballots should be counted for Sto. Domingo, his counsel admitted that: "We cited the arguments and the law applicable. We learned this appreciation only upon receipt of the decision. We could not have anticipated it because we have vigorously maintained that the alleged 'marks' there were not placed by the voters themselves but by other persons without their consent. How then could our motion be pro-forma?" 13 Respondent Sto. Domingo in his motion for reconsideration would want the trial court to read the memorandum of objections filed by protestant (petitioner Estrada) to convince said court that its ruling on this point was wrong. But this memorandum of objections had already been considered by the trial court when it said, on page 57 of its decision: "Anyone who tampers these ballots must also be familiar with the memorandum of objections filed by the protestant as early as May, 1968 in order to harmonize the written objections with the physical appearance of the 264 ballots."
Nor will the appreciation of 56 ballots given as the fourth and last ground of the motion for reconsideration be of any importance. The question of appreciation of ballots in election protests comes up after those ballots have been challenged. They are separated. The parties are heard on their reasons pro and con. Only thereafter does the judge weigh the relative value of the reasons given by one party or the other.
It is quite apparent then that the questions raised in the motion for reconsideration have already been considered by the trial judge before the decision of the case on the merits. This is an election protest. Public policy demands that it be instituted and finished with utmost promptitude. It was indeed an utter waste of time for private respondent to have sought reconsideration upon questions which, after all, could have been very well decided by the appellate court.
We, accordingly, rule that where in an election protest a motion for reconsideration of the decision on the merits presents questions which have already been considered by the court prior to or upon the promulgation of such decision, said motion for reconsideration is pro forma and does not suspend the running of the period for appeal. This rule, we are confident, helps remove from the reach of proclamation grabbers a dilatory device conveniently used by them to keep them in office and to frustrate the victors from taking the seats that are justly theirs.
As we look back at the facts, we discern a pattern of delay on the part of private respondent. Recited by petitioner Estrada are the following which took place in the trial court: (1) Motion to reduce deposit from P7,500 to P4,000 dated February 12, 1968; 14 (2) Motion for time to evaluate revision dated February 14, 1968; 15 (3) Motion to allow services of handwriting expert dated February 16, 1968; 16 (4) Motion to reset beginning of technical examination by handwriting expert dated February 27, 1968; 17 (5) Urgent motion to suspend revision of counter-protested precincts dated February 27, 1968; 18 (6) Motion to conduct matching tests with respect to Precinct Nos. 8, 72 and 77 dated June 5, 1968; 19 and (7) Petition to reopen the case to adduce evidence of tampering dated August 26, 1968. 20 This last motion was granted by the judge despite the fact that the tampering, on which evidence was to be adduced, was already previously brought to his attention.
Indeed, even private respondent's conduct after the trial court's decision is not arguably insulated from the charge of delaying tactics. It was on the last day of the statutory period fixed for appealing the main decision — November 4, 1968 — that private respondent's motion for reconsideration was filed. And then, instead of serving a copy thereof on petitioner personally, as had at times been done before admittedly with previous pleadings, 21 service on petitioner was made by registered special delivery mail, with notice that the incident would be heard on the following Saturday, November 9. Copy of the motion and the notice of hearing sent by mail did not reach petitioner on time. Petitioner actually received the mailed matter on November 13, four days after the motion for reconsideration was set for hearing. This was, of course, to be expected from the experience people have with our postal system. Private respondent, we are sure, knew this. Because service was effected thru the mails, private respondent won a week's delay — the judge reset the hearing on the motion for reconsideration on November 16.
On November 16, when the judge announced his readiness to rule on the motion, we find private respondent objecting, asking that his memorandum and opposition to petitioner's omnibus motion be first considered and suing for time to procure extraordinary relief from the Court of Appeals. Private respondent won another week's delay. The judge declared that he would promulgate the resolution in open court on November 23, the next Saturday. In the meantime, however, private respondent made another move to postpone the promulgation. The judge again reset the same on Monday, November 25.
On November 25 at 8:30 a.m., private respondent's counsel successfully obtained a one-and-a-half hour delay upon the ground that he had to postpone another case in Caloocan City. It turned out that, meanwhile, private respondent's lawyers were frantically attempting to secure a restraining order from the Court of Appeals. They filed a special civil action with the said appellate court at 8:04 a.m. that same morning. When private respondent received a copy of the judge's order disposing of their motion for reconsideration at 10:15 a.m., and when the judge denied private respondent's oral motion for reconsideration thereof, the latter was ready. Private respondent's counsel came out with the restraining order from the Court of Appeals.
Consider also the time consumed by the present proceedings in the Court of Appeals. Private respondent's petition was filed on November 25, 1968. It was finally resolved only on May 22, 1969. And yet, upon the excuse that his motion for reconsideration of the decision was not ruled upon on the merits, private respondent would want the appellate court to command the trial judge first to rule on the said motion and thereafter give due course to his appeal. One may well imagine the baneful effects of some such procedure. Had his petition prospered, it is not unlikely that by the time the case is finally decided, the pyrrhic victory which courts abhor would again be repeated.
It must be emphasized that the questions raised in the motion for reconsideration could very well be disposed of, and with finality, on appeal. In the realities of political life, it is unreasonable to assume that whatever be the resolution on the motion for reconsideration, the defeated party would take that resolution hands down. It is not to be expected that respondent Sto. Domingo, who is presently sitting as Mayor would not appeal from the decision adverse to him.
If any meaning is to be attached to the events in the lower courts, it is that private respondent has, in ingeniouly chiseled language, so skillfully taken advantage of judicial procedure to stave off the day of reckoning when petitioner would replace him as Mayor of San Juan, Rizal. The pattern of delay is patent.
A principle already forged by this Court is that a motion for reconsideration which has no other purpose than to gain time is pro forma and does not stop the period of appeal from slipping away. 22 It is in recognition of this doctrine that we hold that where a motion for reconsideration in an election case is taken advantage of for purposes of delay to the prejudice of the adverse party or where such motion forms part of a matrix of delay, that motion does not stop running of the five-day period for appeal.
The foregoing discussions pave the way for an examination of the remedies, if any, available to private respondent.
5. Mandamus will not issue to compel the trial judge to decide private respondent's motion for reconsideration. That motion for reconsideration, we say again, had been decided on the merits. And even on the assumption that the court did not so decide, mandamus will not issue. For, the court did decide; it denied the motion. Perhaps in a way not satisfactory to private respondent. But then, mandamus is no remedy to control the exercise by the court of its discretion. 23 Nor will it avail to compel him to resolve an incident in a particular way. 24 Reason for this is that the law concedes to judges the right to decide questions according to their own judgment and understanding of the law. If the court's resolution is wrong, correctible it is by appeal, not mandamus. 25
As unavailing is mandamus to compel the judge to approve his appeal. Private respondent has not appealed from the judgment. He cannot rely on the cautionary notice of appeal which he has withdrawn.
6. Nor will the writs of certiorari and prohibition issue. Their function is to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. 26 Admittedly, the trial court had jurisdiction over the election case. The questioned order of November 25, 1968 was issued in the proper exercise of such jurisdiction. Granting or denying a motion for reconsideration indeed involves an exercise of discretion. 27 As was pointed out in Bustos vs. Moir, 35 Phil. 415, 417, an election case: "It is absurd to claim that a court has no jurisdiction to do the very thing which the law authorizes it to do. The mere fact that it decides the question wrong is ... utterly immaterial to the question of its jurisdiction." And discretion has not been abused.
Respondent Sto. Domingo's motion for reconsideration did not stop the running of the five-day period for appeal. No appeal has been taken from the judgment dislodging said respondent from his seat as Mayor. Accordingly, that judgment has become final.
Besides, as adverted to earlier in this opinion, the trial court — upon the allegations set forth in paragraphs 17 to 20 of private respondent's petition before the Court of Appeals based on alleged "reliable information" — may not be restrained by the latter court from enforcing the order of November 25, 1968 denying the motion for the reconsideration of its main decision. We have also said that the trial court has correctly denied said motion for reconsideration. It follows then that neither certiorari nor prohibition will issue against the trial judge to stop him from proceeding with the execution of his judgment.
7. In fact, no extraordinary writ may at all issue in the present case. For, a rule that has definitely crystallized because of frequent reiteration is that extraordinary remedies—such as mandamus, certiorari and prohibition may not be sought if there is another remedy as adequate and speedy. 28 We have no doubt that an appeal within the statutory period from the judgment rendered on October 29, 1968 in this election case is as adequate and as speedy as any special civil action. Faster it could be. For, the law commands that election contest appeals "shall be decided within three months after the filing of the case in the office of the clerk of the court to which the appeal has been taken." 29 This is fortified by another statutory precept which directs the trial and appellate courts to "give preference to election contests over all other cases, except those of habeas corpus" and to "hear and decide them without delay, within the time limits fixed by law, whether they are holding regular sessions or not." 30 But appeal, we have heretofore stated, is lost. No remedy is left.
8. In a last ditch attempt to keep this case alive, respondent Sto. Domingo now comes to this Court with the plea "that in the remote possibility that his petition" in the Court of Appeals "for any reason be denied, the same be considered or treated as an appeal."
Reasons there are why this cannot be done. First. At the time the petition before the Court of Appeals was filed, the judgment of the trial court was already final. Second. Said respondent cannot now invoke this Court's power to help him retrieve his right to appeal which he has deliberately discarded in favor of a special civil action — which, mildly put, has served no purpose other than to delay these proceedings. He has already eaten up almost one-half of the term of office that the electorate, to all appearances, had not entrusted to him. He cannot gamble with one court proceeding, and failing in this, resort to another. Indeed, resorting piecemeal to one remedy after another could be an instrument of oppression against the adversary. Third. Respondent Sto. Domingo's petition before the Court of Appeals is bereft of any allegation indicative of any intention of his to appeal. On the contrary, it was meant to procure a decision remanding the case to the court below for further proceedings.
These are considerations which deter us from heeding Sto. Domingo's plea that the special civil action in the Court of Appeals be treated as an appeal. In those cases where this Court considered an appeal as a special civil action or vice-versa, there was reason therefor: to avoid delay and to thwart the commission of injustice. 31 But for this Court to grant said respondent Sto. Domingo's plea, delay instead of being avoided would be encouraged; justice instead of being advanced, denied. No equitable consideration there is which would give some semblance of authority to consider the special civil action as an appeal. He lost his remedy of appeal. Not through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, 32 or through the court's own fault. 33 If negligence or mistake there was, we are certain it was not excusable. The short of it is that private respondent opted to travel the road of extraordinary remedies, not with the intention of having the case brought up for appellate review on the merits. Clear was his aim to have the present questions decided first and, if adversely resolved against him, to appeal. To legitimize such maneuvers is to run smack against the letter and spirit of the election law. Temporizing with delay in election cases is repugnant to our sense of justice. It is our duty to hold that appeal as a remedy has been totally foreclosed to respondent Sto. Domingo.
The merits of the election protest are not before us in these proceedings. But as this decision will have the effect of affirming the finality of the judgment of the trial court upholding the protest of petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, we have gone over the records of the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals which have been alevated to this Court. And we are satisfied that our decision here does not defeat the expressed will of the electorate of San Juan, Rizal.
For the reasons given —
(1) the judgement of the Court of Appeals promulgated on February 13, 1969 is hereby set aside; and.
(2) the judgement of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Election Case No. 10545 entitled "Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Protestant, versus Braulio Sto. Domingo, Protestee", declaring Joseph Ejercito Estrada as the duly elected Mayor for the Municipality of San Juan, Province of Rizal in the elections held on November 14, 1967 with a plurality of 192 votes, with costs against protestee, is hereby declared final and executory as of November, 5, 1968.
Our decision herein shall become final five (5) days from notice hereof.
Costs against private respondent Braulio Sto. Domingo. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano and Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
DIZON, J., concurring:
The undersigned adopts as part of this concurring opinion the following masterly exposition of the case and of the facts made by Mr. Justice Conrado Sanchez:
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada invokes the authority of this Court to overturn the judgment of the Court of Appeals — voting three to two — which (1) declared that the Court of First Instance of Rizal acted with grave abuse of discretion for not resolving on the merits respondent Braulio Sto. Domingo's motion for reconsideration of its decision of October 29, 1968, and (2) nullified said trial court's order of November 25, 1968 which held final and executory the decision aforementioned declaring petitioner the winner in the election contest for the mayoralty of San Juan, Rizal.
The controlling facts may be recited as follows:
In the local elections in San Juan, Rizal held on November 14, 1967, candidates for Mayor were then incumbent Mayor Nicanor Ibuna, Nacionalista Party official candidate; respondent Braulio Sto. Domingo, Liberal Party official candidate; petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, independent; and Enrique Lenon, also independent. On December 31, 1967, the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed Braulio Sto. Domingo as elected Mayor with 7,926 votes as against Joseph Ejercito Estrada with 7,882, or a plurality of 44 votes. Nicanor Ibuna ran third with 6,775 votes. Enrique Lenon obtained 55 votes. In due course, petitioner Estrada lodged an election protest, and respondent Sto. Domingo counter-protested, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 1 On October 29, 1968, judgment was rendered in said election protest, thus:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby annuls and sets aside the proclamation of the protestee, Dr. Braulio Sto. Domingo, and hereby proclaims and declares the protestant, Joseph Ejercito Estrada as the Mayor duly elected for the Municipality of San Juan, Province of Rizal in the elections held on November 14, 1967, with a plurality of 192 votes, with costs against the protestee.
Sto. Domingo's counsel was served with copy of the decision on October 30, 1968.
At 1:45 p.m. on November 4, 1968, the last day of the five-day period to appeal statutorily fixed by Section 178, Revised Election Code, Sto. Domingo filed a motion to reconsider the decision. Copy of the motion was sent to Estrada's counsel by registered special delivery mail and with notice that the motion would be heard on the following Saturday, November 9, 1968 at 8:30 a.m. Attached to the motion was registry receipt 17713. Sto. Domingo therein averred that the trial judge erred (1) in reviewing and annulling the decisions of the other branches of the same court on the exclusion of voters; (2) in rejecting 'Boyong' and 'Dr. Boyong' votes; (3) in rejecting protestee's (private respondent's) evidence on the tampering of ballots after revision; and (4) in appreciating certain ballots.
Came the morning of November 9, 1968. Sto. Domingo and his counsel appeared in court. Absent were Estrada and his counsel, both of whom until then had not received copy of the motion. For lack of proof that Estrada had received notice of the motion for reconsideration of November 4, 1968, the hearing thereof was reset for November 16, 1968 at 8:30 a.m.
In the afternoon of November 9, 1968 Estrada, who got wind of what took place in the trial court that morning, filed an 'omnibus motion' alleging that Sto. Domingo's motion for reconsideration was not legally sanctioned, flimsy and frivolous, a mere scrap of paper, and intended for delay. He prayed that that motion be stricken out and that the judgment be immediately executed as it had become final and executory. The omnibus motion he set for hearing on November 12, 1968 at 8:30 a.m.
Parenthetically, Estrada's counsel was personally served a copy of the motion for reconsideration only on November 11, 1968 upon the court's verbal order given on the 9th of November. The copy sent by registered mail reached his counsel only on November 13, 1968, four days after it was set for hearing (November 9, 1968, 8:30 a.m.).
At the November 12 hearing, the judge advised the parties to submit memoranda of authorities and reset both the omnibus motion and the motion to reconsider on November 16, 1968.
It was on the scheduled hearing of November 16 that Sto. Domingo completed proof of service by mail of his motion for reconsideration by the presentation of the registry return card postmarked November 13, a certification by the Acting Postmaster of Makati as to the mailing of registered letter No. 17713 on November 4, 1968, and the affidavit of Manuel B. Busico who posted the mail. Estrada's counsel orally moved for the immediate resolution of the pending incidents. The judge was ready to rule on the motions. Sto. Domingo demurred, pleaded that his memorandum and opposition to the omnibus motion be first considered; that in the event of an adverse resolution he be allowed at least five (5) days from receipt to enable him to procure extraordinary relief from the Court of Appeals. The judge thereupon declared that he would promulgate the resolution in open court on November 23, 1968, a Saturday.
On November 19, 1968, Sto. Domingo filed a cautionary notice of appeal, manifesting that he would appeal to the Court of Appeals in the event his motion for reconsideration be thwarted. Admittedly, however, he withdrew the cautionary notice of appeal later. This withdrawal was granted by the court on November 21, 1968.
On November 20, 1968, upon Sto. Domingo's urgent motion, the judge calendared the promulgation of the resolution for Monday, November 25, 1968, at 8:30 a.m.
Allegedly informed that resolution on his reconsideration motion would be adverse to him, Sto. Domingo's counsel sought the judge in the morning of November 23, 1968, asked the latter to give him a copy of the order before the close of office hours on that day. The judge declined, instead stated that the order would be read and released in open court the following Monday, November 25, 1968.
A hectic day, November 25, began at 7:30 a.m. when Sto. Domingo's counsel saw the judge to ask for a copy of the order. The judge told him to wait until the order shall have been read in open court. An hour later, 8:30 a.m., when the case was called, Sto. Domingo's counsel requested that the case be called again at 10:00 a.m. purportedly on the ground that he would first ask for the postponement of another case in Caloocan City. The court granted the request. At 10:00 a.m., the disputed order was read and promulgated in open court. The parties secured their copies of the order at 10:15 a.m. The dispositive portion of the order reads: 'IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, it is the opinion of the Court that the reconsideration of its decision dated October 29, 1968 is not in order as the same had already become final and executory.'
Then and there, Sto. Domingo's counsel orally moved to reconsider. The judge after hearing the arguments of the parties denied the motion. 2 Sto. Domingo's counsel was prepared to meet this contingency. He drew from his pocket and exhibited to the judge a copy of the Court of Appeals' restraining order.
It developed that some two hours earlier, at 8:04 a.m. on November 25, Sto. Domingo's counsel lodged with the Court of Appeals a three-pronged double spaced 15-page petition with Annexes A to J for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction. 3 Counsel secured in the appellate court in about an hour's time a full-page single spaced typewritten summons and a one-and-a-half page single spaced temporary restraining order enjoining the Court of First Instance of Rizal 'from executing any order and/or writ of execution ... in Election Case No. 10545' and/from declaring the decision in the said case 'final and executory'.
Upon the other hand, with equal dispatch, Estrada tried to fend off Sto. Domingo's move when he filed with the Court of Appeals, although belatedly, at 10:45 a.m., a 5-page opposition to the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus attaching thereto his oath of office.
At 10:52 a.m. before the trial court adjourned, a bailiff of the Court of Appeals served on then Judge Andres Reyes, presiding over the trial court; the summons and restraining order; and at 11:50 a.m. likewise served the summons and restraining order upon Estrada.
After hearing, respondent Court of Appeals rendered the disputed decision of February 13, 1969, mentioned at the start of this opinion. Reconsideration thereof was denied by said court, again voting three to two, on May 22, 1969.
On the basis of the foregoing, the first question that arises is whether in election contests a Court of First Instance has the authority to consider and reserve a motion for reconsideration or new trial.
In Arnedo vs. Llorente, et al., 8 Phil. 257 this Court answered the above question categorically in the negative. After an extensive discussion of whether, in the light of the spirit and purpose of the laws controlling elections at that time, Section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure was applicable to election contests, this Court finally said:
This line of reasoning might be extended further, but we deem it unnecessary, and think that what has been said justifies us in holding in favor of petitioner's contention that Court of First Instance have no jurisdiction to vacate final judgments entered by them 'determining' election contests had under the provision of section 27 of Act No. 1582.
The following vital pronouncement of the Court in Navarro vs. Veloso (23 Phil. 625) inferentially but nonetheless clearly supports its view as set forth in Arnedo-Llorente:
We have already decided in a cause not yet published that the Election Law is a special law providing within itself a complete procedure highly special in its nature by which the protest may be carried on; and that it must be strictly followed. The statute requires that a protest shall be inaugurated by motion upon notice to all of the candidate receiving votes for that particular office. That requirement must be literally followed. It was evidently the purpose of the Legislature to bring into the proceeding every person who was interested in the result of the election and to give him an opportunity to be present at the hearing of the protest and to be beard. What that purpose was, we do not now stop to inquire. It is sufficient for us that the legislature has so required.
While the fact that the present Revised Election Code expressly provides for an appeal from the decision of a Court of First Instance in election cases but is completely silent on the question of whether or not the defeated party has the right to file a motion for reconsideration or new trial may indicate, to a certain extent, continued adherence to the doctrine laid down in Arnedo-Llorente, We have to admit that said doctrine has been abandoned, for in Calañgi vs. Jhocson (G. R. No. 16108, not reported) and in Palomata vs. Villareal (40 Phil. 641) We held that the remedy by motion for reconsideration or new trial provided for in Section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now Section 3, Rule 37, Rules of Court) is available to the defeated party in election contests. Indeed, it being the rule in this jurisdiction that the Court of First Instance who, either in an action or a special proceeding, rendered a decision, may, before said decision has become executory, modify or reverse it motu proprio if, in its opinion, it had committed errors of fact or law justifying such modification or reversal. We can think of no reason sufficiently strong to deny said the Court the same authority when a party to the case call its attention—by motion—to substantial errors committed by it in rendering its decision. This notwithstanding, our pronouncement in Navarro vs. Veloso (supra) "that the Election Law is a special law providing within itself a complete procedure highly special in its nature by which the protest may be carried on, and that it must be strictly followed" (23 Phil. p. 626, emphasis supplied) still holds true and as authoritive as ever.
For the purpose of this concurring opinion, therefore, the undersigned assumes that respondent Sto. Domingo had the right to file, and the Court of First Instance presided by petitioner Judge Reyes had the right to consider and resolve the motion for reconsideration filed by the former.
But was said motion for reconsideration filed in accordance with the Rules of Court? Pertinent and decisive of this question is Section 10, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court which provides that if service of pleading is made by registered mail, proof of service thereof shall be made by attaching to it the corresponding registry receipt and by means of an affidavit of the person mailing containing a statement of the facts showing compliance with Section 5 of the same Rule: (1) the registry receipt to be attached to the original of the motion for reconsideration filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court, and (2) an affidavit certifying, upon personal knowledge, that a copy of the motion was sent by registered mail to the adverse party. Not denied is the fact that respondent Sto. Domingo's motion for reconsideration complied only with the first requirement. It did not comply with the second.
The need for the affidavit of service cannot be overemphasized. The registry receipt proves nothing more than a letter, document or pleading has been sent through the mails. It does not prove at all the nature and purpose of its contents. The required affidavit of service is precisely intended to do this. This is not a mere "technicality"; but even if it were, We say with Navarro and Veloso (supra): "That requirement (service of notice to all of the candidates receiving votes for the particular office under protests) must be literally followed. It was evidently the purpose of the Legislature to bring into the proceeding every person who was interested in the result of the election and to give him an opportunity to be present at the hearing of the protest to be heard. What the purpose was, we do not stop to inquire. It is sufficient for us that the legislature so required." (23 Phil. 626; Emphasis supplied).
As it has been held that without proof of service, as required by the Rules, a motion is nothing but a scrap of paper which the Clerk of Court would even be justified in not receiving for filing (Tan vs. Dimayuga, et al., L-15241, July 31, 1962), the inevitable conclusion is that, in the eyes of the law, respondent Sto. Domingo's motion for reconsideration was of no legal effect, and its filing did not suspend the running of the period of appeal. Upon this ground We agree with petitioner Judge Reyes that said motion was pro forma.
The motion aforesaid is pro-forma on yet another ground: in substance it was but a reiteration of reasons and arguments previously set forth in respondent Sto Domingo's memorandum submitted to the trial court and which the latter had already considered, weighed and resolved adversely to him when it rendered its decision on the merits..
We come now to the question of what remedy or remedies could have been availed of by said respondent after the rendition of the final judgement and after the denial of his motion for reconsideration.
Admittedly, the decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal presided by petitioner Judge Reyes declaring Estrada the mayor-elect of San Juan, Rizal, was appealable either to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court, as the case may be, within five days from notice thereof (Section 178, Revised Election Code), said appeal to be taken as in a criminal case. As said notice was served on respondent Sto. Domingo on October 30, 1968, the five-day period of appeal expired on November 4 of the same year. On that date, however, he chose to file not a notice of appeal, in accordance with Section 178 of the Revised Election Code, but a motion for reconsideration. For the reasons set forth by petitioner Judge Reyes in the corresponding resolution—which We need not here reproduce in extenso—said motion was denied on November 25, 1968, because "the reconsideration of its decision dated October 29, 1968 is not in order as the same had already become final and executory".
Again, upon receiving notice of the denial of his motion for reconsideration on November 25, 1968, respondent Sto. Domingo, instead of taking an appeal from the Court's decision on the merits, filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus praying for judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed:
(1) this Petition be given due course;
(2) upon the filing of this petition, a restraining order, or writ of preliminary injunction, be issued ex parte by this Honorable Court, or by any one of its Justices (as provided by Sec. 2 of Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court) considering the urgent and perilous situation created by respondents' acts, commanding or enjoining the respondents, jointly and separately, their agents, representatives and men, from executing any order and/or writ of execution issued by respondent Judge declaring the decision in Election Case No. 10545 final and executory, from removing petitioner from his office as municipal mayor of San Juan, Rizal, from installing respondent 'Joseph Ejercito Estrada' in petitioner's place as said mayor, and from otherwise molesting, disturbing petitioner in, or excluding him from, his lawful exercise and performance of his duties, rights and prerogatives as municipal mayor, until further orders from this Honorable Court.
(3) after hearing, said restraining order or injunction be declared permanent;
(4) judgment be rendered annulling the proceedings and orders of respondent Judge complained of, commanding the said respondent to desist from continuing with the said proceedings and likewise commanding the respondent judge to take cognizance of, and to resolve, the petitioner's motion for reconsideration, Annex 'D' of this petition and, should said motion be denied, to give due course to petitioner's appeal, as stated in the cautionary notice of appeal, Annex 'J' hereof; with costs against private respondent;
(5) private respondent 'Joseph Ejercito Estrada', be sentenced to pay the damages sustained by petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts herein complained of; and
(6) petitioner be granted such other relief as the Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in the premises.
Clear it is from the allegations of respondent Sto. Domingo's petition for certiorari etc. that, because of the alleged intention of Judge Reyes to declare his decision final and order its immediate execution, and protestant Estrada's alleged threat to take over the functions of the Office of the Mayor of San Juan, Rizal, by force, the purpose of his action was to prevent these things from happening by seeking the annulment in advance of the order he feared Judge Reyes would issue, and by compelling the latter, in the meantime, to decide his motion for reconsideration on the merits. That special civil action was not addressed at all against the merits of the final judgment disposing of the election protest, the review of which on errors of fact or of law could be made only by appeal.
Upon the other hand, We hold the view that neither the writ of certiorari nor that of prohibition could lie against the order of petitioner Judge Reyes denying the aforesaid motion for reconsideration. That matter was fully within his jurisdiction — jurisdiction that respondent Sto. Domingo is in estoppel to deny. While the order of denial could have been assailed as suffering from an error of judgment, We are certain that it did not suffer from lack or excess of jurisdiction, nor from what in law is considered as grave abuse of discretion.
The question of whether the writ of mandamus should be issued to compel Judge Reyes to decide respondent Sto. Domingo's motion for reconsideration on the merits must be answered in the negative, for the simple reason that in his resolution of November 25 His Honor had already done that. Suffice it to say, in this connection, that in said resolution, Judge Reyes said that the reasons and arguments relied upon in the motion for reconsideration were a mere repetition of those invoked by the same party in the memorandum submitted to the Court prior to the rendition of judgment and which His Honor had already considered, weighed and found devoid of merit. Clearly implied in this is a reiteration of his opinion that said reasons and arguments were without merit. Indeed, had he found them to be meritorious in any respect. His Honor would have either reversed or modified his decision. But even if this were not the case, respondent Sto. Domingo could have raised all said questions on appeal — unquestionably a plain, speedy and adequate remedy consistent with the purpose of the law to avoid unnecessary delays in election cases.
It has been suggested that, perhaps, construing the law liberally, the special civil action fro certiorari etc. instituted by respondent Sto. Domingo in the Court of Appeals should be considered as an appeal from the final judgement disposing of the election protest.
The undersigned is unable to give his assent to this suggestion. It is not feasible under our law and jurisprudence. Moreover, it would defeat the "reason of the law" which is "the life of the law". The peculiar features of the law for the disposition of election protests "are manifestly the result of the demands of public policy that such contests should be instituted with the utmost promptitude, and dispatched and determined in the most summary manner consistent with the right of various contestants to have an opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence in support of their contentions; this in order "to put a speedy and certain end to the litigation between the parties about a public matter so well calculated to promote and perpetuate discords and feuds" — "and to destroy confidence on the local magistracy and demolish their efficiency." (Arnedo vs. Llorente, supra). All We need add to this is that respondent Sto. Domingo had a clear choice of remedy. Having exercised his option freely, he must stand by the result.
The following is a summary of the views heretofore set forth:
(1) After the rendition of a final judgment by a Court of First Instance in an election protest, the prevailing jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is that the Court, motu proprio or on motion of the defeated party, may, within the period of appeal provided by law, reconsider its decision or grant a new trial, in spite of the fact that the Revised Election Code does not expressly provide for a motion for reconsideration or new trial. This notwithstanding, however, any law or rule of court that may be applied to election protests should be construed strictly to avoid unnecessary delays in the final determination of the case;
(2) The final judgment of a Court of First Instance in an election protest is appealable either to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court, as the case may be, within five days from notice thereof, for revision, correction, annulment or confirmation and the appeal shall proceed as in a criminal case (Section 178, Revised Election Code); but in the present case, neither the motion for reconsideration nor the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus mentioned in the foregoing discussion suspended the running of the aforesaid period of appeal, nor were they, separately or together, equivalent, in law, to the appeal authorized by law; and
(3) Upon the undisputed facts obtaining in this case, the final judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal presided by petitioner Judge Reyes has become executory.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, my vote is to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from, with costs.
BARREDO, J., concurring:
Saving a few points of difference in grammar and syntax, my immediate view of this case before Us may be aptly stated in the language of Mr. Justice Serrano in the preface to his dissenting opinion from the decision of the Court of Appeals now up here for review, thus:
This is a case where, either by master strategy or purely by a streak of luck in an effort to outsmart his opponent, one of the parties, by design or unwittingly, was able to create the confusion that has led to the present state of things where the respondent Judge was led to issue his questioned order in which he has allegedly failed to decide the motion for reconsideration on the merits. First, the motion for reconsideration was filed on the last day of the period for appeal; second, only the registry receipt was attached to the motion for reconsideration without the required affidavit; fourth, the necessary affidavit was submitted later; fifth, it was after the trial court, when neither the protestant (private respondent here) nor his counsel did not appear at the hearing, had ordered personal service, that petitioner personally served a copy personally to the other party's counsel; sixth, with the prior knowledge obtained somehow by petitioner of what the decision of respondent Judge was as well as of the plan of private respondent to assume the position of Mayor of San Juan immediately after the promulgation of the questioned order of respondent Judge, petitioner performed the master stroke of preparing in advance the present petition and filing the same also in advance. It is now being made to appear that respondent Judge gave more importance and attention to the alleged technicalities when he dwelt in his order more on the defects of the motion for reconsideration instead of deciding the same directly on the merits. There is no question that petitioner failed to comply with the rule requiring the submission of a short affidavit together with the petition and the registry receipt although he was able to prepare a long motion. He now comes to this Court making a capital of this alleged failure of respondent Judge to decide the motion for reconsideration on the merits as an alleged abuse of judicial discretion. We say often that a party should come to court with clean hands, that he should be blameless of the situation that has come about and sought to be remedied. It must be said now that one who has committed the omission that gave rise to the confusion that led to the undesirable state of things does not qualify as acting with clean hands. The simple truth is that petitioner failed to follow the rules which are made for orderliness in court proceedings and parties are enjoined to observe and follow them to preserve this aim. Therefore, we should not be so ready to make exceptions by dubbing situations created by the party asking for relief from the same as extraordinary circumstances and thereby justify the inadvisable relaxation of the rules to accommodate such party who is as much to blame as anybody, if not solely to blame, for the resulting confusion. While to err is human, the same should not, however, serve as a means to disregard established rules that are so clear that an omission or failure to comply therewith would constitute inexcusable negligence. Otherwise, exceptions would create a situation where the general rule would disappear in the midst of exceptions and provide courts as well as parties with a mantle of excuses for disregarding entirely such rules; for, even under stringent requirements of strict observance, many a time parties take undue advantage of the tendency to liberalize the rules for the alleged purpose of giving precedence to substance over technicalities to cover not only wanton disregard of orderly procedure but also to shield deliberate acts of delay in the proceedings on the part of the party who will be benefited by such delay.
Indeed, as I was carefully scanning the records of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals page by page, the conviction gradually formed in my mind that this case is a perfect example of what the proceedings in an electoral contest ought not to be. As I see it, We have here a classic case which both parties have treated as "a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movements and position, entraps and destroys the other" 1 or like "a duel (to be) won by a rapier's thrust." 2 From beginning to end, private respondent appeared bent to utilize all strategems of delay his counsel's ingenuity could conceive, and, on the other hand, petitioner wouldn't let any moment pass betwixt the expected favorable action of the court and his full enjoyment thereof, both parties being hardly mindful of the lofty and unbending principles of law and propriety applicable their respective situations. To petitioner was lacking the willingness to assist the courts in determining the validity of his proclamation with the expediency and dispatch that becomes an electoral contest in court, an attitude deserving only of reproof; in the petitioner was absent the calmness and sobriety to see to it that in the hour of his judicial victory he should not appear as an overeager grabber, greedily apprehensive of a fellow snatcher, a posture not anymore commendable than respondent's. No doubt, this spectacle is abhorrent. Consequently, I will have to differ with Mr. Justice Serrano's apparently blanket absolution of petitioner.
The picture started to form before this Court on June 7, 1969, when the petition was filed and was completely exposed in all its details after the parties filed their respective pleadings, orally argued and subsequently submitted the case for decision only a little over two weeks ago. It is well that this case is being disposed of without further delay and, more importantly, with as close fidelity to the public interest and the highest principles of the law and procedure in election contests in the courts as the individual and combined wisdom and integrity of the members of this Supreme Tribunal can conceive.
The main opinion so very ably penned by Mr. Justice Sanchez readily invites concurrence. I feel, however, that it would not be out of place for me to voice a few considerations which I gather do also inform the votes of some of my brethren but which, for reasons they consider weighty enough, they would not want embodied, as of now, in a judgment of this Court, as anyway, they are not indispensable, so my brethren believe, to the conclusion unanimously arrived at in this particular case. My purpose in this separate opinion is to try to straighten out some points embodied in the decision of the Court of Appeals which if left untouched may be erroneously considered as accepted by all of us. At the same time, I would like to take this opportunity to express my views on some fundamental issues herein involved which I believe should be resolved but which the majority prefer to leave for determination in more appropriate cases, albeit they are intrinsically urgent, considering the mores and temper of the times.
The first point that naturally comes to my mind is the doubt thrown by private respondent's counsel as to the propriety of the procedure this Court has adopted in this case. I cannot but acknowledge that petitioner did come to this Court on the theory, clearly expressed in the petition, that "this is an appeal by certiorari" against a decision of the Court of Appeals. This is not to admit, however, that counsel is correct in contending that, accordingly, this Court is powerless to view or consider the matter differently. By the Constitution, the Judiciary Act and the Rules of Court, appeals from decisions of the Court of Appeals may be taken to this Supreme Tribunal, "not as a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and will be grapted only when there are special and important reasons therefor." (S. 4, R. 45) It is easy to understand that in determining how to exercise such discretion, this Court is not limited to acting only one way or the other, that is, to give due course or not to give due course to a petition for review. This is the highest tribunal of the land, the court of last resort and it is the only authority that can set aright wayward actuations of all lower courts and tribunals. In performing its role thus assigned to it, it does not only comply with a duty, it discharges a responsibility of seeing to it that every matter brought to its attention ends in justice and law, as much as it is humanly possible to do so. If it happens, as in this case, that it is alleged that the Court of Appeals did not only err in deciding questions of substance but has also "so far departed from the usual and accepted course of judicial proceedings — as to call for an exercise of the power of supervision" of this Court, but on the other hand, to review the case as an ordinary appeal would have the effect of contributing in a large measure to the evident dilatory tactics of one of the parties which, of course, would be unquestionably prejudicial to the public interest, it is obviously within the power of this Supreme Tribunal to ordain that the matters in issue between the parties as regards the decision of the Court of Appeals be reviewed, not by the procedure of an ordinary appeal but by a simple certiorari, since, anyway, the said matters boil down to the question of whether or not the Court of Appeals has acted in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, undoubtedly appropriate for a special civil action of certiorari. By the procedure We have adopted in this case, this Court is enabled to administer justice without bothering about cumbersome technicalities of procedure that can only result, if enforced, to a denial of justice for, indeed, justice unduly delayed is justice denied.
This Court, through the revered and eminent Mr. Justice Abad Santos, found occasion in the case of C. Viuda de Ordoveza vs. Raymundo, 63 Phil. 275, to lay down for recognition in this jurisdiction, the sound rule in the administration of justice holding that "it is always in the power of the court (Supreme Court) to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it." Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cope with all situations without concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do justice, in any case, without further loss of time, provided that the right of the parties to a full day in court is not substantially impaired. Thus, this Court may treat an appeal as a certiorari and vice versa. In other words, when all the material facts are spread in the records before Us, and all the parties have been duly heard, it matters little that the error of the court a quo is of judgment or of jurisdiction, We can then and there render the appropriate judgment. It is within the contemplation of this doctrine that as it is perfectly legal and within the power of this Court to strike down in an appeal acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or committed with grave abuse of discretion, it cannot be beyond the ambit of its authority, in appropriate cases, to reverse in a certain proceeding any error of judgment of a court a quo which cannot be exactly categorized as a flaw of jurisdiction. If there can be any doubt, which I do not entertain on whether or not the errors this Court has found in the decision of the Court of Appeals are short being jurisdictional nullities or excesses, this Court would still be on firm legal grounds should it choose to reverse said decision here and now even if such errors can be considered as mere mistakes of judgment or only as faults in the exercise of jurisdiction, so as to avoid the unnecessary return of this case to the lower courts for the sole purpose of pursuing the ordinary course of an appeal.
To be sure, by the Court's considering this case as a special civil action of certiorari and not as an ordinary appeal, private respondent cannot complain that he has suffered or will suffer any substantial prejudice; he has been heard as fully as if this were an ordinary appeal; the records of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have been elevated here and the Court has gone over them; the material facts essential for the corresponding judgment are not disputed; it cannot be pretended that beyond all these, private respondent and his counsel, could still have anything more to present for Our scrutiny and consideration. Accordingly, private respondent's stricture against the procedure adopted by this Court is without merit.
Now, to the case itself.
This case started in an electoral protest filed by petitioner in the Court of First Instance of Rizal contesting the correctness and validity of the proclamation by the municipal board of canvassers of the municipality of San Juan, Rizal of private respondent as the elected mayor of said town by a plurality of 44 votes over petitioner. After a protracted trial which ended on June 29, 1968 but which was reopened, on motion of respondent, from August 30, 1968 to September 29, 1968, on October 29, 1968, the trial court rendered a decision setting aside private respondents proclamation and declaring petitioner the duly elected mayor with a plurality of 192 votes over said respondent. This decision was served on petitioner on the same date and on the protestee on the next day October 30, 1968. At 1:45 p.m. on November 4, 1968, respondent's last day to appeal under the law, he filed a 23-page "motion for reconsideration," accompanied with nothing else but a registry receipt, purported to indicate that copy of the motion had been sent by registered mail to counsel for the protestant, and a note to the effect that the hearing of said motion was to be on "Saturday, November 9, 1968 at the usual motion hours, etc." At the hearing so set, neither petitioner nor his counsel appeared. The court noted that there was no proof of service of the motion upon the adverse party and ordered that the hearing be postponed to the succeeding Saturday, November 16, 1968. Notably, later on the same day, November 9, 1968, petitioner's counsel filed a so-called "Omnibus Motion".
Respondent's motion for reconsideration alleged the following grounds:1äwphï1.ñët
I. THE COURT ERRED IN REVIEWING AND ANNULLING THE DECISIONS OF OTHER BRANCHES OF THE SAME COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE IN EXCLUSION CASES;
II. THE COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE SO CALLED 'BOYONG' AND 'DR. BOYONG' VOTES;
III. THE COURT ERRED IN REJECTING PROTESTEE'S EVIDENCE ON THE TAMPERING OF BALLOTS AFTER REVISION; AND
IV. THE COURT ERRED IN THE APPRECIATION OF CERTAIN BALLOTS.1äwphï1.ñët
On the other hand, petitioner's "omnibus motion" urged that the court disregard respondent's motion for reconsideration because, (1) for lack of notice to the adverse party, it is a "mere scrap of paper, which the clerk of this Honorable Court should not have received; consequently, this Honorable Court should not, as it has no right to consider it"; (2) the filing of said motion was "ill-advised and intended for delay — being frivolous and/or dilatory in nature, and, therefore, lack merit"; and (3) "the decision of this Honorable Court is already final and executory, and furthermore, this Honorable Court has no more jurisdiction to entertain the motion." It prayed that "an order of execution be issued and the Clerk of Court be instructed to issue immediately, the proper writ of execution." This motion was set for hearing on November 12, 1968 but was later reset for November 16, 1968 together with the motion for reconsideration.
Before said hearing of November 16, 1968, on November 11, 1968, petitioner's counsel was served by personal service, with the motion for reconsideration. On November 13, 1968, the service by registered mail originally made by respondent was completed. As scheduled, hearing of both motions was held on November 16, 1968, with both parties participating. Respondent submitted a written memorandum supporting his motion and an opposition to the "omnibus motion." Although the record includes a "Protestant's Memorandum" dated November 10, 1968, according to respondent, the same was not formally filed, hence respondent's urgent manifestation and motion dated November 16, 1968 (10:25 a.m.) praying that "Protestant's Memorandum" be stricken out. More importantly, respondent prayed that, in the event that the court's resolution of his motion for reconsideration be adverse to him, he be given five (5) days within which to seek remedy in a higher court and, in this connection, that the release of such resolution be not made on a Saturday, as it would be difficult for him to go to a higher court on such a day. There is nothing in the record to show that his motion of respondent was acted upon by the trial court.
After the hearing, the court announced that it would resolve both motions on November 23, 1969; later, however, upon request of respondent's counsel, this was moved to November 25, 1968 at 8:30 a.m., but upon request again of respondent's counsel, the release or promulgation of the Court's resolution, by open Court reading thereof, was reset for 10:00 a.m., the same day.
It appears that, in the meanwhile, after withdrawing a sort of precautionary notice of appeal he had filed on November 19, 1968, respondent's counsel had also prepared for filing with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to restrain the trial court from executing its allegedly expected order denying respondent's motion for reconsideration and granting the petitioner's prayer that the said motion for reconsideration be declared as inconsequential, (1) not being authorized by law; (2) having been filed without notice to the petitioner; and (3) for being pro-forma and that the decision be, therefore, declared already final and executory. The petition also prayed that a writ of mandamus issue to compel the trial judge to resolve the respondent's motion for reconsideration on its merits. This petition was actually filed with the Court of Appeals at 8:04 a.m., November 25, 1968.
As scheduled, at 10:00 a.m., on November 25, 1968, the trial court released its resolution of the motion in question accompanied by an open court reading thereof. Immediately after the reading of the court's resolution, respondent's counsel moved verbally for its reconsideration. The court promptly denied said motion, also verbally. Whereupon, respondent's counsel made it known that they had secured a restraining order from the Court of Appeals enjoining the effects of the court's orders. A bailiff of the Court of Appeals served the restraining order on the trial judge at 10:32 a.m., the same day, November 25, 1968 and petitioner himself was also served with the said restraining order at 11:50 a.m., that same day, but not before said petitioner had already taken his oath as mayor, had signed the appointment of a private secretary and had issued a circular advising all subordinate officials of the town of his assumption of office.
It is in the light of these undisputed facts, albeit differently stated in the decision of the Court of Appeals and the main opinion of this Court, that the following basic issues have to be resolved:
1. Were the filing by respondent Sto. Domingo of the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in the Court of Appeals at 8:04 a.m. and the issuance of a restraining order by the Court of Appeals before 10:00 a.m., of the same day, November 25, 1968, premature, and consequently, was the Court of Appeals without authority, not only to entertain said petition and issue the questioned restraining order but also to take any further action in the case?
2. Did the Court of Appeals exceed its jurisdiction or commit grave abuse of discretion in remanding the case to the trial court and ordering the said court to act upon and resolve herein respondent's above oft-mentioned motion for reconsideration?
PREMATURITY
Candor demands that it be conceded that the resolution of the issue of prematurity is not as simple as it appears to be. The five learned justices of the Court of Appeals who formed the division of five that rendered the decision under review had, in fact, different views thereon. During the deliberation in this Court, the discussion on this point was participated in by practically all the justices in an effort to reconcile varying views on different aspects thereof.
Stripped of verbosity and irrelevant details, the fact that stands out clearly in relation to this point is that respondent Sto. Domingo went to the Court of Appeals before the order he was complaining against was issued. In other words, factually speaking and in point of time, there can be no doubt that respondent's petition was prematurely filed.
Looking at the matter from the legal standpoint is, of course, something else. The pertinent allegations of the petition read thus:
17. — That while petitioner has been unable to secure an official copy of the resolution of respondent Judge (for reasons hereinafter stated) he has been reliably informed (and because of the aforementioned circumstances and the persistent reports circulated by the followers of respondent 'Estrada' that he [Estrada] will 'sit as Mayor on Monday', has reason to believe) that at the hearing at 8:30 o'clock this morning (Nov. 25), the respondent Judge will in open court (1) disregard or strike out petitioner's motion for reconsideration as prayed for by respondent 'Estrada' on the ground that the Election Code does not provide for a motion for reconsideration but only for appeal and that there was no proof of service of the motion, both of which are incorrect; (2) declare as final and executory his decision ousting petitioner as Municipal Mayor of San Juan and installing respondent Estrada in petitioner's stand; (3) order the execution or enforcement of said decision with the petitioner considered notified of said order in open court (as in a criminal case) and to abide by the same (while respondent 'Estrada' takes his 'oath' as mayor immediately if not in open court'); and thereby deprive petitioner of any opportunity to contest the said order and execution in the appellate courts before they are carried out by the respondents over his objection.
18. — That the aforesaid actuations of respondent Judge have given rise to serious anxiety and great tension among the parties and their followers, as well as among the people of San Juan, Rizal and, as this petition is being filed by petitioner, the respondent 'Joseph Ejercito Estrada' and his men, many of whom are armed, are reported to be poised to forcibly execute the order to be issued by respondent Judge this morning while the petitioner's men, despite his instructions and advice to them to keep the peace and to ignore the taunts and challenges hurled at them by respondent "Estrada" and his men, may not be able to restrain themselves if unduly provoked or harmed, and unless a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction is issued by this Honorable Court against the respondents, their employees, agents, men and representatives, violence and disorder, and possibly bloodshed, are likely to break out in the municipality of San Juan, Rizal to the consequent injury not only of the parties and their men, but also of other people, and the petitioner will be forcibly and unlawfully removed from his office as mayor without due process of law.
19. — That in spite of petitioner's efforts to secure a copy of the respondent judge's resolution up to the close of office hours last Saturday, he has been unable to do so, he being informed that the said Order would be read in open court this morning and any written order would be released only thereafter; hence, the inability of petitioner to attach a copy of said resolution to this Petition, which because of the extraordinary circumstances above cited, has to be filed even before receipt of said copy. Petitioner, however, shall file said copy by way of supplemental pleading immediately upon receipt thereof this morning if the same is reduced to writing by respondent Judge.
20. — That by the foregoing acts — the disregard or striking out of petitioner's motion for reconsideration of his decision without just and legal ground, the denial of petitioner's remedy or appeal from said decision as provided by law, and the execution of the said decision although the same is not yet final and executory (by reason of petitioner's motion for reconsideration and also the cautionary notice of appeal), and the opportunity given to respondent "Joseph Ejercito Estrada" and his men to forcibly and unlawfully remove petitioner from his office as mayor immediately without giving petitioner adequate opportunity to seek relief from the appellate courts — the respondent Judge has unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from his office as Judge, unlawfully excludes the petitioner from enjoyment or exercise of his legal right to move for the reconsideration of respondent Judge's decision and to appeal therefrom, and likewise unlawfully sanctions the petitioner's removal from his lawful office without due process of law.
To put it mildly, these allegations are most unhappily phrased. If the theory of respondent is correct, that any declaration of finality of the trial court's decision can be set aside by certiorari as an excess of jurisdiction or a grave abuse of discretion, with as much plausibility, it can be enjoined by prohibition. Consequently, respondent did not have to make the following peculiar allegations:
That by the foregoing acts — the disregard or striking out of petitioner's motion for reconsideration of his decision without just and legal ground, the denial of petitioner's remedy or appeal from said decision as provided by law, and the execution of the said decision although the same is not yet final and executory (by reason of petitioner's motion for reconsideration and also the cautionary notice of appeal), and the opportunity given to respondent 'Joseph Ejercito Estrada' and his men to forcibly and unlawfully remove petitioner from his office as mayor immediately without giving petitioner adequate opportunity to seek relief from the appellate courts — the respondent Judge has unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from his office as Judge, unlawfully excludes the petitioner from enjoyment or exercise of his legal right to move for the reconsideration of respondent Judge's decision and to appeal therefrom, and likewise unlawfully sanctions the petitioner's removal from his lawful office without due process of law.
The peculiarity of these allegations lies in the use of the past tense in referring to acts alleged. It must be emphasized that at the time the petition was prepared and at the time it was filed, in point of fact, the trial court had not yet committed any of the "foregoing acts — the disregard or striking out of petitioner's motion for reconsideration, etc." Much less had the "respondent Judge (already) unlawfully neglected (by them) the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins etc." Neither could it have been true at that time that the then "respondent Judge, likewise by reason of the foregoing, (had already) acted without or in excess of jurisdiction." (Par. 21 of the petition.) A great deal of difference between the above-quoted allegations of past facts and acts and the allegation of future or impending acts. If the respondent meant the latter, the language of his petition, as laid, was far from signifying such intention.
The trouble, therefore, with respondent's pose is that it was made to appear as resting, not on an educated guess, which is allowed in particular cases, of the court's reasonably expected resolution, based on the nature of the issues, the arguments of the parties and the court's shown reactions thereto, but, rather, on an altogether improper factual assertion that he had knowledge, based on "reliable information," of what the order of the court was already. For the reasons stated in the main opinion, everyone must agree that, as a matter of public policy, any party who seeks la remedy based on knowledge, by whatever means acquired, of an order or judgment of a court still unissued or to be promulgated should be turned down. It is an assault on the dignity of judicial proceedings; it downgrades the sense of responsibility of judges; it lends premium to the infidelity of the custodians of the court's secrets and confidence and thereby foments betrayal of trust and easy yielding by the employees of the courts to the temptation of placing any prepared decision or order of the court on the auction block. By all means, these must be avoided. Any party who resorts to such a practice must not be allowed to secure any relief in equity, for he surely would have "unclean hands." To such a party, the prematurity of his complaint ought to be held as fatal and, for that alone, therefore, the Court of Appeals should have refused to issue the restraining order in question.
Even if a more liberal view of respondent's posture is taken, the result would be the same. Stated otherwise, even if the faulty language of the respondent were to be overlooked and his petition were interpreted as alleging probable impending acts of the trial court which would be detrimental to him, instead of alleged past acts (which have not yet occurred), still, the Court of Appeals should not have granted respondent's motion for the issuance of a restraining order, for even under such hypothesis, respondent's petition would still be lacking in a cause of action, inasmuch as the said petition does not allege that the trial court would not, in any event, have granted respondent's motion to give him sufficient time to secure a remedy in the higher courts. Respondent should not have taken for granted the trial court's sense of responsibility in the face of the possible consequences of the court's forthcoming resolution which are alleged in paragraph 18 of his petition. In other words, respondent assumed, without any basis discernible in the records, that the trial court was utterly wanting in the qualities of judicial adaptability required by the situation. If the filing of and the unfavorable resolution on motions for reconsideration have been, as a rule, considered as pre-requisites for the issuance of the special remedies of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in order that the court involved may have the opportunity to correct any possible error in its questioned actuation, with much more reason should it be a pre-requisite for the issuance of the restraining order here in question that respondent should have alleged that despite his representations, it could reasonably be foreseen that the trial court would deny his prayers.
Moreover, even if respondent's petition were to be construed in the light most favorable to it, thereby overlooking its inaccuracies of language and the inadequacies of its factual allegations just discussed, there would still be the point that, in the mind of this Court, as articulated in the main opinion, the fears of disorder, violence and bloodshed voiced in respondent's allegations in said paragraph 18 of his petition appear to be more fancied than real and that they were only conjured for the sole purpose of inducing the court to lend its hand to respondent's dilatory scheme. Indeed, more than mere trumped up allegations of public disorder, is needed to overthrow the presumption that judicial orders will be accorded due recognition and obedience and that the parties aggrieved thereby will resort to the peaceful and orderly procedures provided by law for the redress of their grievances. Stated differently, the apprehensions expressed in respondents petition were not legally sufficient to move the court to authorize a departure from the plain, speedy and adequate remedies available in the ordinary course of law. Otherwise, all that a respondent litigant has to do to secure a special remedy from an appellate court is to make hints that the lower court's processes would not be met by those concerned hands down — a plain invitation to mob rule. I share wholeheartedly the view in the opinion that it should be presumed that the trial court would have capably dealt with the situation in the remote event that the fears expressed by respondent had materialized, hence there was no necessity of resorting to extraordinary legal remedies.
It is clear then that even if respondent and the Court of Appeals may be absolved from the charge of prematurity made in the petition herein because the petition in said court could have been liberally construed to allege reasonably expected impending acts which could warrant the remedies of prohibition and mandamus, i.e., that it was merely intended to have the trial court ordered to refrain from issuing the said impending order and to issue instead an order resolving respondent's motion for reconsideration exclusively on its merits, the net result would still be that the said petition should have been dismissed and the issuance of the restraining order prayed for denied. As already explained, it was not for the Court of Appeals to assume that if the trial judge, who, after all, as the records elevated to this Court show, had acted with quite commendable dispatch in dealing with previous incidents in this electoral protest, had been duly apprised of the circumstances feared by respondent, His Honor would not have adequately disposed of the matter. Indeed, it is to be regretted that in giving due course to the respondent's petition and issuing the questioned restraining order, the Court of Appeals, sanctioned and gave aid, as it were, on the patent pattern of delay being woven by the said respondent. Had respondent court been more circumspect and less jumpy it could have easily escaped this pitfall to act on the respondent's 14-page petition with ten annexes containing a total of at least 138 pages, not to speak of the nature of the issues discussed therein, within the space of less than two hours and grant, on the basis thereof, an order restraining a judicial proceeding, not altogether fatal, as will be seen anon, is not far from acting with undue haste. As stated in the main opinion, the Court rules that there was no cause for hurry; the trial court was on course; no reason for intervention by a higher court existed — respondent court acted precipitately. This was not mere error of judgment, there was enough grave abuse of discretion, considering that what is involved herein is an election contest and every attempt at delay therein ought not to be tolerated. To be clearer, the charge of prematurity may be overlooked, but the utter lack of cause of action for prohibition and mandamus and the transparent strategem to protract the basic case were evident. I concur in the declaration that the restraining order in question is illegal and unwarranted.
The setting aside of the restraining order is, of course merely academic at this juncture. If respects have been paid above to the legal points pertinent thereto, it is only because of the importance individually accorded to them by the aforementioned five justices of the respondent court and also because they were given considerable attention during the deliberations of this case in this Court. In any event, it is not, I hope, out of place for me to have spread on the records my personal views on them.
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS .
By the supplemental petition filed by respondent after the trial court did actually deny his motion for reconsideration and grant petitioner's "omnibus motion" and, thereafter further denied respondent's verbal motion for reconsideration of such actions of the trial court, the case before the Court of Appeals developed into one of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. At least, that is how respondent made it appear. After due hearing, by a vote of 3 to 2, the respondent court granted the petition by annulling and setting aside the order of the trial court denying, on the one hand, respondent's motion for reconsideration and granting, on the other, petitioner's prayer that the decision in the basic electoral contest favorable to be declared final and executory, as well as subsequent orders of said trial court that followed up the same. The issue now for resolution by this Court is whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals exceeded its jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering such decision and in denying the motion for the reconsideration thereof.
In the process, the respondent court made the following rulings favorable to the private respondent:
1. Motions for reconsideration are allowed in election cases.
2. Respondent's motion for reconsideration is not pro-forma.
3. There was substantial compliance with the corresponding rules in the filing of said motion, hence it is not a mere scrap of paper.
4. The remedy in the circumstances of the respondent in the court below is not appeal but, precisely, the petition he filed in the Court of Appeals for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction.
MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION ARE ALLOWED IN ELECTION CASES
The main points raised in herein petitioner's "omnibus motion" granted by the trial court is that motions for reconsideration are not allowed in election cases; that the only remedy open to parties who lose in such cases in the Court of First Instance is to appeal on time either to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals; and that inasmuch as respondent had not perfected an appeal within the five days allowed by the election law for said purpose and, instead, had filed the motion for reconsideration in question, the decision of the trial court became final and executory upon the expiration of said five days, respondent's motion notwithstanding. The trial court apparently sustained petitioner's posture; the Court of Appeals rejected it. The main opinion of this Court skips the issue, quite controversial as it is, because the view of the majority of my brethren is that its resolution is not necessary in this case, since an invulnerable decision can already be rendered based on less controversial points. With all due respect to the majority, I prefer to bolster my concurrence in the decision in this case with the forthright view that the petitioner should have also been sustained on this point, even if only in a qualified manner. May I add that I regret that the majority has refused to tackle this point because I feel that this is precisely the opportunity for this Supreme Court to declare total war on what has gradually become the worst bane of the institution of suffrage in this country — dilatory tactics employed in court in election contests. Without trying to claim any credit for it, it is a well known fact that I had been all over the Philippines during the twenty years preceding my incumbency as Solicitor General, attending to all kinds of court battles involving electoral contests, as head of the legal panel of one of our major political parties. I know only too well from this unusual experience how indifferent many candidates who have been robbed of the proclamation have become to the filing of any protest, whether in the courts or in the electoral tribunals, because, according to them, the successful vindication of their electoral victories becomes usually, or, more often than not, an empty one, on account of the delay that such protests always suffer, with notable tolerance or indifference on the part of the courts and tribunals, which leave them in most cases with only a few months or even days only of the terms of their respective offices.
This is not all. In Querubin v. Court of Appeals, et al., 82 Phil. 226, this Court emphasized the need for speedy determination of election contests thus:
The purpose of the law in sections 177 and 178 of the Revised Election Code is to impress the need of speedy disposal of election contests, as imperatively demanded by public interest. The terms of office of elective positions are short. Any cloud as to the true result of an election should be dispelled as soon as possible. Public faith, confidence and operation essential to the success of government, are jeopardized by controversies as to who have been actually chosen by the electorate. These controversies should be settled as soon as possible. Doubts as to the true expression of the will of the people in polls should be cleared out without delay. The legislative policy, as embodied in sections 177 and 178 of the Revised Election Code, of hastening the administration of justice in election contests, is aimed at making more effective the constitutional principle that sovereignty resides in the people.
Earlier, in Arnedo v. Llorente, 18 Phil. 257, this Supreme Court had stressed the same point of view.
The remedy furnished for the trial of election contests, such as that under consideration, is one of the provisions of a general election law. Its peculiar and distinguishing features are manifestly the result of the demands of public policy that such contests should be instituted with the utmost promptitude and dispatched and determined in the most summary manner consistent with the right of the various contestants to have an opportunity to be heard, and to submit evidence in support of an their contentions; this in order 'to put a speedy and certain to the litigation between the parties about a public matter so well calculated to promote and perpetuate discords and feuds' — 'and destroy confidence on the local magistracy and demolish their efficiency.'
It is my considered view that delay in the disposition of election cases is one of the major causes of the dwindling of the faith of the people in the administration of justice. It is incumbent upon this Court, as it is upon the other two great departments of the government, to arrest this trend, to the full extent of their powers. Involved in electoral contests is the very principle on which our government rests — popular suffrage. Once it becomes apparent to the people that the force of their ballots can be thwarted indirectly by dilatory tactics sanctioned or tolerated by the courts, despair may easily follow and the resort to bullets, in place of ballots, cannot be far behind. Particularly to the common barrio folk and the ordinary man in the street, the ballot represents his most cherished treasure. It is the height of folly to pretend that the intelligence and patience of these simple elements of our citizenry can always be taken for granted. It is always best to avoid danger as soon as it becomes apparent. Therefore, I, for one, vote that this Court outlaw the practice of filing ordinary motions for reconsideration in election cases since by doing this, a definitely big stride shall have been taken towards the early disposition of said cases and the encouragement which dilatory practices have received from the apathy and indifference of some of our courts will be largely dampened, if it does not altogether vanish. It is high time this Court did something to stop delays in electoral contests because I am afraid that in many sectors of our people it has already reached the point of being an alarming scandal.
If my brethren feel it is too much to do so, I would be willing that We do not go back exactly to the ruling in Arnedo v. Llorente, supra, which absolutely denied the right of a defeated party to file any motion to vacate the judgment in election cases involving local offices. Perhaps, indeed, such an extreme doctrine may not be entirely consistent with the public interest involved in said contests. There may really be extreme instances when reopening and new trials may be imperative to serve the ends of justice. Our task, therefore, is to reconcile the urgent includible need to eliminate rooms for delay in electoral contests with the demands of justice that all litigants must have their full day in court, unless they waive their right thereto, wholly or partially. To this end, I hold that except when fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect have intervened, in which eventualities proper motions for new trial may be entertained, motions for reconsideration may be allowed in election cases only when they raise questions which cannot be taken up for the first time on appeal, and, in every such instance, the corresponding motion must be disposed of by the court with maximum dispatch. The considerations which I believe make this conclusion inescapable are the following: .
The jurisdiction of the courts in election cases is strictly special and limited. An election case is neither an action nor a special proceeding within the contemplation of the Rules of Court. It is a remedy created by the Election Code itself. The Rules of Court are applicable thereto only "by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient." (Rule 143) Very aptly does the main opinion written by Mr. Justice Sanchez describe the nature of election contest proceedings as follows:
The statutory scheme clearly mapped out in the Revised Election Code is that proceedings in election protests are special and expeditious. The periods for filing pleadings are short. Trials are swift. Decisions in municipal election contests are to be handed down in six months after the protest is presented. The time to file a notice of appeal is cut short to five days from notice of the decision. Appeal is to be divided within three months after the case is filed with the clerk of the court to which appeal is taken. Preferential disposition of election contests except as to habeas corpus proceedings is set forth in the law. (Section 179, Revised Election Code. See also: Sections 89, 172 to 178, Revised Election Code.) Even the Rules of Court make it abundantly clear that election cases enjoy preferential status. (Section 1, Rule 22, Rules of Court.) The proceedings should not be encumbered by delays. All of these are because the term of elective office is likewise short. There is the personal stake of the contestants, which generates feuds and discords. Above all is the public interest. Title to public elective office must not be left under cloud. Efficiency of public administration should not be impaired. It is thus understandable that pitfalls which may retard the determination of election contests should be avoided. Courts should heed the imperative need for dispatch. Obstacles and technicalities which fetter the people's will should not stand in the way of a prompt termination of election contests.
Such being the case, adherence to the intent and purpose of the law creating the remedy compels that the procedure to be followed from beginning to end in an election contest may not depart from the statutory scheme referred to by Mr. Justice Sanchez. It is bad enough that already the periods therein provided within which cases must be decided have suffered judicial extension by rulings of this Court that they are not binding but merely directory, because when one considers that all over the country now, there can hardly be found any court that is making a real honest to goodness effort to observe the spirit of this statutory injunction, in the same manner that many judges do not mind the second top priority, next only to habeas corpus cases, that electoral contests occupy in the rules, one is appalled by the realization that the injunction is just as good as if it did not exist at all. It would, indeed, be worse if an entire item of procedure not found in such statutory scheme were allowed to be bodily engrafted into it, such as this, of a motion for reconsideration, meaning a motion to vacate a judgment so the court may review and re-study the case or even reopen the trial to receive further evidence of one kind or another, since the filing of such motion necessarily entails the suspension of the period for appeal. Having in view the intent and purpose of the law, evident from its having cut drastically the usual periods for filing pleadings and periods for appeal and eliminated completely any mention of motions for new trial, I cannot find any excuse why such motions may not be done away with.
Personally, the writer feels very strongly that no warrant exists to justify departure from the doctrine so very soundly forged in the Arnedo case, supra, but, as already stated, it seems that some of my brethren whose opinions have surely given me steady guidance in these starting days of mine in this Court are of the view that instances there can be that may imperatively require the granting of motions for new trial even in election cases. Frankly, and with all due respect, I venture to say that perhaps it is better to incline towards the proposition that included in the spirit of the election law is the thought that parties are expected to so prepare their cases, to the end that the necessity for new trial or reopening be avoided or, at least, limited to occasions when fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect intervene. I see no injustice in this posture, specially if due weight is accorded to the considerations of public interest referred to by Mr. Justice Sanchez which point to the extreme need of terminating electoral contests without unnecessary loss of time.
I am not unmindful of the provision regarding the inherent power of the courts "to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice." (Par. g, sec. 5, Rule 135) To start with, however, it is my considered opinion that whatever inherent powers the courts may have must be reconciled with the expediency and peremptory nature of election cases, and not the other way around. In other words, the invocation of inherent powers is no license to adopt procedures which necessitate the unreasonable extension of the time needed to dispose of a case. Anyway, the exercise of these inherent powers need not necessarily involve prolongation of any proceedings, if only proper care, diligence and devotion are instilled in the courts and the parties and their counsel.
Much less am I persuaded by the argument, adduced by the Court of Appeals, that since by specific provision of the Election Code appeals in election cases "shall proceed as in a criminal case", the provision on new trial in the rules of criminal procedure is thereby made part and parcel of the procedure for appeal in election cases. Need I waste ink and paper to only point out that by no stretch of the imagination can new trial be considered as part of the procedure for appeals? It may have been so in the olden days but, even then, only in civil cases. I recall that under the Code of Civil Procedure, Act 190, the filing of a motion for new trial was a formulary requisite for appeals, but this concept of new trials was radically upon the advent of the current rules. Very clearly, motions for new trial under the present procedure are no longer matters of form or bare pre-requisite for appeal. Such a motion now would not conform with the spirit of the rules, if it is not intended and so formulated as to really attempt to impress upon the court the necessity of correcting material parts of its original judgment that may affect the result.
In synthesis, and yielding to the views of my more experienced colleagues, the most I would concede is that if motions for reconsideration having the effect of suspending the period for appeal in election cases are to be allowed, the same must be limited only to such as would raise questions which may not be taken up for the first time on appeal and, by way of exception, when demanded, upon proper showing, by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, subject, in all instances, to the sound discretion of the trial court which cannot be reviewed except upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion. As I do not find these requisites present in the questioned motion for reconsideration of respondent in the trial court, I hold that the holding of His Honor that the consideration thereof was not in order is in accordance with law and, consequently, the Court of Appeals exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering that the said motion be passed upon or resolved by His Honor in the sense required by said court. To be clearer, it is excess of jurisdiction for any court to require to be done what the law directly or by implication prohibits or does not authorize to be done in obedience to the demands of paramount public interest such as, in this case, the speedy determination of election contests.
PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS PRO-FORMA
If reluctant concession has been accorded above to the insistence that motions for new trial or for reconsideration, suspensive of the appeal period, may be in order, under certain circumstances, in election cases, I find it difficult to agree to the pronouncement of the Court of Appeals holding that private respondent's motion is not pro-forma. The learned trial judge found it to be so, the main opinion of this Court confirms this, and I concur.
His Honor held that the said motion for reconsideration "was but a repetition of the contents of the memorandum filed by the said protestee and in a small way, a refutation of a portion of the memorandum filed by the protestant, which movant could have refuted, by filing a reply memorandum before the case was submitted for decision." In the interest of more factual accuracy, I refused to take this finding of His Honor for granted and I went over the mentioned memoranda as well as respondent's questioned motion carefully. I am satisfied from my examination and comparison thereof that His Honor's holding substantially factual. Of course, pro-forma in the sense of being a mere "repetition" of a previous pleading does not mean that the identity between one and the other is perfect up to the last word and punctuation. Additional citation of authorities and the restructuring or further embellishment of language, even with increased dashes of emphasis, do not, to my mind, remove from a pleading the stigma of pro-forma, especially when it is evident that such reenforcement could just as well have been duly taken advantage of in the original or prior pleadings of the party concerned. To put it the other way, parties should not be allowed to spare any effort in presenting their positions fully to the court before it resolves the issues submitted to it, much less to reserve any point or matter of persuasive value and then spring it upon the court only after it has made an unfavorable resolution. Such a practice is neither fair to the court nor concordant with the best interests and the speedy administration of justice. On the contrary, it can only leave the impression, as in this case, that it is a devise to delay the anticipated certain unfavorable result of the proceedings.
If there were any new matters in respondent's motion, they were hardly of any material consequence to the results. Surely, the pro-forma nature of said motion may not be obliterated by apparently new matters that would not anyway significantly alter the result. For instance, the reference made to the 31 allegedly tampered ballots which were part of the subject of the reopening of the trial which respondent had previously been granted by the trial court is an example in point. Even if this matter were considered new because it was not mentioned in the previous memorandum of respondent's counsel which was filed before said reopening, albeit they must have been somehow taken up already during such reopening, it is obvious that said 31 ballots, ostensibly for respondent, but ruled by the trial court as marked and void, would not be enough to reverse the majority of 192 votes which His Honor found for the petitioner. Thus, when a motion for reconsideration merely reiterates, in a more or less expanded, different or more embellished or emphatic form, points, arguments or grounds already taken up before the decision, the reference in said motion to new matters which cannot conceivably alter the result cannot save such motion from being still pro-forma. For the reasons repeatedly adverted to above, it is perfectly understandable and profoundly sound that the rigor of this ruling be applied fully to election cases.
The argument is pressed that under Section 2, Rule 37, third paragraph, a motion for new trial cannot be pro-forma if it "points out specifically the findings or conclusions of the judgment which are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law or to the provisions of law alleged to be contrary to such findings or conclusions" and because respondent's motion appears to be of such type, His Honor erred and, on the other hand, the Court of Appeals is right. Evidently overlooked by such argument is the point that it is implicit in the quoted provision of the rule that the specifications required thereby may not be of matters already taken up before the filing of the motion contemplated. This is common sense. The rule regulates the form in which new matters, not old ones, are to be placed before the court, for it is obvious reiteration would only produce delay, aside from being somehow odious and rather insulting to the court and in any event, the best way to have such matters decided is not to repeat them to the same court but to take them up on appeal, in which their resolution would have the additional advantage of greater weight and finality, considering, in particular, that what is involved is an electoral contest which public interest requires to be promptly and expeditiously settled.
Accordingly, I would like to express my full concurrence in the ruling in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Sanchez that:1äwphï1.ñët
We, accordingly, rule that where in an election protest a motion for reconsideration of the decision on the merits presents questions which have already been considered by the court prior to or upon the promulgation of such decision, said motion for reconsideration is pro-forma and does not suspend the running of the period for appeal. This rule, we are confident, helps remove from the reach of proclamation grabbers a dilatory device conveniently used by them to keep them in office and to frustrate the victors from taking the seats that are justly theirs.
Since respondent's motion for reconsideration did not suspend his period for appeal, the decision of the trial court became final and executory, retroactively to November 5, 1968, when said period expired, hence, viewed, this time, from the angle just discussed, the Court of Appeals must be held again to have likewise committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in remanding the case to the trial court for further proceedings. It bears reiterating that any order or process issued by a court that in effect impedes, obstructs or otherwise delays unreasonably the even course traced by the law for the prompt and expeditious final disposition of an election contest constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction and must be stricken down as obnoxious to public interest. In this sense, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals has no legal standing and is properly subject to certiorari or prohibition.
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE CORRESPONDING RULES IN THE FILING OF SAID MOTION, HENCE IT IS NOT A MERE SCRAP OF PAPER
Another issue bypassed by the main decision herein, although extensively discussed by the parties, is the contention of petitioner, upheld by the trial court, that for lack of proof of service and of service out of time of respondent's motion for reconsideration, the same was a mere scrap of paper which the clerk of court had no right to receive for filing and the trial court had no authority to act upon.
Much can be said about respondent's failure to comply with the clear provision of the rules in filing his motion for reconsideration. As part and parcel of the grand strategy to take advantage of every technical procedure which necessarily has the effect of delaying the final outcome of the case, respondent, filed his motion in question in the afternoon of the last day allowed for it by law and instead of serving notice thereof on petitioner in the most expeditious manner which he had, in fact, availed of already on previous occasions, i.e., by personal service, he chose to make the service by registered mail, gambling thereby, it might be supposed, on the possibility of delay, not uncommon these days, what with the poor mail service that the Bureau of Posts is giving, that the said service or, at least, that the proof thereof may suffer and that the court could be requested to postpone the hearing of the motion, trusting for this purpose, on the usual apathetic and passive attitude of many judges to such matters. But as if Fate herself had lost her patience with the antics of delay being employed by respondent, when the motion was filed with the court, it was accompanied by no more than the registry receipt purportedly corresponding to the mail sent to petitioner's counsel by registered service containing a copy of respondent's motion and the notice setting the hearing of the motion on November 9, 1968. This did not comply with the rules.
Sec. 6 of Rule 15 provides that "No motion shall be acted upon by the Court, without proof of service of the notice thereof, except when the court is satisfied that the rights of the adverse party or parties are not affected" and correspondingly, Sec. 10 of Rule 13 which governs the proof of service of motions provides that "if service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit (of the person mailing showing compliance with section 5 of this rule [requiring that copy of the motion be deposited in the post office, in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the party or his attorney at his office, if known, otherwise at his residence, if known, with postage fully prepaid, and with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to sender after ten (10) days if undelivered]) and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon receipt thereof by the sender, or in lieu thereof the letter unclaimed, etc." It can thus be seen that in the case of respondent's proof of service, the required affidavit was lacking. Accordingly, it would appear that, by his own fault in not complying with the rules, the court was rendered powerless to act upon respondent's motion on November 9, 1968 at 8:30 a.m., the date set by him for the hearing thereof. Not only that, if the doctrine laid down in the case of Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81, (followed in subsequent cases) were to be applied, the clerk of court should even be held to have committed a mistake in receiving it, since without such proof of service, said motion was "nothing but a useless piece of paper." Moreover, respondent also failed to comply with Sec. 4 of Rule 15 which requires that "three days at least must elapse between the date of service of notice and the date set for the hearing," inasmuch as, in fact, the service of the respondent's motion upon petitioner's counsel was completed only on November 11, 1968, (of the personal service) and November 13, 1968 (of the service by registered mail already mentioned), which were already subsequent to the date originally set. Of course, the trial court, extending its patience, postponed the hearing to November 16, 1968 because of lack of proof of service — an exercise of discretion, the propriety of which has not yet been tested in this Court, albeit it is the usual practice in the courts of first instance and appears to be sanctioned in American jurisdiction. (42 C. J. p. 497)
The query that comes to the front now is, what is the legal consequence of respondent's above-mentioned transgressions of the rules? In this respect, I agree with respondent. Although there is real need to emphasize to lawyers and judges alike that proper observance of the rules is imperative in an orderly administration of justice and constant tolerance of departures therefrom may lead to the complete erosion of said rules, without which anarchy and confusion would visit the courts, I find, in this particular case, reason enough not to insist on strict observance of the provisions and jurisprudence just discussed.
As already intimated elsewhere in this concurring opinion, petitioner is not one to be caught without his own bag of tricks. His pretense to ignorance regarding the filing of respondent's questioned motion and its contents should not impress anyone. To be borne in mind must it be that the contest before this Court has been a heated one since its outset in the purely political arena. When it reached the trial court and the proclamation of the board of canvassers was set aside and petitioner was declared winner by His Honor, it is impossible to believe that petitioner just blissfully waited for things to take the usual judicial course of perfection of an appeal, etc. Rather, it is to be assumed that petitioner and his counsel and followers excitedly and anxiously watched the portals of the court wishing to heaven the respondent did not appeal. Glued to the receiving stamp of the clerk of court's office must have been the eyes, not only of petitioner, but of everyone who had any interest in the elections in San Juan, awaiting eagerly passing of the hour of finality of the decision of the trial court. Under these circumstances, it is but fair to assume that when, at last, alas for petitioner, the motion came at 1:45 p.m., November 4, 1968, petitioner's counsel, if not petitioner himself, must have immediately devoured the pages thereof, and digesting the same, began to devise the appropriate strategy and tactics.
On the record, how did petitioner react? Instead of displaying complete candor to the court by openly confessing that he or his counsel had already read respondent's motion and was, therefore aware of all its contents so as to be ready to meet and put down the same, if he could, he went to court with the ruse of a mistitled "omnibus motion". 3 He tried to represent therein that he had only "received verbal information" of the filing of respondent's motion and relying on the technicality that there was a defect in the manner of filing and service of said motion, he prayed that the decision be declared final and executory.
None can begrudge petitioner of the privilege to make such a prayer, but for him to pretend that he had not yet gone, by himself of his counsel, over the motion is too transparent a stratagem to escape detection by the trained eye. In truth, petitioner could not avoid self-betrayal, for in paragraph 6 of his so-called "omnibus motion", the following revealing allegations appear:
That the grounds and/or arguments, now stated in the motion, are merely the reiteration and/or repetition by the protestee, in his previous memorandum, and therefore, had been duly passed upon and previously considered and/or taken into account, by this Honorable Court before rendering the decision in question; evidently, the present motion is based on flimsy and frivolous grounds, and furthermore, purely intended for delay.
These allegations cannot but mean that petitioner and/or his counsel had already read and studied respondent's motion. By this token, petitioner must be held to have waived the technical transgressions relative to the filing and service of said motion. In this respect, the Court of Appeals is correct.
All requirements of service of notice under the rules are intended for no other purpose than that a party to whom such notice is due should be made aware of the matter which his adversary would want the court to act upon before the court acts, a shade of due process. In principle, therefore, once it appears that the party is already informed by one means or another of what he is to be notified, the required service becomes an empty gesture and strict observance thereof is considered as already waived. This is more so when the party concerned is this one who confesses to or admits such knowledge or information. Such is the principle applied to the rule on service of summons and the voluntary appearance a defendant makes after a complaint is filed against him. There is no reason at all why the same rule should not be applied to the notice of motions. And in line with this rule, petitioner's objections to respondent's motion appealing in his "omnibus motion" could be considered sufficient hearing of his side. It results, therefore, that any discussion of the effects of the postponement of the hearing of November 9 to November 16 would be purely academic and will serve no useful purpose presently.
I cannot end this discussion, however, without taking note of the ruling made in the main opinion of the decision of the Court of Appeals to the effect that:
Hearing on the motion for reconsideration in question might not even be necessary; it requires mere review of the evidence and the law. No extraneous matter not taken up during the trial need be considered. Section 2 of Rule 37 requires merely that "a written notice of which shall be served by the movant on the adverse party." No law requires hearing on a motion for reconsideration of a decision. It is not essential to due process (Manansala vs. Heras, et al., L-10582, April 30, 1958; Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. vs. Frivaldo, L-14179, Sept. 15, 1960.)
In so far as it is implied in the foregoing that Rule 15 on motions does not indispensably require hearing of motions which by their nature cannot be acted upon by the court ex-parte, the same is definitely not in accordance with the letter and spirit of the rules. The attempt to downgrade the meaning of the term "written notice", as if it meant merely any kind of notice and not necessarily a note of the date of hearing, is pure sophistry. The written notice mentioned in Sec. 2 of Rule 37 refers to the notice defined by Section 4 of Rule 15 thus:
Notice of a motion shall be served by applicant to all parties concerned, at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof, together with a copy of the motion, and of any affidavits and other papers accompanying it. The court, however, for good cause may hear a motion on shorter notice, specially on matters which the court may dispose of on its own motion.
There can be no question, therefore, that the notice required is that of a hearing of the motion and not only of the motion per se. And the statement that no law requires hearing of motions for reconsideration as part of due process, if supported by the cited cases, does not apply to such motions in the ordinary courts, but perhaps only to administrative bodies, as in the Heras case cited. The doctrinal rule in this jurisdiction on the matter under discussion has not been changed since Manakil vs. Revilla, supra. Any ruling in the decision of the Court of Appeals not in line therewith, even with the aid of American authorities, deserves scant consideration.
THE REMEDY IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE RESPONDENT IN THE COURT BELOW IS NOT APPEAL BUT, PRECISELY, THE PETITION BE FILED IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS WITH PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.
Inasmuch as an erroneous choice of remedy in the case of respondent could have fatal consequences, I deem it important to also express my views on the issue of whether or not the respondent had indeed taken the wrong option in immediately going to the Court of Appeals by way of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus instead of appealing. Incidentally, I must confess that the fact that the trial court foreclosed respondent's right to appeal by declaring its decision final and executory complicates the problem.
My considered view is that the starting point of discussion should be from the promulgation of the decision of the trial court. In the face thereof, respondent had three options: (1) to abide by it, (2) to appeal and (3) to take chances of a motion for reconsideration or new trial. Of course, from the point of view of respondent, option (1) was out of the question. In connection with the two other options, I am certain that learned counsel for respondent is not unaware that even in ordinary actions, there are motions for reconsideration that do not suspend the period for appeal, principally, those that do not amount to motions for new trial conforming with Section I and 2 of Rule 37, and by doctrinal rule, motions pro-forma. It cannot be said then that in making his choice of filing the questioned motion for reconsideration counsel was not conscious of the perils of his election of remedy. In this connection, it was not for him to gamble on his opinion of whether or not his motion is pro-forma. Considering specially that this is an election case in which the courts are bound in principle to disdain all dilatory tactics in whatever form they may come, counsel who is learned and experienced in political law matters, particularly, must be deemed to know that respondent stood to gain nothing but time or delay by choosing to file a motion for reconsideration as against an immediate appeal. Under these circumstances, it must be held that if it has turned out that the election of remedy of his counsel was not, in the view of this Court, correctly pursued, he has no one to blame but himself. True, the results of the elections in San Juan go in a sense with the fate of this case. I hasten to add, in this connection, that although election cases are affected with public interest, so much so that stipulations of fact are not allowed therein, on the point, however, as to whether a protest should be filed or not or whether an appeal from an adverse decision of a lower court in such protest should be taken, it is clear that the candidates concerned are deemed to represent the will of the voters who have voted for them and so if no protest is filed or no appeal is taken by the candidate, it is as if the interested voters themselves were the ones who have made the decision. Moreover, as will be presently shown, the statement in the main opinion of this Court that the will of the electorate of San Juan is not violated by the announcement of this electoral case resulting from Our decision is not without basis in the record. Had any doubt crept into my mind as to this point and as to the fullness with which respondent has had his day in court on any material angles of this case, I would have voted differently. As things extant in the record stand, however, I feel safe in conscience that this decision vindicates the truth, the law and, at the same time, the real spirit of the rules of procedure in electoral contests.
The more specific issue to resolve has its setting in the developments related to the order of the trial court denying respondent's motion for reconsideration and declaring its decision final and executory. At this point, was it proper for respondent to have gone, as he did, to the Court of Appeals for the writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus or should he have perfected an ordinary appeal by filing a notice of appeal immediately upon the verbal denial of his verbal motion for reconsideration of the trial court's first order of denial? It would appear, in this connection that one of the considerations that impelled the resort to the Court of Appeals was the theory of respondent, sustained later by the Court of Appeals, that the resolution of his first motion by the trial court was not on its merits but based only on the technicality that the same was not in order not only because such a motion is not allowed in election cases but also because the same was pro-forma and, in any event, it was fatally non-complying with the requirements of service of notice of motions under the Rules of Court. It is my conviction that such a theory lacks sufficient merit.
There is nothing sacrosanct in the language used by judges in the formulation of the dispositive portions of their judgment and orders, even of the most diligent and discriminating of them, particularly, when it is borne in mind that many of our judges are not noted for being precise in their diction, so as to preclude the examination of and reference to the rationalizations and discussions in the bodies of such actuations when questions arise as to the real meaning of such judgments and orders. If there are some recognized judicial pronouncements restricting the reference only to the dispositive parts of judgments, 4 no reason of principle exists why other kinds of orders, such as one resolving a motion for reconsideration, should be subjected to such an iron-clad rule. His Honor did use words susceptible of the interpretation that he did not consider it in order for the court to pass on the merits of respondent's motion for reconsideration, still, upon a reading of the reasons given by him in the same order, no one can escape his expressed view, clearly legible in the order itself, that the grounds of said motion are the same grounds he had previously ruled to be without merit. The implication here is indubitable that by such words His Honor was saying that the grounds of the motion for reconsideration are equally without merit as when firstly they were presented to him. To require a repetition of such conviction in express words is to demand what is clear surplusage.
To go at once to the root of the issue posed by the combined opinion of the respected three majority justices of the Court of Appeals, the mere fact that His Honor apparently qualified the dispositive portion of his questioned order cannot be controlling in the face of the palpable truth self-evident in the "considerandos" of the same order that His Honor did mull and weigh the points and arguments raised by respondent therein and found them to be the self-same points and arguments previously pressed on him with vigor and insistence before he decided the case, ergo, of no more significance, value, weight or merit than when they were first brought to his attention. If this is not passing on the merits, it is hard to conceive what is.
Still, this view does not resolve the issue completely. It only serves to make emphatically clear that something went wrong in respondent's strategy which caused him to be caught in his own trap. The "nagging" question still persists, was there any possibility for the respondent to perfect his appeal after the orders of denial were rendered or issued? Besides, are these orders appealable? At this juncture, it may be stated parenthetically that respondent actually tinkered with a step that, if made on time, would have preserved his right to appeal, the precautionary appeal which he filed on November 19, 1968 and then subsequently withdrew. Had such precautionary appeal been filed on or before November 4, 1968, all subsequent contingencies may not have mattered. But as it is, we are confronted with the stark reality that respondent has not even validly attempted to perfect an appeal. How can mandamus lie to compel the trial court to restore his right to appeal? Indeed, as I see it, as a consequence of his own erroneous choice of remedy from the start, i.e., by filing the motion for reconsideration, respondent sealed his own doom and it is not for this Court to restore to him what he has lost by his own free election. The suggestion that there is here some kind of mistake curable in equity, like fraud, accident and excusable negligence, is definitely off the hook. Counsel's mistake must be suffered by his client, not by the public interest involved.
True, had he filed a notice of appeal with the trial court, chances are that the same would have been disallowed because the court had already declared its judgment final and executory. Naturally, respondent's only recourse is the action he took before the Court of Appeals. He almost succeeded, but since this Supreme Court rules that the decision of the Court of Appeals is erroneous, respondent is in the unenviable position of having rowed into the river of No Return. The decision of the trial court is already final, indeed, it became so on November 5, 1968. The only graceful alternative left for respondent is to bow to it and yield to petitioner the reins of the municipal government of San Juan.
Let it not be said that respondent has lost merely on a technicality and that the election in San Juan is being ended by the courts without fully going into the merits thereof. Such would be an entirely erroneous view of the whole case before Us and a short-sighted one, indeed, if only because whatever merit there is in respondent's cause related to the election contest itself may best be judged by the representations of his counsel, and as the record reveals, nothing counsel contended before the trial court was left unresolved by His Honor on the merits. As a matter of fact, the same questions and issues were raised by counsel twice, and twice His Honor found and held against him. Can there be any clearer resolution of the merits of his basic case?
If it be decried that respondent has been denied his right to appeal, the immediate answer that can be given is that it was not denied to him, he lost it by his own fault. Nor is there reason to lament that this Court could have found enough reason to reverse the decision of the trial court, had, respondent been allowed to appeal. Notwithstanding that, in the manner the case has come to this Court, the merits of the protest itself are not involved, I took pains, as other members of this Court have done, to scan carefully the records, wherein everything counsel for respondent can ever say of said merits already appears, and I am fully convinced that as this case was presented to the court, the final verdict in favor of petitioner can hardly create any doubt as to the final victory of petitioner.
For the record, it is but meet that I explain this feeling of mine as briefly as possible. And what I have to say reassures me of the moral buttresses of my vote. At the same time, by my doing this, those interested will better understand the statement in the main opinion expressive of the satisfaction of all the members of the Court that this decision "does not violate the expressed will of the electorate of San Juan".
Of course, the shortest way to get a full statement of the position of respondent as to merits of his position in the basic electoral contest is thru the motion for reconsideration in question filed by his counsel. Indeed, it can be said that this motion represents the best and all that counsel can ever say on behalf of respondent. I cannot imagine what else the counsel can add to what appears in the said motion and in the various pleadings, motions and memoranda he filed in the courts below which discuss practically the same matters repeatedly. As a matter of fact, it can be safely said that further proceedings here or in the Court of Appeals would serve no one any useful purpose — the net result would only be loss of valuable time for all, to the detriment of public interest.
Now, in respondent's oft-mentioned motion for reconsideration, counsel formulates the following propositions as the basic grounds for reversal of the trial court's decision on the merits:
I. THE COURT ERRED IN REVIEWING, AND ANNULLING THE DECISIONS OF OTHER BRANCHES OF THE SAME COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE IN EXCLUSION CASES;
II. THE COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE SO CALLED "BOYONG" AND "DR. BOYONG" VOTES;
III. THE COURT ERRED IN REJECTING PROTESTEE'S EVIDENCE ON THE TAMPERING OF BALLOTS AFTER REVISION; and
IV. THE COURT ERRED IN THE APPRECIATION OF CERTAIN BALLOTS.1äwphï1.ñët
I shall proceed to examine these four grounds briefly and show that taking them up all together, they are insufficient to overturn the conclusion of His Honor in favor of the petitioner as the one duly elected as mayor of San Juan in the last local elections.
1. The first ground involves 282 votes in favor of petitioner which respondent claims were cast by persons whose registration as voters had been previously ordered cancelled by another court in corresponding exclusion proceedings. On the other hand, petitioner contends that the court that ordered such alleged exclusion acted without or in excess of jurisdiction inasmuch as the voters concerned were not properly notified, apart from the fact that the respective petitions for exclusion were not filed within the period prescribed by law. In answer to this, respondent submits that His Honor had no jurisdiction or power to set aside the order of exclusion aforementioned. The fact of the matter is that the 282 voters concerned were able to vote and they were allowed to vote because when they presented themselves at the proper electoral precincts, their names remained uncancelled in the registry lists of voters and none challenged their right to vote. It would appear that if there were any such alleged order of exclusion, the same had not reached neither the corresponding board of inspectors nor the respective voters. Accordingly, it cannot be said that by recognizing the validity of the 282 votes in question, the trial court set aside the alleged orders for their exclusion. In effect, what His Honor did was merely to hold as legal the votes of the 282 respective voters whose names, from all that appears, were in the permanent list of voters at the time they voted, the said permanent list of voters being conclusive with respect to those entitled to vote in an election. (Dizon v. Cailles, 56 Phil. 695, 699) Par. (f) of Section 176 of the Revised Election Code ordains pertinently the following:
In election contest proceedings, the registry list, as finally corrected by the board of inspectors, shall be conclusive in regard to the question as to who had the right to vote in said election.
2. The 31 ballots claimed by respondent under his third ground for reconsideration were ruled by the trial court to be marked ballots. Respondent apparently does not deny they are marked, his only contention is that he has proven by expert evidence that the marks found thereon were placed by hands other than those of the voters who cast them, as a result of alleged tampering of over four hundred ballots which occurred after the revision by the board of revisors appointed by the court and which precisely was the cause of the reopening of the trial ordered by His Honor in September, 1968. This issue of fact was decided by His Honor who saw the ballots and heard the witnesses adversely to respondent. He gave credence neither to the supposed ocular witnesses nor to the expert. It is very doubtful if His Honor's conclusions in this regard, considering his discussion in the decision of the evidence in question, can be reversed by an appellate court. In any event, as already intimated elsewhere in this concurring opinion, and as will be shown presently, said 31 votes cannot affect the final result.
3. Regarding the 183 so-called "Boyong" votes rejected by the trial court, it is best to consider them together with counsel's contention regarding alleged errors in the appreciation of other ballots committed allegedly by the trial court. On pages 19-22 of the motion for reconsideration, counsel contends that the trial court erred in rejecting some ballots totalling 57 in all. Together with the "Boyong" votes, the total number of allegedly erroneously appreciated ballots claimed by respondent would be 240. The majority of petitioner over respondent arrived at by His Honor is 192 votes. Assuming these 240 votes were erroneously rejected, and even adding to them 31 allegedly tampered ballots, and thus, a total of 271 votes were to be considered favorably to respondent, there would appear, at this point, only a majority of 79 votes in his favor, that is, conceding to him already the so-called Boyong votes which at best are controversial. On the other hand, going over the appreciation of the other questioned ballots made in the decision of the trial court, it appears that His Honor was overly liberal in accepting marked ballots. The following are only the first 24 items resolved by His Honor involving a total of 174 votes purportedly for respondent:
1. In each of Ballots Nos. 181, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 189 and 190 (Precinct No. 15), the printed date 14, 1967 was underlined.
2. In each of Ballot Nos. 200, 201, 203, 204 and 205 (Precinct No. 101) letters "O" were written inside the shaded block of the ballots.
3. Ballot Nos. 160, 161, 169, 170, 171, 172, 174 and 177 (Precinct No. 14) are objected to on the ground that the printed numbers 1 and 8 for Councilors were encircled.
4. Ballot Nos. 194, 196, 197, 198 and 199 (Precinct No. 64) are being objected to on the ground that the printed number 2 for Members of the Provincial Board and the printed number 1 for Councilors were also encircled.
5. Ballot Nos. 188, 189, 190 and 199 (Precinct No. 95) are being objected to on the ground that numbers 1 and 5 for Councilors were likewise encircled, and letter "O" in the printed word "Election" was shaded.
6. In each of Ballot Nos. 201, 202, 216 (Precinct No. 95), the printed numbers 2 and 5 for Councilors were encircled, and likewise, the letter "O" in the printed word "Election" was shaded.
7. Ballot Nos. 216, 217, 218, 220, 221 and 222 (Precinct No. 101), are being objected to on the ground that there is a small "X" appearing on the bottom of the seal of the Republic and at the center bottom of each of the ballots.
8. The protestant is contesting ballot Nos. 210, 211, 212, 213, 214 and 215 (Precinct No. 101) on the ground that there are numbers appearing at the lower portion of the first box intended for the answers to the plebiscite.
9. Ballot Nos. 148, 192, and 206 (Precinct No. 15) and Ballot No. 172 (Precinct No. 101) are being objected to on the ground that the word "Dr" was written on the upper left portion of each of the ballots.
10. Ballot Nos. 206, 207, 208 and 209 (Precinct No. 101) are being objected to on the ground that the letters "SSB" were written after the printed word Senators, while in each of Ballot Nos. 183, 184, and 185 of Precinct No. 95 the initials I.N.C. appear thereof.
11. The protestant is contesting Ballot Nos. 87, 88, 89 and 91 (Precinct No. 14), and Ballot No. 207 of Precinct No. 15 on the ground that there were signs of pesos "P" written in the shaded block of the ballots.
12. The letter "O" appearing in the printed word "Election" and the letter "B" in the printed word "Plebiscite" were shaded in each of Ballot Nos. 218, 220, 224, and 225 (Precinct No. 15).
13. Ballot Nos. 84, 88, 90, 91, 92, 100, 103, 105, 108, 109, 110 and 111 (Precinct No. 15) as well as Ballot Nos. 191 and 192 of Precinct No. 95 are being contested on the ground that the letters "O" of the printed words "Official Ballot" were shaded in each of the ballots.
14. In each of Ballot Nos. 112, 119, 125, 137, 140, 141, 142, 145, 150, 160, 162, and 165 of Precinct No. 15, the printed number 15 of said precinct was encircled.
15. Ballot Nos. 95, 106, 108, 109, 116, 125 (Precinct No. 14), and Ballot No. 187 (Precinct No. 95) bear various numbers above the printed words "Official Ballot" while in Ballot Nos. 127, 128, 130, 131, 134, 136, 137, and 148 (Precinct No. 14), 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, and 168 (Precinct No. 62), number 31 appears above or below the same printed word "Official Ballot".
16. In each of Ballot Nos. 178, 179, and 181 of Precinct No. 95, number 31 was written at the bottom of the ballots; and in each of Ballot Nos. 178 (Precinct No. 14), 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, and 180 (Precinct No. 15) number 31 was written in the lower box for the answer to the Plebiscite.
17. The letter "O" in the printed word "Election" was shaded and the printed number 1 for Councilors was encircled in each of Ballot Nos. 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, and 199 of Precinct No. 101.
18. The letter "O" in the printed words "Official Ballot" were shaded and numbered, were written below the seal of the Republic in each of Ballot Nos. 193, 194, 195, 196, and 197 of Precinct No. 95.
19. The printed precinct number 101 and dated 14 were encircled in each of Ballot Nos. 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, and 193 of Precinct No. 101.
20. The letter "B" was written below the seal of the Republic, the letter "O" of the printed words "Official Ballot" was shaded and the printed words "Governor" and "Mayor" were underlined in each Ballot Nos. 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 145 of Precinct No. 101.
The above-described ballots are valid. The Court is not convinced that there was any fraudulent intent to mark the ballot for the purpose of identifying the same. They are not significant enough to render the ballots marked or invalid.
21. In each of Ballot Nos. 165 (Precinct No. 5), 86 (Precinct No. 28), 70 (Precinct No. 31), the answers to the Plebiscite were underlined. Being isolated cases in their particular precincts, the Court considers these marks as innocent and do not affect the validity of the ballots.
22. Ballot Nos. 92 (Precinct No. 38), 183 (Precinct No. 40), and 46 (Precinct No. 52) were objected to on the ground that there were heavy erasures. The objection of these ballots by the protestant is without merit. The erasures were not made for the purpose of marking the ballots.
23. In the case of Ballot Nos. 196, 197 and 217 (Precinct No. 15), 172 and 179 (Precinct No. 62), 204 (Precinct No. 12) 149 (Precinct No. 14), 118, 189, 191 and 193 (Precinct No. 64), 148, 162, 153, 171, 175, 176, and 177 (Precinct No. 66), and 109 (Precinct No. 26), various initials such as 'N.G.', 'I-C', 'RP', 'F.B.', 'T & T', 'O.A.', 'INC', 'L.P.', 'I.N.C.', 'S.D.A.', 'LXX', 'H.M.H.S', 'LEE' ,'PT', 'L.A.', 'BD', and 'L.S.', were written by the voters on their respective ballots. The Court considers the marks as done innocently and insignificant which do not invalidate said ballots.
24. The names of the candidates were enclosed in parentheses in Ballot No. 69 of Precinct No. 31; Ballot Nos. 157 and 158 of Precinct No. 36; Ballot No. 103 of Precinct No. 56; Ballot No. 114 of Precinct No. 90; and Ballot No. 58 of Precinct No. 73. These parentheses are innocent and irrelevant and do not invalidate the ballots. (Pp. 19-23, Decision of Judge Reyes.)
By standards of the election law and the applicable jurisprudence, these 174 ballots are unquestionably marked ballots and are, therefore, invalid. The pattern of intentional marking appearing on them is so patent and manifest that one has to be very naive to ignore the same. Accordingly, at this point, petitioner would still have a majority of 95 votes over respondent, and speaking generally of the appreciation of the trial court of the remaining questioned ballots whether of the petitioner or the protestant, this number can still increase and cannot be less anymore. Hence, the statement in the main opinion, which is the consensus among the members of the Court that the will of the electorate of San Juan is not violated by this decision can stand all kinds of scrutiny.
I cannot end this concurrence without expressing a sense of great satisfaction and a burning feeling of hope. Source of rightful satisfaction to all who are deeply interested in the prompt effectuation of the popular suffrage in all electoral contests brought to court and the speedy and just administration of justice in this country must be, not only the manner in which this Court has exposed, with corresponding telling reproof, the manifest attempt of private respondent to run rings around the courts in order to delay as much as possible what he must have felt all along would be an ultimately unfavorable outcome of the present electoral contest, but also the resolution this Court adopted of cutting down considerably the period of this review by considering these proceedings as a certiorari rather than as an appeal, to make up, as it were, for the valuable time lost in the courts below, without in the least depriving any of the parties of even a particle of their full day in court and due opportunity to be heard, as likewise, the unanimous vote in this Court to arrest the hand of the respondent court which would, in effect, have extended some form of unintended assistance to the dilatory strategies in this electoral case. Satisfaction indeed, We must feel that in only a little over two weeks, We have succeeded in disentangling a mess that occupied lower courts for much longer periods which must have eaten up the time that the rightful victor and his constituents have lost because of the undue delay this case has suffered, to the great detriment of public interest and the corresponding erosion of the faith of the people in popular government and democratic institutions, even though We have had to go over more volumes of records and pleadings. The light this Court has flashed in this decision is not only the amber light of caution, but the red light of stop to all unscrupulous men who would try to put roadblocks to the fast and proper determination of the true will of the people. My hopes and prayer are fervent that all concerned, particularly, the lawyers and judges manning the lower courts will not, by newer ingenious means and ways, render all our efforts in vain.1äwphï1.ñët
For the rest, the learned and beautifully penned main opinion written by Mr. Justice Sanchez has my full and wholehearted concurrence. Judgment set aside.
Footnotes
1Election Protest 10545, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, entitled "Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Protestant, versus Dr. Braulio Sto. Domingo, Protestee."
2The verbal denial order was confirmed in a written order of the same date, November 25, 1968.
3CA-G.R. 42386-R, Court of Appeals, entitled "Braulio Sto. Domingo, Petitioner, versus Hon. Andres Reyes, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Respondents."
4Nirdone vs. U.S., 308 U.S. 338, 341.
5Section 179, Revised Election Code. See also: Sections 89, 172 to 178, Revised Election Code.
6Section 1, Rule 22, Rules of Court.
716 SCRA 175, 180.
8See: Ong vs. Commission on Elections (1968), 22 SCRA 241, 256-257; Pacis vs. Commission on Elections (1968), 22 SCRA 539, 542; Pedido vs. Commission on Elections (1968), 22 SCRA 1403, 1413; Aguam vs. Commission on Elections (1968), 23 SCRA 883, 887-888; Pacis vs. Commission on Elections (1968), 25 SCRA 377, 389; Solidum vs. Macalalag, L-28666, May 20, 1969.
9Section 1, Article 11 (Declaration of Principles), Constitution.
10See: E.g. Giron vs. Caluag, 8 SCRA 285, 292. See also: Espiritu vs. Municipal Council, 102 Phil. 866; Hebron vs. Reyes, 104 Phil. 175; Buencamino vs. Hernandez, 8 SCRA 483; Palting vs. San Jose Petroleum, Inc., 18 SCRA 924; Co Pek vs. Vivo, 18 SCRA 924, where although the appeals were dismissed for being moot, this Court nevertheless decided the issues on the merits.
11Decision of the trial court, p. 16; emphasis supplied.
12Rollo, Court of Appeals, p. 247.
13Oral arguments on the oral motion for reconsideration of the resolution denying private respondent's motion to reconsider the decision. Rollo, Court of Appeals, pp. 248-249; emphasis supplied.
14Record of Election Case 10545, Court of First Instance of Rizal, p. 55.
15Id., p. 66.
16Id., p. 72.
17Id., p. 95.
18Id., p. 97.
19Id., p. 224.
20Id., p. 279.
21This was admitted by private respondent's counsel in the oral arguments before this Court.
22Valdez vs. Jugo, 74 Phil. 49; "Y" Shipping Corporation vs. Erispe (1967), 20 SCRA 1, 4; Lonaria vs. De Guzman (1967), 21 SCRA 349, 354.
23Board of Election Inspectors vs. Sison, 56 Phil. 914, 917; Eugenio vs. Tan, 84 Phil. 563, 565; Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors Association vs. Court of Industrial Relations (1968), 23 SCRA 492, citing Inchausti & Co. vs. Wright, 47 Phil. 866; Marcelo Steel Corporation vs. Import Control Board, 87 Phil. 374; Palileo vs. Fred Ruiz Castro, 85 Phil. 272; Diokno vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 91 Phil. 608.
24Santiago Labor Union vs. Tabigne, 17 SCRA 286, 287, citing Lupisan vs. Alfonso, 78 Phil. 842; De Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 75 Phil. 824; Morada vs. Caluag, 5 SCRA 1128. See also: Dy Cay vs. Crossfield & O'Brien, 38 Phil. 521, 528; Montalbo vs. Santamaria, 54 Phil. 955, 963; Quianzon vs. Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Norte, 58 Phil. 594, 597; Eugenio vs. Tan, supra; Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors Association vs. Court of Industrial Relations, supra.
25Id.
26Sections 1 and 2, Rule 65, Rules of Court; Pacis vs. Averia (1966), 18 SCRA 907, 914-915, citing cases; Gray vs. Kiungco (1968), 25 SCRA 216, 218, citing Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. vs. Barrios, 79 Phil. 666, 669; Ang Ching Gi vs. De Leon, 79 Phil. 580, 582; Ong Sit vs. Piecio, 78 Phil. 785, 789; Ternate vs. Daza, 76 Phil. 842; Claudio vs. Zandueta, 64 Phil. 812, 819; Westminster Bank vs. Torres, 57 Phil. 422, 425-426; Tayko vs. Capistrano, 53 Phil. 966, 871; Sabado vs. Gonzales, 53 Phil. 770, 777; So Chu vs. Nepomuceno, 29 Phil. 208. 210-211. See also: 3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 143, 159.
27Lucero vs. Dacayo (1968), 22 SCRA 1004, 1007; Gray vs. Kiungco, supra.
28Lidasan vs. Commission on Elections (1968), 22 SCRA 975, 977. See also: Giron vs. Caluag (1963), 8 SCRA 285, 291; Republic vs. Perez (1963), 8 SCRA 337, 342; Harrison Foundry & Machinery vs. Harrison Foundry Workers' Association (1963), 8 SCRA 430, 434, citing cases; De la Cruz vs. Sta. Maria (1963), 7 SCRA 992, 1000.
29Section 178. Revised Election Code; Portillo vs. Salvani, 54 Phil. 543, 550; Querubin vs. Court of Appeals, 82 Phil. 227, 229-230.
30Section 179, Revised Election Code.
31Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc. vs. Quiroz (1966), 16 SCRA 784, 785; Mutuc vs. Commission on Elections (1968), 22 SCRA 662, 665; People vs. Domiguez (1968), 24 SCRA 163, 168; Sotto vs. Mijares, L-23563, May 8, 1969.
32Punzalan vs. Papica, L-13804, February 29, 1960; Pacis vs. Averia, supra, p. 915; Pendon vs. Cabatuando (1968), 25 SCRA 184, 190-191.
33Gavan vs. Wizlizenus, 48 Phil. 632, 636; Dais vs. Court of First Instance, 51 Phil. 396, 403.
DIZON, J.: concurring opinion:
1Election Protest 10545, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, entitled "Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Protestant, versus Dr. Braulio Sto. Domingo, Protestee."
2The verbal denial order was confirmed in a written order of the same date, November 25, 1968.
3CA-G.R. 42386-R, Court of Appeals, entitled "Braulio Sto. Domingo, Petitioner, versus, Hon. Andres Reyes, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Respondents."
BARREDO, J.: concurring:
1Per Alonzo v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315.
2Per Alonzo v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315.
3The correct concept of an omnibus motion is defined in Sec. 8 of Rule 15. It is that of a motion attacking any pleading or proceeding, and is called omnibus because it is deemed to contain all available objections, such that any objection not specified therein is considered waived.
4To the mind of the writer, the constitutional provision to the effect that "No decision shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based" (S. 12, Art. VIII) has necessarily modified the doctrinal rule that the dispositive part of a judgment is "the final order of disposition and actual adjudication of the rights litigated" and must prevail over the findings and holdings in the opinion part of the judgment, since the latter "is merely an opinion ordering nothing." (2 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., p. 194, citing cases.) If this constitutional requirement has any significance and purpose at all, it is to insure that all judgments are accordingly supported by the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the court. Such being the case, it stands to reason, that whenever there is any problem or question raised as to the meaning and extent of a judgment, it is best that resort be made to the conclusions and findings appearing in the decision itself. In other words, it is now permissible, by implication from the Constitution, to get the true meaning and intent of any portion of a judgment from a consideration of its entirety and not of the dispositive part alone. (De Ralla v. Dir. of Lands, 83 Phil. 491.)
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