Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-21623             April 30, 1966
RIZAL SURETY and INSURANCE COMPANY, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Gil R. Carlos and Associates for plaintiff-appellant.
Macaranas, Enaje and Opeña Jr., for defendants-appellees.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On March 16, 1962, Cargill, Inc. shipped on board the vessel "SS EURYALUS/EURADAMAS" at New Orleans, Louisiana, consigned to the Superior Feed Mills, Inc. in Manila, 6,000 sacks of soybean meals weighing 604,481 lbs. which was insured with the Rizal Surety & Insurance Company. Upon arrival of the shipment it was unloaded and placed under the custody of the Manila Port Service, which is a subsidiary of the Manila Railroad Company. When the cargo was subsequently delivered to the consignee, it was found that 106 sacks were shortweighed by 7,526 lbs. by reason of which the surety company paid to said consignee their value amounting to P1,158.93. As a consequence, the insurance company filed a claim with both the vessel and the arrastre operator for reimbursement of said amount and when both refused it instituted the present action on March 13, 1963 before the Court of First Instance of Manila making as alternative defendants the Delgado Shipping Agencies, Inc., agent of the vessel that brought the shipment, on one hand, and the Manila Railroad Company and Manila Port Service, on the other, seeking to recover from either the value of the short-delivered cargo in the amount of P4,158.93, with legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint, plus attorney's fees, and the costs of action.
Defendants Manila Railroad Company and Manila Port Service filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction for the reason that the action is not one of admiralty and the amount sought to be recovered is not more than P2,000.00 thereby placing it within the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court. The court a quo granted the motion stating that since the action is based on the arrastre contract and the amount involved is less than P5,000.00 it has no jurisdiction over the case.
Plaintiff interposed the present appeal.
Considering that the action against Delgado Shipping Agencies, Inc. is one of admiralty and belongs to the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance while the action against the Manila Port Service and the Manila Railroad Company is based on the arrastre contract which because of the amount involved, comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court, can the instant case be taken cognizance of by the former upon the theory that both defendants are sued in the alternative?
The answer must be in the affirmative bearing in mind that the cause of action against the alternative defendants arises out of the same transaction which is the recovery of the value of the lost merchandise and the nature of the loss could not be determined at the moment. This view finds support in Section 5 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 5. Joinder of causes of action.—Subject to rules regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties, a party may in one pleading state, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party (a) if the said causes of action arise out of the same contract, or transaction or relation between the parties, or (b) if the causes of action are for demands for money, or are of the same nature and character.
In the cases falling under clause (a) of the preceding paragraph, the action shall be filed in the inferior court unless any of the causes joined falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, in which case it shall be filed in the latter court.1äwphï1.ñët
In the cases falling under clause (b) the jurisdiction shall be determined by the aggregate amount of the demands, if for money, or by their nature and character, if otherwise.
As may be seen, the instant case comes within the purview of the rule abovequoted for therein it is postulated that a party may in one pleading state in the alternative as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party if they arise from the same transaction with the particularity that the case may be filed in the Court of First Instance if any of said causes of action falls exclusively within its juridiction. This is precisely what was done in this particular case. Because of the uncertainty of the place where the disappearance of the shipment occurred, plaintiff brought the case in the alternative before the court of first instance upon the theory that it may have occurred while the shipment was in transit or while in the custody of the arrastre operator.
This case also finds support in International Harvester Company of the Philippines vs. Aragon, et al., 84 Phil., 363. In said case, the complaint was filed in the municipal court against both the shipping company as agent of the vessel on which the shipment was loaded and the Manila Terminal Company, Inc. as alternative defendants, seeking to recover the sum of P200.00 as value of undelivered goods, it being uncertain whether said cargo was lost at sea or while in storage at the Port of Manila. In affirming the dismissal of the case this Court stated that the municipal court had no jurisdiction over the same because it is predicated on the contract of carriage by sea which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court of first instance. And reasoning by analogy, we may say that the instant case also falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila upon the theory that the loss or disappearance of a portion of the shipment may have taken place during the voyage and hence it involves a maritime case which falls within the original jurisdiction of said court. The fact that the amount sought to be collected is less than its jurisdictional limit is of no moment, because the cause of action being indivisible, covering as it does laws on ordinary as well as maritime contract, such jurisdictional limitation as to amount must yield to the greater jurisdiction of the court as to subject matter for reasons of expediency and convenience.
Constitutional and statutory provisions conferring jurisdiction on the inferior courts of demands below certain amounts do not forbid determination of said demands in the superior court where they are connected with larger claims or with a type of demand solely within the jurisdiction of the superior court. (21 C.J.S., p. 81, Emphasis supplied)
Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and the case is ordered remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. No costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
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